MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MCNAMARA FROM JOHN A. MCCONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400040013-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 15, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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=5 March 19b5
z
U
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Honorable Robert S. b ,cNL1 ara
Secretary of Defense
By direction of NSAM-317, USIB established a Technical
Surveillance Counter-measure Committee under the temporary
chairmanship of Mr. Thomas Karamessines. Assistant Deputy
Director for Piano for CIA. The Committee is made up of repre-
tives of the Intelligence Community. The work is to be carried
oc,..
out by two sub-committees -- one with responsibility for research
and development, and the other for implementation of agreed measures.
I am of the opinion. and USIB concurs, that this Committee
should have a full-time chairman. for ten
years Chief of Technical Services Division. CIA. who is particularly
well qualified in this field, is free to accept this appointment. His
selection has been concurred in by General Carter of CIA. General
Carroll of DIA, and Mr. Hughes of the Department of State.
Prior to making this formal appointment, I would like to
have your views since the work of this Committee requires not only the
support of the Intelligence Community, but that of other elements of
the Department of State and Department of Defense.
There is some urgency attached to this matter since Mr.
willing to serve# but is delaying a decision on other
opportunities open to him until this question is resolved.
0 OSD REVIEW COMPLETED
JOHN A. AA.cCi)NE
04
DOS REVIEW COMPLETED Director
cc: The Secretary of State
The Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Orig - Addressee
cc2 - DCI
cc LR.
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t ,-,5 / `3; /'
15 March, %965
SV i MOR.A.NDUM FOR:
The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
etary of Defense
Mr. McCone has read the attached and asked
that it be brought to your personal attention.
;xeectative Assistant
cc. The Secretary of State
The Special Assistant to the ?resident
for National Security Affairs
Orig - Addressee
cc 2 - DCI
cc ER
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The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The L Secretary of Defense
Washington, D? G.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
1965
I am attaching for your information two CIA memo-
randa dealing with the Cyprus situation. The first memo
points out that there have been no significant moves toward
a reconciliation of Greek and. Turkish Interests in the
island and that the situation there remains basically
explosive.
The second memo describes the Soviet position on
the Cyprus dispute and the skillful manner in which Moscow
has exploited the Issue.
Faithfully yours,
/s/
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
Attachments:
1.
Intelligence Memorandum dated 12 Feb 65, Subject:
Cyprus
(OCI No. 0763/65)
2
OCI Special Report dated 12 February 1965, Subject:
Soviet:
.
Policy and Tactics in the Cyprus Dispute (OCI No. 0276/65.A)
Identical letters sent to: The Honoia.ble McGeorge Bundy, The`-__ p,1
Honorable W. Averell Harrlma
The Honorable Phillips Talb`Sf
The Honorable Cyr .i R. Vance
Distribution:
Original w Addressee
1 - DDCI w/att
11
1 DD/I w/o att
ER via ExDir w/att
The Honorable George W. Ba11I,
he Honorable John T. McNl u_ia tox ,
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
12 February 1965
OCI No. 0763/65
Copy No.
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
I GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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12 February 1965
OCI No. 0763/65
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Inf}rlligence
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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OCI No. 0763/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
12 February 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Cyprus
SUMMARY
1. Despite the absence of overt incidents in
Cyprus during the past several weeks, there has been
no significant movement toward a reconciliation of
the national interests involved nor of the Greek and
Turkish communities on the island. The situation
therefore remains basically explosive. The Greek
Cypriots, because of weakening support for their
position in both the Soviet Bloc and among the non-
aligned nations, are no longer hopeful of obtaining
settlement through the UN General Assembly and are
moving ahead with plans to create unilaterally a
new regime on Cyprus. US, British, and UN attempts
to stimulate direct negotiations between the Turks
and the Greeks or the Turks and Greek Cypriots have
not been productive. Makarios, strengthened by the
recent arrival of Soviet-built military equipment,
appears ready to engage in new exercises in brinks-
manship with the Turks. The most immediate danger
involves Ankara's plans to rotate part of its army
contingent on Cyprus later this month. Makarios has
thus far refused to permit this rotation. In the
longer run, Makarios' announced plans to conduct
unified elections and re-write the constitution--
with or without Turkish Cypriot agreement or partici-
pation--is likely to spark new crises. Turkish
leaders in Ankara, giving the impression that they
now have Soviet assurance not to intervene in case
Turkey moves against Cyprus, are warning that they
will not make further concessions to prevent violence.
In the event of hostilities, there appears to be in-
creasing danger that Turkish-attacks would also be
launched against the Greek islands off the Turkish
coast or against Greek Thrace.
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1. Six months ago, Turkish Air Force jets,
reacting to widespread Greek Cypriot attacks against
Turkish Cypriot positions, bombed Cyprus and pre-
sented the world with the imminent threat of a new
Greco-Turkish war. During the period of relative
peace since then, the Greek Cypriots have imple-
mented, by legislative decree and executive fiat,
plans for creation of a new governmental structure
based on majority, i.e., Greek Cypriot rule. The
political structure created by the constitution of
1960, under which the Turkish Cypriot minority
(18% of the population) held wide political powers,
including veto rights over important legislation,
has been drastically altered. A de facto government,
entirely Greek Cypriot in composition, rules over
95% of the area of Cyprus.
2. Prior to the outbreak of violence in 1963,
Makarios had proposed thirteen amendments to the
original constitution. The net effect of these
proposals--if implemented--would have been creation
of a government entirely under Greek Cypriot control.
The Turkish Government, acting on behalf of the
Turkish Cypriot community, rejected the proposals
outright. Over the past year, however, ten of the
thirteen points have been achieved and the remaining
three are expected to be accomplished soon.
3. Despite these gains, the Greek Cypriots
appear less optimistic of early victory today than
they did six months ago. Some Turkish Cypriots
have accepted Greek Cypriot rule, but the majority
of that community remain in enclaves to which they
fled when violence broke out. Widespread unemploy-
ment and primitive living conditions for many of
these refugees have not yet forced them back to
their villages in Greek-held territory. Turkish
Cypriot morale is reported higher today than it
has been in months because of recent changes in-
volving Cyprus on the international plane.
4. Meanwhile, within the Greek community there
are signs of growing discord over both the final
goal of the struggle and the means of achieving
that goal. The foreign policies of Makarios have
come under increasing attack from supporters of
General Grivas and right-wing Greek Cypriot news-
papers. Some Cypriot newspapermen, who have
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previously written vitriolic articles against the
West, are reportedly pondering the possibility of
throwing their support to a new foreign policy less
dependent on the Soviet Bloc. Violence within the
Greek Cypriot community is on the increase. Several
score explosions have occurred in recent weeks, but
no arrests have been made and no explanations fur-
nished by the government. Press accusations that
UN troops have been involved have not been substan-
tiated, and it is generally assumed that factional
or personal Greek Cypriot rivalries are responsible.
5. The upsurge in Turkish Cypriot morale and
the ferment within the Greek community can be traced
to recent developments outside Cyprus. Most important
of these are (a) an apparent change in Soviet policy
toward the Cyprus dispute, and (b) developments in
connection with the current session of the United
Nations General Assembly.
6. Through October 1964, all parties to the
Cyprus dispute appeared convinced that the USSR sup-
ported the Greek Cypriots in their contest with the
Turks. Moscow was on record as against partition of
Cyprus and in favor of the political integrity and
independence of the island. The USSR also negotiated
an agreement to supply arms to the Cypriots, although
the terms of this agreement have never been revealed.
7. Beginning with Turkish Foreign Minister
Erkin's visit to Moscow in early November, the
pendulum of Soviet foreign policy appeared to swing
toward a more neutral--if not pro-Turkish--position.
Soviet spokesmen have emphasized that they have al-
ways opposed enosis (union with Greece) and that they
recognize the need to find a solution acceptable to
both ethnic communities on Cyprus. While both of these
views are opposed by the Greek Cypriots, it was For-
eign Minister Gromyko's suggestion that "federation"
might form:the basis for a Cyprus solution that
caused a violent reaction in both Athens and Nicosia.
Ankara has long demanded a "federal solution" for
Cyprus.
8. The Soviet Ambassador in Nicosia reportedly
has told Makarios that the USSR would not intervene
if Turkey were forced to take military action to
prevent enosis. Conversely, it appears unlikely that
Soviets would support partition of Cyprus as this
would also result in the island and its military bases
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falling under the control of NATO states. The USSR
presumably prefers a demilitarized, independent
republic in which the already powerful local com-
munist party might maneuver for eventual control.
9. There have been other disappointments for
the Greek Cypriots. Both Makarios and the Greek
Government have emphasized for months that Cypriot
hopes were focused on securing a favorable resolu-
tion from the United Nations General Assembly. The
Greeks and Greek Cypriots hoped to obtain a resolu-
tion supporting "unfettered independence and self-
determination"--the latter interpreted by the Greeks
in Athens as a synonym for enosis. They recognized
that there was little likelihood of obtaining sup-
port from the Western powers for a resolution which
would have the effect of nullifying the Cyprus Agree-
ment of 1960, Support, however, was anticipated
from both the Soviet Bloc and the non-aligned Afro-
Asian countries. Makarios assiduously has sought
to align Cyprus with the Afro-Asians on international
issues in preparation for the present session of the
UNGA.
10. The dispute in New York over Article 19 of
the Charter has made it uncertain when, if at all
during the current session, the Cyprus issue will
be discussed. In Nicosia and Athens, however, there
is no longer any real anticipation of victory at
the UNGA. This pessimism is based not only on the
change in Soviet policy toward Cyprus but also on
discovery of unexpected resistence among the Afro-
Asians to the use of the term "self-determination"--
when it obviously means enosis--in any resolution.
11. With little chance that the UNGA will move
the Cyprus problem toward solution, attention is
again turning to possible negotiations among the
parties directly involved. Greek-Turkish negotia-
tions, held under US sponsorship last summer, col-
lapsed partly as a result of inability of the
Greeks to sell the proposed compromise solution to
Makarios. It is generally accepted that in any
future negotiations the Greek Cypriot leadership
will have to be directly involved.
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12. UN mediator Galo Plaza has been mentioned
as a possible catalytic agent to get the parties
around a conference table. Plaza has been working
for several months on a report containing his recom-
mendations for a solution. Thus far, his report
has been very closely held and he apparently will
not make his recommendations known until the UNGA
debate is either completed or postponed. While
Plaza is generally well-liked in Athens and among
the Greek Cypriots, he is distrusted by the Turks.
13. There have been reports that exploratory
conversations between the Turks and Greeks and be-
tween the Greek Cypriots and the Turks have taken
place in New York. In the capitals concerned, how-
ever, the governments deny this and insist that pro-
posals for direct talks now are premature. Makarios
continues to insist that the only negotiations his
government will engage in would be with the only
other party "directly concerned," i.e., the Turkish
Cypriots.
14. In any negotiations, agreement might be
possible on many issues, including the desirability
of an independent republic and respect for the
island's territorial integrity. Two issues, how-
ever, would be extremely difficult to resolve.
Turkey demands a federal form of government with
geographic separation of the two communities and
with enosis permanently precluded. The Greek
Cypriots and the Greeks have termed "federation"
totally unacceptable and insist on the right of
the majority to determine the island's future
through the exercise of the right of self-determ-
ination. No government in Athens could expect
to survive if it participated in an agreement
permanently precluding enosis.
15. Makarios' real intentions on the subject
of enosis remain unclear. Last summer it was
generally assumed he opposed enosis, since the loss
of his own political power would inevitably follow.
His public attitude at that time, however, could
also be explained by his desire to court the So-
viet Bloc and the non-aligned countries which
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opposed enosis on the grounds that the island and its
military bases would be incorporated into NATO-member
Greece, Since the recent change in Soviet policy
and his realization that little was to be expected
from the UNGA, Makarios has again been reaffirming
that enosis is his ultimate goal.
16. While some observers have expressed hope
that the Greek Cypriots and the Greek Government now
may be more inclined to engage in negotiations, in
the wake of the erosion of their international po-
sition the possibility also exists that as frustra-
tions mount an even more dangerous situation may
develop.
17. As hopes of effective UN action have
dwindled in Athens and Nicosia, there have been
rumors that enosis might suddenly be proclaimed,
either by Makarios or following a military coup
against Makarios by Greek officers serving in high
positions on the island. Most observers feel,
however, that a proclamation of "instant enosis"
at this time is most unlikely because of a widely-
held conviction that Turkish reaction to such a move
would be violent. Far more probable would be the
slow implementation of a program leading to "de
facto enosis." Ties between Cyprus and Greece in
all fields--political, economic and social--would
be strengthened over a period of months or years until
Cyprus became, in effect, an integral part of the
Greek nation. This program presumably would be
less likely to provoke a reaction from either Turkey
or the Turkish Cypriots.
18. Makarios is committed to creation of ma-
jority rule on Cyprus with or without Turkish con-
currence. In addition to implementation of his 13
points, he has announced his intention to promulgate
a new electoral law in time for elections this
summer. This law would eliminate the constitutional
provision for separate elections for the two communi
ties.
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19. When questioned about probable Turkish
or Turkish Cypriot reaction to these moves, Makarios
indicated little concern. The Turkish Cypriots, he
stated, could participate in the creation of a new
government if they wished. If they refused, they
could stay in their "ghettos" and "wither on the
vine." As for Ankara, Makarios appears confident
that Cyprus is now too strong to be successfully
invaded.
20. This confidence presumably has been
strengthened by recent arrival on Cyprus of sig-
nificant quantities of Soviet-built military equip-
ment. In December 1964, a Soviet ship brought
more than 100 trucks to the island. In late Janu-
ary and early February, Greek ships arriving from
Alexandria reportedly have unloaded Soviet-built
anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, field artil-
lery pieces, considerable quantities of ammunition
and at least two motor for edo boats.
-34 tanks and possibly more torpedo
boats, are scheduled to arrive shortly. One of the
problems raised by the arrival of these items is the
possibility that the Greek Cypriots, particularly
General Grivas, may become dangerously overconfi-
dent.
21. The arrival of Soviet-built equipment may
cause other far-ranging repercussions. Recent progress
toward better relations between Moscow and Ankara
may be seriously affected. The Turks could even
consider the build-up of military equipment on
Cyprus so detrimental to their strategic interests
that they will attempt to destroy the equipment
before it reaches the operational units of the
Greek Cypriot National Guard.
22. The Greek Cypriots may decide to use their
military power to eliminate some of the smaller
Turkish enclaves on the island. Demands for the
stationing of Greek Cypriot police patrols in
these enclaves would be one possible way of pro-
voking the Turks into taking preventive action
and thus assume the onus of having resorted to
violence. Such action would be easier if present
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UN forces engaged in maintaining the cease-fire
were removed or reduced in number. The Cypriot
Government is said to be preparing to request the
UN Security Council to reduce the size of the
6,000-man UN force when the current mandate ex-
pires on 26 March. General Grivas, for one, re-
portedly is "fed-up" with constant UN surveillance
of his forces.
23. A more direct danger to peace involves the
Turkish Army unit on Cyprus. Ankara has announced
its intention to rotate part of its 650-man contin-
gent in late February. Makarios has stated that
the treaty providing for stationing of this unit on
Cyprus is "dead" and thus Turkey will not be per-
mitted to rotate its troops. Troop rotation caused
a crisis last fall and was finally resolved when the
Turkish Cypriots opened the Nicosia-Kyrenia road to
Greek Cypriot travel in return for the government's
acquiescence in the rotation. There are indications
that Makarios is again hoping to gain concessions in
return for permitting rotation. Turkish leaders have
warned, however, that this time there will be no
concessions and that attempts to delay the operation
will not be tolerated.
24. Despite serious erosion in their_'interna-
tional position during the past few weeks, the Greek
Cypriots still appear to have time on their side.
The high morale of the Turkish Cypriots today can be
expected to deteriorate again in the absence of some
solution which permits the several thousand refugees
to return to their homes. In a last desperate move to
force Turkish armed intervention, the Turkish Cypriots
may yet launch the long-predicted attack against
superior Greek Cypriot forces.
25. US and NATO interests would be directly
involved in any new crisis. While the Turkish Gov-
ernment may no longer be able to mount a successful
amphibious operation against Cyprus, because of the
greatly increased defensive capabilities of the
Cypriots, it could be expected again to launch air
attacks against Greek Cypriot positions. More
ominous, however, are reports from Ankara that in
case of new hostilities on Cyprus, the main Turkish
thrust will be against the Greek islands off the
Turkish coast or against Greek Thrace. (Map)
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12 February 1965
OCI No. 0276/65A
Copy No,//(2,
SPECIAL REPORT
SOVIET POLICY AND TACTICS IN THE CYPRUS DISPUTE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELL.IG ENCE
SECRET
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12 February 1965
The USSR has skillfully exploited the Cyprus
crisis to further a number of its policy objectives
in the eastern Mediterranean at the expense of the
West. It has been able to pursue its major goal of
weakening the NATO alliance by playing upon the am-
bitions and animosities of Greek and Turk without,
thus far at least, committing itself to any specific
course of action. In recent months Moscow has taken
a position more favorable to that of Turkey as the
new Soviet leadership has vigorously pursued a policy
of rapprochement with Ankara.
Soviet Objectives
Soviet policy in the east-
ern Mediterranean area has been
aimed primarily at reducing the
cohesion and effectiveness of
the southern flank of NATO.
Since the Cyprus crisis began,
the USSR has consistently pur-
sued this goal by exploiting
tensions among NATO allies and
by seeking to complicate efforts
to achieve a settlement of the
dispute. Thus, Moscow's policy
during the prolonged crisis and
Soviet gestures toward the Greek
Cypriots and the Turks have re-
sulted from strategic considera-
tions which transcended the pa-
rochial issues of contention on
the island.
Moscow's most immediate
goal in Cyprus has been the ter-
mination of Western base rights.
Soviet propaganda has encouraged
Greek Cypriot opposition to the
continuation of British sovereign
base areas on the island. The
USSR has also sought to discredit
those political elements in Cy-
prus favorable to the West and
to strengthen the already impres-
sive position of the Communist
Party of Cyprus.(AKEL). The
influence of AKEL grew consid-
erably during 1964 as the Ma-
karios government consistently
sought to give the impression
of a closeness of views between
the Greek Cypriot and Soviet
positions.
The USSR has portrayed it-
self as the champion of the in-
dependence and integrity of the
island. The Soviet Union has
consistently opposed enosis
(union with Greece). Soviet
statements in public forums of-
fering the Makarios' government
an alternate source of support
have encouraged it to maintain
its independence of Athens.
Soviet support for the
Makarios government, however,
was not dictated by any inher-
ent sympathy for.the Greek Cyp-
riots, but by the political and
strategic considerations already
outlined. In recent months, So-
viet officials have expressed
doubts about the long-term pos-
sibilities for Cypriot independ-
ence and have shown a full ap-
preciation for Makarios' capa-
city for duplicity. Even when
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it was attacking Turkey most
vigorously, the USSR managed
to keep open its lines of con-
tact with Ankara and to preserve
its freedom of maneuver for a
move toward rapprochement if
this were expedient. In fact,
it appears that both before and
during the crisis Moscow has
calculated that its objectives
in the area were more likely to
be achieved through closer re-
lations with Turkey.
In recent years the USSR
has made intermittent efforts
to improve relations with Tur-
key. These moves have been
prompted primarily by a desire
to reduce and ultimately elimi-
nate the extensive NATO presence
on the Soviet borders. As a
part of this program, the USSR
has slowly expanded its diplo-
matic, cultural, and economic
contacts with Ankara and has
tried to promote neutralism in
Turkey.
The most recent Soviet ef-
forts, begun in early or mid-
1962, were moderately success-
ful, and in June 1963 a Turkish
parliamentary delegation visited
the USSR. A Soviet delegation
was to have returned the visit
in January 1964, but the Cyprus
crisis led to the postponement
of this good-will gesture until
January.1965.
Initial Reaction--
Limited Support for a arios
Moscow's initial reaction
to the outbreak of communal
fighting on Cyprus in December
1963 was to give full support
to Makarios' renunciation of
the London and Zurich agreements
of 1960 which established Cyp-
riot independence. Soviet
propaganda emphasized the need
to respect the national inde-
pendence and territorial integ-
rity of the Cypriots and al-
leged that NATO was exploiting
communal tensions to justify
interference in the internal
affairs of the island.
Soviet support for Makar-
ios' efforts to block US-UK
plans for a NATO peacekeeping
force on the island was moti-
vated in part by a concern that
the West would succeed in using
the crisis to strengthen. its
military position in Cyprus--
thus jeopardizing Soviet se-
curity interests in the eastern
Mediterranean. These same stra-
tegic calculations led the USSR
to encourage Cypriot opposition
to British base rights.
At the same time, this
militant vocal support enabled
Moscow to undercut Chinese
charges that it was indifferent
to anti-Western movements among
oppressed nationalities.. Fi-
nally, by encouraging the Greek
Cypriots, who were trying to
reduce the political role of
the Turkish community, Moscow
sought to aggravate relations
between Ankara and Athens, thus
further weakening the southern
sector of NATO.
Despite its interest in
encouraging Makarios to termi-
nate the London and Zurich
agreements, the USSR carefully
avoided any commitment to sup-
port the Cypriot Government
militarily.J
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Tentative Gestures
Toward Ankara
A new phase opened up last
spring and summer as Moscow ap-
parently calculated that the
danger of Turkish intervention
had diminished. During this
period, Moscow began to spell
out its opposition to enosis
more clearly and at the same
time sought to draw the anti-
Turkish sting out of earlier
statements. This tactic was re-
flected in a 4 May Khrushchev,
statement in Izvestia and a
Pravda article a same day.
Both commentaries sought to lay
the blame for the crisis on "the
imperialists and reactionaries
that have their own special plans
for Cyprus."
sources, e also offered
Ankara aid and indicated that,
as a gesture of friendship, a
Soviet parliamentary delegation
would visit Turkey in July. On
2 June, Turkish Foreign Minister
Erkin told the press that the
USSR had given assurances that
it would not supply weapons and
war material to Cyprus.
Opposition to
Turkic Intervention
By the end of July, however,
tensions in Cyprus had again
raised the danger of Turkish
intervention. On 26 July Pravda
published a highly inflammatory
interview with Archbishop Ma-
kariosin which he expressed his
"appreciation" for remarks made.
earlier in the month by Khru-
shchev concerning Cyprus. Ma-
karios interpreted these remarks
as a "serious warning" to Tur-
key against invasion; Khrushchev's
statement fell far short of this,
but Pravda allowed Makarios to
give x t bellicose ring.
At the same time, however,
Moscow may have become concerned
that the Greek Cypriots had be-
gun to believe their own pro pa-
7
asked the Soviet Union "to in-
tervene" on its behalf, accord-
ing to the Cypriot foreign min-
ister. Khrushchev responded im-
mediately with noncommittal notes
to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu
and to Makarios. Only on 15
August, after the danger of fur-
ther Turkish attack had subsided,
did a Soviet Government state-
ment promise "help" in the event
of foreign invasion.
Moscow apparently issued
some private warnings to Turkey,
but it is unclear how specific
these were. Erkin told the US
ambassador that on 15 August
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
stated that in case of further
Turkish military activity in
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Cyprus, the USSR "will help Cy-
prus militaril "
Following
up these conversations, Erkin
approached the US ambassador on
more than one occasion for US
assurances of support in the
event of Soviet retaliation
against further Turkish military
action in Cyprus. Erkin may
have elaborated on Gromyko's
warning simply to obtain assur-
ances from the US before Turkey
undertook any further action in
Cyprus.
The Soviet Government state-
ment of 15 August offered to
open negotiations with Cyprus
concerning the "help" to be
rendered in case of an invasion.
As a result of this offer, a
Greek Cypriot delegation traveled
to Moscow and on 30 September
signed an agreement with the
USSR. The full details of this
agreement have not yet been re-
ported, but there is speculation
that it covered a wide range of
military material.
Deliveries under the pact
began in January 1965 and are
likely to be finished by mid-
February. The USSR is known
to have transshipped, through
Egyptian ports, antiaircraft
guns and artillery, tanks and
armored cars, as well as spare
arts and ammunition.
Recent Moves Toward Turkey
By the time of the Cypriot
visit to Moscow it was already
becoming clear that the USSR
was determined to resume its
efforts to improve relations
with Ankara, and it is unlikely
that the Greek Cypriots received
many specific promises from the
Soviet authorities. Moscow may
have calculated that Turkey had
abandoned further plans for an
attack on Cyprus and that Arch-
bishop Makarios was moving to-
ward accepting enosis. Under
these circumstances, it was not
only possible but necessary to
seek an improvement of relations
with Turkey and to base this
effort in part on a common op-
position to enosis.
Moscow's efforts have been
facilitated by Ankara's convic-
tion that the West had not given
it adequate support over Cyprus.
In the latter half of 1964, this
disillusionment led to a feeling
in Turkey that it was necessary
to improve relations with the
USSR. The first step in this
effort was Erkin's 30 October -
6 November visit to Moscow.
This visit, first proposed
by the USSR in mid-1963, was
used by both governments to dem-
onstrate a renewed warmth in re-
lations. This took the form of
a Soviet recognition of the
"lawful rights" of the Turkish
community on the island--a tac-
tical gain from the Turkish
point of view--and an agreement
on cultural and scientific ex-
changes. Subsequently, a Turkish
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technical delegation visited
the USSR in December for two
weeks and concluded an agreement
to expand trade.
The USSR quickly responded
to the Erkin visit by sending
to Turkey the longadelayed par-
liamentary delegation, led by
presidium member Podgorny, from
4 to 13 January 1965. During
the visit Podgorny made routine
reference to such issues as Turk-
ish adherence to NATO and sought
support for the Soviet position
on UN Article 19, but directed
most of his. efforts toward im-
proving the atmosphere of rela-
tions. He offered economic aid
to Turkey and invited both Pres-
ident Gursel and Prime Minister
Inonu to visit the USSR.
Despite a Turkish show of
optimism that the USSR is moving
to endorse Ankara's position on
Cyprus, Podgorny specifically
refused to recognize the validity
of the London and Zurich agree-
ments--which give Turkey the
right to intervene militarily.
Moreover, on 13 January TASS an-
nounced a visit to Moscow of an
AKEL delegation to discuss the
Cyprus situation. This announce-
ment reiterated the standard So-
viet line that the independence
and integrity of Cyprus must be
respected, that foreign inter-
ference must be avoided, and that
the Cypriots must be free to de-
cide their own affairs.
o gorny promised a statement en-
dorsing the principle of federa-
tion as a possible means of set-
tling the dispute on the island.
This promise was partially ful-
filled by an equivocal statement
in Izvestia by Gromyko on 21
January. Gromyko suggested that
federation might be chosen by
the Cypriot people, but immedi-
ately qualified this statement
by indicating that such a "sys-
tem presupposes the existence of
a single centralized government."
Although Gromyko's refer-
ence to federation excited the
most comment among the princi-
pals to the dispute, it was al-
most certainly intended to be
read as part of a larger scheme
which would contain elements
pleasing to both the Greek Cyp-
riots and to Ankara. Moscow
probably was aware of the opposi-
tion in Athens and Nicosia to
federation, but it appears to
have miscalculated the intensity
of the emotional impact of the
term "federal solution." This
suggests that Soviet efforts to
pursue a consistent policy, while
giving the appearance of being
all things to all men, may have
finally broken down. Moscow's
recent stand, for instance, has
already begun to erode the once-
strong position of AKEL on the
island and appears to have se-
verely reduced its chances of
coming to power by electoral
means.
Behind the balancing act
attempted by Gromyko, however,
was a clear statement of basic
Soviet interests in the affair:
opposition to enosis and to the
presence of foreign troops on
the island. Gromyko declared
that "the main thing now is to
ensure Cyprus' independence and
territorial integrity" and that
"the withdrawal of all foreign
troops" is necessary.
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Outlook: Limitations on
Soviet Action
Soviet goals have not
shifted since the downfall of
Khrushchev, but the new leaders
appear to be moving with greater
vigor to improve relations with
Ankara. Erkin's visit was the
first by a high-level foreign
non-Communist official after
the fall of Khrushchev. The
dispatch of a figure with the
stature of Podgorny and the
propaganda treatment of his
visit reflect considerable So-
viet interest in impressing Tur-
key with the potential gains of-
fered.by closer relations.
Despite Moscow's quick rec-
ognition and exploitation of
Turkish disillusionment with
the West, Soviet policy is to
a degree limited by past Soviet
initiatives. The logic of the
situation following the Turkish
air strikes in August demanded
at least the offer to "help"
the Cypriots. This help is
probably not of such a magnitude
as to have a serious effect on
the military situation on the
island, but its psychological
impact could damage the Soviet
position in Turkey. Moscow,
moreover, would face a genuine
dilemma if Turkey should take
a threatening stand against Ma-
karios' recent steps to promul-
gate an electoral law which dis-
regards the terms of the London
and Zurich agreements.
Finally, Soviet leaders
are probably aware of the fra-
gile nature of the recent improve-
ment in relations with Turkey.
The rapprochement of the past
few months has been undertaken
over the opposition of the Jus-
tice Party, which now appears
likely to win the forthcoming
elections in Turkey. Despite
growing trends of independence
and opportunism in Ankara's for-
eign policy, there remains a
strong current of anti-Russian
feeling in Turkey and it is un-
likely that there will be any
significant change in attitudes
in the next few years.
Despite these limitations
on its freedom of action, the
USSR will continue to seek to
expand its role in the eastern
Mediterranean at the expense of
the West. It is unlikely to
assist in seeking a solution of
the Cyprus problem, since it has
most to gain by a continuation
of tensions between Greek and
Turk. The USSR might actively
oppose any solution which par-
titioned the island, as was pro-
posed by Turkey last summer.
Moscow is likely, however, to
pursue its rapprochement with
Ankara as far as possible, with-
out compromising its position
elsewhere: in the Afro-Asian world
in the event of renewed Turkish
threats of intervention.
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@guqvs Registry
10 FEB 1965
Honorable John A. McCone
Director, Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20025
The recently published National Intelligence Estimate,
"Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1964-1970,"
is an excellent document which promises to be very helpful.
It represents a marked improvement in our understanding of
the Soviet forces, an improvement which should assist us
greatly in our planning for the future.
I notice that the estimate reflects the kind of examination
of evidence which I had in mind when I asked that a joint
CIA/DIA study group on this problem be established two years
ago. I trust that this group will continue to function as
needed, and will make a final report on what it has been
possible to accomplish before disbanding.
I am sending a similar letter to the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency.
.0
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