PROPOSAL FOR A SNIE ON COMMUNIST REACTION TO VARIOUS US COURSES OF ACTION IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400090012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 28, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2003/10/ el61RDP80B01676R000400090012-8
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
September 28, 1964
MEMORANDUM TO: The Honorable
John A. McCone,
Director of Central Intelligence.
SUBJECT: Proposal for a SNIE on Communist Reaction to
Various US Courses of Action in Indochina
We feel that another look at the problem in light of the Tonkin Gulf incidents
may allow for a firmer estimate than that contained in the May SNIE. An agreed
intelligence assessment of this sort would, furthermore, now be especially timely
in view of current planning. In fact, for it to be useful, we have to ask
action on October 5.
The following questions are offered as general guidelines and could be re-
worked into a more precise terms of reference or used as the basis for an ONE
draft estimate. We believe that oral contributions are preferable, to save time,
so that ONE may quickly draft the basic working paper. The outline is not as
formidable as it looks, because these questions have been discussed before, and
this project involves more an updating of agreed positions than exploration of new
problems .
1. How do Hanoi and Peiping view present trends in SVN and Laos? What
is their position on maintaining and intensifying the VC effort or making any
aggressive move in Laos? How are they trying to play Laos, with respect to
a conference or intensified military action at any point? (All the above in the
absence of any new move by us).
2. What, after the Tonkin Gulf episodes, is Communist China's view of
the US threat to North Vietnam and its own relationship to Hanoi? What is Peiping's
view of US intentions and likely action? What is the extent of Sino-North Vietnamese
military cooperation and how and under what circumstances is it likely to increase ?
For what contingencies and for what action does Peiping seem now to be preparing,
and under what circumstances would it probably decide to take further action to
strengthen its warnings that "aggression against North Vietnam means aggression
against China?"
3. What might trigger a Hanoi-Peiping decision to abandon the 1954 Geneva
Accords and send troops into South Vietnam ?
4. Do the North Vietnamese desire the presence of Chinese forces in North
Vietnam ? If so, under what circumstances ? Is there any evidence of a difference
of view between Hanoi and Peiping as to what assistance the Chinese should provide?
State Department review
completed
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5. Are they likely to seek negotiations ? Under what circumstances?
What terms? Any possibility of Hanoi-Peiping disagreement over timing?
6. What are Soviet views of the situation? How explain recent criticism
of both US and Peiping and hints of possible interest in a negotiated settlement
even under UN auspices ? Can Moscow exert a moderating influence on Hanoi?
How would Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow react to:
1. Resumption of DeSoto patrols with or without 34A maritime operations
a. If the North Vietnamese go after the destroyers and we
retaliate again with air strikes, what would be the
likely communist reaction? Would it depend on the
targets and/or intensity of the retaliation?
2. Resumption of 34A, particularly maritime operations.
3. Air action and/or ground operations against infiltration-associated
targets in the Lao panhandle.
4. A gradual and systematic pattern of US/GVN attacks against infiltration
and military-related targets in the DRV, combined with directly communicated
private warnings of our objectives and limited intent.
a. Are the communists likely to feel compelled to take some
action to disrupt such a program in the early stages and
to force our hand? What actions might they take? What
actions might they take just to prepare for this contingency?
b. How would the communists react to continued prosecution
of the program ?
We should much appreciate your authorizing this SNIE.
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