LETTER TO MR. THOMAS L. HUGHES FROM W. F. RABORN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400110011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 31, 1965
• Content Type: LETTER

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31 JUL 1965
Thank you for your paper on Pakistan
dated 21 July 1965. I have noted it with great in-
terest, as have a small number of my interested
colleagues.
Sincerely,
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
WElder:MMW (29July65)
Orig - Addressee
2cc - O/DCI
1 cc - ER /'~;-
STATE review(s) completed.
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 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE --' r
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1965
PERSONAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
W. F. Raborn,
Director of Central Intelligence.
At last week?s USIB meeting you asked if I could describe
our policy problems with Pakistan. Since the matter is a
complicated and detailed one and I may only know part of the
story, I did not really respond to your question at the time.
Afterwards I asked our people to go through the exercise
of drawing up a grievance list on Pakistan as a possible
means of giving you in summary form an impression of the
record which is presently of concern to the policy makers.
This paper has no status as a policy document nor is it in
any sense an estimate. Since it was prepared for you, we
have, in the section on "Military and Security Matters" classi-
fied "Background Use Only", drawn in large part from special
CIA sources.
If you think the other USIB members would be interested
in having a copy of this inf ormal memorandum, I will need your
permission to release it to them.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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Over the past several years the Government of Pakistan has taken a long
series of actions that have been counter to U.S. interests. In the following
pages, we list the most important of these, dating from late 1962 until
the dare'sent. They are grouped chronologically, according to certain
critical areas of interest.
We recognize, of course, that Pakistan has had more or less valid
reasons for taking many of these actions -- its fear of India, domestic
political considerations, a desire to play a large role in Afro-Asia --
and do not underestimate their importance? Also there have been a few
instances, such as Ayub's refusal to support China on the Vietnam issue
during his Peking visit of March 1965, for which Pakistan deserves credit.
On balance, however, the record is a disappointing one considering the
U.S. investment in Pakistan.
--We have bi-lateral security arrangements with Pakistan, as well as shared
membership in SEATO and CENTO. Imperfect as any alliance system may be,
there are certain minimum standards of behavior that we expect from any ally.
We feel that Pakistan has fallen short of these standards in a number of
respects, especially since 1962; even before that time, the Pakistanis
attempted to divert the alliances to its regional quarrel with India and
have encouraged other members to do likewise.
--At the time of the Chinese attack on India in 1962, President Kennedy
asked President Ayub to signal India that Pakistan would not take any action
that would undermine India's position vis-a-vis China, while India was under
attack. Pakistan refused, thus threatening the unity of the subcontinent in
the face of Communist attack.
--Although in 1960 Pakistan had declared itself willing to send troops into
Laos in support of SEATO commitments there, in N6t,einber 1962 Ayub, speaking
before a secret session of the National Assembly, asserted that Pakistan had
no military commitment to SEATO. He added, and has repeatedly reaffirmed,
that he sees India as a greater threat than international Communism. Such
an attitude is clearly not in accord with the purposes of SEATO.
--In November 1963, exercise MIDLINK took place. We hoped to see the
exercise receive good publicity in Pakistan as a reaffirmation of our
common purpose. The Pakistan government kept publicity to a minimum.
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--In March 1963, and again in March 1965, the Pakistanis apparently
offered their assistance to Peking in developing diplomatic ties between
Communist China and Turkey. Aside from countering our general objective
of keeping Peking isolated diplomatically, the Pakistani action was
particularly repugnant in that it used ties established through LENTO.
--In April 1963, Foreign Minister Bhutto declined to attend the SEATO
Foreign Ministers Conference. Instead, he attended a preparatory meeting
for the Second Bandung Conference, at which Pakistan joined forces with
Indonesia and China.
--On June 23, 1964, Ayub charged in a press interview that U.S. policy had_
lost its moral content and that the U.S. had let down its friends. In
addition, he claimed that the agglomeration of U.S. power on the periphery
of China increased the chances of a Korean-type war. Such statements clearly
undercut the rationale of our alliances.
--On August 12, 1964, Ayub returned to the attack, stating that Pakistan
had no intrinsic interest in SEATO and joined the treaty organization only
to accommodate the U.S.
--On August 13, 1964, Pakistan formally withdrew its offer to send troops
to Laos.
--In the fall of 1964, Pakistan cancelled its participation in joint naval
exercises with the Royal Navy.
--In Moscow on January 13, 1965,Bhutto spoke out in favor of a nuclear-
free zone in the Indian Ocean. Ayub, in Peking on March 2, joined the
Chinese in opposition to the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Indian
Ocean. Both of these statements undercut U.S. attempts to increase its
naval strength in the Indian Ocean and make the establishment of U.S.
facilities there (e.g. on Diego Garcia) more difficult.
--In April 1965, Foreign Minister Bhutto again found it inconvenient to
attend an alliance conference -- this time the CENTO Ministerial conference.
Instead, he went to Moscow with President Ayub.
--During the spring of 1965, Pakistan introduced new strains into its
alliance with the U.S. during border conflicts with India over the Dahagram
enclave and the Rann of Kutch. In the latter case, Pakistan almost certainly
used U.S. MAP-supplied equipment against India in violation of the terms under
which it was supplied. In both cases, Pakistan pressured the U.S. by demanding
to know whether we would "stand by" our treaty commitments to assist
Pakistan against "Indian aggression." There was no clear-cut case of Indian
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aggression in either case, and the Pakistani tactics were obviously
attempts to rationalize their own shortcomings as an ally.
--In late June 1965, Pakistan reportedly provided the Indonesian Air
Force with replacement parts for C-130 aircraft. These parts had been
supplied to Pakistan for its own use by the United States, so that the
Pakistani action is in violation of the terms of our military aid
agreement. In addition, since the Indonesian C-130s are used in operations
directed against Malaysia, the Pakistanis are tacitly supporting
Indonesian aggression against a fellow Commonwealth member.
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As Pakistan has loosened its ties with the U.S., SEATO and CENTO, it has
increasingly come to look to Communist China for reinsurance against India.
This has been a self-reinforcing process. Although Pakistan had never been
a strong critic of China, the increase in Sino-Pakistani ties has come at
a time when the confrontation between the U.S. and Communist China has been
reaching critical proportions. Parallel to the decline in relationships
with the U.S., the rapprochement with China can best be dated from the time
of the Chinese attack on India. As we have noted, Pakistan refused to give
any comfort to India at the time of the Chinese attack. Indeed, it has
exploited India's discomfiture for its own purposes and gone further by
actually condoning Chinese behavior.
--In November 1962, the Pakistani Foreign Minister (then Mohammed Ali)
stated that the Chinese withdrawal from south of the McMahon line was proof
of Chou's statesmanship. The Pakistanis supported the Chinese position on
the border conflict.
--In December 1962, Pakistan and China announced their intention to "align"
their common border. Since the area in question lies in Kashmir -- which is
claimed by India -- this provocative announcement dealt an inevitable death
blow to any hope that Indo-Pakistani talks on Kashmir -- then in progress --
might be successful. We attempted to dissuade the Pakistanis from this
move, but they proceeded with it, and a border agreement was subsequently
signed. Completion of a border agreement with Pakistan enabled Peking to
claim that, among its neighbors, only "recalcitrant" India had failed to come
to an amicable border settlement.
--In February 1963, Foreign Minister Bhutto visited Peking.
--In August 1963, Pakistan and Communist China signed a civil air agreement
that was implemented in June 1964. Peking thus acquired direct air access to
South Asia and beyond. There is now some speculation that the Chinese air
line may seek to extend its operations into Africa, using Pakistan as a
transit point. The Pakistani agreement marked China's first significant
breakthrough on the international civil air front.
--In February 1964, Chou En-lai paid a formal visit to Pakistan. Since
then, he has stopped over in Pakistan on a number of occasions and had
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several consultations with Pakistani leaders, including President Ayub.
--Following the Chinese nuclear test, Pakistan supported Peking's call
for a world-wide summit conference on nuclear matters, and on December 2, 19th,
President Ayub termed the test "a most significant achievement of the
Chinese government and people." Pakistan's attitude in this regard was
particularly unhelpful, coming at a time when we were attempting to mobilize
world opinion against the Chinese nuclear threat.
--On February 19, 1965 Pakistan and China signed an agreement for a
$60 million Chinese loan to Pakistan.
--In March 1965, President Ayub visited Peking and received exceptionally
full ceremonial treatment. The visit was the occasion for a number of
statements condemning "imperialism" and praising Sino-Pakistani friendship.
Although Ayub stood firm on the Vietnam issue, the visit of a U.S. ally to
Peking clearly behefited the Chinese international position.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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BACKGROUND USh ONLY/NC) FOREICN DISSENT
idO )1SSEM '471) OA7D
B. Military and Security Matters
In addition to the relatively overt indications of political ties, there
have been several reliable reports - some of them extremely sensitive - of
collaboration between Peking and Rawalpindi in military and security matters.
-- The first indications of Pakistani interest in a security arrange dent
came in the summer of 1963, when Ayub made his statement (July 8) that the
"smaller nations" of Asia would have to loon to China for protection against India.
On July 17, Bhutto claimed tiiat in case of Indian aggression the "largest nation
in Asia" would come to Pakistan's assistance. There were rumors in Pakistan at
the time of a Si-no-Pakistani security understanding. We do not know if any
existed then; the Chinese reportedly did, however, privately support Bhutto's
statement.
-- Cooperation in the security field was almost certainly a topic of
discussion during Chou's visit to Pakistan in February 1964. Two reliable and
sensitive reports indicate tint both t3hutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed knew
of a secret memorandum that Ayuh had made of his talk with Chou. The Pakistanis
claim that they have no secret understandings with China.
-- In November 1964, Bhutto again discussed with Aziz Ahmed a secret Sino-
Pakistani understanding, but did not reveal its content.
-- As early as August 1963, there were reports of Chinese military personnel
In Pakistan. The Indians have frequently made charges of this type and covert
reporting has noted tine presence in East Pakistan of otherwise unaccounted-for
Chinese. We do not know any details, however, and cannot assess the significance
of their presence.
-- The Indians also charge that Pakistani military personnel are receiving
training in guerrilla warfare and other fields in Communist Cliina. The Pakistanis
have informed us that six of their officers are there undergoing language
training.
-- In September 1964, Gen. Liu Ya-lou, Chief of the
Force, visited Pakistan. Covert sources report thf- visit
military personnel to Pakistan, some of ?ihom may have met
Ay ub .
c :CRI'T
NACtKGROUND USE ONLY/:d0 FOREIGN DISSENT
NO DISSEM ABROAD
Chinese Communist Air
of other Chinese
privately with President
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:CRLT
i ACK'GROUN 3 USE Oi'ILY/\O FOREIGN DISSEM
':C' DISSE:X ABROAi)
-- In the spring of 1965, Forei;;n ? inister Bhutto met wit i tie Chinese
Cnarg d'affai.res in London and orieled him on tic proceedin-'s of the SEATO
ministerial conference. It is not known how muca '.Hail -.was riven.
in summary, it appears ]i_?hely that there is some de^ree of military and/or
security cooperation between Con wnist China and Pakistan. There is also
-probably some sort of understanding between the two, perhaps relating to actions
that either side -night take in case the other was involved in conflict with
Although we do not believe that such an understanding is very formal the
Pakistanis have probably been dealin^ with China in sensitive areas behind our
backs.
: C " ET
AC`GFOUQD US: ONLY/dO FOR.EI(d DISSE;`i
dO TSSi :4 ABROAD
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Pakistan has shown some interest in improving relations with the USSR as well
as China, but the potential for improvement has been limited by the Soviet com-
mitment to India and, probably, by Soviet concern over the special US facilities
in Pakistan. Some progress has, however, been made.
-- On October 7, 1963, Pakistan and the USSR signed a civil air agreement
that enables Aeroflot to expand its operations still further in South Asia.
-- In June, 1964, tile Soviet Union extended a $1I) million loan to Pakistan.
The USSR has been assisting Pakistan in the field of oil exploration.
-- In January, 1965, Bhutto paid a visit to :Moscow. In April, President Ayub
also journeyed to Moscow and toured the USSR. The visit was kept in very low key,
and apparently contributed little towards developing Soviet-Pakistani relations.
Directly connected with both Po,~.Istan's alliance policy and its relationships
with China,,ha.s been the shifting course of Pakistani policy in Southeast Asia.
Pakistan was never an overly enthusiastic member of SEATO; it did, however, co-
operate in SEATO planning and was willing to commit troops to Laos in 1960. With
the intensification of conflict in Vietnam, and the confrontation between
Indonesia and Malaysia, however, Pakistan has adopted positions that are at least
unhelpful towards its allies, especially the US.
-- In July 1964, Pakistan announced its support for the May French proposals
for a Fourteen Nation Conference on Laos. The call for such a conference has been
supported by China, the USSR, Cambodia and North Vietnam. The ITS and the UK had
rejected it on May 21.
-- On 13 July, 1964, Ayub warned that an expansion of the Vietnam war would
lead to Chinese Communist involvement. He urged a political solution, and noted
that Pakistan would be unable to participate militarily because of its pre-occupa-
tion with India. He commented on 19 July that he could not see why Pakistan
should get involved in Vietnam, and on 12 August informed us officially that
Pakistan would not participate. Pakistan's total commitment to the Free World
position in South Vietnam amounts to an investment of about $7,000 of relief
supplies.
-- On 16 June, 1965, Pakistan called for a cessation of US bombings in North
Vietnam. In general, Pakistan has urged "moderation" on the United States, with
little corresponding pressure -- in public at least -- on the Communists.
S O? CRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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-- In late June, 1964, Foreign Minister Bhutto met with the North Vietnamese
Foreign Minister, and discussed Vietnam. The latter praised Bhutto for his "correct
appreciation" of the President's speech offering unconditional peace talks. Both
North Vietnam and China have been generally appreciative of Pakistan's failure to
support the US in Vietnam.
-- With regard to Malaysia, the Pakistanis have adopted a position of
91neutrality", refusing to support their fellow Commonwealth-member against Indonesian
aggression. Within the Commonwealth framework, the Pakistanis iave worked to weaken
Commonwealtn support to Malaysia, even at the verbal level.
:; L CRET
NO FOREIGN, DISSEM.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. C.-cchfield
OA Per our conversation.
23 July 65
(DATE)
FORM
US10-101
AUGN 54 101 WHICH RELACES FORM
ED.
DEPARTMENT OF ATE
THE DIRECTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
July 23, 1965
Memorandum for Admiral Raborn
I was waiting to give this
to you personally at USIB on
Wednesday.
Thomas L. Hughes
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