PRESS CONTACTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBAN CRISIS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R000100110012-8
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 15, 2002
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 26, 1962
Content Type:
MF
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Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP80B01676R000100110012-8.pdf | 219.92 KB |
Body:
Approved `For Release 2001A1 jNjff RjM6- ?1676R00 0011001
EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)
COMPTROLLER
INSPECTOR GENERAL
GENERAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Distribution: TO ALL ADDRESSEES
1 - Col. Grogan
1 - ER via DCI, DDCI
NOTE: Copies to DD/I and Col. Grogan were fwd'd 26 Oct.
This memorandum contains information for the addressees. Ad-
dressees may give this memorandum additional circulation within
their components as required. All copies should be destroyed not
filed, upon completion of circulation. A master file will be kept in
the Executive Director's Office and will be available upon request.
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY,
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- Approved Fo`rwRelease 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01 WR000100110012-8
October 24, 1%2
MZMQR AMD UM TOM: 0snsral Castes
*U$JXGT: Prose Cestacts La C.assctios with the Cuban Crisis
I sets a growing amount of pros s cssaaasst indicating that the
Cuban situation developed precipitis.ty for one or two renews:
(a) iaforssatisa was witbbsid from the public. or (a) intelligence
was fatty or inadequate.
Oen Use therefor* sh&WA be abeat as follows:
The MR$U and ZKibi areas were surveyed on August 89th
and ptsstios kb sad lb.n. was as syldasss Si army cesetrnsdes
activity or un ne al Si awMartot, its. S oogom t
wawa-- of& cs same" is Into ispissNbor and party Octsbsv woes
insdfsettws because ad bad wander and do flights that wars suesoss-
fat concentrated as dswis~-ls$ essential istssaastiss as known,
isssatjstlass nab as SAM sites. cruise scissile sites. etc. ft-
--- was obtained is a ald-diptssabsr as the arrival o[ tams
crates saepsctod of containing fas 1a ss ad LL-26* but the planes
themselves son" set be detected as no crates wore opened.
The first affective fUgbt rovoaUsg significant iatsrawtiaa
occurred is October 14th after several days' delay bscasss of
woatber and this night revealed the fuselage of ass IL-22 which
bad bass ancratod, the lscatisa ad the rsswaising crates, asd the
ovidsiacs sit some IiRRM sibs. The most advascod apparently had
d.os under construction for a few days. Subsejt flights rovoalsd
progtasstvo assets ties ad tin. Mau sites. additional MAIM sites
being c omm nos t od and initial construction as the first Si the IR f ld
sites, aces a substantial somber of YL Us (crates of which bad
been previously noted and roper" is being on the runway and
ass crate unleaded and the plane being plated is operational states.
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One can only conclude that what we observed had been care-
fully planned for execution in a very minimum time in the interests
of avoiding detection.
I am told there are a number of articles in preparation. soma
of which wish to deal with the role of intelligence in the findings and
subssguent decision. .some writers have expressed a desire to do a
profits on m o personally. I would like both any personal role and
the role of intelligence played down.
'he might confine ourselves to the followiatg:
On the evening of M achy, October 15th, analysis of photographs
taken on ;unday, October 14th. revealed the probable evidacs of
medium range missiles in Cuba. This probability was reported to
the White Howe Tuesday morsiag and btcCone. who was on that day
in ,oattle to attend the funeral of his stepson who had been killed on
the 14th in an accident, was advised and returned to Washington on
the first available plane.
The 'Central Intelligence 1;.geucy and the entire Intelligence
Community worked continuously on analysing the photographic product
and preparing the necessary appraisals and estimates needed for
proper policy consideration and decisions. The United :.tares
Intelligence Board made up of senior intelligence officers from
;sate, befense. rnvy, Navy, =sir Force and Atomic Energy Cornm-is-
nion met every day and somnetimes more often to consider current
intelligence and estimates as they evolved. Jubcommittees of the
Soard were in continuous session. a result the President and
his policy advisors were currently supplied with a coordinated send
considered judgrrent of the criticest situation. 1rdcCons personally
attended all meetings of the senior Govern=sat officials and with
the National security . a'xn,: it and with the President in considering
the alternative courses of action & ad reaching final decision as to
the coarse we have f3l:..wyd. as a principal intelligence officer of
the Government. continue o meet daily as a memoer of the '.'reside sal
appointive L'xeeativ-e _C:MZA ittee of the N. ;,L.
JU17S~ .aa: ..:.root
Approved For Release 2002/10/30 CIA-RDP80BOl676R000100110012-8
Executive Registry
Approved,For?Release 2002/10/30: CIA-RDP80BO1676R000400110012-8
- MW
DD/R 691-62
29 October 1962
FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Press Contacts in Connection with the
tubas Crisis
I randuat for General Carter from
, dated 94 October 191 , subject
Sow as Above
noted your re feed *e aorazWkm relative to
att. t to follow the line Indicated. I s tld lfkee, however,
to Est change in the second sentence of the first
bra of the proposed lime, which I believe is owe in
acrd with the facts and also makes a bettor case for our
aativitioa. I believe that our successful flights in September
and early October concentrated on developing Information on
not piously covered by photography since the August
bul'ld-4p, rather than obtaining recd rerrage of the areas which
bad shown no evidence of unusual activity or in which known
sites existed. This coverage of now areas was aimed at
obtaining tatornation on additional sites, cruise missile
sites and any other military installations which night exist.
MUMM SCaTILt9 JR.
qty Director
March)
co: VDCI
!I
motive Director
Colonel GrO9116a
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2-[~ 237 ? U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 0-587282
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