THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UK AND FRG CONCERNING MILITARY ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400140011-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 8, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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S. E 1~A I~ J l E.:ert,i.o ROW"
8 November 1966
MORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CEtdTRA.L INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: The Current Negotiations With the UK and FRG
Concerning Military Issues
Problems of equitable burden sharing which arose between the UK and
FRG and the US and FRG have now led, in the current tripartite negotiations,
to a broad review' of allied strategy and force requirements. The scope
and importance of this agenda suggest that in fact what these talks are
about is the future American role in 3-rope. The central questions
raised are whether the post-1945 pattern of our involvement with Western
Europe's security would be, and should be, changed by a reduction in
American forces stationed there.
This paper does not deal directly with the immediate technical issues,
on which much staff work is already being done. Instead, it is-an attempt
to see this episode in inter-allied relations in some historical perspec-
tive, to define political forces at work which will affect the future
conduct of our allies and of the Soviet Bloc, and to suggest how our
interests might be affected by a. move at this time to redefine the
American military role in Europe.
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Eu
rope Today, Soviet Policy, and the American Interest
The goals which American policy set itself in Europe in the early
postwar period have been achieved in large measure. Western Europe has
not been attacked, and in recent years even the veiled threats of Soviet
attack faced earlier have ceased. Internal Communist forces have declined
greatly in potency. The crippled societies of 1945 recovered confidence
behind the American shield, with the result that disintegrating forces
were contained and moderate and constructive elements were able to
dominate the politics of the recovery period. Rapid economic growth
followed, and for the first time in Europe's history the benefits began
to be more widely shared. In addition, American influence helped to
foster the European unity movement, and this, together with NATO, provided
a framework for reintegrating West Germany into Europe as a respectable
and responsible state.
It was foreseen that the recovery of strength and pride in Europe
would produce some resentment of the vastly disproportionate power of
the US and of its predominant weight in the Alliance. Not only has
this happened, but in recent years many Europeans have had an increasing
sense of not being master in their own house. This feeling has been
sharpened by fears of an American investment invasion fueled with vast
resources and technological supremacy, by American pressures for greater
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military effort under American revisions of strategic doctrine, and by
appeals for active support of American policy in other areas, notably
in Asia. American "leadership," once called for to heal Europe's sick-
ness, has often, when it was actually provided, been received as unpalatable
medicine. De Gaulle, in the French manner, has elevated such discontents
into a general theory and made them the basis of a policy which categor-
ically repudiates the present American role in Europe. This policy has
produced an organizational crisis in the Alliance.
The voices of discontent have found some echo in West Germany, always
hitherto the "staunchest" of American partners in Europe. There, economic
strains, American pressure for offset payments, and concern that Allied
policy was moving toward acceptance of an indefinitely divided Germany
have combined with weak leadership to produce some political disarray.
For the first time in the postwar period, the barometer of German American
relations has tended to register heavy weather.
Some of the distemper in European American relations arises from a
revised view of Soviet policy which has gained wide credence in recent
years. Since 1962, when the Soviets allowed the Berlin "crisis" to fade
away in the aftermath of the Cuban confrontation, the USSR has refrained
from crude pressures under military threat. The main theme of its policy
has been European security, that,is, settlement and stabilization on the
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basis of the status quo in Germany. There is a strong desire in Western
Europe to believe that stable and increasingly constructive relations with
the East are possible, and no great desire to allow this vision to be
aborted by claims of the Germans to the unity of their country. A mood
that looks forward to enjoying the fruits of Western Europe's growing
productivity, without further intrusion of the alarms, excursions, and
costs of cold war, inevitably makes the burdens of NATO, a military
alliance built on the assumption that there was a real threat of Soviet
attack, harder to bear.
It is natural that by now questions should also begin to be raised
in this country about the American role in Europe. Do we really need
large military forces there more than two decades after the end of
World War II? Are the costs acceptable in view of Europe's prosperity
and American burdens elsewhere? Are there not persuasive indications
that the USSR no longer poses a "threat" to Western Europe? The answers
to these questions naturally give some difficulty in the context of
domestic politics. They are easier if sought in terms of the long-
range interests of the United States as aworld power.
It is a cliche, but still valid, to declare that the alignment of
Western Europe in world politics remains vital for us. There is some
tendency nowadays to think of that area as parochial, withdrawn in
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weariness from the balance of power game, and there is much in the
European mood that supports this. But this area is still the most power-
ful concentration of productive forces outside the US and USSR. Historically,
its political dynamism has been formidable. To consign it to the backwaters
of world politics, to assume a, quiet Europe at peace with itself and with-
drawn from struggles that proceed elsewhere, would probably not be a sound
wager on the future.
The USSR clearly does not think that all power struggles in Europe
are over, despite its relative passivity on European issues in recent
years. The Soviets desisted from gross pressures after 1962 because
they understood at last the great risks involved, and because they
realized finally that pressures would not rupture but only consolidate
the Western Alliance and the American presence in Europe. They have
seen in recent frictions in European -American relations an opportunity
to pursue by other means their main objective of excluding American
power and influence from that area. The emphasis on detente in Europe,
on an all- ropean security settlement made without American participation,
aims at disrupting the Atlantic connection and at moving Western Europe
toward a more neutral position in world politics. The Federal Republic
would continue to be treated as a pariah, held in contemptuous isolation
until it produced politicians who saw the light and were willing to come
to terms with Soviet power. Thus a Soviet "threat" continues to exist in
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the sense that, even though the USSR does not for the present menace
Western Europe with armed attack, its basic strategy is still to
separate Western Europe from America, and thereby greatly to diminish
both as power factors.
It would be absurd to suggest that this Soviet vision of a vast
shift in the world balance of power is, because of current frictions
within the Western Alliance, even remotely near realization. The
dominant political forces in Western Europe today are still, despite
concern over some American policies, generally committed to the view
that an Atlantic coalition under American _Leadership is essential to
their interests. De Gaulle's doctrines have for the most part been
taken as too much an expression of personal idiosyncracy and French
particularism. His nomination of himself to lead a third-force European
coalition has not won general acclaim; the division in NATO is still
i to 1.
On a long view, however, American policy cannot afford to be com-
placent about Europe. This country has a role to play as a world power,
while Western European states now define their interests largely in
regional terms; this difference in angle of vision will inevitably strain
relations from time to time. After two world wars, moreover, Europeans
incline to stand aside from ideological struggles on a world scale, and
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to confront no power challenge unless it is visibly at their own gates.
At the same time, the European unity movement appears to have stagnated,
and the Sau_1..1ist impulse to a revival of nationalism makes it impossible
to preclude a reversion to intra-Buropean quarreling. And there can be
no doubt that the Soviets stand ready still to exploit whatever divisions
may develop within Europe, and between Europe and the US.
Altogether, while the condition of Europe and of Atlantic relations
today do not give grounds for alarm, there is reason for attentive concern.
Because any a toward developments on this front have such a vital bearing
on world power relations, and ultimately on American security, there is
always reason for special sensitivity. It will be in the American interest
for a. long time to come to give highest priority to Erarope, to its security
and internal order, and to the preservation of our influence there, however
heavy the burdens and intense the preoccupations elsewhere.
Issue in the Alliance
The question posed in connection with the tripartite negotiations
is whether the American stake in Europe and in good Atlantic relations
would be prejudiced by a significant reduction in American forces. Or,
given the condition of Europe described above, is this the moment when
some partial military disengagement can be undertaken with tolerable risk?
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There is no way of defining exactly what amount of cut in American
forces would now be viewed as "significant" by the allies. Clearly there
is some degree of further modest drawdown which would be understood,
even if not with full sympathy, as owing to the demands of the Vietnam
war and to the balance of payments problem; such a cut would not be
construed as a turning point in US policy toward Europe which confronted
the allies with a new situation. Equally there is some larger scale of
cutback which would be so construed. Very likely this would be true of
any cut large enough to effect really meaningful savings for the US,
It is also possible, perhaps likely, that s,. lesser cut would be t en
as a portent of a larger one to follow. In any case, what is worth
discussing is a cut, whatever its magnitude, which did lead the Europeans,
and perhaps the Soviets as well, to conclude that American policy toward
Europe was changing direction and that we intended to lessen our involve-
ment there. It is not necessary to discuss reactions to a belief that
we intended simply to abandon our European interest and commitment
entirely, since nobody would be likely to infer that.
It should also be said that, whatever meaning Europeans might attach
to a reduction they took to be significant, their views would probably
be little affected by reasons the might give or by public relations
manipulation. European opinion-makers are notoriously skeptical of
official truth, and most sophist.cated people would prefer to believe
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the "real reasons" which would surely be provided by numerous articulate
commentators. At present, when many people find in the Vietnam war a
welcome pretext for disenchantment with American policy and for dis-
trusting the credibility of American official utterances, even very
sound and defensible explanations would be likely to encounter heavy
going. The various liabilities of American policy in Europe described
above are a political-psychological reality of the present moment.
Since, as will be argued below, the political effects of a force cutback
provide the main ground of concern, it would be well to recognize that
at present our ability to influence the rin::,truction which Europex
opinion puts on our policies is less than it has been.
Security Implications
The most obvious question raised by a proposal to reduce US forces
is whether Western Europe would be exposed to significantly increased
risk of Soviet attack. It is also the easiest to answer.
It is extremely doubtful that the Soviets at any time' in the
postwar period seriously entertained the idea of achieving their objectives
in Western Europe by actual military attack. At various times they
threatened war if certain limited demands were not met, primarily con-
cerning Berlin. In the early postwar years they probably believed that
such threats against a weakly defended Western Europe, together with the
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considerable subversive potential they then had there, might cause Western
will to fail, and that such a demonstration of Soviet power might, as new
demands were added, lead on to a general collapse. In the late 50's,
under a carefully-fostered impression that they had achieved a decisive
power advantage in nuclear-rocket weapons, they revived the same technique
of assault by intimidation, and again they failed. The Soviets have
evidently learned that it is not possible to advance in Western Europe on
the cheap, that is, by a mere show of intimidating power.
The Soviets pulled back from actual attack primarily, no doubt,
because they co,,,Od not foresee the consequences and judged the likely
costs of a major war to be unacceptable. There is another reason that
ought not to be underestimated. Soviet history shows that under this
regime there are serious political-ideological inhibitions against resort
to naked aggression. Advances for Communist power are supposed to be
won by indigenous revolutionary action. Even if the Soviet leadership
might in some circumstances bring itself to overlook this nicety, it
would have to be concerned about the reactions of the Soviet people in
a major war brought on at Soviet initiative.
There is every reason to believe that the grounds the Soviets had
for refraining from direct attack in the past still apply, and would
apply even if American forces in Europe were considerably reduced, prob-
ably even if they were withdrawn entirely. The Soviets know that the
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US considers it vital to its own security that Communist power not engulf
Western Europe. They would understand that overt aggression by them would
unleash a train of events carrying the highest risk of general nuclear war.
Their conduct over the last two decades proves that they intend to stand
well back from that contingency.
Soviet Policy in the Wake of a Force Cut
It is possible, of course, that the Soviets would think that a US
force withdrawal meant that Atlantic links were weakening, that if they
pushed once again. with tactics of intim l.daT%io. the Western Alliance would
prove fragile, and that they could then register some demonstrative gain,
say, finally at Berlin, which would prove to all the world that the
relations of power had shifted. This seems extremely unlikely. Any
American force cutback would no doubt be accompanied by elaborate mutual
pledges of continued firmness within the Western Alliance. More important,
the Soviets would know that the US would be highly sensitive to any new
Soviet moves to exploit the situation. They would probably expect, in
fact, that the American response to any opening gambit by them would be
so vigorous as to preclude the nicely modulated development of a "crisis"
situation under their control.
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This is not to say that at some later time the Soviets might not
come to think that a reduced American posture in Europe invited a renewal
of pressure tactics. But this would not arise from the altered force
equation as such. It would result from their reading of the general
drift of European-American relations; they might infer that a really
divisive loss of mutual confidence among the Alllc!s made effective re-
sistance to new demands unlikely. Since the Soviet style is somewhat
heavy-handed, there could be no guarantee that they would not act in
this manner at some stage.
The scenario they would at first consider more promising would be
entirely different. They would activate their diplomacy and propaganda
to persuade Western Europe that, with the US beginning to disengage,
new possibilities for detente on a European basis were opening up. Some
withdrawal of Soviet forces would occur to document this trend. Cultural
exchanges and economic relations would be expanded wherever-possible to
provide symbolism. Plausible security undertakings would be offered,
and these would, of course, at least imply recognition of the status quo
in Germany. Efforts would be made to give the communiques issuing from
the meetings of statesmen an anti-American nuance. The object of all this
would be to commit influential political elements in Western Europe to the
view that American power was no longer needed there, and that its final
departure could be viewed with equanimity. The Soviets would also hope
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that discreet cultivation of European American dissensions that might
arise would help to accelerate a process of political-military disengage-
ment.
The Soviets are not fools enough to believe that such a campaign
could achieve quick or easy success. But they would grind away at it
so long as the auspices were favorable. The assets they could bring
to bear would include their political-subversive apparatus in the West.
In the political climate the Soviets would be trying to engender, the
Communist parties would have greatly improved chances of escaping from
their chronic isolation, and united front tactics might work to con-
siderably better effect than heretofore. Success would obviously depend
on bringing a fairly wide spectrum of non-Communist opinion to the view
that the situation in Europe was changing in a fundamental way which
called for new departures in both internal and external policy.
All this is a very large order and the Soviets would have their
work cut out for them, even if European-American relations deteriorated
markedly in the wake of force reductions. it would be the extent of
deterioration over some considerable period which would determine the
measure of their opportunity.
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Repercussions in the Alliance
Thus, the eventual reaction of the European allies to what they saw
as a significant change in American military policy would be crucial. It
is unlikely that there would be any immediate general alarm about the
security of the area. Fear of actual Soviet attack is now minimal.
Sophisticated opinion would realize that the full weight of US power
remained committed by the forces which remained, and would believe also
that the US, which has borne the burdens of global struggle in other less
vital areas, could not in its own interest be indifferent to the fate of
Europe. Some recriminatory voices would no doubt be loud, and De Gaulle
would help to magnify them, but they would probably not be determining for
the attitudes of Allied governments. There might be some initial confusion,
but it would probably be manageable.
It would be the long pull which would matter. Politicians, like
investors, discount the future. However the force cuts were justified,
there would be some sense that American resources were overstrained, or
that some shift of priorities in American policy, presumably toward Asia
and away from Europe, was taking place. Over time this could mean still
less inclination to support American policy in other areas or to accept
American leadership on matters that did not immediately involve the
security of Europe.
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A military alliance almost never collapses all at once; it dies
away by degrees as the participants sense that the original premises
that bound them have lost validity. Ultimately, and this would be
especially true if US policy encountered reverses elsewhere and the
general view held of the relations of power should become less advan-
tageous to the US than at present, the basic alignment of Western Europe
could be affected. A gradual shift of perspective might at some critical
juncture lead Western European states to adopt the view that the USSR
was after all the only first class power relevant to Europe's arrange-
ments, and to begin to accommodate thei7 s