LETTER TO THE HONORABLE WILLIAM F. RABORN, JR. FROM GEORGE W. BALL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400130023-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: January 16, 1966
• Content Type: LETTER

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SEC RET
State Department review completed
January t'~,
Dear Red:
sr ~[ft cor.-
Secretary McNamara and I have beer giving
sideration to the alternatives we will cordror t; if wi -can{ rue to
get. no respon se, or get a. '1.eariy :negative r spar s - , r n c resent
diplomatic efforts. To assist S in this 7< :-':.1df-ra'..? ind ter
the use of the President, we wou. d like your assessm- nt, :ing
ONE only, of two basic possible -'ases:
I. Resumption of the Bombing
U. Deferral of Resumption
Case I would involve three hypothetical choices:
A. Resumption on. the previous targeting pattern only,
with road and rail nee in the northwest a.r~d northeast hit
up to defined limits from the Chinese t ord i , ?4=.ith no
strikes within the Hanoi and Haiphong l rim tern.
B. The same. plus strikes on major military targets,
notably POL and electric power installations, within the Hanoi
and Haiphong perimeters, where thi; ^ar he dote without
major civilian casualties.
C. As in A and B, jAM mining of Haiphong harbor and
the two lesser ports tc the north.
For all three case:,, it should be assumed that SAM sites would
be struck as necessary to carry out the. program without unaccep able
The Honorable
William F. Raborn, Jr. ,
Director of Central Intelligence.
CRBT ....,_ ~.
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SECRET
_2-
lasses, and that airf=.elds would be struck i; but only if. hostile
air action became a siantfi-ant irnpedim tL t".E out
of the program.
The basic questicr, would be the r'eactici I the Cornrnuri z`.
powers ai'A of important r.on-Comm'wuf.t r Itions tc, such progra.rn.3.
However, we believe ~'~??~ a t aiso i cl p ? o-. ( gi' .~Otre ass's ;_
meat of the military of e ;; of U,ese prc lr'-.am or the, North
Vietnamese military effort in the south, :i.rd ttic sh.c)uid be i:icla yd.
Case IrL speaks for its elf and irvci.z the q estions;
including of course the i+uestior. whether zox.-resumpticr would
permit significantly greater DRV military a,. fJorl directed aga. rrt
the South.
I leave it to yo w :hethier the twc Ca e 3 1 covered in
the same paper. SLicE oUl assessmer t;s appear to depend an ar
initial e`.raiuatiou of the basic positions c4 4 iar1:.., Peiping, and
Moscow, and the attitudes in non-Communist c ...tr ey, as thesc
factors have new evolved during the paus~, it rrici_pt CE- test to
combine the two cases into a single paper which.:,Y sold havi'` such a.r:
over-all assessment as its opening section.
All materials in the Department and in the Department cif
Defense will be available to ONE and to you for. this ope_ r at:"or., and
Mr. Bundy specifically has the total. PIT 'A file for your use.
We have rio particular ieri' h specif ,c ac .or: in ri .th 1. :f the
text becomes long, a summary might. later 1 '); r._*_tf.:. We do a.ci
the effort be intensive, with, a view to a piper .ir .,ur dhotis not ?att
than Th; rsday rnor n]rg, January 20th.
Sincerely,
_Js, i
George W. 3w~ a 1
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