LETTER TO THE HONORABLE W. F. RABORN FROM GEORGE BALL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000100040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1966
• Content Type: LETTER

DIA, OSD, JCS and DOS review(s) completed.
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON
2 9 DEC 1965
Honorable W. F. Raborn
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the United States
Intelligence Board (USIB) study entitled "Infiltration and
Logistics--South Vietnam" and the more recent intelligence on
the use of Cambodian territory by the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese forces as a source of supply, sanctuary, and fortem-
porary military facilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recom-
mended (JCSM 812-65 of 12 Nov 65 attached) a series of specific
actions to minimize such support in or from Cambodia.
One recommended course of action is to expand and intensify
overall intelligence collection programs to further identify and
define the nature and extent of support to PAVN/Viet Cong in-
surgency in or from Cambodia. This action as viewed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff would include collection programs as follows:
a. Intelligence agent collection nets in Cambodian cities,
ports, and areas adjacent to the Cambodian/RVN border.
b. Conduct of extensive high altitude reconnaissance of
Cambodia.
c. Maintenance of close air and surface surveillance of
maritime shipping entering and departing Cambodian ports.
d. Conduct of covert ground cross-border information excur-
sions by small teams into Cambodian territory.
Accomplishment of such undertaking by U.S. agencies envisages
cooperation and assistance of intelligence collection agencies of
allied nations operating in the area.
DRAFT,
Y _
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Since future policy decisions relating to actions to counter use
of Cambodia by PAVN/Viet Cong forces should be made on the basis
of timely, reliable intelligence, it appears desirable to re-examine
US/RVN assets, as well as those of friendly third countries, to
determine further programs which might be developed to provide the
necessary information. It is therefore, requested that you ask the
USIB to undertake the necessary review and preparation of plans to
obtain those additional data which are required to be responsive to
this problem.
The Secretary of State concurs in this request.
Sincerely,
Enclosure
Cy #16 of JCSM 812-65 of 12 Nov 65
DRAFT
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
JCSM-812-65
12 November 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: US Policy and Actions to Deal With Cambodian
Support of the Viet Cong (S)
1. (TS) Recent studies by both the United States Intelligence Board.
(USIB) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (Appendix A) conclude that
the Viet Cong (VC) use Cambodia for a source of supply, for a. sanctuary,
and for temporary military facilities. Supplies in the form of weapons,
ammunition, medicine, and chemicals used in munitions have been
captured during actual infiltration into South Vietnam (SVN) from Cam-
bodia. There is considerable evidence, including reports of US Special
Forces advisors, that the VC use Cambodian territory in some areas
along the 600-mile border for sanctuary. There is also evidence that
the VC have established temporary military facilities, such as rest
camps, training areas, hospitals, work-shops, and storage depots on
Cambodian soil. Recent reportd', from Phnom Penh disclose that Prince
Sihanouk may start trading openly with the VC. Cambodia's deteriorating
financial position may have led Sihanouk to reason that the advantages
of trade arrangements with the VC would outweigh any sanctions brought
to bear against him by Saigon or the United States.
2. (TS) Although the Cambodian Government has been careful not
to provide the VC military support and has asserted its neutrality,
Cambodians do permit the use of their territory and resources by the
communist insurgents. This VC use of Cambodian territory is made
possible by some active cooperation with the VC at lower Cambodian
Government and military levels, an indifferent attitude by other officials,
and the inability or failure of the Government to control or even patrol
its frontiers. By permitting its country to be used as a source of supply.
as a sanctuary, and for military facilities, Cambodia has forfeited its
claim of neutrality.
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3. (TS) Recent reports indicate a continued buildup of VC/People's
Army of Vietnam (PAVN) troops in SVN. The increased requirements
of this larger force (including a significant increment of regular troops),
the determined Government of Vietnam/United States (GVN/US) efforts
to seize the initiative in Southeast Asia, and the resulting higher level
of military activity are causing the VC, as the USIB study points out,
to place increasing dependency on outside sources of supply for arms
and ammunition, technical equipment, medical supplies, cadre personnel,
and trained technicians. With the GVN/US efforts to minimize infiltration
through other land and sea routes being intensified, the importance of
Cambodia to the VC insurgency can be expected to increase as the one
remaining unimpaired support route available to them. The Cambodian
sanctuary provides the VC with a decided military advantage and has a
detrimental effect on the war effort in SVN.
4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have weighed the pros and cons of the
specific actions that would be required to minimize Cambodian support of
the VC and consider that the following factors are important to a resolution
of the problem:
a. Cambodia is the only contiguous source of VC support against
which no action is being taken. Since control of the insurgency involves
seeking out and destroying the VC/PAVN forces and their sources of
support, the reasons for taking action in this remaining area are
militarily clear.
b. From a political viewpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize
a risk of antagonizing Prince Sihanouk by any forceful action, with a
possibility that Cambodia may seek a closer relationship with
Communist China. Although Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)
and/or CIIICOM intervention appears unlikely, some increase in
CHICOM military assistance to Cambodia may be expected.
c. The possible benefits derived from GVN/US observance of
the inviolability of the Cambodian border must be weighed against
the violation of South Vietnamese sovereignty by VC incursions into
SVN and.their use of Cambodia as a sanctuary. SVN's fundamental.
right of self-defense is compromised by a policy that prohibits effec-
tive counteraction. Further, the use of Cambodian territory by the
VC, with immunity to pursuit. unduly inhibits field commanders in
the defense of their areas and forces.
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ILLEGIB
5. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the military require-
meets are of paramount importance and that forceful action must be
taken to stop the use of Cambodian territory for VC logistics and
sanctuary despite possible adverse political and military reaction.
6. (TS) It is understood that the Department of State is now in the
process of reviewing US policy toward Cambodia. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider that this revision should be conducted on a priority basis.
They have observed that relations with Cambodia have not improved as
a result of current and past policies and that support of the VC is continuing.
They consider that the present state of affairs, in which Cambodians are
supporting the VC, is inconsistent with continued US recognition of
Cambodian neutrality.
.7. (TS) US policy toward Cambodia should provide for GVN/US action
which will result in minimizing Cambodian support of the VC, including
the reduction of infiltration of war materiel into SVN from Cambodia.
In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered courses of action
to accomplish that objective. Although there are risks associated with
the application of the more severe courses of action. the Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider that Cambodia's political and military reactions will be
insignificant in relation to the gains made possible through suitable
application of the pressures and actions recommended. These courses
of action are:
`'f a: Course of Action A. Expand and intensify the over-all
intelligence collection program for Cambodia.
/ b Course of Action B. Conduct a political/psychological
campaign to persuade the Government of Cambodia to take actions
to stop support of the VC.
c. Course of Action C. Encourage third country participation
in actions designed to bring pressure against Cambodia to stop
support of the VC.
d. Course of Action D. Increase surveillance of the sea lines
of communication (LOCs) between the RVN and Cambodia and
increase controls on the Mekong and Bassac waterways,
e. Course of Action E. Conduct covert paramilitary operations
into Cambodia to reduce the infiltration of personnel and materiel
and to collect intelligence information.
ILLEGIB
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f. Course of Action F. Conduct low altitude aerial reconnaissance
into Cambodia.
./" g. Course of Action G. Authorize GVN/US operations into
Cambodia #.n immediate pursuit of VC forces which are withdrawing
into Cambodian territory.
h. Course of Action H. Conduct military operations to prevent
entry of maritime shipping carrying contraband goods into Cambodian
ports.
t. Course of Action I. Conduct overt air and/or ground cross-
border operations into Cambodia against confirmed LOCs and
facilities which support the VC insurgency.
Details of each course of action are contained in Appendix B.
8. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that Courses of Action A
through G are appropriate and necessary for immediate implementation
and that Courses of Action H and I may be necessary at a later date.
9. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:.
a. US policy toward Cambodia include, as an objective, the
denial of Cambodian territory for the support of the VC insurgency.
b. Courses of Action A through G be approved for immediate
implementation.
c. Courses of Action H and I be reserved for consideration
pending the outcome of Courses of Action A through G.
d. A memorandum substantially as contained in Appendix C
be forwarded to the Secretary of State.
SIGNED
DAVID L. McDONALD
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
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APPENDIX A
DIA STUDY
VIET CONG USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY
TOP SECRET
icsM- 812-65
Appendix A
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 VIET CONG USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY
The strategic location of Cambodia on mainland Southeast Asia, coupled
with the escalation of the war in Vietnam, requires a reevaluation of the
Cambodian situation and a sharp look at the available evidence to determine
the extent of Cambodian complicity in the external support to the Viet Cong
(VC).
In the past few years, Cambodian international political posture has
undergone a departure from its enunciated policy of neutralism. Prince
Sihanouk also is convinced that the Viet Cong will be successful in
establishing a Communist state in South Vietnam. He believes this is a
natural political development and in time the whole of Southeast Asia will
be dominated by the Communist philosophy as delineated by Peking. Sihanouk
apparently feels that he must make accommodations to a situation that appears.
to him to be inevitable. Under these circumstances, he is making efforts to
ingratiate himself and his nation with the leaders of "the wave of the future"
in order to retain Cambodian individuality, territorial integrity and security.
In the past two years he has turned abruptly from the United States which he
feels certain will be forced to withdraw from Asia. He has terminated US
aid programs and has eliminated US diplomatic presence in Phnom Penh. On the
other hand, he has tied the Cambodian Army logistically to the Red Chinese
by the acceptance of a ChiCom military aid program that probably has equipped
the Cambodian Army's tactical units with Chinese-made small arms. He has
been consistent in his attacks on US foreign policy throughout the world
using the standard Communist terms of reference to express his disapproval.'
Finally, in late August of this year, the Prince offered medical supplies to
the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLFSVN). Cambodia
has, therefore, placed itself in a position that is diametrically opposed to
US interests in the area.
The infiltration of war materiel into South Vietnam cannot be disputed.
Sufficient non-indigenous ordnance items have been captured to establish
materiel infiltration as a fact. During the past year the first bulk
seizure of the new family of Chinese Communist small arms occurred in the
delta. Prior to 1964, the capture of other weapons from the Communist Bloc
was not uncommon. Explosives from outside of the RVN have been captured in
caches and on the delta waterways. One of the questions to be examined is
whether or not any of the infiltrated materiel transited neighboring Cambodia.
DIA has completed a study on the Viet Cong use of Cambodia in light of the
present situation. All available data was reviewed, and from over 4,000
separate pieces of information more than 270 reports were included in the study
such as: 42 prisoner of war interrogation reports; 30 official US and South
Vietnamese reports; 18 captured materiel reports; 8 photo reconnaissance
mission reports; 140 agent reports; and other classified data. Strong
evidence is now on hand that the Viet Cong utilize Cambodia as aqogistics
base, as a transit ar nctua x, AQ Q base of commun cat ons and as a
52urce o supply. There is circumstantial evidence that Cambodian ports are
utilized for ingress of supplies _destine or the Viet Cong. There is
sufficient data on hand to conclude that the lower echelons of;the Cambodian
military and the civil services have knowledge of Viet Cong activities and, in
iffy cases actively collaborate with them. Finally, Cambodia's present
po t ca trio a e to recent a fissions of agreements with the NFLSVN
indicates growing complicity and collusion between the RKG and the Viet Cong.
The strong evidence referred to takes the following forms. On the use
of Cambodia as a logistics base, DIA holds 17 POW interrogation reports in
the 1964-1965 time frame. In these reports the prisoners state that they
participated in or witnessed the purchase, and/or transportation of arms,
ammunition, food, chemicals, medical supplies, etc., from Cambodia into South
Vietnam. There is the hard evidence of the capture of weapons, ammunition,
medicines, and chemicals during actual infiltration. DIA has in excess of
60 agent reports which confirm not only the general intelligence mentioned
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but also set forth the detailed methodology of Viet Cong logistical support
from Cambodia. The Viet Cong use of Cambodia as an infiltration or transit
area for personnel is confirmed by 10 POW reports of men who infiltrated
from the DRV via Cambodia. In addition, there are 20 agent reports supporting
their statements. The evidence that Cambodia is used by the Viet Cong as a
sanctuary is overwhelming. This is supported by 18 POW reports, 53 agent
reports over 80 recorded incidents of Viet Cong withdrawal into Cambodia as
reported by US Special Forces Headquarters at Can Tho, South Vietnam and three
photo reconnaissance missions. There are also 17 agent reports that indicate
that Cambodia is used as a communications zone. These reports are supported
by other classified data. On the subject of Cambodian low level collusion
with the Viet Cong, DIA holds the following: 10 POW reports and 34 agent
reports. Additionally, the following quotation from the August 1965 report
of the British Military Attache in Phnom Penh is interesting. Quote....
However, I keep hearing alarming stories from a variety of commercial sources
that the smuggling is large scale, continuous, and implicates almost everyone
in the bureaucratic chain of command -- police, customs, army, the export
licensing office, and the rice marketing board. Unquote.
Now, to turn to the mechanics of Viet Cong use of Cambodia. Supplies and
materiel arrive in Cambodia by a variety of routes: the Mekong and Bassac
Rivers to Phnom Penh; the sea routes to Sihanoukville and Kampot; the inland
waterways from Laos; and the roads and trails from Laos. Once within Cambodia,
personnel and supplies are moved as follows:
First, by porter or vehicle on motorable road approaches to the South
Vietnam border. These routes provide access from Cambodian markets where Viet
Cong cadres and purchasing agents can obtain necessary supplies. Evidence
indicates that the Viet Cong portaging these supplies fan out into the complex
of trails to cross the border.
Second, by sampan or junk on inland waterways leading to the central
and the southern or delta areas of South Vietnam. Four inland water routes
provide access to the central area, and six. waterways provide access to the
southern or delta areas. From these, connections with most points in the
delta area can be established.
Third, by sea from the Cambodian ports via the Gulf of Siam to the
west coast of South Vietnam and to the island of Phu Quoc.
In-file data clearly confirms that the following types of supplies and
materiel enter South Vietnam from Cambodia.
2. Surgical equipment and medicines to include antibiotics.
3. Rifles, automatic weapons, recoilless rifles, mortars, grenades,
mines and ammunition.
4. Potassium chlorate, potassium nitrate, sulphur, mercury and
phosphorus.
A few statistics published overtly by the Royal Cambodian Government prove
interesting. In 1960, 10 tons of potassium chlorate were imported; in 1963
(through September) 107 tons of potassium chlorate were imported. This
material is not indigenous to Cambodia and present consumption of it is limited
to approximately 10 tons per year. A recent analysis of Viet Cong mines and
demolition charges showed them to contain more that 80% of potassium chlorate.
Finally, the Government of South Vietnam has captured in excess of 40,000 pounds
of chemicals on delta waterways in one period from March of 1963 to February
1964. Ninety-'five per cent was potassium chlorate. Some of the bags containing
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the chemicals bore names of Cambodian firms in Phnom Penh. In many cases,
the captured boatmen admitted bringing the chemicals in from Cambodia. .
These statistics coupled with the data on captured materiel gives
circumstantial evidence that the Cambodian ports are handling materiel
destined for V4.et Cong.
Phu Quoc Island is an interesting case in point. The southern half of
the island is government controlled, while the northern half belongs to .
the Viet Cong. In the Gulf of Siam, the Viet Cong have a supply organization
at Kampot, Cambodia. From here, supplies are brought over to northern Phu
Quoc where there is a major logistics depot. From there, supplies are carried
over to the mainland, using island steps.
One of the prime uses of Cambodia by the Viet Cong is for sanctuary. The
weight of evidence here appears incontrovertable. Much of the information
comes from interrogations of Viet Cong prisoners or defectors who actually
crossed the border to seek a safe haven. Supporting data comes from the
SVN army, photographic data of suspicious locations and agent reports. This
data reveals that the Viet Cong utilize sanctuary for the following reasons:
1. When pursued by ARVN; operational reports from ARVN and US
advisors. continually mention that the Viet Cong in the border areas break
contact and seek refuge in Cambodia.
2. As a training area; we have as examples the statements of POW
Tran Van Quam, who attended a training school in Cambodia, and Than Thi Tao,
a female rallier who also trained in Cambodia.
3. As a staging area; POW Du Van Phuoc took part in an attack on
an ARVN post near Vinh Yuong. He stated that the attack was launched from
Cambodia, and upon failure to overrun the post, his group returned to base
in Cambodia.
4. As to i stics or hospital area; as an example, POW Nguyen Van Bo
stated he observed Viet Cong wounded carried back to Cambodia to be treated
after an operation in South Vietnam.
Intelligence data indicates that the important areas or spot locations
of Viet Cong occupancy are:
1. The salient where the Laos-Cambodian-South Vietnam borders meet;
2. The Camp Rollande area;
3. The Mimot-Snoul area;
4. The Mount Lo Go area;
5. The "Parrot's Beak" area;
6. The Kas Kok-Thuong Phuoc area;
7. The Giong Bang area; and,
8. The Kampot-Ha Tien area.
The involvement of the Royal Cambodian Government in support of the Viet
Cong cannot be conclusively proved e. However, the lower echelons
o t e Cambodian i- itary and the civil services appear to be deeply involved
with the Viet Cong in the border areas. As a result, the supposition is that
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the RICE is aware of much that has happened, but it officially closes its eyes
and ears. There are numerous specific incidents of low level Cambodian knowledge
of Viet Cong activities, and of outright Cambodian collusion with the Viet Cong.
Cambodian officials are aware of the excessive importation of chemicals
which can be used for explosives. They are also aware of South Vietnamese
claims that chemicals from Cambodia have been smuggled into South Vietnam.
Furthermore, recently Prince Sihanouk announced that Cambodia has provided
the Viet Cong with medical supplies. Arrangements have been worked out in Hanoi.
In conclusion, Cambodia's geographical location with the many routes of
approach to South Vietnam, provides the access and the safe haven the Viet Cong
require. The Royal Cambodian Government has the political motivation to support
the Viet Cong both overtly and covertly, and has expressed sympathy with their
cause. Finally, the weight of evidence proves that Cambodia is being used by
the Viet Cong and probably with its approval. Sir, this concludes the briefing.
Are there any questions?
1
Y'- 1
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APPENDIX B
COURSES OF ACTION
'POP SECT
Appendix B
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APPENDIX C
DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR. THE SECRETARY OF STATE
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