MEMORANDUM FOR DICK HELMS FROM R. W. KOMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000100060004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 1, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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WASHINGTON
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1 September 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR DICK HELMS
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
6/26/2003
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Here's a copy of Bill Leonhart's quite
perceptive report on his last Vietnam trip. As
an old reader between the lines, I think you will
IL
suspect may be as important as adre.
I've talked with Bill Colby about this.
Incidentally no criticism intended. From
what we've seen, Agency support a first
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see that we've gotten some movement. If pacifi-
cation (what do we call it now?) is the new order
of the day, I ho e the A e nc
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
August 30, 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Visit to Vietnam -- August 1966
I. PACIFICATION.
1. The main purpose of my second visit to Vietnam was to find
out more about Ambassador Lodge's views on where we go from here
on pacification, how to speed it up, and how MACV planned to re-
direct more GVN military resources to tough local security problems.
I tried out a number of ideas along these lines that Bob Komer asked
me to discuss with Lodge and Porter.
a. Lodge was more than receptive. Your recent
messages have firmly focussed his att
ti
en
on onifiti
paccaon
which he now calls "the heart of the matter. " Westmoreland
and Porter are similarly engaged,. An extensive planning effort
is now underway--but its real bite will not come until 1967.
b. On the Embassy side, a Roles and Mission Working
Group is targeted on streamlining the hodgepodge of GVN
military and civilian security forces. MACV is doing staff
exercises on an optimum ARVN force structure; a design for
a post-hostilities GVN security establishment; and a balanced
U. S. force structure which can be suptained, indefinitely if
needed, without a reserve call-up. You should have their
conclusions by early October.
c. Similarly, a new US/G'VN effort at coordinated
pacification planning is underway, really for the first time.
Porter has pulled together all the civilian agencies plus MACV
in a Joint Planning Group on RD goals, resources, and guide-
lines. Regular meetings, including joint field trips, with
GVN, RD and JGS officers are coordinating selection of 1967
national priority areas and setting combined resource and
manpower requirements. Completion expected by December.
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d. All of these are useful initial steps, but they must be
followed through effectively and on a scale that matches our
commitments. Much more remains to be done before there is
an effective and responsible pacification system in operation
on the ground. Moreover, even at this planning stage, there
are still a number of unresolved questions--the extent of
participation by U.S. forces; the role.of ARVN corps and
division levels in pacification operations; possible transfer
of RF/PF to the RD Ministry; or the conversion of the RF/PF
to a Police Constabulary for post-hostilities civilian security.
e. But there now seems general Mission agreement that,
while U. S. forces must help, ARVN should carry the main
weight of the pacification job and that in 1967 the GVN will
devote at least 50 percent of its military resources to RD in
I, II and III Corps, and 25 percent in IV Corps, where there
are as yet no significant U.S. forces. As rough aggregates,
these represent progress; their application to provinces and
districts have yet to be worked out.
2. ARVN Force Improvement. Closely related to the use of
ARVN for accelerated pacification is a systematic new MACV effort
to improve the quality and effectiveness of GVN forces. This parallel
effort may be the most significant event now taking place in Vietnam.
a. At its core is expansion of combined operations and
the military "buddy system. " It builds both on the small unit
models of the Marines" Combined Action Companies and the
newer association of the US 1st Division with the 5th ARVN
and of the 25th US with the 25th ARVN. It will cover the use
of forces in both pacification and major combat actions.
b. The ARVN improvement program will also include
reduction of the ratio of tail to teeth in combat units, improved
leadership training, battlefield commissions, reform of the
draft law, new desertion penalties, and joint US/GVN military
inspection teams to appraise the effectiveness of ARVN units
and commanders in RD. (A similar program for ROK Forces
turned the tide of battle in Korea.)
3. Enemy Situation. All field intelligence available to us con-
firmed weakening VC morale: food and medical supplies are down;
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sickness up - enlistments more difficult; defections more frequent.
The end of the beginning may be in sight.
a. There are a number of projects now being explored
which we hope will accelerate the process: Ky's proposal for
GVN warehouses and ARVN rice collections (paying market
prices) in the delta; the question of a U.S. delta offensive now
under examination by the Embassy and MACV staffs; improved
surrender, interrogation; and prisoner exploitation procedures;
stepped-up economic warefare and resources control. Bob
Komer and I have been plugging away at all of these in
Washington and Saigon, and will continue to do so.
b. Under pressure from here the defector program (Chieu
Hoi) is now in higher gear. As you know, the rate is running
twice last year's; should total 22,500 in 1966; now has a
target--based on better backing and more skilful use of the
defectors against other VC waverers--of 45, 000 in 1967.
II. 'ECONOMIC ITEMS.
1. Bob Nathan has reported to you separately on economic
stabilization, field economic management deficiencies, and the need
for top quality U. S. personnel in the field. We are doing some of
the economic forward planning here in Washington; and Bob Komer
has laid on a new stabilization study to preserve the benefits of
devaluation. But there is an urgent requirement for three or four
qualified economic, experts in the Mission to formulate--and
negotiate with the GVN--an adequate stabilization strategy.
2. GVN Foreign Exchan-a Reserves pose a special problem.
At present GVN reserves total about $250 million and are rising
$10 million a month. If present practice continues, they will be in
the $450 - $500 million range by the end of 1967. We took a tough
line with Minister of National Economy Thanh and Natinnal Bank
Governor Hanh that such accumulations would pose major political
problems for us--and could risk Congressional and public support
for the AID program. We had in mind particularly the vulnerability
of a possible AID Supplemental to this kind of exchange reserve
build-up. We suggested these GVN reserves might better be used
in 1967 to finance a larger share of imports, prepay DLF loans, or
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increase GVN contributions to international monetary institutions.
Both Thanh and Hanh will attend the IMF/IBRD meeting in Washington
at the end of September and we will hit them hard again on this.
3. Port Situation. The takeover has gone well. Relations
between the MACV advisers and their' GVN counterparts are close
and effective. But we are not yet out of the woods. Some deficit
in capacity will remain throughout 1966 and into early 1967. Our
military, as you know, only assumed responsibility for military and
government-to-government CPA shipments--not the much tougher
.task of handling commercial imports.
What we need to do: (1) Give top priority to the completion
of Newport, which continues to slip--restoration of a $30 million
funding cut is now being sought; (2) Refurbish Saigon port by paving
worn out dirt approaches, completing hard stands, and improving
lighting and handling gear--MACV and USAID are now compiling
estimates; (3) Control strictly U.S. civil/military inventory levels
and shipments of non-essential supplies; (4) Review present
arrangements for handling commercial cargoes at the end of the
next 60 days, and, unless promised improvements have been made,
press again'for military management of commercial shipments.
4. Postwar Development Planning. At Komer's request, Nathan
made a first-rate presentation to Ky of the political and economic
benefits of launching a study now. He explained how it should be
organized on sectoral and regional bases to best contribute to binding
South Vietnam together as a nation. Ky seemed enthusiastic and
eager to get started. The way now seems clear.
III. POST-ELECTION PROSPECTS.
Every indication points to a successful Constitutional Assembly
election and an impressive voter turnout. The need to broaden the
political base, to re-start the democratic process, to fold civilians
into the directing military establishment, and to do so on terms the
military will find tolerable are all evident. '
a. But the Assembly will mark a new and more complicated
political phase in our :relations with Vietnam. There will be new
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opinion currents with which to deal and new influences at work
to which we may have to adapt the timing or substance of our
decisions. The political process in short is likely to become
a good deal more tricky in the period immediately ahead.
b. These prospects strengthen the need to institutionalize
the new network of joint US/GVN bodies that are now beginning
to appear. While we were in Saigon, two new joint boards
were set up: a Joint Economic Committee, to be co-chaired by
the Minister of National Economy and the Deputy Ambassador
which will meet regularly every ten days; and a Joint Rice
Board for US/GVN cooperation on production, import, storage,
sale, and pricing. We still need a better handle on rice, and
are trying to get one.
c. Additionally, we now have a Joint Planning Group for
RD, a Combined Postwar Planning Group in prospect, and the
standing liaison between MACV and the JGS. Properly used,
.these joint agencies can provide moorings and stability for our
policies against the waywardness or inexperience of the
Constituent Assembly or the future Parliament. They can
develop into essential instruments of U. S. influence. But they
must be staffed by first-rate people.
Elk
L ~- - 41
lL.'
William Leonhart
SECRET
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