LETTER TO HONORABLE RICHARD HELMS FROM [BOB]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400060011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: December 22, 1966
• Content Type: LETTER

WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP
WASHINGTON, D C 20305
2 DEC 1966
Honorable Richard Helms
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20505
Sincerely, --f ' ,
1-11
lam
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have asked the Weapons Systems
Evaluation Group (WSEG) to ascertain more precisely what the
U.S. national political and military authorities will need to
know about crucial military events on the battlefield in order
to be adequately prepared for critical decisions and to assess
our present capability to support such requirements.
As part of its investigation, WSEG was directed to initiate
a series of personal interviews with political and military
leaders who have had senior responsibilities at the national and
theater levels. The results will be reported only to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, and the findings
will be generalized and published on a classified basis, without
personal attribution.
To be responsive to the requirements of the JCS, WSEG must
complete its program of interviews by about 25 January 1967.
Our present schedule calls for interviews in Europe during.the
period 5 to 14 January 1967.
Due to the press of time I have asked-.___Arnol4-wfio is the
project leader to contact you or your office by telephone with
a view toward arranging an interview. I hope you will be able
to fit this into your busy schedule.
I -'D ,
4
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K: S. MASTERSON
vice Admiral, USN
Director
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 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R00040006001-2
27 DECEMBER 1966 -- Telephone Conversation
1:45 -- DDCI called Adrn. Masterson of WSEG; he was out, so spoke with
Dr. Arnold
DDCI said he was curious to know more of the background relative to
Adm, Mastersonrs letter of 22 Dec. requesting that Mr. Helms grant an
interview to Dr. Arnold regarding a project on capability to support
requirement of national and political and military authorities in crises
situations.
Arnold said that Mr. Vance has asked the Joint Chiefs to look into the general
problem of trying to make tactical situation reporting in combat theaters
more responsive to needs and to look at the question of how adequately
national authorities would be informed if confronted on the battlefield.
Part of this effort has been farmed out to WSEG and, in attempting to pin down
a place to start, WSEG decided to talk to experienced senior people in terms
of their experiences in crises in general and essentially what they would be
after would be to try to pin down the degree, reasons and nature or demands
for specific information of a tactical nature at the national decision-making
level. This has two dimensions -- looking at our own people, and
simultaneously having the same type of question as to what the other fellow
is doing, "We would like to talk with experienced people who have been
experienced in national crises to pin point the demands."
DDCI asked, "The environment you are talking about - time and events any
time from now on or situations in which a crisis builds up, as well as
what happens when we come into conflict?"
Arnold said yes. Said there are two perspectives -- ultimate object is to
look at requirements and then figure systems. Spectrum from when an
incident occurs; what you need to know to alert you to look at it at the
national level; and then, once focusing on terms, what it may signify and
what in terms of national decisions would they want to know, for th$
national policy makers who are trying to define national policy boundaries.
He said they would be talking to the White House, State, DIA and such others
in the decision making community.
.DCI said, what you're after is what we need to know in order to do our
part in these things. Arnold agreed. DDCI said he would talk to DCI
bou,thzs.,.. r
cc -- DCI, with the incoming letter.
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mfb
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400060011-2
On 27 December Admiral Raborn requested a get
together with some veterans of last year's Dominican
crisis. His purpose was to prepare himself for a
session with the Pentagon's Weapon System Evaluation
Group (WSEG). WSEG is trying to analyze how "battle-
field information" - read tactical intelligence - can
be better fed into the national decision making process.
R. J. Smith chaired a roundtable with Admiral Raborn
on 28 December at which John Bross, and
I Iwere in attendance. irne 1scussion
rambled over a great deal of past history - much of it
to refresh the Admiral's memory on events and procedures.
It is difficult to say what tack the Admiral
decided to take before WSEG. He seemed most impressed
with exploring means to alleviate "paper suffocation"
during crisis periods. He proposed to tell WSEG that
the task force approach works well and to propose that
the White House Situation Room be turned into a. national
ops center during crises. On the latter point he agreed
that the Agency should be the logical body to supply
competent staffing and to provide analytic judgments on
the significance of incoming intelligence from all
sources.
STAT
Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400060011-2
 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400060011-2
On 27 December Admiral Raborn requested a get
together with some veterans of last year's Dominican
crisis. His purpose was to prepare himself for a
session with the Pentagon's Weapon System Evaluation
Group (WSEG). WSEG is trying to analyze how "battle-
field information" - read tactical intelligence - can
be better fed into the national decision making process.
R. J. Smith chaired a roundtable with Admiral Raborn
on 28 December at which John Bross, F_ I and
I Iwere in attendance. The discussion
ram e a over a great deal of past history - much of it
to refresh the Admiral's memory on events and procedures.
It is difficult to say what tack the Admiral
decided to take before WSEG. He seemed most impressed
with exploring means to alleviate "paper suffocation"
during crisis periods. He proposed to tell WSEG that
the task force approach works well and to propose that
the White House Situation Room be turned into a national
ops center during crises. On the latter point he agreed
that the Agency should be the logical body to supply
competent staffing and to provide analytic judgments on
the significance of incoming intelligence from all
sources.
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 Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : ?IA-RDP80B01676R000400060011-2
3 January 1967
DDCI talked to Dr. Arnold on hone about
this request. Steno notes att~ched.
Admiral Raborn is also on e list for
interview by WSEG. Plea a see memo
(also attached) relating action taken.
Adm. Masterson: Code 11-76335
Dr. Arnold: Code 11-52535
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 Approve
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DATE
: CIA-RDP80B01676R0
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