LETTER TO GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER FROM MARSHALL S. CARTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000300190017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: February 6, 1965
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved ,W Release 2004/01/15 CIA-RDP80BO16 6R000300190017-3
6 February 1965
General Carlo G. 'heeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D. C.
Dear Go ral Wheelers
I am attaching as a matter e-hich I am sure
w 'U be of tut asst to YOU a memorandum prepared
by the CIA Office of National Estimates concerning
the Kosygtn visit to Hanoi.
Faithfully yours,
(Si;i~ed)' c
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant Ganoral. USA
Acting Director
Attachment
0 - ea addressee
Identical letters also sent to:
Mr. Bromley Smith
Honorable John T. McNaughton
The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
The Honorable George W. Ball
EHKnoche:blh (6 February 1965)
Dist,' bution:
25X1 C`...`' grr
ER via Executive Director
1 -A D/NE
1 -DD/I
l61
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000300190017-3
 Approved FF r Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP80B01676R000300190017-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
5 February 1965
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 7-65
SUBJECT: The Dimensions of Kosygin'a Trip
Premier Kosygin's Hanoi trip is, clearly, the most distinct
reflection yet seen of what appears to be a basic Soviet decision
to contest the spread of Chinese Communist influence in the Far
East. This constitutes the sharpest break to date from the foreign
policies of Khruehchev, who had more or less abandoned the Far
Eastern field to the Chinese.
This Soviet decision is also of major consequence for the
Vietnam war. It indicates a Soviet estimate that, although there
remains a chance that the US might expand the war, it probably
will not, and that a Communist victory is drawing near. In the
Soviet view such a victory, as matters now stand, would redound
excessively to Chinese advantage. We accordingly believe that
the Soviet leaders seek to share -- and guide -- what they believe
to be a Communist bandwagon. Kosygin's efforts will probably
be designed to inspirit the DRV and improve its defense capabili-
ties, to deter the US from deciding to go North at this late date,
and to enhance the DRV bargaining position for any negotiations
with the GVN/US.
We should expect some Soviet proposals to negotiate a settle-
ment, fashioned to facilitate subsequent DRV subversion of the
South. The Soviet leaders would hope through such means to inflict
defeat on the US without either expanded war or inordinate Chinese gain.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
S-E-C-R-E-T declassification
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000300190017-3
 Approved4 Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP80B00 6R000300190017-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
A. Soviet Policy and Communist China
1. Kosygin's projected trip to Hanoi indicates a major
development not only in the immediate Vietnam theater, but in
general Soviet policy respecting the Far East. From the viewpoint
of Moscow, Far Eastern developments over the last year or so were
generally bad. Communist China became a nuclear power and grew
more intractable than ever. North Korea and North Vietnam slid
steadily toward the Chinese camp, while a purge was required to
combat anti-Soviet tendencies in Outer Mongolia. Peiping captured
the Japanese party. The Indonesian Communist Party confirmed its
alignment with the CCP, and the massive Soviet investment in
Indonesia failed to prevent a surging state-to-state rapprochement
between the outlaws, Djakarta and Peiping.
2. Amid this deterioration of Soviet positions, Khrushchev
acted like a man who had recognized a dead end and accepted it.
In Indochina he gave every evidence of wishing to disengage and
to leave the whole sorry mess to the Chinese and Americans to
fight over. This became the first of his foreign policies to be
reversed after his overthrow, and there have followed a series
of reassertions of Soviet involvement in both Laos and Vietnam,
climaxed by the announcement of Kosygin's trip. The responses to
- 2 -
S- E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000300190017-3
 Approvedr Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP80B076R000300190017-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
these preparatory steps have apparently given the Soviets reason
to believe that Hanoi could be worked back toward its earlier
mid-position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
3. There is good evidence that the new Soviet leaders con-
cluded, from their first post-Khrushchev soundings, that China
was no less an enemy than before. And the possibility that the
US might be pushed out of Indochina, taken with China's other gains
of late, must have suggested to them that China was making rapid
strides -- abetted by Soviet default -- towards a dominant posi-
tion in much of the Far East. In this context the journey of
Kosygin to Hanoi -- despite the stop in Peiping en route -- takes
meaning as signifying a basic Soviet decision to contest this
Chinese advance.
4. If so, then how to contest it? In Vietnam itself, the
Soviet answer is to go to the aid of Hanoi. Another possible
action is to exert military pressure on the Sino-Soviet border,
and indeed there is some suggestion of this in recent months.
Beyond this, it is harder to see. The conflict with China should
commend to the USSR a major effort to cultivate state relations
with Japan, but this has not yet developed; Moscow remains unwilling
thus far to make even the moderate concession of returning two
- 3 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000300190017-3
 ? Approver Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP80B, 76R000300190017-3
S-E- C-R- E-T
insignificant islands to Japan.* As for Indonesia, the USSR
appears almost as powerless as the US to reason with Sukarno or
to apply effective pressure on him. The Soviets apparently judge
that their military aid cannot be used as a political lever
without great danger of backfiring. In effect, they are reduced
to endorsing Sukarno's policies, swallowing their disappointments
and fears, and hoping that a post-Sukarno regime will reorient
Indonesian policy in a more pro-Soviet direction.
5. It is sometimes suggested that the USSR, sharing with
the US a common concern over China, might propose or agree to
concert Asian policies with Washington. This seems very doubtful.
In the first place, North Vietnam and Indonesia can hardly be won
to the Soviet slde by tactics of appeasing the US. In the second
place, where Soviet and US interests coincide, as in India, Moscow
finds its policies reinforced by Washington without any explicit
coordination. In.the third place, real collaboration still comes
hard to the Soviet Communists.
6. If the foregoing arguments are valid, they seem to lead
back to a Soviet need for actions which could weaken China directly.
Perhaps the reason is that the USSR fears to open up territorial
questions in even the slightest way lest this stimulate irredentist
demands in China and East Europe.
- 4 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000300190017-3
 Approve 0r Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP80BIS76R000300190017-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
These could include a total economic embargo, military incursions,
incitement of dissidence in Chinese border regions, or - as an
extreme -- attacks on Chinese advanced weapons facilities. Yet
Moscow must feel the outlook for such sanctions unpromising. Some
of them involve a greater degree of manifest hostility than the
Soviets probably want to display at this stage. Moreover, Peiping
could cut off Soviet land communications with Southeast Asia. The
Chinese could also bring added disruption to bear among Communist
and rag-tag groups the world around.
7. These difficulties make the belated Soviet decision to
combat China's burgeoning Far East influence all the more notable.
Perhaps Khrushchev was right in acquiescing, and maybe his successors
will sadly come to see it that way, too. But, if so, a second
climb-down will be all the more embarrassing and expensive for the
USSR. We may thus see new efforts to raise the Soviet stock in
India, Pakistan, Japan,and Burma. Above all, however, it looks
as if such Soviet offsetting is to be attempted in the Vietnam
theater, primarily for what Moscow may be able to accomplish there,
but also as a demonstration to others that the USSR remains an
Asian power.
-5-
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000300190017-3
 Approver Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP80B76R000300190017-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
B. Soviet Policy and Vietnam
8. In Moscow's view the VC, the DRV, and the Chinese must
appear on the way to victory in the war. A US defeat would of
course profit Soviet interests. But such Soviet profit would have
been won at considerable cost, for Chinese influence in the Far East
would almost certainly be advanced and the CCP's anti-Soviet case
for "ware of national liberation" validated dramatically. The
US's declining political base in the South and the US's continued
hesitation to go 'North -- or even to retaliate to post-Tonkin Gulf
provocations -- must almost certainly have led Soviet leadership to
conclude that although the US might still expand the war, the
chances favor US acceptance of deterioration or US negotiation out.
In past crises -- Southeast Asia, offshore islands, and Near East --
the Soviets have characteristically offered dramatic "support"
only after they judged that the accompanying risks had passed their
peak. So it may be in the present case.
9. Thus, at little cost and little believed risk, Kosygin and
comrades may expect that they can gain credit with DRV leaders by
offering them military aid against possible US attack and political
aid against actual Chinese pressures. The Soviets may consider that
improved DRV defenses, now backed up by revived Soviet concern, and
- 6 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000300190017-3
 Approver Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP80B076R000300190017-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
by Soviet technicians on the spot, will heighten US reluctance to
try victory through air power in North Vietnam. The Soviet leaders
must also believe that in the event that, contrary to their expecta-
tions, the US should lash out against the DRV, the increased
presence of the USSR would enhance its voice in Communist responses
and thereby help to keep an expanded war from assuming proportions
endangering the USSR's security.
10. Finally, the Soviet leaders must feel that if the coming
weeks or months bring success to the Communist cause in Vietnam,
a major initiative can increase the Soviet and diminish the Chinese
share in the advantages of victory. They probably even feel that
Soviet prestige and influence would be better served by a
negotiated US withdrawal from South Vietnam to which they contributed,
than by a total collapse of the GVN or an outright Viet Cong mili-
tary victory. Accordingly, we should be alert to the possibility
that the USSR, having strengthened the DRV's military and bargaining
stance, may propose some negotiated settlement of the conflict.
Such terms would probably be ostensibly reasonable, designed to
afford the US a plausible and face-saving formula for disengaging
from its present scale of involvement in South Vietnam, while in
fact facilitating subsequent DRV subversion of South Vietnam.
- 7 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000300190017-3