KASHMIR (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000300150014-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 3, 1965
• Content Type: MF

? Approved For Release 2003/05/29: CIA-RDP80BO1676R00030015
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ~s spa a
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIO R
WASHINGTON 25. D.C. "` IN REPLY REFER TO
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S et
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE --
THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACI7NCY
Op-92/ell
Ser 00334P92
a S EP 16,05
Subj: Kashmir (U)
1. In studying the various reports and talking to various interested
parties about the present situation in Kashmir, it has occurred to me that
we may be overlooking in our intelligence reporting a point of some impor-
tance in this regard. I refer particularly to the Soviet and Chinese Com-
munist interest in this affair.
2. Not very long ago in a long private conversation with the Chinese
Nationalist Mlinister Yu Ta-%aei, he indicated to me that he had convincing
evidence that the Soviet Union has a plan for the seizure of Sinkiang
Province at such time as relations with China would warrant its execution,
that is to say, when China either became a direct threat to the Soviet Union
or so weakened that another occupying power, such as ourselves or the Chinese
Nationalists, might constitute a potential threat through China. I am in-
clined to think that Yu Ta-wei knows what he is talking about and that the
Chinese Communists themselves have been aware of such a plan for some time.
It may be that it is for this reason that the Chinese Communists have made
such an effort to establish a firm military position in Tibet and to gain
control of the Ladakh area. As you will note from the geography of the
situation, Tibet and Ladakh flank Sinkiang. The mountains in the Ladakh
area run in a northwest-southeast direction, The Chinese have reportedly
either completed or are in the process of completing a road from Tibet
across Ladakh to the western end of Sinkiang where Chinese Turkestan adjoins
the USSR. The Indians have presented an obstacle to the Chinese Communists
in control of this strategic area and are compelled by conditions of climate,
terrain and weather to reinforce their outposts there by means of the road
that runs from Srinagar and Kargil to Leh. The season for completion of
this reinforcement is almost at an end,
3. Returning to the Kashmir situation, it appears that aside from the
Azad-Kashmir attempt to create an uprising at the Poonch area, the Pakistanis
were also interdicting the road to Leh in the vicinity of Kargil by virtue
of occupation of commanding heights from the Pakistani side of the cease
fire line. As you know, the Indians dislodged the Pakistanis from these
positions. The Indian Naval Attache, Captain Batra, tells me that the sole
purpose of this was to relieve interdiction of the resupply of Leh.
Navy review(s)
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 "`-Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000300150014-0
Op-92/ell
Ser 00334P92
4. In addition to the above, I am sure you have noted the rather considerable
evidence of collusion between the Chinese Communists and Pakistani govern-
ments, which may well have had as its objective preventing the Indians from
creating any obstacle to the Chinese Communist activities in the Ladakh
region.
S. Thus, behind the already highly charged political and religious ramifi-
cations of the Kashmir problem may well lie the basic problem of the Sino/
Soviet split and the historic apprehension each has of the other in this
strategic area. Consequently, I believe that we should consider carefully
in our intelligence assessments the degree to which both the Chinese Com-
munists and the Soviet Union may be using Pakistan and India for their own
purposes in this game.
Very respectfully,
US L. `TAYLO
Direc r of Naval I elligence
SECRET
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 Approved For Release 200321R4-RDP801301676R000300150014-0
7 September 1965
NOTE TO: Mr. Enright
SUBJECT: Comment on Admiral Taylor's Memorandum
1. No doubt the Soviets do have some interest in Sinkiang.
They were there in the 1940'x, and withdrew only slowly and
painfully after the war. Chiang Kai-shek never fully controlled
that region.
2. Perhaps they have a plan to seize Sinkiang. But we
should be interested to know what evidence Yu Ta-wei had.
3. The road across Ladakh was indeed built by the Chinese
in Indian territory some seven years ago, and has been in use
ever since. However, it is more to support the Chinese position
in Tibet, by way of Sinkiang, than to support Sinkiang. The
Chinese have good direct communications to Sinkiang.
4+. In short, we doubt that the Sinkiang situation has much
to do with the present conflict between Pakistan and India. This
is not to say that the Sino-Soviet dispute is unrelated to the
present warfare, but we do not think that either the Chinese or
the Soviets stimulated the military confrontation to serve their
own purposes.
(See OCI's memorandum of 7 September on Chinese Communist
intentions and capabilities with respect to the Kashmir crisis.)
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