ALLEGED DESIRE BY NORTH VIETNAMESE IN PARIS TO DISCUSS SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION WITH UNOFFICIAL US REPRESENTATIVE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R000100040013-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 22, 2002
Sequence Number:
13
Case Number:
Content Type:
MF
File:
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CIA-RDP80B01676R000100040013-5.pdf | 198.96 KB |
Body:
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E1404,41,
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SECRET
4 Jgnuarir 1.46
4 The Bonerabl Seam *ask
Secretary of State
Alleged Demise by X Vietnamese in
Paris to Discuss Settlement of tbe
Vietsam Situation witb Umetticia/ US
ilepresentative
ag dimseminated t? you and to
Ar. amd no tarther dissemimatioM
will be instructiese.
or Bundy
ODDI: (6 Jan 1966)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - DDP
1 - DDI
1 - SAVA
State Department review completed
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Alleged D0Iiir0 by N
Settiestellt 01 the V
US Representative
otnamese art to ues
Stuation *itb Unoific
1. Stt,ortly after krecura 5 Jett from a snor
Paris, Pierre Salinger gave the follow ng account to a
GIA
icer of au approech made to him, ittlegedly on behalf of
V representatives in Paris, for diacussioss wtth a private
itiA00 OA WOO for ending the war in Sciatil Vietnan.
nger expects a telegram from. his Paris contact indicating
her such a meeting is 90004.0.4 and is ready to coavey a
7-
1 January 1966
left/
T vas approached
and speech writer
to
---- formerly a Com-
the follovOna
MInaxw.
Propositions
3. The Viet Cong representatives i* Paris *ere 41.1
proachable on the subject of aegotiating the situatioa i
VLetnan, and their terms were very simple. he said that t
not care particularly about the US pulling out troops be
discussions begin but they do want to have a part in the d
cussions, they would lilr.e to aee popular elections held, they
would lite a guarantee for 95 years that the big powers would
25)6vtay out of Vietnamese affairs and that if later on iiith
Vtetnamvished to align, itself with the North, the powers
would let the* do it. I 1 indicated that the Viet Cong
.n Faris were friends of hie. Sallower said he would like to
meet with them but that he could not discuss any poesible settle-
3PE1.. sent of the Vietnamesestaation because of the Logan Act.
4. The next day IIF- I telephoned Salinger and told hAn
25X1 tuat the Viet Coug could not meet with him on ouch short notice.
ever, at about 5130 that as day Anselme showed up at the
inger hotel and asked Salinger why it would not be possaole
four or five US liberals to go to Paris and sit dolma with
for
Viet Cong. Salinger said he farther eispiained the Logan
but told Anselme that he should go bite-. to the Viet Cong a
nd
then it they 'would meet with an individual US citisea for
riendly discussion." 25X1
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5. Luger arranged with Ansel's* for Angelus te send
Malinger a telegras in code which 'meld indicate whether or
not the Viet Cong would be willing to talk with such a US
representative, who could be a businessman, professor, banker,
etc., but should speak French and should be Imre of the US
position and the Southeast Asian situation. Winger told
Angels* that if the Viet Cosg were agreeable to such a meeting
that 72 hours after receipt of the telegram by his a US
citizen would be available in Paris for the meeting.
6. Winger expects a telegram either agreeing to or
refusing such a meeting within the next two or three days.
If there is any interest in such a meeting, word should be
gotten back to Winger as soon after receipt of the telegram
(if it is affirmative) so that he could inform Animane of
details.
7.
as:
be co
officer
such a nesting
be coordinated
he has a ready
suggested US representative, Salinger
y an individual such as Norman Cousins might
He also indicated the possibility of a CIA
el felt advisable. Malinger understands that
acceptable to the Viet Coag would beve to
the highest US level, and if unacceptable,
excuse to back out.
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