PROBABLE REACTIONS OF CERTAIN ASIAN COUNTRIES TO A POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION PERTAINING TO B-52 BASING AND OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400150003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 14, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
DATE: 13 Dee 1965
The attached Memorandum was prepared at your request. We
are distributing it to Messrs. Helms, Fitzgerald, Cline,
R.J. Smith., and de Silva, and to no one else.
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TS# 185905-b
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
13 December 1965
SUBJECT: PROBABLE REACTIONS OF CERTAIN ASIAN COUNTRIES TO A
POSSIBLE US MILITARY ACTION
To estimate probable reactions to possible US use of Thai,
Philippine, and GRC airfields as bases for B-52 operations against
enemy targets in North or South Vietnam.
1. Thailand. For the past year or so, bases in Thailand
have been used for US air strikes against Pathet Lao/DRV forces
throughout Laos. For the most part, these operations have been
carried out with the knowledge and consent of Thai leaders, who
view the survival of a non-Communist Laos as essential to the
security of Thailand. At the same time, however -- and despite
a clearcut commitment to the anti-Communist cause -- Thai leaders
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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provoking Communist China and irritating the USSR and the left-
leaning Afro-Asian states. Domestically, they are concerned over
possible public charges of teadyirg to the Americans and incurring
unnecessarily the danger of retaliatory air attacks by the Chinese
Communists.
2. The increased publicity given in recent months to
Thailand-based, US air strikes in the Laos panhandle and to the
prospect of their intensification and the introduction of US ground
combat forces to the area has made the Thai leaders even more
sensitive on the issue of US bases. Under these circumstances,
US efforts to initiate B-52 operations, which would inevitably be
highly visible, would probably be opposed by the Thai government
at this time. Though Thai assent could ultimately be gained, the
negotiating process would draw heavily on US political capital
and would involve substantial costs in terms of increased military
and economic assistance.
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3. If targets in North Vietnam were involved in addition
to those in the South, the Thai leaders would fear intensification
of the Peking-supported subversive campaign recently commenced at
low levels in northeastern Thailand, and would estimate the
chances of overt Chinese military action against Thailand to
have increased. They would thus be more reluctant to agree to
attacks on North Vietnam than to attacks on the South.
4. The Philippines. Under the terms of an informal agree-
went, the US would have an obligation to notify the Government of
the Philippines of the use of Clark ?Field or ether US bases there
for direct air attacks on Vietnam. Whether or not this agreement
is legally binding, the US would, for practical purposes, have to
have Philippine consent. President-elect Marcos has indicated
that he is willing to work closely with the US in Southeast Asian
security matters and he would probably not be personally opposed.
He would probably calculate that such operations, whether against
North or South Vietnam, would not involve a serious threat of
retaliation against the Philippines.,
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5. Nevertheless, Marcos would probably be unwilling to give
the green light to the US move before he judged that his political
position vis-a-vis the Philippine Congress -- upon which the
success of his administration will largely depend -- had been
established; and this could take several months. Marcos would
be especially concerned over the impact of the B-52 proposal on
influential congressmen and journalists who now oppose plans to
dispatch a Philippine combat force of 2,000 men to South Vietnam.
Adverse public reaction, on the other hand., would probably not
be an important factor in any delay, though Marcos would probably
expect small-scale leftist protest demonstrations in Manila.
6. GRC. The Government of the Republic of China (GRC)
would probably welcome the use of its air bases by US B-52s for
operations against either North or South Vietnam. The government
would construe the move as a further indication of US determination
to stop the Communists in East Asia. It would also see it as an
action which would certainly put the US in even more bitter
opposition to Communist China and which could, before long, lead
to war between the two. Taipei would consider that both of these
eventualities would favor its own objectives. The GRC would also
take this occasion to press the US for more military ha:t'dMiwoo
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7. Outside the government, especially among the Taiwanese
population, there would probably be some apprehension that US use
of the, airfields would expose Taiwan to retaliation by Peking.
However, any popular opposition that did develop could easily be
controlled by the government.
8. Chinese Communist Reactions. Attacks on Vietnam by
B-52s from bases in Thailand or the Philippines would provoke a
new outbreak of propaganda from Pelting. The US would be denounced
for this further extension of its aggressive warfare; the two
countries would be denounced as Asian puppets of imperialism,
permitting the use of their territory for attacks against other
Asians. Propaganda of this sort would have some effect in the
world, most especially if the bases were used for attacks on North
Vietmm. It is possible that Chinese subversive efforts in north-
eastern Thailand would be stepped up, though we believe that such
acceleration could not be very rapid or effective.
9. Use of Taiwan bases might stir the Chinese Communists to
some sort of low-risk military reprisal: shelling of the Offshore
Islands, or harassment of GRC shipping and air activity in the
western Taiwan Strait. We do not think that their reaction would
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go beyond this, or that their response within Vietnam would be
influenced by the bases from which US air attacks were launched.
However, the US use of Taiwan bases would confirm the Chinese
Communists in their belief -- already strongly held -- that
Taiwan is nothing but an outpose of US power, threatening the
security of China itself. They would be fortified in their
conviction that Taiwan presents for them a problem which can
be solved only 1~7 bringing it under Peking's control. We do not
believe that they would attempt to accomplish this in the near
future, for they would recognize that their capabilities for
such an enterprise are at present inadequate. They would never-
theless be reinforced in their feeling that in the long run war
between themselves and the US is virtually inevitable.
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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