LETTER TO MR. HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR. FROM RICHARD HELMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000100050005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 21, 1966
• Content Type: LETTER

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C. Mc
nsel to
use
Dear Mr. McPherson;
on, Jr.
esident
21 March 1966
Per your request we have revised the raemor !Warn
prepared on 19 February for Senator Muskie and brought the
pertinent statistics up to date. Three Copies of the revised
text are attached herewith.
Though we are delighted to render any assistance we
can in such ventures, we would appreciate having this document
considered and used only as a background briefing memorandum.
We would much prefer not to have it positively described as a
"CIA report".
Sincerely.
/5/4C
Richard Helms
Attachment
0/DCI;SAVA/ VAS: Jr:mee
Distribution
Original & 1 w/att - Addreee
1 w/att DCI V
1 w/att DDCI
1 w/att - DDP
1 w/att C/FE
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1 w/att - White House Special Projects
1 w/o att - VAS Chrono
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ru
FEC
1566
The tketern ota Our Investment: inonstrable
improvecuents in the ..Atuation in Vietnam since
the vying of 1965
ITH
The
in the US air
In the late
The n.iost olgnific
the situation, atario
Vietnam, particularly the sharp increase
cc commitment which began to reach Vietnam
65, has produced a. number of denaonstrishle returns.
however, is the marked difference between
ere, and trends evident prior to the tainteive UY.;
input (i.e., late last Spring) and the situation, at.mospbere sad trends
which are evident today. Last year, defeat was staring the GYN in the
face; this year the alilitary situation has been stabilized, confidence has
been regained, the CYN has markedly improved its military and political
performance, the attitudes of the 6outiz Vietnamese people have began
to shift, and it is our advev series who are beginning to have serious
doubts about the wisdexu or probable success of their preeent courses
of action.
The Viet Cons insurgency is designed to create a politico-military
climate which will permit the establishment of a Communist goverruxient
in south Vietnam under North Vietnamese Communist control leading to
political control over the whole co.antry by the North Vietnamese Corunist
arty. Though portrayed publicly as an internal revelation, this insurgency
Is directed and supported by North Vietnam. As early as the end of 1963.
the Viet Cong were optiLkistic about their chances at eucceeding and had
every reason to be so.
Erorn the Ap bac battle in January 1563, where the Viet Cons
fought for several days, to the widespread aurae of terrorism. following
.01ealts downfall, the Viet Lo.ng constantly improved their military and
political sittiatloin. throughout the countryside. Viet Gong forces. bolstered
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ated
r scale zrd
tided gains
of let and Zn:
oath:wed to expand and improve their capabilities
y operations. Their military StLCCOSSilk durinv
rritory and population control in the coastal
orps (i.e.. the northern half of South Vietnam)
as well as the virtual isolation of government forces in nany provincial
and district capitals. similar but not quite so successful efforts were
made in the id and 4th Corps areas (the southern portion of the country
including the Mekong Delta). fairly large scale operations involving one
or more bettalions were carried out by the Viet Gong with relative iropunit ?
13y the end of 1964, YC ndlitary gains coupled with their terrorism and
propaganda efforts. particularly among the rural population, had given
them ensure of invincibility and convinced many Vietnamese, particularly
n rural areas1 that a Communist victory was inevitable.
The Viet Con maintained their initiative and momentum during
at half of 1965. They made great strides in force development
trating at least 5,700 troops. including major elements of the
ietnarnese 37.5th division, during this period. Local recruiting
th Vietnam was stepped up. and newer and heavier weapons
delivered in increaaingi quantities. They had repeated successes
field which improved their image and damaged the morale
its supporters.
bar 1964 battle with three Viet Gong ref/Wants at
southeast of :Saigon, at least two Gni battalions-
al reserve unit--were put out of action. In Large scale
ks in Feburary 1965. heavy losses were inflicted on government
In Binh Dinh Province. vinailar Viet Cong victories occurred
Ba Gin battle in Aray and is the overrunning of TOU Wtorong and
district towns in June and August. Serious disruptions of lines
unication occurred--the central highlands were completely
or extended periods --and the Viet Cong made appreciable
gene. VC morale was high, the rural population was
and the VC found it easy to gain new recruits.
of
is
ter
d year. government forces were finding it difficult to stem
ong tide. The Alkirti (South Vietnamese Army) was being wh.Appawed
erves were stretched to the breaking point. The Viet Cons had
ity of conducting multi-regimeatal size operations in. three widely
sted areas of South Vietnaro while the ARAM could react with sufficient
cope with only one such threat at a time. In the spring of 1965.
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blunted.
of a
aircraft.
massive raid-
0 csmpaia prepared designed to contol major
to cut up 3eutb Vietnam and separate the Binh
rpm the western Pleiku area.
evr were foiled and this Viet Cong drive was
halted by the massive use of air power.
by the introduction of faster-reacting US jet
friendly ground /actions. made possible by the
ction of. US combat troops.
the late Summer of 1965 the initiative had begun to shUt to the
rted GYN. Slowly but surely the CVN began to gala a merrientum
the number of Communist successes declined and there were
portant government victories. Severe Viet Con* losses accrued at
cod in June and at Bra Dap in July, and the siege of Ditc Co was broken
at. Major US contrihutions were the victory eouth of Chu Lei in
the opening of Itoute 19 from Qui filton to An Khe, the successful
of Pleiku, and the destruction and harassment inflicted by increased
s. These successes, followed by a decline in the tempo of Viet
vity, allowed the government to gain a semblance of political and
equilibrium by early Fell.
since the Fall of 1965, US forces have increasingly moved out of
their base perimeter areas to conduct eaarch-and-destroy operations against
Viet Cone main force units in their previously sacrosanct base areas. In
November, for example. US let Cavalry =TIMM (Airmobile) troops inflicted
over 1.200 casualties on three North Vietnamese regiments in the la Drarte
Valley area of western :.leiku province in the Central Highlands. 'piscine:es
captured from these units in the same area 4,?ring an operation in January
1966 claimed that their units had not yet received replacer-eats for their
losses tin either men or materiel) and were not yet ready to resume large
scale operations.
the end of 1965, the rate of large scale Viet Cong attacks has
yen though there has been some Increase in the tstal number
Large scale attacks- -regimental level--declined from
to one in December and none in January. Battalion strength
d from g in Novesiber to 7 in Decerr.ber and sharply dropped
. Since the la Drang battle in November, there has been a
cy for Communist units to avoid large-scale engagement*
ridiouth. Vietearese forces. However, they have by no means
bandoned large-scale combat, as demonstrated by at least three enen.y
gitnental attacks in the paet two months.
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" 1.23111C:1 aultaer we us, ass CRaSQ& j42RaL **01,13-an%1111 at
possible and is now being suetained, both in the form of 18-52 Stratoforteesi
air strike* on previously inviolate COrarrtital at hese areas and in the form of
operations on the gronnd. Recent GVN and allied action. have taken the
Initiative and pat the Communists on the defensive. forcing them to abandon
their own plans for attacking at times and places of their choosing. Operation
HARVEST MOON. 849 December, in the Owing Nam/Omani Tin border area.
forced two Communist regiments (one identified as North Vietnamese) to defend
therneolves. Operations JEFFERSON, VAN BUREN and HARRISON which began
31 December in Phu Ten Province, have maintained continuing pressure on the
3d Viet Corgi and 9th North Vietnamese Regiments, and have killed hundreds of
Commansist troops. Operation uASHER.WHITE WING. berm 24 January, upset
the plane of the North Vietnartiese leth and Curd Tam Regiments1 and the Viet
Gong 2d Regiment in northern Binh Dinh Province. These operations inflicted
more than 1,800 casualties (XIA) on the Communist forces. Reacting rapidly
to accurate intelligence, allied troops in Operation UTAH surrounded a sub.
*metal portion of another North Vietnamese Regiment in ratans Ngal Province
In early March and killed more than 600 Communists. U.S. forces north of
Saigon, now in their third week of Operation SILVER. CITY, are targeted against
two Viet Cons regiments recently reported in the area and have killed about 3$0
V.C. then far. Tide type of pressure will increase as the built?up allied forces
coneolidate themselves and as experience is gained.
These harassing and spoiling operations which the U.S. troop commit
mont now permits the allied side to mount have unquestionably disrupted
Communiat planning and thrown Communist forces off balance. (Captured
documents, for example. indicated that the Communists planned to end the
recent Tet truce with a buret of activity. but their plans were foiled by the
offensive operations the GYN and its allies were able to mount.) Such ground
operations, combined with the B-52 striket and tactical sir strikes against
Viet Cong base areas, will make it Increasingly difficult for the Yiet Gong and
North Vietnamese unite to mass and retain the elements of ~pries. Mere is.
of course, no room for excessive optimism. The Viet Cons are not abandoning
their previous strategy of progressing toward a more conventional military
force structure and, where favorable oppertuldties present thenaselvee, they
will continue to attempt large scale attacks, some of which will probably be
eu.ccessfuls The increased U.S. presence, however, is making such attacks
Increasingly costly and drastically reducing their chances of success.
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Tit* v Knew South Vietnam's military posture
during the past year is reflected in a host of statistics. In 1%5. the
Viet Cons lost about 35. 400 man, almost double their fatalities in any
previous year. Almost 24,000 were killed in the last six months of 1965
alone. The South Vietnamese lost IL 250 killed lest year. about 4,000
more than in 1964. During the first two months this yeas, the GYM has
lost about the same number killed as during the corresponding period
last year. Viet Cong losses,, however, are about double the amount
last year. (US combat fatalities in 1963, amounted to 1 365.)
In 1965, Vietnamese governaient forces captured almost twice as
many Communist weapons ao. in 1964. Toward the end of last year, the
ratio of weapons lost as between friend and foe favored the government
forces for the first time since coid.1963, a trend which has continued
during the first two months of this year.
Communist prisoners defectors and
indicate that the events of the past year have had a dsuionstnbty adverse
effect on Viet Cons morale and shakes, confidence in ultimate vi
throughout Viet Con; ranks. Communist Party hastructions issued in
m144965 stated that major outcomes's, especially in the central high
lands, were a necessary precondition for a general offensive and up.
rising in 166. The Party merited that, otherwise, the war would
become very protracted. These success*, did not materialise and
hence the realisation is growing throughout Viet Cong ranks that they
are in for SI long haul a realisation which at least among some units
has resulted in serious discouragement and despondency. AU available
sources of information suggest that the Viet Cons are being laced with
growing desertion problem among their own troops and among the
local citizens they rely on for various idade of support (e.g., porters).
VC captives have spoken of the large number of sick troops
Lu their uflit, and the inadequate medical attention they receive. Rice
shortages have also been mentioned, especially in the Highland
Provinces. AU have spoken of the fearful effect of US/GVM air power
and artillery strikes.
Prisoners taken from the Zad battalion 33rd PAVN regiment on
9 January stated that 30 percent of the soldiers have malaria.
Captives from the H43 battalion state that the battalion has many
personnel AWOL, and many are stricken with malaria.
-S.
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rth Vietnamese regiment state
130 men during the attack on
maining men were formed
which had only two
new personnel joined the 9th battalion during
January 1%6; while in the !Chu See area,
ortned using VC from local force units.
Prisoner* from headquarter, company of the North Vietnam. Quyet
Tam regiment stated that on many occasions the regimental headquarters
had been forced to move almost immediately after being set up, because
of armed helicopter strikes. The.. captives had the specific mission of
rounding up deserters and soldiers accidentally separated from their unit.
One prisoner stated that after the fighting at /ions Son hie regiment was
to receive replacements from local forces. On 8 February the regimental
commanding officer issued & command for all urdts to disperse and go into
the isurrounding hamlets and act as guerrillas.
The diary of a VC captured on U January 1966 stated:
four days in tenni. About 8 to 9 thousand American soldiers
for a sweep?operstion. The attack was fierce, in the lest few . A
number of underground tunnels collapsed. Some were caught in them and
ha,ve not been able to get out yet. It is not known what have become of
sister. Ba Bay. Hong flank and Tau He in these tunnels. In their attempt
to provide security for the agency. Tarn and Ut ware killed. Their bodies,
left unattended and deteriorated, have not been buried yet. In the afternoon,
one of our village unit members trying to stay close to the enemy for
reconnaissance was killed and his body has not been recovered... Ohl
What herd days, one has to stay in tunnels, eat cold rite with salt drink
unboiled water! However, one is free and feels at ease.
A VC letter dated 20 September 1%5 captured by the let Air Cavalry
Division in Binh Dinh Province stated: "There is an acute forced labor
shortage in the area. The local people's morale is low. There has
been ineffective and poor performance of varioue echelons of cadre within
the area. Front line supply CialkUILU1001/1 at district and village level are
ineffective; three rice mills were closed because of the inability of forced
labor to transport adequate amounts of rice, and finally, as a result of
repeated AVNAF and US sweep operations within the area, the over-all
picture le gloomy and the main objective (control of the highlands) has
not. been attained. "
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Another indication of declining Communist MOrale is the last that
last yeer's returns from the government's psychological wartime
program. called "Chieu Hot" (rhymes with "you boy") or "Open Arm.."
are most impressive. This program is designed to entice both civilians
and military per from the Viet COAX to the government side. AU
to/d. the Chita Not program brought in 42.552 persons In 1965 .-about
three times as many as in 1964. Even or. to the point, the number of
returnees who could be identified as Viet Cong military defectors was
five times as numerous??9. 472 in 1965 compared to 1.903 in 1964. The
defector* last year also included an appreciable number.-2.174...of
"political cadres. "i.e.. Viet Cong subversive agents who at least at
one time were strongly indoctrinated Communists.
loss e to Viet Cong manpower through both casualties
s are showing an even greater lactate* title year. 9.630
rth Vietnamese soldiers can be confirmed as having been
lod I .7anuary through 12 March 1966. or 3.661 more
ed (5.969) during all of Januar* February and kitsch
1965. As for defectors there were 1.672 Viet Cong "returnees" during
January 1966. and 789 during the first tan days of February alone, as
compared with less than 600 during all of January and February 1963.
A4tarch figures are not yet available but appear to be sustaining this
higher defection rate.
As the Viet Cong have continued to sustain this heavy drain on their
wer, they have been forced to resort to increasingly draconian
to meet their needs. The Communists have stopped u:;) their
recruitGient drives among the peasants. and Last month issued
r the creation of a combat support ff3ree...."youth sheet teams"
women a* well as men. The present forced draft nature of
ecruitment is reflected in the appearance in combat on
eat occasions of extremely young and often poorly trained
*se who state that they were impressed into service. They
youths recruited in North Vietnam for intiltzsition into
=often new draftees with minimal training.
of regular North Vietnamese military units attest to
problen-,s of the Viet Cong.
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At the same time, the Viet Cong have imposed ever greater financial
burden* on the peasant. in areas under Communis control. To help finance
their agsression? the Viet Coma have doubled and even tripled their rate of
taxation on the populace. Itscont reports list taxation rates this year of
65% and even 70% of the rice being harvested IA Viet Cong.held areas of the
delta and central coast. There are also reports, verified by Viet Cong
prieoners, of growing peasant recalcitrance at these levies on production.
here itovernzoont troops have moved in to drive out Communist units
during the, rice harvest, such as major allied operations in coastal Phu
Yen Province north of Saigon in January and February, a favorable peasant
reaction has been trnmalitately apparent. Peasants in this long Viet Cong
held area have been providing the **vertu: neat information on the location
and movements of the Communist troops in, the province. The rural popu-
lation has shown itself increasingly Inclined to support CVN and allied
force. (e.g.. by volunteering useful and accurate intelligence information)
in areas in which the peasantry has come to feel rtelatively secure from
Viet Omg retaliation. Captured Viet Cons documents attest to this trend
in their exhortations to Viet Cong cadre to tighten up on. local security.
The Viet Celia resort extensively to terrorism in their effort to
impose their will on the people in the countryside. Last year, the
Comnists in South Vietnam killed L 495 civilians and kidnapped 12.760
These included 210 government officials rourdered...often in
me fashion..and 329 others kidnapped. This resort by the Communists
brutality against the Vietatemeas peasant does not square weU with
Cong boast that they have the support of the people in a ems against
at year of refugees from insecure areas
held territory bespeaks efforts of the
the Viet Cong. More than 800,000 such
ed thus far. The bulk of these--about
vary shelters provided by the Saigon
t large numbers have already been
national social structure. from time
get of Viet Cons terrorist raids
which attest to Contmun.jat displeasure at the outflow of such human
resources y controL
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gree of control exercised respectively by the
Viet Cons over the population
ularly since "control" is such a hard c
rms. However. the trend is now running clearly.
C government. Available figures (which are fairly
magnitude indicator.) show that as of last December (1963)
controlled 5Z.1% (7, 724, 200) of the 1.3 million population as
944 200) a year previous. The rural population under
increased slightly in the early part of 1965 to a high
In July; but by year's end. this figure had declined
The remaining 25. 214 (3, 800. 000) of the population
in contesting areas.
hay
the impro
wall as in t
to recognise that more
Vietnam= and that returns are being
doe! life sad physical well-being o
of problems for our adversaries.
Despite the ravages of the war in the countryside, our assistance during
1965 *tabled100, Vietnamese farmers to irrigate and improve
300, 000 hectare 0 acres), thus significantly increasing the
value of their land. Additionally. 33.042 peasants received agricultural
Dane indirectly financed by Un assistance. in fiscal year 1963, 325 new
rural wells were dug with our help. Since a crash program of assisting
South Vietnamese hamlet .thesmallest rural population unit--in elementary
education was begun in 1963, more then 3, 200 hamlet classrooms have been
built under the MAID program, more than 5, 200 teachers? trained, sod more
than 7 minion textbooks delivered. Another I million books are already
contracted for delivery. These figures do not include t6. 000 hamlet self-
help projects already initiated by the Vietnamese thentselves.
t year, about 6.7 million Vietnamese were vaccinated against
and lora, diseases frequently of epidemic proportions throughout
Southeast Asia. Vaccination of farm animals against disease since 1963 has
reduced outbreaks of epidemics in that period to only four, with only 120
animal fatalities from disease. Rodent control programs saved an
estimated 760 million piasters worth of food crops law year alone. US
aid to South Vietnam's fishing industry has boosted the tonnage of catch
in 1.963 to 368,000 tons, compared with only 52. 000 ten years ago. All
of these, and other US program. of assistance la agricultural extension,
alth, housing, and education, are permitting South Vietnam to continue
to develop and move forward despite the massive and continuing drain of
the war on its own resources.
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Uxsdei th. medical civic action pro grant inst year. over four and
a half million Vietnamese from the U.S.
armed forces. There were more than 2,400 military civic action
construction projects. such as bridges, schools. rood repairs. and
drainage controls. Uzdts and individual. contributed to the support of
hundreds of orphanages, schools, and hospitals.
An econozoic boom has accom.panied the expansion of our military
effort. Planned U.S. construction projects in South Vietnam at year's
end were valued at nearly $1 billion. Petroleum consumption rose from
250,000 barrels in January 1960 to more than I minion per month in
December. Imports by ship into South Vietnam rose 000 per cent while
intercoastal shipping doubled, from the January VAS tonnage figure of
25, 000. Civilian personnel working on military construction projects
totaled only a few thousand in January but were over 20.000 at the end
of the year. Measured against the ideological prornises--and threats
of the Communists. the.. are positive factors. Much of this development
has, of course, been forced-draft activity inspired by war and poesessed
of inflationary potential. but nevertheless it has provided jobs, incomes
and phyeical facilities where none ezeisted before.
The most significant return on the U.S. investment of the past
?and, in the final analysis, the most important one--has been its
political impact. Within South Vietnam the most marked and
petal development of the past year is an apparently growing conviction
among the populace?.,both urban and, especially rural--that the Viet
Cong no longer are certain, perhaps not even likely, to emerge victorious.
This more favorable public attitude, in turn, has helped Saigon's military
Leaders provide the country with a progressively greater degree of
governmental stability and political progress. hnprovemente in this
area should not be overt-stressed or over. sold but the definite beginnings
of solid improvement have been made.
Although there are still IRAOT CMS prOblerret yet to be overcome,
South Vietnam's leoders are steering a course which they bop*
end of nest year will bring national elections and the creation of &
democratic national assembly. These leaderso have been in office
for a longer period now than any government since Diem's overthrows.
are men who represent a rising generation of genuine nationalist element .
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Er before they took offic. they showed an awareness of po
cial improvewent in South Vietnam. With our assi
ams as those recently delineated at Honolulu they are
d forth the concrete prospect of social and political progress and.
same time, make increasingly apparent to all the hollowness of
false promises in this sphere long made by Cornmurdst propaganda.
desire
such
able
EFFECTS IN THE
The US/GVN
restricted campaign desive
educing North Vietnam s ab
South Vietnam. There are sever
th Vietnam has been a highly
civilian casualties while
support COZZI MAIMIllt activities in
positive indications that this air
campaign is producing concrete results.
The air attacks have been able to impose an increasingly high price
on the DRY'. support of the war in the South. The sir attack. are also
a significant factor in keeping the morale end will to fight of South Vietnam
at a high level.
North Vietnam baa been forced, by the ks, to forfeit an
increasing amount of foreign trade earrdngs..eorn six million in
965. The DRY has lost almost IT percent of its national bulk petroleum
storage capacity and over 25 percent of its electric power generating
capacity. North Vietnam has had to forego or postpone plans for orderly
economic development and to suffer increasing upheaval of industrial
output. Reconstruction efforts have been hampered by difficulties in
allocating manpower. The regime is also meeting increasing problem*
In the distribution of food, particularly to relocated elerrtents of the
population and to large increment* of workers detailed to reconstruction
and repair activities.
The greatest brunt of the air attack. has been foil on the railroads
ghways used to rapport the togiatic supply of the Conmunist fore**
and to infiltrate PAVN forces into South Vietnam. Air attack alone
cannot complet ely stop this flow of men and supplies. Eta it can and has
disrupted this flow and made it a considerably more difficult and costly
process. Large *mounts of manpower have been diverted from productive
employment to repair and keep open the lines of communication running
through the southern provinces of North Vietnam and Laos to South Vietnam.
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Moreover. the DRY ha. been compelled to useoperations
k the forward x3oven.ent of men and supplies. This slows up move.,
iderably. making the trip by truck fro m Hanoi to the South
rder almost three times longer. The Communists hove also
been forced to expend ranch manpower and resources in constructing new
roads, by-passes, and other expedients to keep traffic moving he both
North Vietnam and Laos.
A final effect of the US/GYN air attacks is that they increase
the ready heavy dependence of North Vietnam an Coxnmuniet China
and the USSR. While the amount of their military and reconstruction
aid cannot be quantified precisely, it creates an additional drain on the
economies of these two countries. particularly Communist Ckina.
3 February 1966 apeech in Hanoi. Le Dud .' Tho.-North Vietnamese
(Communist) Party Politburo member and the Chief of tke
rganisotion Department.-admitted that some members of the
party apparatus have developed "erroneous thoughts and views" and
have made flea incorrect assessmeat of the balance of power between the
enemy and us." Tho claimed. naturally, that such "erroneous thoughts'
were confined to "a small number of comrades," but the fact of internal
dissension within the Party itself would never have been publicly
acknowledged, even in this =loaner. if North Vietnam's leaders did not
consider it at least potentially serious. hat Tho obviously aaaaut is
that the nature and size of the present joint US/GYN effort La beginning
to generate doubts even within the North 'Vietnamese Communist Party
itself about the wisdom of the intransigeast and militant policies of
Hanoi's leaders. Tho is telling tus in short, that present U.S. policy
and the massive U.S. investment of the past year are beginning to produce
exactly the kind of political result* they were devised to create.
I Z.
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Approved For albgeN244#dAISIlilliRgAIU1676R000100(
TO: DCI
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DATE: 22 March 1966
REMARKS:
Attached is a memorandum prepared
for the White House at their request.
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0
A