CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400030005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 21, 1961
• Content Type: MFR

CIA TS #172,939
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21 April 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Considerations in the Establishment of a Defense
Intelligence Agency
GENERAL
On 2 10 arch 1961, in response to a request by the Secretary
of Defense. the JCS recommended establishment of a Defense Intel-
ligence Agency (DIA) under the JCS. In commenting on the Chiefs'
recommendation, many of the staff advisers of the Secretary of
Defense questioned the desirability of placing the DIA under the JCS.
Their concern centered about three distinct but interrelated issues:
Could the DIA perform its assigned functions under the
JCS?
2. Would DIA be truly a consolidation of the DOD intelli-
gence effort, or would it only amount to another agency
loosely imposed on the existing intelligence structure of
the Services?
. Would DIA produce 'military as distinguished from
national' intelligence?
On 3 April 1961. the Secretary of Defense requested the JCS
to develop the rationale underlying their original proposal of
2 March 1961. with particular regard to the three issues noted above.
The memorandum also raised a series of associated subsidiary
questions designed to more closely define the basic problem.
The ICS reply of 13 April 1961 sufficiently elaborated the
proposal so that Judgments can be offered.
With respect to the first two issues noted above, it is our
opinion that should the DIA be placed under the JCS. it would be able
to satisfactorily perform its functions as a truly consolidated intelli-
gence agency. We base this opinion in part upon careful consideration
of intent of the Chiefs' reply to the Secretary's request of 3 April
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and in part. upon our conclusion that sufficient safeguar4s can
be built into the charter of DIA to ensure the desired result.
THE ISSUE; OF "NATIONAL" VERSUS "MILITARYi
INTEl LiGENCE
The question has been raised whether a Defense Intelligence
ncy placed under the JCS would satisfy the "national ' intelligence
nsibilities of the Secretary of Defense. This question appears
based on a misconception of the intelligence responsibilities
Depart.ruent of Defense. According to the National Security
Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's) the Dool is not responsible
for "national" intelligence; this is the responsibility of the Director
of Central Intelligence supported by the United States Intelligence
11,'oard. The DoD? like other executive departments. is responsible
for "departmental intelligence. "Departmental(' intelligence for the
''..)01..) has been defined by the NSCIDis se "military" intelligence.
ertinent ecerpt. (underlining added) from the NSCIDIs are:
"National intelligence is that intelligence which is required
for the formulation of national security policy, concerns/
more than one department or &teen!, and transcends the
exclusive convetence of a eillesliepartment or agtrcy.
The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce national
intelligence with the support of the U. S. Intelligence
Board. . . (NSCI) No. I)
Z.The Director of Central Intelligence shall dies . inate
national intelligence. (NSCID No. I)
"Departmental intelligence is that intelligence which
any department or agency requires to execute its awn
i.sion. . (NSCID No. 1)
rt Tient of Defense shall produce mill
SCID No. 3)
's The Dopartment of Defense shall have primary re.
ponsibilfty for . . . collection of military intelligence
information. . . (This includes scientific, technical
and economic information directly pertinent to Llol)
) (NSCID No. 2)
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-t.5 or THE OR
TION for mitt
We have onsidered five
;)IA within the Dort
1. Under the Joint Stafli
2. Under one of the military departments;
the Cities of the Secretary of Default
4. Under the JCS; and
tly lmder the C
JCS.
s for locating a
L Assigrn.ut under the Joint 5taf This alternative
Act, as amend
no executive author
Z.
by
states that the Joint Staff "s
.Assigament Under eall of I The
Cormack Amendment would to 011* of the
itary departments. From a purely administrative point of view,
would be the simplest solution but we do not regard this as a
ixable solution. Military intelligence is a defeaae-wide activity
which employs many people and utilises extensive facilities and
resources in each of the military departments. More importantly,
--)coD intelligence activities are entwined wit) strategic planning and
the operations of the unified and specified commands. Neither of
thee. are respetuabilities of the military departments. The assign-
ment of DIA to one military department would introduce a4 additional
complicating factor in the already complex relationships which exist
between the unified commands, their components. and the military
departments. Aside from this, it would be quite difficult to deter-
mine a basis for assignment of the Defense intelligence function to
any particular military department, or to convince these who die -
greed that each assignment was anything ether than an arbitrary
decision.
could be
an Assistant t
report directi
the ice the Secretary of D.fsllaa: This
d under as Assistant Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of Defense, or by having the agency head
to the Secretary of Defense.
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a. Advocates tat the Aye
f5ecretary or agency head couldmake
decisions an resources and management wMc
zloty be hard to develop and implement under the
JCS system. It is further argued that this course
of action would ensure "civilian" control. In
short, this alternative alone it is contended would
ensure the Secretary of Defeat: that the intelligence
forts of the DoD will be efficiently and forcefully
conducted t always subject to his control.
Opponents of this alternative point to the fundamental
principle that intelligence wad military operations are
inseparable. This principle is illustrated at the unified
and specified command level and below, where both
intelligence and operational considerations are integrated
by the responsible commander and his cliff; they are not
separated. It is argued that the principle is equally valid
at the Department of Defense level where strategic planning
and direction are integrated by the Secretary of Defense.
with the assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This pro
cakes of integration is compile= it requires a large staff.
It cannot be performed, it is said, when the staff responn
sibility for the intelligence function is separated from the
staff responsibility for the operational function. In addi-
tion, this alternative would assign to a staff advisor of
the Secretary operational responsibilities which are
presently discharged by the unified command structure
through the JCS.
c. A suggested variant of this alternative would designate
a principal assietant to the Secretary of Defense es
responsible for DoD istelligence "policy, " but would
assign the DIA to the JCS. We believe this is unsound
since there is insufficient DoD intelligence " to
warrant appointment of a separate staff assistant for
this purpose alone.
under the Jo
Chiefs of Staff:
w ?? 11.???????
The principal arra-no/at in favor of tlds alternativeis
that strategic planning and intelligence are so closely
related that they cannot be separated. In addition it
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this alternative would implement approved
as of the Joist Study Group (Kirkpatrick)
role and responeibilitiee of the JCS and
unified and specified commanders in intelligence matters
should be strengthened. Further it would not involve
a staff office of OSE) in detailed operational matters.
Finally this alternative is the unanimous recommembt-
tion of the JCS and of the Secretaries of the three military
3epartruents.
Opponents of this alternative consider that there is every
evidence that the Department-wide intelligence function
may 'slier in effectiveness U eubordinated to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Instead of a real "union" of intelligence
functions. a DIA under the JCS will develop into nothing
ore than a loose confederation of quasi.-independent
ganisations operating under an additional layer of
inistrative control. Furthermore, opponents fear
that the JCS might inhibit the Director. DIA. from free
and direct access to ether components of Do and to
other organisations in the national intelligence community.
ALS IIAMISt. directly underthe Ch man Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Under this alternative. DIA would report directly to the
Chairman. JCS. This might eliminate the claimed
fieficiencies of "committee management" while keep ng
,)IA closely connected with the JCS structure. Such a
solution, however, would raise complex and far-reaching
legal questions to which no definite answers can be given.
. /0 U. S. C. 14Z(c) provides, in part, that the Chairman
may not exorcise military command over. . . any of
the armed forces. It can be argued that placing DIA
under the Chairman would violate this prohibition. but
the issue is not as clear-cut as it appears on the sur-
face. There are counter arguments.
The legislative history of the phrase. may net exer-
cise command over. . . any of the armed foreesr ie
not conclusive. In the first place "military command"
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d. Congrese apjrsut1y had in
milftary man rom riinetagi the
?e." There is no evidence that
Congress conside ed the problem in terms of placing
a joint agency under the Chairman.
Secondly, the meaning of the term any of the armed
forces" is ambiguous. Title 10, United States Code.
defines "armed forces's as the Army. Navy, Air Force
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. If the term "any" is
construed to mean "say one" then DIA. is not an armed
force. Conversely. if the term is construed to mean
any part" then DIA, composed of military personnel,
ails within the meaning of any of the armed forces."
As to this the legisLative history is insufficient to clearly
ascertain the intent of the Congress.
A review of the Congressional comments and debates
attending the passage of this legislation, however, leads
to the conclusion that a strong argument could be made
in support of the proposition that assignment of 1.31.A_ to
the Chairman would be contrary to the intent of the
Congress.
. There remains a further legal possibility Assuming
arguendo that the Secretary of Defense is prohibited
by law from assigning to the Chairman the authority
over DIA that the Secretary considers essential, it can
be argued that what the Secretary is prevented from
doing by statute, the President could accomplish by
executive order in the exercise of hie Constitutional
powers as Commander-ind?Chisf.
Chief Justice Taney observed in the ea:* of Flarm.ing v.
page. 9 Howard 603, 618 (1850)
commando in-chief. he Abe President) ja
authorised to direct the movement of the nava
And military forces placed by him at his command,
and to employ them in any manner he may deem
effective.
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h. There are no cases, however, precisely in point as to
whether the President as Commander-in-Chief would be
bound by a statutory prohibition against the Chairman's
exercising military command. This would present a
grave Constitutional question. There are strong &ZVI...
minds pro and con.
. There is a further issue. Regardless of legal argumente
many important Congressmen like Mr. Vinson are opposed
to a single chief of staff for the armed forces. Placing
DIA under the Chairman might be construed as a step
toward a single chief of staff. Thus, the extremely sensi-
tive problem of intelligence might be interjected into the
political arena with adverse consequences.
We question whether the advantages that could be attained
by placing DIA under the Chairman, would merit the danger
of involving the vital subject of intelligence in political
controversy.
7iNCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
None of the alternatives discussed above are wholly satisfactory.
On balance, the choice is essentially between placing the DIA in OI)
or placing it under the JCS. We believe that it should be placed under
the JCS provided there are proper safeguards. Our principal reason
is that the intelligence function is inextricably linked to the strategic
planning responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By this standard,
the DIA should be assigned to the JCS. We believe that this is the
underlying principle upon which the JCS and the Secretaries of the
Military Departments made their recommendations. Although we are
mindful of the repeated argument that the JCS would not provide the
kind of direction to the DIA which the Secretary of Defense would
require, we consider placing DIA under the JCS to be a matter of
principle, while the argument against is a matter of performance.
We feel performance should be adjusted to accord with the principle --
not the converse. Certain specific authorities can be incorporated
Into the charter establishing the DIA to make sure the new organisation
will be completely responsive to intelligence needs of Ow calm* Defense
establishment. These include specifying the rank and powers of the
Director, the functions of DIA, and ensuring that the Director will have
free and unrestricted access to DoD components and to any other
organization in the national intelligence complwtity.
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it Ari
if the rotary of Defenie approves the above recommendation
will provide the following implementing papers:
I. A cri .orandurl for the JCS, the Secretariies of
the Military Departments, and principal staff
assistants of the 5 cc rotary outlining the approved
concept aad plan for the DIA.
aft Do.D Directive establishing the DIA with
i,t plernenting memo rends.
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PRIVILLGa itiFORMATION
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(DRAFT)
MORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE
MIT ART DEPARTMENTS
4RECTOR or DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND ENCINEERING
C,HAIRt4ANt JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
i'SSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
'NERAL COUNSEL. OF THE
DEPART4ENT OF DEFENSE
'-'1STANT5 TO THE SECRETARY
OF 027.FENSE
J3JECT: Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency
I. After careful consideration of the issues and problerle
involved, I have decided to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) reporting to me through the Joint Chiefs of staff. Attached
a draft DoD Directive creating DIA.
Z. The principal objectives in establishing a DIA are to
obtain unity of effort among all components of the Jepartment of
fe se in developing military intelligence and a strengthening
the over-all capacity of the Department of Defense for the
llection, production, and dissemination of intelligence information.
3. Although perhaps of lesser priority, but certainly not of
lesser importance. are the objectives of obtaining a more efficient
allocation of scarce intelligence resources. more effective manage-
ient of all Dol) intelligence activities, and the elimination of all
duplicating facilities, organisations, and tasks.
. I desire to emphasize rny intent that DIA will fully integrate
the intelligence resources and function, assigned to its control; it
ovoix":5 -
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is not a confederation. DIA will not be an additional layer of
trative control superimpoited upon the top of the existing
intelligence organizations.
5. The draft Directive does not put allDal) intelligence and
related activities in one organization. Special operations will remain
the responsibility of an Assistant to the Secretary of Uttionale *ad
OMINT, tLINT and COMSEC will remain the responsibility of NSA.
While a ma}or part of DoD intelligence activities will be brought
mder DIA, important activitieo such as counterintelligence, personnel
and industrial security, and technical intelligence probably will
continue to be conducted by the military departments under the
coordination of DIA. The draft Directive, of necessity. C&nnOt treat
how these d other details of rAtA ar. to be implemented. At the
me the Directive is signed. I shall provide a mechanism for resolving
uch problems to the end that DIA may become fully operational ats
possible.soon as I regard this objective as a matter of the highest
priority.
I approve on an intezlxn basis the appointment and member-
ship of a Military Intelligence board Min as outlined in the JCS
d plan for a DIA, dated Z March 1961, to act only as an
ody to the Director, DIA. The MIB will meet on the call
ctor, DIA. When DIA has become fully operational I will
the desirability and utility of continuing the MIB.
rec
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7. Ln light of the basic concepts and decisions outlined above,
please submit your comments on the draft Directive to the General
Counsel of the Department of Defense, by
:7?7;ectarv of Defense
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1[ CONFIDENTIAL - 4 May 61
(DRAFT) DECLASSIFIED - 4 Nov 61
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE
SUBJECT: Defense Intelligence Agency
References: (a) DoD Directive 5148.4, "Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)"
(b) DoD Directive 5100.23, "Administrative
Arrangements for the National Security
Agency"
(c) DoD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of
DoD and Its Major Components"
(d) DoD Directive C-2000.5
(e) DoD Directive S-5100. 20
(f) DoD Directive C-5200.5
I. GENERAL
A. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense
and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is hereby established as an
agency of the Department of Defense under the direction, authority
and control of the Secretary of Defense.
B. Functions, Authorities, and Responsibilities assigned
by references (b), (e), and (f) are excluded from the scope of this
Directive.
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II. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND
The Defense Intelligence Agency shall consist of:
A. A Director, a Deputy Director, a Chief of Staff, a head-
quarters establishment, and such subordinate units, facilities, and
activities as are specifically assigned to the Agency by the Secretary
of Defense or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting under the authority
and direction of the Secretary of Defense.
B. Such subordinate organizations as are established by the
Director, DIA, for the accomplishment of DIA.'s mission.
C. The chain of command shall run from the Secretary of
Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Director, DIA.
Guidance to the Director, DIA, shall be furnished by the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting under the authority and
direction of the Secretary of Defense, and the United States Intelli-
gence Board.
III. RESPONSIBILITIES
The Defense Intelligence Agency, under the direction and
operational control of its Director, shall be responsible for:
A. The organization, direction, management, and control
of all Department of Defense intelligence resources assigned to or
included within the DIA.
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B. Review and coordination of those Department of Defense
intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the military depart-
ments. Over-all guidance for the management of such functions will
be developed by the Director, DIA, for review, approval, and promul-
gation by the Secretary of Defense.
C. Supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs,
policies, and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA.
D. Obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the
allocation and management of Department of Defense intelligence
resources. This includes analysis of those DoD intelligence activities
and facilities which can be fully integrated or co-located with non-DoD
intelligence organizations.
E. Responding directly to priority requests levied upon the
Defense Intelligence Agency by USIB.
F. Satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major corn-
ponents of the Department of Defense.
IV. FUNCTIONS
Under its Director, the Defense Intelligence Agency shall per-
form the following functions:
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A. Develop and produce all DoD intelligence lestimate?jand
_ _
en,Lis-,Zid> 1- ME s a" Si J ' t- S 4 \
DoD ftnformationor the United States Intelligence Board. Such
A
estimates may indicate differences in analysis and evaluation.
B. Provide for the assembly, integration, and validation
of all Department of Defense intelligence requirements and the
assignment of relative priorities thereto; assign specific require-
ments to Department of Defense collection resources; and originate
requests, when necessary, to non-Department of Defense collection
resources to fulfill DoD requirements.
C. Establish a single DoD Collection Requirements Registry
and Facility which will be fully compatible with any National Require-
ments Registry and Facility.
D. Provide programs, policies, and procedures for DoD
collection activities.
E. Conduct such counterintelligence functions as may be
subsequently assigned to DIA.
F. Provide for the integration of all Department of Defense
current intelligence production.
G. Establish and maintain the DoD Indications Center.
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H. Conduct coordinating and planning activities to achieve
the maximum economy and efficiency in the management of all
Department of Defense intelligence activities.
I. Provide the Secretary of Defense, the staff assistants to
the Secretary, the military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
specialized DoD agencies, the unified and specified commands, and
other organizations in the national intelligence community with mili-
tary intelligence.
J. Provide DIA research and development requirements.
K. Develop plans for the integration of DoD intelligence and
counterintelligence training programs, career development programs
for intelligence personnel, general support programs, and other
intelligence activities of the military departments.
L. Cooperate with the Central Intelligence Agency and other
intelligence organizations for mutual support; common and combined
usage of facilities, resources, and training programs; and elimina-
tion of duplication.
M. Provide in the person of the Director, DIA, one of the
Department of Defense representatives to the United States Intelli-
gence Board.
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N. Provide for DoD representation on USIB committees.
0. Develop plans, programs, policies, and procedures to
make the maximum use of the intelligence contributions of all
attaches and MAAG's.
P. Provide guidance, in conformance with USIB policies, to
the major components of the Department of Defense on the public
release of Defense intelligence information.
Q. Develop plans, programs, policies, and procedures for
intelligence mapping and charting activities.
R. Develop common DoD systems and procedures for pre-
paring and administering a consolidated budget for all DoD intelli-
gence activities. Such systems and procedures shall be approved
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) before submis-
sion to the Secretary of Defense.
S. Discharge such other intelligence functions as the Secretary
of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff may assign.
V. RELATIONSHIPS
A. In the performance of its functions, the Defense Intelligence
Agency shall:
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1. Coordinate actions as appropriate with the other
components of the Department of Defense and with
those departments and agencies of government
having collateral or related functions in its field
of assigned responsibilities.
2. Maintain appropriate liaison with the other components
of the DoD and with the necessary departments and
agencies of the government for the exchange of infor-
mation and findings in the field of its assigned respon-
sibility.
B. The military departments and other DoD components shall
provide support, within their respective fields of responsibility, to
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency as may be necessary
to carry out the assigned responsibilities of the Agency.
VI. AUTHORITY
To discharge the responsibilities of the Agency, the Director,
DIA, or his designees, are specifically delegated authority tc:
L Have free and unrestricted access to and direct com-
munication with all elements of the Department of
Defense and wi-th-ay other organizations in the
national intelligence community.
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2. Operate and control all organizations, activities, and
resources assigned or attached to the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency.
3. Establish DIA intelligence facilities taking-over or
using, wherever feasible, established facilities of the
military departments.
4. Obtain such information from any component of the
DoD as may be necessary for the performance of
DIA's functions.
5. Supervise the execution of approved plans, programs,
policies, and procedures for those DoD intelligence
functions and activities not directly assigned to DIA.
6. Centralize or consolidate the functions for which DIA
is responsible to the extent the Director deems feasible
and desirable in consonance with the aims of maximum
over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness.
VII. ADMINISTRATION
A. The appointment of all general and flag officers and civilian
officials of comparable rank of the Agency shall be approved by the
Secretary of Defense.
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B. The Director, Deputy Director, and Chief of Staff of the
Defense Intelligence Agency shall be commissioned officers of the
Armed Forces on active duty and normally shall be from different
services. However, there shall be no established system of inter-
Service rotation or designation for these key posts. The Director
shall have at least three-star rank while serving in this position.
C. The Defense Intelligence Agency will be authorized such
personnel, facilities, funds, and other administrative support as the
Secretary of Defense deems necessary for the performance of its
functions. The military departments and other DoD components
shall provide support as necessary for the Agency. Budgeting and
funding for the Agency will be in conformance with policies established
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
D. The assignment of personnel to the Agency will be subject
to the approval of the Director, DIA.
VIII. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Directive is effective upon publication. All components
of the Department of Defense will review their existing directives,
instructions, and regulations for conformity with this Directive and
submit necessary amendments thereto to the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense within 90 days.
Secretary of Defense
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