LETTER TO MR. JOHN MCCONE FROM THOMAS L. HUGHES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400080030-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: April 14, 1964
• Content Type: LETTER

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE V ..
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL
APR 14 19$4
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is conducting a major
study and re-evaluation of US arras control and disarmament policy
for biological and chemical weapons. One aspect of this study is
concerned with the problems posed by the possibility that Nth
countries might acquire, or seek to acquire, a capability in BW or
CW weapon systems in the next few years. Accordingly, ACDA has
requested that a National Intelligence Estimate be prepared on
the likelihood of proliferation of these weapons.
The proposed NIE should include a brief analysis of the tech-
nical and economic resources required to develop an indigenous BW
and/or CW capability and should identify both potential Nth countries
and non-nuclear powers which already have a BW or CW program. In
estimating the likelihood that an Nth country will acquire BW or
CW weapons systems, primary consideration should be given to-the
prospects for developing and producing these weapons without external
assistance. However, the possibility that an Nth country might
acquire them from another nation or through the efforts of a group
of foreign experts should also be considered. In this connection,
the proposed NIE should discuss the policies and attitude toward
proliferation of foreign countries which already have BW or CW
weapons.
We appreciate that the present schedule of NIEs is heavy,
but hope that the requested estimate could be completed during the
third quarter of 19614. Suggested terms of reference are attached.
Sincerely,
t66
Mr. John McCone,
Director of Central Intelligence,
CIA Headquarters,
Langley, Virginia.
State Department review completed
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Likelihood of Proliferation of BW and CW Weapons Systems
Suggested Terms of Reference
To estimate the likelihood of proliferation of biological and
chemical weapons systems during the period 1964-1967-
Scope
The estimate should consider both the likelihood of Nth countries'
developing an operational battlefield capability with biological and/or
chemical weapons and the likelihood. of the Nth country's acquiring a
token capability -- i.e., a capability to inflict mass casualties on
the population of one (or a few) cities of a traditional enemy.
Both BW/CW agents and delivery means should be considered.
Questions Bearing on the Problem
A. Technical and Economic Resources Required
1. What are the minimum technical and economic resources
required by an Nth country to develop and produce BW/CW agents
and munitions on a scale sufficient to provide an operational
battlefield capability? Estimate the financial costs of such
programs and compare them with the costs of acquiring a token
capability.
2. What potential Nth countries have the requisite resources?
What is the earliest date by which they could begin to produce
BW/CW agents and munitions?
3. What foreign countries other than the USSR already have
BW/CW programs? Consider both laboratory scale development
programs and production for stockpile. What is the level of
technical sophistication of their programs? Are they engaged in
research on new agents and new methods of delivery?
4. Discuss defensive requirements and the extent to which
additional technical or economic resources would be needed by
Nth countries and by countries which now have BW/CW research
programs.
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1. Which potential Nth countries are likely to acquire or
seek to acquire an indigenous BW/CW capability in the next three
years? By the end of the decade?
a. Is there any evidence of BW/CW research and testing
activity at the present time?
b. Discuss the principal motivating factors for those
countries most likely to produce Bv1/CW weapons for stockpile.
Do they consider their BW/CW program a "poor man's substitute"
for a nuclear weapons program?
2. Discuss the likelihood of potential Nth countries acquir-
ing outside assistance for their BW/CW programs. What are the
chances of Nth country joint programs, one Nth country buying
1v1/CW weapons from another, or using a group of foreign experts
to develop a 1W/CW program?
3. Discuss factors affecting Nth countries' intentions to
employ or threaten to employ BW/CW weapons.
C. Policies and Attitudes Toward Proliferation of BW/CW Weapons
1. What are the policies and attitude of foreign countries
which now have a BW/CW capability toward proliferation of these
weapons?
2. Discuss the likelihood of change in these policies and
attitudes if one or more Nth country acquires an indigenous BW/CW
capability.
D. Implications of BW/CW Proliferation
1. Effects on traditional regional conflicts (UAR-Israel,
India-Pakistan).
2. Effects on proliferation of nuclear weapons.
INR/SIS:HMWiedemann:mrp
CONFIDENTIAL
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. !,,.,.;Cone
as been alerted that you
wish to discuss this request at the USIB
meeting tomorrow and he will pass the
word to the Board. ONE has been alerted
and they will be prepared to discuss it
with you at the pre-USIB session.
21 April 1964
FDA ATE)
MAY FORM
FORM GN 54 101 WHICH RELACES
BE USED. 10-01
i AU
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