LETTER TO HONORABLE MCGEORGE BUNDY FROM W. F. RABORN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400150009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 25, 1965
• Content Type: LETTER

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s-s'cyz
25 August 1965
The attached paper was prepared in response
to my request for a better understanding of the
fundamental differences between fndia and Pakistan.
All of this is probably "old hat" to you, but
I hope you will find this summary interesting.
Sincerely,
(Shed)' it RED '
W. Ir. Raborn
Honorable McGeorge .mod
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.
WFR /mfb
(-I-C---O - ER w/cy attch
c - DCI White Hs. file w/cy attch
lcc - Abbot Smith for info - no attch.
lcc - DCI official chrono - no attch.
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k
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
18 August 1965
1. Indo-Pakistani hostility. Hindu-Muslim antagonisms go back
for centuries; they were seriously aggravated when India and Pakistan
became separate countries in 1947. Since then the strongest motive
force in Pakistani foreign policy has been the desire for security
against the assumed threat of Indian domination. India, larger and
stronger, has seen little need to improve relations, and has only
rarely tried to do so. Pakistan's policies towards other countries
have been heavily influenced by what such countries could and would do
to help it against India; India's choice of friends has reflected its
judgment as to who would support India against Pakistan, and, more
recently, against Communist China.
2. Despite their antagonisms, India and Pakistan have been able --
or forced by the pressure of events ?-- to resolve some of their mutual
problems. They were able, on their own, to divide up the fiscal assets
as well as the administrative and military machinery of former British
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India. In 1960, after a long and difficult series of negotiations,
they agreed on a satisfactory distribution of the Indus River valley
waters. The prospects of very substantial benefits (large dams, canals,
other engineering projects to be built by several Western powers) plus
strong pressures by those powers led to the agreement.
3. However, the Kashmir dispute remains unsolved and virulent.
Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, but its Hindu ruler opted to join
India at the time of independence. Karachi claims (probably correctly)
that the Kashmiris would vote to join Pakistan in a free election. It
initially tried to seize the area, but failed. Since 1948 it has
exerted numerous diplomatic efforts, in the UN and elsewhere, to make
good its claims. The US, the UK, and other powers have exerted
considerable effort and pressure on the two disputants in a series of
futile efforts.to get an agreement. Recently there has been consider-
able fighting on the cease fire line as well as new Pakistani efforts
to start a guerrilla uprising there.
4. Pakistan's search for security: (1) CENTO and SEATO.
Pakistan, fearing India, first turned to the West for protection. The
US, seeking to implement its "containment" policy, was organizing a
chain of alliances around the borders of the USSR. Pakistan seized
upon this as a means of security. Military aid, provided by the US
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for the pprpose of resisting Communist aggression, was accepted by
Pakistan primarily as a means of deterring any aggressive Indian
received nearly one billion dollars in military assistance from the
us, It had, until 1962, generally close working relations with the
West and hostile ones with the Communist powers.
designs. Pakistan signed an arms agreement pact with the US in 1953,
and joined SEATO in 19511. and CENTO in 1955. From 1954 to 1961+, it
armed forces large enough to deal with both Pakistan and China.
in October 1962, the Chinese army inflicted a humiliating defeat on
the Indians. India then embarked on a policy of major military
expansion, enlarging its army from 550,000 to over 900,000. It
began a program leading to self sufficiency in the production of
large quantities of tanks, artillery, aircraft, etc. It received
commitments of large amounts. of military. aid from both the US and the
USSR. New Delhi describes its efforts as aimed solely at preventing
Communist Chinese aggression. However, it clearly` intends to have
5. India: 1962 and the search for security from China.
Though angered by Pakistan's Western alliances, India did not
initially feel itself threatened by its smaller neighbor. However,
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6. Pakistan's search for securit : (2) China. This Indian
military buildup badly frightened Karachi. It believes that the
strengthened Indian army is aimed not only against China, but against
Pakistan as well. In fact, substantial elements of the Indian armed
forces are deployed toward the borders of Pakistan rather than China.
Since 1962, President Ayub has gone out of his way to establish good
relations with China as a counter to increasing Indian strength. At
the same time Pakistan's relations with the US have worsened. None-
.theless it.still remains formally allied with the USI
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and continues to receive major
US military and economic assistance.
7. Outlook: Indian-Pakistani hostility is likely to persist,
.and the Kashmir dispute will almost certainly continue to prove
intractable. Indeed, tensions which have been aggravated by recent
crises in the Rann of Kutch and in Kashmir are likely in the immediate
future to continue at a heightened level. While a major war between
the two countries is more likely than at any time since 19+8, we
believe that it will probably be averted. But the policy of the two-
nations will continue to be primarily determined by their fear of and
hostility towards one another, and not by Cold War issues.
8. India is determined to acquire the military hardware it
feels it needs. In 1964, it received a US commitment of $100 million
worth of aid for each of the next five years, and it will not wish
to jeopardize this commitment by any falling-out with the US.
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Indian hostility toward and fear of China, also make it desirous of
maintaining friendly relations with the US. At the same time, India
will seek to maintain good relations with the USSR which has already
furnished SAMs, tanks, and the facilities for building Mig 21s, and
which is considering furnishing four submarines. In addition, India
looks to the USSR as a counterweight to Chinese pressures against
Indian borders.
9. So long as Pakistan continues to estimate that it cannot
count on US support and influence to restrain Indian hostility, so
long will it continue to be friendly with China
which it will see
/
-as the only available force that can bring pressure against India.
Pakistan almost certainly realizes that it has no real possibility
of getting meaningful economic or military assistance from Peiping
and only a small chance of receiving aid from Moscow. Moreover,
Ayub Khan, though perhaps not certain of his advisers, would be
reluctant.to break Pakistan's ties with the West. But all Pakistanis
regard the Indian problem as their paramount one.
10. In this situation, some US policy aims will certainly be
frustrated. In particular, there is no chance whatever in the
foreseeable future of getting Pakistan and India to cooperate in
mutual efforts against the Communist bloc. It will even be difficult
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for the US to remain friendly at the same time with two countries
so hostile to each other. Each is capable of choosing to forego
American aid rather than yield to direct pressure on matters it
deems of vital national interest. Nevertheless, US aid, both
military and economic, will continue to be highly desired by both
countries. A continuing willingness to provide assistance would
in all likelihood continue to give the US some leverage on the policy
of the respective countries.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
25X
ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman
00150009-5