(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000200060052-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: May 9, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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ACTION MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
Action Memorandum No. $`2
Date ~ ~aY 1962
TO Deputy Director. Intelligence
SUBJECT
REFERENCE:
The DCI is interested in knowing precisely where the
Agency and the intelligence tarnmunity stood on the question
of intervention at the time of the Hungarian revalutian,
Please have someone get in touch with me immediately
and I can spell out the+ terms of reference in greater detail.
25X1
E~cecutivt Assistant
SUSPENSE DATE:
SECRET
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15 May 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Assistant to the Director
THROUGH Acting Deputy Director (IntelligenceT
SUBJECT Intelligence Reporting on the Hungarian
Revolution
1. In response to your "Action Memorandum" B-2 of 9 May,
we have reviewed the record. Our findings in summary are as
follows:
a. US intelligence did not predict the first Soviet
intervention in Hungary on 24 October 1956.
b. It did accurately forewarn of the second inter-
vention on 4 November.
c. No DD/I issuance came directly to grips with
the possible consequences of US intervention in Hungary,
although SNIE 12-2-56 touched on the subject as follows:
"It seems unlikely that US action short of
overt military intervention or obvious preparation
for such intervention would lead the USSR delib-
erately to take steps which it believed would
materially increase the risk of general war."
d. There is no indication that this question was
ever asked of the DD/I, or that the IAC (USIB's prede-
cessor) ever discussed it.
2. An annex discussing the subject in detail is attached,
along with the pertinent publications.
25X1
25X1
~a~
~'.~~~
Attachments: a/s
R. J. SMITH
'Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
Frecvtive Registsp
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ANNE X
INTELLIGENCE REPORTING ON THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION
1. The significant dates in the Hungarian Revolution
were: 23 October 1956, when the uprising in Budapest started;
24 October, when Soviet forces in Hungary and Rumania were
committed against it; 29-30 October, when these forces were
disengaged and withdrawn from Budapest; 31 October, when Pre-
mier Nagy announced his intention to withdraw from the 6Varsaw
Pact and thereby precipitated a Soviet decision to intervene
for the second time; and 4 November, when this operation was
carried out.
2. The events in Hungary immediately followed those in
Poland and overlapped the Suez crisis. Soviet forces were in
a state of alert throughout the period, and US policy and in-
telligence attention was directed at the whole range of these
events, with the greatest emphasis to the possibility of So-
viet military intervention in the Near East.
3. In the fall of 1956 US Intelligence knew and reported
that the Communist Party in Hungary had been badly split by
events since the XX Soviet Party Congress, that its control
over the populace had been somewhat weakened, and that pop-
ular dissatisfaction was building up. It failed, however, to
appreciate the depth of popular emotions, the complete dis-
integration of the Hungarian Party, the speed with which events
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cuere to move, or the momentum which the revolution was to
develop. As a result, the initial outbreak in Budapest came
as a surprise. Intervention by Soviet troops on the scene fol-
lowed so quickly--within 12 hours--that no warning reached
Washington before they were actually engaged. In the confu-
sion of the next few days, the pace of events ran consistently
ahead of intelligence reporting.
4. With the Soviet withdrawal from Budapest on 30 October,
however, it was clear that a new phase had begun. On the same
day, the IAC (USIB's predecessor) approved SNIE 12-2-56, "Prob-
able Developments in East Europe and Implications for Soviet
Policy," which stated that:
"14. Evidence at present does not permit an estimate
of whether or not the USSR will occupy Hungary with addi-
tional military force sufficient to quell the rebellion,
in the event that present measures to establish control
are unsuccessful. Unless it does so, however, we believe
it unlikely that the USSR would find it feasible to im-
pose for any long period a Stalinist system of rigid
police and ideological controls over the Satellites..."
5. Reporting by the Office of Current Intelligence in what
was then called the Current Intelligence Bulletin noted on
1 November Nagy's announcement of the previous day that he had
demanded that Soviet troops leave the country and that he in-
tended to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. On 2 November, OCI
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reported that Nagy had officially protested to Soviet Ambas-
sador Andropov about the re-entry into Hungary of new Soviet
military formations. It also reported that all airfields of
the Hungarian air force had been surrounded by Soviet troops
and noted indications of small scale Soviet troop re deploy-
ment within Hungary. It cautioned, however, that Nagy's as-
sertions were not backed up by firm evidence. (Nagy was, of
course, right.)
6. On 3 November, OCI was able to report that:
"The reinforcement of Soviet units in Hungary during
the past three days, coincident with the movement of So-
viet troops already within the country and a recent switch
in the USSR's propaganda line concerning Hungarian p olit-
ical developments, indicate an imminent Soviet move to
block Hungarian efforts to sever virtually all ties with
Moscow. These developments also suggest that the USSR is
now prepared to resume hostilities if the present show-
of-force fails to "correct " what Moscow has already called
an alarming situation."
"Reliable sources in Budapest now accept the validity
of Premier Nagy's complaint to the United Nations that the
USSR is sending heavy Soviet troop reinforcements into
Hungary. These sources credit xeports that at least 600
Soviet tanks have recently entered the country from the
USSR and Rumania. The USSR, probably reacting to Hungary's
sudden and unilateral withdrawal from the Warsaw pact and
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its request to the United Nations to guarantee Hungary's
neutrality, has apparently deployed Soviet forces through-
out the country in strategic areas and has surrounded or
occupied key urban centers."
Soviet operations began at 0500 the next morning.
7. The Watch Committee reports:
a. 25 October: "...all available evidence indicates
that the extensive Soviet military precautions in the
Western USSR and Eastern Europe were prompted by Soviet
fears of Satellite insurrection. It is considered that
Soviet capabilities to attack Western Europe have at least
temporarily declined as the result of the unexpected lack
of Soviet decisiveness and control of the situation, the
necessity for the USSR to restore stability in Eastern
European Satellites and the demonstrated unreliability of
at least some Satellite forces."
b. 1 November: "These developments seem to indicate
that the USSR, confronted with the first major threat to
its control of the Satellites, is now seeking to salvage
the situation by means other than force and may be willing
to accept further liberalization, provided friendly Com-
munist regimes remain in power. Evidence is inconclusive
that the USSR would accept peacefully the emergence of a
non-Communist regime in Hungary. Whatever agreements may
be reached with respect to Soviet forces in other Eastern
European countries, the Soviet declaration pointedly
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avoided the question of withdrawing Soviet forces from
East Germany. One immediate effect of these developments
has been to impose at least a temporary deterrent to any
Soviet military attack against Western Europe."
8. None of these issuances directly considered the pos-
sible consequences of US intervention. There is no record that
the question was raised in any other paper prepared in the DD/I
area. Furthermore, the minutes of the IAC do not give any
indication that the question was raised in that forum.
9. The nearest approach to discussion of this question
also appears in SNIE 12-2-56, as follows:
"17. It seems unlikely that US action short of overt
military intervention or obvious preparation for such inter-
vention would lead the USSR deliberately to take steps which
it believed would materially increase the risk of general
war. The Soviet leaders probably recognize that the US
nuclear-air capability remains superior to that of the USSR,
and have probably concluded that at present the USSR, even
if it launched a surprise attack, would receive unacceptable
damage in a nuclear exchange with the US."
"18. Soviet suspicions of US policy and present cir-
cumstances which involve Soviet troop movements and alerts
probably increase the 1-ikelihood of a series of actions and
counteractions leading inadvertently to war. Such a series
of actions could most readily originate with respect to
East Germany."
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10. There is no reference to intervention in the next
estimate, SNIE 12-3-56: "Probable Developments in Soviet-
Satellite Relations," which caws approved 27 November after
the revolt had been crushed.
C. Excerpts from t~~Jatch Re' orts for 18-24 Oct 56 and
25-31 Oct 56
A. CIB items on Hungary, 31 Oct-5 Nov 56
B SNIB 12-2-56 and 12-3-56
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