OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO DDCI FROM DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400120010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 26, 1965
• Content Type: FORM

App ved 'epvcR a se ~808/O5L sl
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
DDCI
2
:T,
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
_
-FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
For appropriate further routing, if you
feel this is indicated
w(s) completed.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
D I
O
d
76
l
~ CONFIDENTIAL
-ra
SECRET
F 2M61 o. 237 Use previous editions
(40)
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE :1961 0-567282
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October 22, 1965
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
W. .Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
I lunched today with Dobrynin at one o'clock at his invitation.
He was less relaxed than usual as he was worried about getting to
New York to meet Gromyko who was on his way back from Cuba. The
weather was clouding over and he was afraid that he would not be
able to fly. He left the table once and when he returned said, "No
planes are flying so I am taking the train to New York." Feeling
that he was anxious to do other things, I left as soon as lunch and
coffee was finished, at 2:30.
He started in by giving me Mr. Kosygin's personal regards. He
commented, "You had two talks with Mr. Kosygin. That is unusual."
I replied that I didn't find that unusual since in 1959 1 had a
ten-hour talk with Mr. Khrushchev and saw him a second time at lunch
at our Embassy. He commented that Mr. Kosygin did not have the same
personal ba bits of long discussions; they were brief and to the point.
He asked how the President had received my report on our conversa-
tions. I replied that he was much interested, and particularly
amused by Mr. Kosygin's saying that they had all voted for him even
though their votes hadn't been tallied, but were frankly disappointed
in his later actions which looked more like the positinn of Goldwater.
I told the Ambassador that I had explained to Mr. Kosygin how wrong
he was in this respect.
This led
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This led to a rather extensiv d~ ~cussion about Viet-Nam.
Dobrynin asked why we didn't talk to?rtFie /Vietnamese; when was the
last time we had approached them directly; and why we insisted on
going through an intermediary _.. to all of which I pointed out we
had had no encouragement, that one can't talk to people who won't
talk to you.
I chided him that his Government wasn't sufficiently courageous
to take a position, that they were too afraid of the attacks of Red
China. Such sensitivity to the attacks from Red China, I suggested
was unwise and unproductive.
I pointed out that we (Soviet Union and United States) were
taking parallel action on the Subcontinent and that this was a
mature way to behave. We then had some discussion about the problems
between India and Pakistan. He expressed the opinion that the
difficulties were so great that he didn't see how there could be an
immediate settlement. I emphasized the importance we placed on
keeping conversations going. Pakistan would be unwilling to relax
unless there was some hope of conversations which might eventually
lead to some solution. The United States had no position on what
the solution might be but I personally felt that since neither side
would give up to the other, and self-denial was characteristic of
the people of the Subcontinent, some sort of autonomy for Kashmir
or the more restricted area around the Vale might be the ultimate
solution. There were already people in India who felt such a solution
would be possible. No Indian Government could propose it, however.
I suggested perhaps the Soviet Union might be willing to make some
proposal tin encourage a settlement between the two.
In the present situation I told him I thought both were at
fault. Pakistan had started the trouble by infiltrating saboteurs
and India had overly reacted. He seemed to accept this as an
analysis of the situation. I said we wanted to keep friendly terms
with both sides and I felt the Soviet Union had been wise in
establishing a position of reasonable confidence with the Pakistanis.
We didn't like their intimacy with Red China and I assumed the Soviet
Union felt the same way. He didn't protest.
I asked him
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I asked him about Tito and him-health.. He said hadn't
heard there was an th n basically the matter except n attack
of t e u, repeated some of t e ngs that Tito had told me.
I sa thought'ito was realistic, in some ways more so than
the Soviet Union. If the Soviets really wanted to come to an
understanding with us, why did they support Castro and liberation
movements in Latin America.
He said he was looking forward to hearing from Gromyko about
his visit to Cuba. He claimed that he didn't know why Castro was
permitting people to leave the country. He asked if we would ever
be willing to make a settlement with Castro and I said if the
Soviet Union and Castro both decided it was to their interest to
abandon creating of trouble in other parts of Latin America, there
might be a basis for talking about it.
I expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union was not getting
much out of the money that it was investing in Cuba and Latin
America and that they would learn in time if not already that
these investments were unprofitable. He then argued about social
conditions in Latin America. He maintained we were supporting the
status quo and didn't recognize there was a revolutionary spirit
in Latin America to overcome the social injustices. I pointed to
the Alliance for Progress and said if they were really interested
in getting rid of social injustices we would be glad to work with
them in overcoming such injustices not only in Latin America but
elsewhere in the world, but that we would constantly oppose
Communist revolutions to establish dictatorships of the proletariat.
They would have to make up their minds to abandon that method before
we could work together. I asked him when they would be sufficiently
objective to be willing to achieve stability in the world and work
together with us to achieve real social and economic progress. I
suggested the parallel actions on the Subcontinent had encouraged
me to believe that some day that might be possible.
We had some argument about who misunderstood whom, but he
did not argue against my comment that there were a number of
different ways of achieving progress in the underdeveloped eountttes
other than Communist revolution.
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I asked him a bit about why the Soviet Government didn't permit
their own people to have freer expression. I said I had noticed
they had recently clamped dorm on some writers who wanted to tell
the truth as they saw it. He countered by attacking us for our
rigid support of the status quo in Latin America and the under-
developed countries.
I told him Mr. Kosygin had convinced me that Soviet leaders
wanted to come to some understanding on the control of nuclear
weapons, but I found too much rigidity in the way to achieve that
objective. An important aspect was to develop a method to make
it possible for such countries as India, UAR, Israel and Germany
to forgo permanently the development of independent nuclear
capability. He took refuge in arguing that if the United States
and the Soviet Union signed a nonproliferation agreement, other
countries would follow. I explained why this wouldn't be automatic
and even if these countries adhered to an agreement there would be
a chance of their pulling out at some future time.
He referred to the statements of Shastri regarding Indian
policy. I said, "Yes, but you know Bhabha." He said, "Yes, we
know him very well." I said, "Then you know he is pressing for
Indian nuclear development." He said, "Yes, but he's not the
Government." He took refuge in saying that this was a matter
that our good friends Foster and Tsarapkin would be talking about.
The conversation drifted back to Viet-Nam, Dobrynin maintaining
that we were unrealistic when we didn't accept the fact that "the
Viet Cong speaks for the people." We argued about who spoke for
South Vietnamese opinion, unprofitably along familiar lines.
The conversation was in good humor throughout. He seemed
especially interested to know our point of view about India and
Pakistan settlement of Kashmir; what were our real hopes and
expectations for a solution re Castro; and how we sought an end
to the fighting in Viet-Nam.
I tried to get across to him that I didn't think any real
relaxation of tensions would take place until the Soviets abandoned
yhetr support
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their support of liberation movements and wars of liberation and
were ready in a common-sense way to work together for greater
world stability and social and economic progress rather than
their revolutionary concepts. I suggested they ought to leave the
latter to China.
He handed me a letter from Matekevich, Minister of Agriculture
of the USSR in which the Minister thanked me for sending him
material he had asked me for, on the changes in production and
location of slaughter houses in the United States since his visit
in 1955. The Minister wrote, "I found these materials very
interesting," and expressed his "appreciation of the attention
you gave to my request." (unusually cordial)
It was left that we would get together again when we had more
time. The Ambassador suggested some day next week.
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