LETTER TO HONORABLE GEORGE W. BALL FROM W. F. RABORN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400120009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 26, 1965
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 200
A-RDP80BO1676R000400120009-8
S"M
2 6 NOV 1965
Honorable George W W. Ball
Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
L reply to your letter of November 17. 19b5, you are
probably now aware that the 303 Committee has approved both
aspects of the covert support program for Indonesia. We have
obtained the necessary funds and the operational arrangements
are now being effected.
Sincerely,
,(Esigned) W. F. RabOrm
F. ltaborn
Director
3 NOV1965
kExecutive Director-Comptroller (date)
O/PPB;RLStallings.cnb (19 Nov. 165)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 Addressee
ER
1 - ExDir
1 - PPB subject
1 - PPB reading
1 - JMG budget neg. book-
1 - RLS chrono
10PI/CDF 173346
%nPaages 3-6
1-1
I cJi~ ti.4`-`xc
SECRET EYES
Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400120009-8
 Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400120009-8
Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400120009-8
 Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400120009-8;
November 2, 1965 ,r.
Dear Red:
As requested in your letter of October 13th,
we have looked over your initial draft terms of
reference for an estimate on reactions to different
US courses of action in the Indo-Pakistani situation.
I think you will agree that a major problem is
to cut this paper down to manageable proportions; we
have tried to do this by setting up a new series of
assumptions. The scope note is important and stands
as drafted. We are in general agreement with your
formulation of the five courses of action, and offer
the attached draft which we feel sharpens the issues
involved somewhat more than the original formulations.
To achieve maximum utility, the estimate should
be completed before the proposed Shastri and Ayub
visits. I suggest that we aim tentatively for early
December with the understanding that we may adjust
the date of completion when the timing of the visits
has been decided.
z
George '4 Ball
Attachment:
As stated.
Admiral William F. Raborn,
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.
Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400120009-8
 Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400120009-8
SECRET
1. Communist China remains preoccupied with the war in Vietnam
and will not launch a major military attack on India. It is, however,
willing at any time to resume military probes across India's northern
border.
2. The USSR maintains a neutral policy in regard to stopping open
Indo-Pakistan hostilities, but continues its basic pro-Indian policy
including both economic and military assistance.
3. The cease-fire endures, the UN achieves at least a limited troop
withdrawal, but no political settlement is in sight and the Security Council
remains the focal point of UN action.
The problems of the subcontinent and US interests there are complex
and interrelated. It follows that any particular US action will produce
different reactions according to the other decisions which accompany it and
set the general context of US policy. In order to render the problem
manageable, we assume in this estimate five general US courses of action.
In so doing, however, we recognize that many other combinations of policy
decisions and many variations of emphasis are equally possible.
Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400120009-8
 Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400120009-8
COURSE I: The US, convinced that India is potentially the most effective
counterweight to China in Asia and that Pakistan's rapprochement with China
cannot be held within acceptable limits, moves clearly toward India with
the prior understanding that the price of US support will be renunciation
of an independent Indian nuclear weapons capability and collaboration with
the US in the security field in relation to Communist China. The US resumes
large-scale economic aid to India and substantial military assistance; it
refrains from pressing India to make concessions on Kashmir; it resumes
economic but not military assistance to Pakistan.
COURSE II: The US, concluding that Pakistan can be made a reliable ally
and that a close working relationship with India is precluded for the
indefinite future, focuses its support on Pakistan on condition that, in
return for the US pressing India for concessions on Kashmir, Pakistan will
limit its relationship with China. The US resumes extensive economic aid to
Pakistan; it makes military aid immediately available and increases previous
military commitments to a level that enables Pakistan to face confidently
any future military threat from India; it renders some economic but no
military aid to India and presses hard for concessions on Kashmir.
COURSE III: The US. believing that the premises of its major investment in
the subcontinent are still valid, seeks a compromise solution on Kashmir
that would leave its relations with both India and Pakistan essentially
intact. To this end, it works through the UN and bilaterally to get negoti-
ations for a political settlement underway: it resumes economic assistance
Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400120009-8
 Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400120009-8
to both countries in a manner calculated to bring both disputants to the
negotiating table; it supplies replacements for present levels of military
hardware without, however, altering the basic balance of military force.
COURSE IV: The US, convinced that a lasting political solution can only
be arrived at between the disputants themselves and that US participation
in the negotiation process would be disadvantageous, adopts a wait-and-see
policy. It resumes limited economic aid on a short-term basis and
conditions longer term economic assistance on an effective process for
keeping Indo-Pakistani tensions under control, on Pakistan's self-imposed
limitations on its relationship with Communist China, and on India's
economic performance. Depending upon progress in limiting Indo-Pakistani
tensions, the US makes available replacements for present levels of military
hardware, but avoids longer term MAP negotiations.
COURSE V: The US concludes that Indo-Pakistani hostility is so profound as
to be insoluble in the foreseeable future, thereby rendering previous levels
of US assistance disproportionate to US interest in the subcontinent.
Taking a calculated risk that India and Pakistan will increase their
dependence on Communist and other support, the US adheres to modest programs
providing limited PL 80 assistance, limited amounts of program aid, but no,
new project assistance and no military aid.
Approved For Release 2006/12/06: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400120009-8