REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON YOUR RECENT TRIP TO VIETNAM, 1 JULY 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000100060007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 18, 1966
• Content Type: MF

NSC REVIEW
COM LETED,
6/26/ 003
Approved For Release 2003/09/026FM1180B01676R0001,00060007-0
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18 JUL 1966
FOR: ihe Hottorable Robert1,V . 1C0
aacial Aesistant to the President
ExecuL P.
ve istry
- ?,-z ,.?.5 :.51
.eport to the President on Your Recent
rip to VietElatAi 1 July 066
You very kindly invited my reaction to your report to
your latest trip to Vietnam. I find in
your geral conclusions as to the situation in the area and the long
raid ahead. Ae you know, I also fully agree with your view as to the
importance of increasing the emphasis on our pacification and civilian
operations, as without this even euecessful military operations will
aot produce a lasting result.
ith respect to how to a aplish this greater emphasis,
you lay a groat deal at emphasis on better organizational approaches
la) ths jab, both on the Vietnamese and American side. Because of
;the weakness of the Vietnataese which you note as one of our problems,
you quite properly emphasize the need to step up the American effort
o compensate. To provide additional manpower, you suggest a
greater engagement of r..,!ACV in the civilian aspects at pacification,
"tt both 'central staff and district levels. This appears on the surface
quite reasonable judgment and one can only support the idea of
jacreasirg the contribution_ of our military resovxces to the overall
pacification problem. I do suggest, however, that these steps may
have to be watched very carefully in order that they not inadvertently
:Ater the essentials of our pacification effort, which to date has given
1?avat welept to irregularity local characteristics and individuality of
leadership.
hile we refer to the "civilian" aspects of pacification, I
olieve that the greatest element of the program is its political coat
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lYrn'
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one, police
truth merely
a s pacification progra
a pacification effort, to secure its collaboration
imrnist fish from the popular sea, must comva
population, not raerely an administered
uch emphasis on our side an the administrative aspects
skier effort being put in this field with only lip
1xerv1ce given to the importance of political motivation. This is
particuisxypossible, of course, when our preimure on the population
2iS aimed at eliminating the enemy from its ranks rather than primarily
to stimulate the community to better itself, and incidentally to purge
:itself of elements hostile to this process. A particular fondness of
Vienximese officialdom for eyewash pleasing to superiors has
;Erequently led to such mistake in emphasis, i.e., counting barbed
wire stretched, piglets distributed, or rzlass public pledges of
loyalty.
of VC otherwise. This would be