U. S. POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R000100110004-7
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 14, 2003
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 14, 1962
Content Type:
MEMO
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Approved `For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000100110004-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
06/26/2003
EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM No. 7 7
27 December 1962
DATE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (.INTELLIGENCE)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)
COMPTROLLER
INSPECTOR GENERAL
GENERAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Chief EE, DD/ P
AD/RR, DD/I
Attachment: Agency prepared Summary of Belgrade Airgram A-543
LBK:rm
1 - Each above
-1 - ER (basic) (O/DCI and DDCI saw basic on routing)
1 - Exec Director
This memorandum contains information for the addressees. Ad-
dressees may give this memorandum additional circulation within
their components as required. All copies should be destroyed not
filed, upon completion of circulation. A master file will be kept in
the Executive Director's Office and will be available upon request.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET, December 14, 1962
TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
SUBJECT: U. S. Policy toward. Yugoslavia
Following a discussion of U. S. policy toward Yugoslavia,
the President:
1. Indicated that he was prepared to seek an amendment
to the Trade Expansion Act to restore most-favored-nation treat-
ment for Yugoslav goods. The Department of State will prepare a
memorandum justifying this course of action. This memorandum
should be designed to indicate the advantages of securing most-
favored-nation treatment as against the possible alternative course
of extending additional aid to Yugoslavia.
2. Authorized the Departments of Defense and State to
arrange for the sale of spare parts to Yugoslavia to maintain U. S.
military equipment already delivered to the Yugoslav Government.
The timing of an announcement of such sales should be coordinated
with the White House in connection with the effort to restore most-
favored-nation treatment.
3. Directed the Departments of State, Defense and AID
to study the proposals and recommendations made by Ambassador
Kennan in Belgrade's airgram A-543 and prepare for the President's
consideration possible courses of action.
McGeorge Bundy
cc: The Director of Central Intelligence
SECT
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19 December 1962
SUMMARY OF AMBASSADOR KENNAN'S VIEWS ON US POLICY TOWARD
YUGOSLAVIA*
Ambassador Kennan notes that US policy toward Yugo-
slavia after Belgrade's break with the Soviet bloc in 1948
was designed to encourage divisive forces within the bloc
and to encourage a liberal, pro-Western domestic evolution
in Yugoslavia. It was not designed to lead to the over-
throw of the Tito regime.
Kennan concludes that this policy was generally suc-
cessfully pursued until 1962. Although it did not produce
"any great changes in Tito's view of himself as a Communist,"
Yugoslavia's domestic institutions and foreign policies be-
came significantly different from those "of the real Communist
countries." With Tito gradually assuming a less active role
in Yugoslav affairs there was even the prospect of a more
forthcoming policy toward us.
Kennan next reviews the collapse of US policy brought
about by the independent actions of Congress and militant
American anti-Communist groups, pointing out that Belgrade can
only conclude that it is being punished because it calls it-
self Communist and not for any particular anti-US actions.
Yugoslav officials seem to have drawn the lesson that the
price of good relations with the US is renouncing their
political past, placing in question the legitimacy of their
regime, and denouncing their belief in socialism.
Kennan states that US policy toward Yugoslavia has
never enjoyed a broad understanding or commitment outside
the working level in the Department of State. It has had
powerful enemies, moreover, in right wing American and re-
fugee groups, with their religious and Congressional sup-
porters and spokesmen. In addition, the press has failed
to provide adequate coverage of Yugoslavia.
To correct the situation, Kennan advocates recovering
freedom of action by the Executive Branch through repeal of
recent anti-Yugoslav legislation. Next, an effective policy
--he does not specify what--toward Yugoslavia must be re-
constructed. Concurrent with both these efforts, a major
educational effort must be launched toward the public, the
press, the Congress and its staffs, and the various echelons
of the Executive branch. Short of this, Kennan believes,
we had better "fold our tents" before "the Yugoslavs do it
for us."
massy Belgrade, Airgram A-543, 28 Nov 62, (LOU)
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/021,1
SENDER WILL CHECIC C~..ASJIF'^ATI
Exec Director (to issue as a
DIRECT REPLY
DISPATCH
FILE
INFORMATION
Exe cuti
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
Executive Director
FORM 1 237 Use previous editions
OFFICIAL ROUTINt SLIP
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CON DEIF NTIAL
(40)
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 0-587282
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