MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN MCCONE FROM JEROME K. HOLLOWAY, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400080023-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: April 27, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY
EUR
CONFIDENTIAL
April 27, 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN McCONE
Central Intelligence Agency
The Secretary has asked that you receive a copy
of the enclosed memorandum of conversation between
Ambassador Bohlen and Louis Joxe. The covering note
from Assistant Secretary Tyler says:
"Chip sent me attached by letter.
There should be no distribution.
"You may remember Joxe, who is a personal
friend of mine, and is now Minister of State.
He is non-political and serves de Gaulle without
being a Gaullist.
"I attach great credence to his views.
"If you would like anyone else to see this,
would you just jot down their names on the memo
itself?"
Attachment:
Memo of conversation
dated April 21, 1964.
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State Department review completed
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Participants: M. Louis Joxe
Mr. Joseph Alsop
Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen
Date and Place: American Embassy Residence
Dinner, April 21, 1964
After dinner at the Residence the following conversation took
place between M. Louis Joxe, Mr. Joseph Alsop, and myself:
French Re cognition of Communist China.
Alsop stated to Joxe that he had never been able to see any
direct French interest which was served by the French recognition
of Communist China and asked Joxe if he would tell him on a com-
pletely confidential and personal basis what he thought the purpose
had been.
Joxe replied that the recognition of Communist China was not
a new thought to General do Gaulle; that very shortly after he took
over power in May 1958 he had asked Joxe what he thought of the
idea of France's recognizing Communist China. Joxe had defin-
itely given him a negative reaction, pointing out that it would have
a very bad effect on his relations with the United States and that
he saw no advantage to France in proceeding with this step given
the situation in the Far East. De Gaulle had agreed not to pursue
the matter at that time.
Joxe said that it was always necessary in discussing de Gaulle
and his motivations for any action to separate his "method of
analysis" and his "conclusions". He realized that no American
would agree with de Gaulle's conclusions, but he thought it might
be helpful if they understood his method of analysis. In the first
place it was important to be aware that do Gaulle had little under-
standing of the realities of the external world. He was purely a
proponent of France and French circumstances and regarded
everything through the prism of French mentality. In the case
of the Far East he undoubtedly thought that he was moving further
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CONFIDENTIAL
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ahead than others and was taking a step which sooner or later
all other countries, including the United States, would have to
take.
in reply to my specific question as to whether the timing of
recognition early this year had not been cfected by de Gaulle's
analysis of the Indochinese situation, Joxe expressed very definite
agreement. He said he thought de Gaulle was convinced for a
variety of reasons (and here Joxe indicated that France's experience
made it difficult for him to conceive of success by the United States)
that the current American policy in Vietnam was doomed to failure
and he wished to be installed in Peking in anticipation of the time
when there would be some serious negotiations with the Chinese.
He said de Gaulle had the distinct view that no question in the
peripheral area to the south of China can be settled without the
agreement of that country. He also felt that it was important to
be in a position to be able to discuss matters directly with the
Chinese Communists. Joxe said that he felt that there was no
more to the recognition of China than this generalized view of
de Gaulle on the situation in the Orient. He had no under standing,
Joxe felt, of the interrelation of the various factors in the Far East
and s,emed to be completely ignorant of the possible consequences
of the support of neutralization in Indochina on other countries in
the area.
Joxe then said he thought it was very important that our two
countries should seek to find subjects on which they could agree
rather than stressing the ones on which they disagree. I pointed
out it was not easy to find the subject on which there would be full
agreement -- this was certainly not true on Indochina, nor on NATO,
nor on the organization of Europe. Joxe agreed, adding the subject
of nuclear policy, but felt there should be something that we could
concentrate on which would offer this possibility.
I told him that on other subjects, such as most African questions,
we worked very well together, but that unfortunately it was and
would be the disagreements that would get the headlines. I told him
my concern was that as public opinion in the United States got the
impression that France was no longer d'friendly" country it would
cause great difficulty to American diplomacy. I said I had been
very much encouraged by the calm attitude of the people in the
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CONFIDENTIAL
Executive Branch of the United States Government.
Aesop, who had remained silent during most of Joxe's expose
then said that in his opinion the United States would carry the war
to the north and even use the atomic bomb if necessa-= y. He said
it was his view that if we permitted Vietnam to be overrun by the
Communists the United States would cease to be an Asiatic -Dower
and there would be a radical shift in Japanese policy which would
be followed by Formosa, the Philippines, Thailand, etc.
Joxe expressed some surprise at this statement and inquired
if we were prepared to take on China since he was certain that
China would not stand by and see VietMinh crushed by the United
States.
Alsop rather pooh-poohed China, saying it has no military
power and no bomb and therefore is not in a position to do anything.
When I mentioned that they had done a considera:0le amount in
Korea through the use of manpower and our Air Force had been
relatively ineffective, Alsop dismissed Korea saying we did not
understand the nature of the problem then but felt at present our
military were much more alert. Both Joxe and I expressed
serious doubt as to the possibility mentioned by Aesop, but he
persisted in his view.
Alsop also stated that he felt de Gaulle was animated primarily
by animosity towards the United States and that this was the real
explanation of his recognition of Communist China. Joxe disagreed,
and stated that de Gaulle was not primarily Motivated by any feeling
in regard to the United States but that he would not be deterred
from an action which he was taking for other reasons simply be-
cause it was not pleasing to the United States. He admitted that
from an American point of view it would look as though it was the
United States, but if you understood de Gaulle's psychology you
would realize that this was a matter of a certain amount of indiffer-
ence to it. He did admit, however, that de Gaulle always seemed
to pass slights or even imaginary slights. He said that in effect
de Gaulle was animated by determination not to have the French
dependent on any other country.
Joxe said during the conversation that de Gaulle had very
successfully supported the operation and -that he would be out and
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back on the job within ten days or so. He said, however, that
the next six months would tell the story. It was conceivable that
de Gaulle would make a complete recovery and be unaffected by
the operation. On the other hand in such cases it was not unusual
that the removal of a prostate gland might load to a considerable
diminution of energy and inability to support the arduous schedule
necessary for the President of the F rend Republic.
He said there was one thing he 'knew for a fact to be true about
do Gaulle's character and that was his absolute conviction that if
you were not physically able to support the requirements of the job
you must give up the job. He repeated therefore that he thought
the next six months would be decisive for de Gaulle's future. He
said six months would be about the time required to make this
test.
In the event that de Gaulle could not carry on Joxe was certain
that there was no "dauphin's designated. He was also reasonably
certain that France would not revert to the old system of Parlia-
mentary rule. He did not however speculate on who might be a
possible successor to de Gaulle.
After the conversation when we had joined the ladies Joxe
said to me that he had been glad to have the opportunity to speak
with Alsop and while he found him a little "belliciste" he did not
take too seriously what Alsop had said.
I mentioned very briefly to Joxe Alphand's view that France
might support us in the event we extended the war, to which he at
first expressed surprise and later said this might be possible but
had no certain knowledge of it since it was a matter which had
never been discuesed in the Cabinet.
AmbCEBohlen:am
April 22, 1964
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