WOULD THE LOSS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS PRECIPITATE A 'DOMINO EFFECT' IN THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400080012-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 9, 1964
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/
V!fjA1DP80BO1676R
'0
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Would the Loss of South Vietnam and Laos
Precipitate a "Domino Effect" in the Far
East?
1. The "domino effect" appears to mean that
when one nation falls to communism the impact is
such as to weaken the resistance of other countries
and facilitate, if not cause, their fall to com-
munism. Most literally taken, it would imply the
successive and speedy collapse of neighboring coun-
tries, as a row of dominoes falls when the first is
toppled--we presume that this degree of literalness
is not essential to the concept. Most specifically
it means that the loss of South Vietnam and Laos
would lead almost inevitably to the communization
of other states in the area, and perhaps beyond
the area,
2. We do not believe that the loss of South
Vietnam and Laos would be followed by the rapid,
successive communization of the other states of
the Far East. Instead of a shock wave passing from
one nation to the next, there would be a simultane-
ous, direct effect on all Far Eastern countries.
With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is
likely that no nation in the area would quickly
succumb to communism as a result of the fall of
Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continua-
tion of the spread of communism in the area would
not be inexorable, and any spread which did occur
would take time--time in which the total situation
SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
deciossification
MORI/CDF Pages 1-5
Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400080012-9
 Approved For Release 2006/0$.DE(R 7P80BO1676R000400080012-9
might change in any of a number of ways unfavorable
to the Communist cause.
3. The loss of South Vietnam and Laos to the
Communists* would be profoundly damaging.to the US
position in the Far East, most especially because
the US has committed itself persistently, emphati-
cally, and publicly to preventing Communist take-
over of the two countries. Failure here would be
damaging to US prestige, and would seriously debase
the credibility of US will and capability to con-
tain the spread of communism elsewhere in the areas.
Our enemies would be encouraged and there would be
an increased tendency among other states to move
toward a greater degree of accommodation with the
Communists. However, the extent to which individual
countries would move away from the US towards the
Communists would be significantly affected by the
substance and manner of US policy in the period
following the loss of Laos and South Vietnam.
4. Southeast Asia. In the remaining piece
of Indochina, Sihanouk would probably accelerate
his movement toward accommodation with the Commu-
nists, in anticipation of a Communist victory he
considers inevitable. Thailand would almost cer-
tainly shift toward a neutralist position, hoping
thus to forestall any vigorous Communist move against
This memorandum assumes a clear-cut Communist
victory in these countries, i.e., a withdrawal of US
forces and virtual elimination of US presence in
Indochina, either preceeded or soon followed by the
establishment of Communist regimes in Laos and South
Vietnam. The results of a fuzzier, piecemeal vic-
tory, such as one staged through a "neutralist"
phase, would probably be similar, though somewhat
less sharp and severe.
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400080012-9
 Approved For Release 2006/0
89
1676R000400080012-9
E C I R
the regime for as long as possible. Cooperation
with the US would be reduced. Already, Thai leaders
have made clear their worries about the firmness of
US commitments in the area and their doubts about
the wisdom of ready responsiveness to Washington's
immediate policy desires. Burma would be less af-
fected, having already virtually severed its ties
with the US. Ne Win would see the ouster of the US
from Indochina as confirming the wisdom of the
isolationist, somewhat pro-Peiping course he has
already embarked upon.
5. London, Canberra, and Kuala Lumpur have
been counting ultimately upon US support for
Malaysia against Indonesian aggression. They would
be badl'y disconcerted by a US failure in Indochina,
and would almost certainly seek some clear US com-
mitment?to help them defend Malaysia. Indonesia,
for its part, would be emboldened in its efforts
to crush Malaysia.
6. US Western Pacific Bases. US military
strength in the Far East is based on the chain of
islands from the Philippines cc Japan, not on the
Asian mainland. As long as the US can effectively
operate from these bases, it will probably still be able
to deter Peiping and Hanoi from overt military ag-
gression. Furthermore, the protection of these
island countries from Communist subversive efforts
is a different problem from that of protecting
countries on the mainland. In the Philippines,
there would be some impetus to the tendency of ultra-
nationalists, such as former Foreign Minister Lopez,
to press for reduced cooperation with the US and a
softening of the Philippines' anti-Peiping stand.
They would also seek restrictions on US bases
SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-R?P80BO1676R000400080012-9
 Approved For Release 2006/0810 , I &, f BO 1676 R000400080012-9
similar to those presently enforced in Japan. We
do not think this would affect Philippine government
policy, at least as long as the present admi.ni.stra-
tion is in power in Manila.
7. On Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers
would be greately disheartened, but they would not
be likely to seek an accommodation with the Commu-
nists. As in the case of the Philippines, the
Nationalist Chinese leaders appreciate the efficacy
of US sea and air power, and their nation has proved
among the least vulnerable in the Far East to Com-
munist infiltration and subversion.
8. In Japan, the loss of South Vietnam and
Laos would almost certainly produce some increase
of neutralist sentiment. There would be more ques-
tioning of the desirablity of remainsng committed
to the US side and continuing to be made a prime
Communist target by the presence of US bases. The
mutual defense treaty and the US bases in Japan
and Okinawa would come under even greater attack
than at present. At a minimum, political pressures
for further restrictions on the use of these bases
would be greatly intensified, and the government
would probably make a few concessions to these
pressures. We do not believe that there would be
major changes in Japanese policy.
9. Communist Asia, Aside from the immediate
joy in the DRV over achievement of its national
goals, the chief effect would be upon Communist
China, both is boosting its already remarkable
self-confidence and in raising its prestige as a
leader of World Communism. Peiping has already
begun to advertise South Vietnam as proof of its
thesis that the underdeveloped world is ripe for
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400080012-9
 Approved For Release 2006/08IO - J 0BO1676R000400080012-9
revolution, that the US is a paper tiger, and that
local insurgency can be carried through to victory
without undue risk of precipitating a major inter-
national war. The outcome in South Vietnam and
Laos would conspicuously support the aggressive
tactical contentions of Peiping as contrasted with
the more cautious position of the USSR. To some
degree this will tend to encourage and strengthen
the more activist revolutionary movements in various
parts of the underdeveloped world.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400080012-9
 Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400080012-9
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Juen 15, 1964
TO : CIA - Mr. McOone
I have arranged for the attached
estimate to be added to the papers
distributed by Mac Bundy for consid-
eration at the 6 p.m. meeting in
Secretary Rusk's Conference Room
today. It relates to Question 8
of the Q and A memorandum.
WP~
a
,~~ William Bundy
Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400080012-9