THE INSURGENCY SITUATION IN THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000100060001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 23, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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23 Neve ber 1966
Major Cneral Jack E. Thomas tr)/1
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USAF
SUBJJCT The Insurgency Situation in Thailand
I. In response to your request, we have carr4piled the following
notes on the insurgency situation in Thailand which we hope will assist you
in preparing your briefing for General McConnell. These remarks reflect
the agreed opinion of all of is in the Agency who deal with Thai matters but.
because of What I understood to be the inforr$481 na.ture of your request, they
have not been coordinated or even circulated outside of this building.
Z. The Northeast: The Communist insurgents in northeast Thailand
are increasing their numbers but maintaining a relatively low level of
activity. The Communists currently seem less aggressive than they were
last June when (aa you are aware) there were three significant ay.-bushes of
Thai governr tent forces. The tempo of arb.,ed encounters has quickened sortie-
what since the first of November, but this appears to have been the result of
the resumption of more active patrolling by government forces with the end
of the natty 'season rather than a reflection of heightened subversive military
initiative. A 12 November clash in the Na Kae district of Nakhon Phanom
did result in the most severe casualties yet sustained by government forces
in any single encounter (2 killed and 12 wounded) but it probably did not
represent a terrorist decision to display greater aggressiveness. 'The
government team attacked on 12 November was deep in an area heavily
infested by subversives. The terrorists were probably reacting to this
intrusion rather than deliberately seeking engagement with governry,ent troop*.
3. Subversive activity- in the northeast continues to be concentrated
on the kilns of forced village propaganda meeting*. The Cornmunists
obviously regard these eeseions as an effective method of disrupting local
administration and impressing the populace with their prowess without exposing
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thetiiehr to a possible mann g by government security forces. These
ie.tirga do seem to be an effective vehicle through which the Communists
can demonstrate to the populace their control over a given area. The meetings
appear to be conducted with increasing forcefulness. On several recent
occasions village headmen have been manhandled or tied up in view of the
villagers, police in.fornAints have been publicly executed, and villagers
suspected by the Communiets have been abducted at the end of the meetings.
4. Con tudst terrorism remains highly selective. Comeaunist
*ctirrt are invaribly persons who have been openly cooperative with the Thai
government. The lesson is not lost on the villagers that the way to avoid
terrorist vengeance is to avoid cooperating with the government. This of course
coeeplicates tie government's efforts to assert its control over the countryside.
The Communists have been carrying out their armed propaganda activity with
almost complete impunity. Only once (on 20 October 1966) has a village
propaganda meeting been interrupted by Thai security forces. This interference
did not cow the terrorists. Instead, in obvious retaliation, the police post
responsible for this interruption has since been subjected to three armed
attacks by Communist forces.
5. Counterinsurgency efforts have not yet stemmed the growth of
urgency mover-lent in the northeast; instead, subversive strength appears
teasing. Last spring we estimated that there were shout 650 herd core
armed insurgents, we now believe the figure is in the 1.000-1.200 range.
The latter figure, however, may reflect better knowledge on our part as much
as, or poseibIy more than, an absolute Increase in the sise of the insurgent
force. The figure of 5.000 insurgents has appeared in the press, but this
seems to be a wild exaggeration based on a misunderstanding or misquotation
of Thai eourcas.
6. S011i increase in the number of Communist terrorist. is indicated
by the fact that since mid-summer they have been requisitioetng food from the
villagers. (Until mid.milliintriler the Communist* seemed to subsist largely on
supplien obtained from their relatives or voluntary supporters.) There is
no evidence that the Conartuniets have increased their popularity significantly,
however, lance the villagers appear to acquiesce to Communist requisitions
more out of fear rather than out of voluntary or ideological support for the
Communist cease. This failure of the Communists to spark a wide popular
following betide out considerable hope for the Thai government's counter-
insurgency MOlisurea, particularly if government suppression operations can
be increasingly supplerl,ented by civic action efforts capable of enlisting
support for the government.
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7, White current Thai government counterinsurgency programs
nd to be weighted toward suppression activities, there is evidence of
eased government awareness that remedial socio-political efforts 1.--3.ust
rnpany police and suppressive action. With the assistance of various
elements of the U.S. Mission, the government also appears to be giving
increasing attention to the problems of strengthening village security. Static
village defenne teams (local people encadred by two or three policemen) are
being set up in Sakon NsIthon and Nakhon Phanom. The Coanmunists regard
these village defense teams as a potential hindrance to their terrorist activity
and as a result the te&111111 are /request targets of Communist harassment.
The teams have already demonotrated their value in thwarting Communiet
Incursions into the villages or in bolding the terrorists at bay until governxr.ent
reinforcements can be called in. k in hoped that the villagers will regard these
teams as concrete evidence that the Thai government is concerned with their
sefety, feeli a reeponsibility for protecting them, and ie not solely interested
in suppression operations which, in some cases, alienate these villager..
S. There is some evidence that North Vietnam has been involved in
the training of Thai insurgents since at least 1962. indeed, North Vietnam
Ilk ay be playing ft more significant role in aiding the Thai Communists than
Communist China, which has also trained some Thai insurgents. One recently
captured terrorist stated that he and about 60 other Thai recruits received a
six-month guorrilla course near liesoi in 1962. His story generally parallels
that of an insurgent defector who was a member of a class of 150 Thais who
received an eight-month political and military training course in the Hoe Binh
district of North Vietnam in 1965-1966. There have hewn occasional rumors
of actual North Vietnameee troops in northeast Thailand, but their presence
has never been verified and we consider it unlikely that North Vietnam would
commit regular troops to Thailand at the present time.
9. The Mid-south and South: The situation in south and mid-south
Thailand appiiarsrnent ornront. No incidents were reported in
the mid. south in October 1966 and only one encounter between the Border
Patrol Police and Communist terrorists along the Malaysian border. The
fact that things are momentarily quiet, however, affords no grounds for
complacency. Current Communist activity in the mid-south is probably directed
at recruiting and regrouping in the wake of several Thai government sweep
operations conducted there in recent month.. Communist terrorists (remnants
of the Malaya insurgent.) still exert a significant measure of control along
the Malaysian border. Although these terrorists (fugitives from the Malaysian
government and predominantly ethnic Chinese) do not appear presently involved
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sur ency picture, logic and prudence would lead us to
ed and disciplined force ti lust figure in any Conaimnist plane
activity in the south.
for fut
10. General McCormaWs Visit: When he iees General Dawee, we
would suggeet that General McConnell might most profitably concentrate his
conversation on the insurgency picture. Dawee is almost exclueively concerned
with military and insurgency matters. He would probably have few thoughts
and little of isignificance to say on other issues (e. g. the Constitution) and
would almost certainly appreciate an opportunity to talk at length on the
insurgency situation which he knows best. In the past weak he has given
highly optimistic account. of the Thai governwent's counterinsurgency measures
to domestie and foreign press reporters.* He would almost certainly appreciate
a friendly audience to which he could explain or expand on his thinking. Like
other Thai officials, Dawes would probably bristle at any suggestion that the
Thai government is giving too ruch emphasis to suppression operations and
not enough attention to civic action. A relaxed discussion of such relative
priorities with an old friend, however, could yield interesting and possibly
helpful results.
11. We believe the situation satin ate outlined above would generally
be endorsed by the U. S. Mission in Bangkok, on whose recent comments and
porting we have drawn freely. We would suggest, however. that General
McConnell could probably obtain the best current picture by consulting with
!upon his val In Bangkok. If General McConnell so desires,
would be happy
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isSpecial sistard for Vietnamese Affairs
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5Despite his optimism,General Dew** appears to be the source of the 5, 000
insurgent figure (mentioned above), which is now appearing in the press. It
seems, however. that Delvee was misquoted and actually used a figure of 1.000,
which accords with our estinzate.
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