WHY HAVE SO MANY CRITICS ACCUSED THE CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN OFFICER CORPS OF FOSTERING CAREERISM? SOME THOUGHTS?

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003600260002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2001
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• Content Type: PAPER

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Army/Navy
Declassification/Release
Instructions on File
WHY HAVE SO MANY CRITICS ACCUSED THE
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN OFFICER
CORPS OF FOSTERING CAREERISM?
by
Commander L. T. Wright, USN
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AMERICAN OFFICERS AND CAREERISM
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all;
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought
HAMLET
INTRODUCTION
We in the military officer corps have become particularly
sensitive to charges that our profession fosters careerism.
What is this "careerism"? Why are we so charged? This paper
will attempt to assess some of the reasons for the spate of
such accusations and the directions from which they come.
No attempt will be made to justify or refute a charge of
careerism. Each officer must reach his own decision in this
regard.
CAREERISM?
"There exists an unwholesome amount of irresponsible
critism of the implementation of our national military policies.
The more vociferous of critics aim their slanderous attacks
at our military leaders. The continued. degradation of career
military officers as a class can do irreparable damage to
our ability to attract and retain capable personnel. Able
and conscientious men will not indefinitely continue in a
profession dishonored by public criticism." (8:1953)
Right on! The author of these words obviously is
concerned with our efforts to create a volunteer armed
forces. He also shows sympathy for career officers in the
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face of current criticisms levied against our profession.
This undoubtedly strikes a responsive chord in many of us.
Interestingly, the author of the above remarks was the
"Womble Report" of 1953, which resulted from a Department
of Defense study of the "Future of Military Service as a
Career that will Attract and Retain Capable Career Personnel."
Although the term careerism per se was not used in the
Womble Report, it may be that the word had not yet come into
vogue, for the professional integrity of career military
officers was certainly in question by our critics. From this
we can deduce that current accusations of careerism directed
against military officers are not a new phenomenon. What
then of this word careerism.
Webster defines it as "the policy or practice of advanc-
ing one's career (as in the arts and professions) often at
the cost of professional or personal integrity: career build-
ing as a deliberate aim." Others have defined a careerist
as: "one who consistently places his own personal advancement
above the'best interests of the profession. One who sacrifices
dignity and loyalty for advancement."
Like all words or descriptive phrases, the meaning is in
the eye of the beholder -- or in how it is perceived by an
individual. For example careerist is often used colloquially
to refer to a person who is a "lifer", or who has decided
to make the service a career. Careerism is the noun which
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-seems to have the odious meaning. Does it make a?difference
which values are used to measure professional integrity? I
believe that it does. Anthony Wermuth has compared the values
characteristic of American Culture with those of small units
of the Army. Note the differences in the two lists. (11: )
VALUE CLUSTERS GENERALLY
CHARACTERISTIC OF AMERICAN CULTURE
MILITARY VALUE FACTORS IN
SMALL UNITS OF THE ARMY
1. Activity and work
2. Achievement and success
3. Moral orientation
4. Humanitarianism
5. Efficiency and practicality
6. Scientific and secular ration-
ality
7. Material comfort
8. Progress
9. Equality
10. Freedom
11. Democracy
12. External conformity
13. Nationalism and patriotism
14. Individual personality
15. Racism and related group
superiority
Social background of
unit members (e.g.,
homogeneity, hetero-
genity)
Personality of unit
members
3. Protectiveness of
immediate leaders
4. Performance of immediate
leaders
5. Military discipline,
professionalism and role
of soldierly honor
6. Commitment to one's
social-political
7. War indoctrination
8. Exigencies of military
life and the combat
situation
9. Replacement system and
rotation policy
10. Technical aspects of
weapons systems
11. Social prestige of
profession
12. Egalitarian practices
within the military
organization
These values are not necessarily in order of importance.
Additionally, comparison of the values of small units (or
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group values) in the Army with individual values of our
culture may seem to be mixing apples with oranges. However,
(whether we agree with the values listed or not) I believe
that these lists demonstrate some differences between our-
selves
and our civilian counterparts. What does all this
have to do with careerism and the spate of critics who accuse
the contemporary American officer corps of fostering careerism.
Simply this: a critic who accuses the service, or a particular
officer, of careerism often is quite naturally using his own
value system as a yardstick. The same group, or officer, by
military values may be acting as a professional with no taint
of careerism. i don't mean to imply that some members of our
profession do not advance their careers at the cost of pro-
fessional integrity. i do believe that we have become too
thin skinned when criticism or cries of careerism are heard
from outside our organization, e.g., civilians. We must
be aware that different measurements may be in use to define
professional integrity.
To a journalist, professional integrity may demand that you
immediately and publically denounce any cost overruns on a
military procurement contract. To a senior officer involved
in management of the contract, professional integrity may
demand that you try like hell to prevent the cost overruns
while insuring that your superiors are kept well informed --
but not that you pull a Gordon Rule.
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Our confrontation with the journalists during last
year's "Military and the Media" seminars of the Naval War
College dramatically illustrated to me the sentiment of
many, that the professional officer corps fosters careerism.
Although I don't recall the term careerism being used, the
message clearly came through that we were thought to be
lacking of professional integrity. Conversely, I believe
that we illustrated to the media representatives that their
professional integrity was also in serious question.
Unfortunately the media is not the proper opponent for us
to exacerbate. On the positive side, I believe that each
of us (the media and the military) became a bit more aware
of the value system in use by the other.
The current criticism directed against us as professional
officers undoubtedly stems from a myriad of factors. Changing
socio-politico mores in our society, the Vietnam War, and
the move to an all volunteer armed forces to name but a few.
A number of scholars and military men have expressed
concern, lest the all-volunteer military return to a modern
version of the 1930's "From Here to Eternity" military:
isolated from society, unresponsive to civiliam influences,
and structured along caste lines. Such a military, many
feel, is incompatible with democratic society. (6-18)
In such a military, the inner elite is made up of those whose
military experience conformed most closely to the pro-
fessional ideal, i.e., those who had gone to the Academy,
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been to the Staff College, had the proper assignments,
etc. (3-18)
The charge of careerism, in part, may stem from
ideological differences. For example, Samuel.P. Huntington
compares liberalism with the military ethic. He considers
individualism as the heart of liberalism and that it emphasizes
the reason and.moral dignity of the individual and opposes
political, economic and social restraints upon individual
liberty. In contrast, he feels that the military ethic
requires the individual to be subordinated to the group.
(5:90) This seems to be consistent with the point in
Wernuth's study in comparative values. Huntington goes
farther, and examines the reform criticism of the military,
and reports that "military standards of honor, obedience
and loyalty were adjudged either hypocritical or positively
dangerous." "Absolute obedience to orders", wrote Ernest
Crosby, the most proliferic anti-militarist of the muckraker
period, "involves, of course, the abdication of conscience
and reason." In sum, Huntington feels that the reformers
viewed military professionalism as economically wasteful,
socially useless, and ethically backward. (5:292) This point
may be illustrated by certain segments of liberalism,
particularly the literary field and communications media,
which seem to be united in their hostility to the military
profession.
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Another source of the criticism stems from the in-
creasing disaffection of young people from government in
the late 1960's focused particularly on the uses of
violence, which took some of the most promising young
leaders of the country by assassination, and involved many
others in urban riots or foreign combat. The military
establishment and the police, as symbols of officially
condoned force, became primary objects of this alienation.
(12:405)
This alienation has taken many forms with which we
are.all familiar. Draft evaders, a hostile press, Senator
Fulbright, Jack Anderson, George McGovern, and of course,
our own Cy Bunting, to name a few. Professor Bunting
probably expresses the feeling of a number of the alientated
in his recent book The Lionheads. The principal characters
in this book clearly illustrate a lack of professional
integrity, and an abundance of careerism. For example, "It
is his sensing of his standing in the eyes of men like these
(high ranking contemporaries) that ultimately dictates his
selection of options." Thus does Bunting describe General
Lemming. (1-19) "'Not only are his staff afraid of him and
anxious to advance their own careers; they are also tired."
(1-21) "They lack the courage to point out what has gone
wrong." "The professional world runs on patronage; the
professional army is no different." (1-54)
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Undoubtedly there are many truths in The Lidnheads
and Cy Bunting has done a good job of painting the black
black. Disagreement with politico-military perspectives
gives officers an opportunity to select themselves out as'
Yarmolinsky notes. (12-224) Undoubtedly some officers
with strong reservations about U.S. policies in Vietnam --
like Bunting -- have selected themselves out. In turn,
officers who fit in with official doctrine of their service
are most likely to rise. Here is the real crunch for the
professional officer. What does my professional integrity
demand? We are all interested in advancing our careers,
yet we must look ourselves in the mirror each morning.
The implications of "cover up" in the My Lai affair,
the Army General who sold government weapons for personal
gain, the story of the marine cutting an ear off his dead
adversary, and many other stories of the Vietnam War
period have provided ammunition to our critics. Many
major news stories implied careerism and these stories seemed
to breed others as journalists sought to outdo each other on
their expose's of military misdeeds. (Is that journalistic
careerism?) Gloria Emerson of the New York Times is one of
the more prolific such authors. As a matter of interest
she continues her offensive in an article in the April 1973
issue of Harper's, in which she implies that the officer
corps, as a group, are latent homosexuals who love blood
and war. As to the latent homosexual charge,
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I would offer to prove it false, but that is truly above
and beyond the call of duty (at least for Gloria Emerson.)
As to the love of blood and war, I fear that Miss Emerson
may have seen "Patton" once too often. In any event, it
must be admitted that, properly or improperly, the Vietnam
War tarnished the prestige of the military officer corps and
further added to charges of careerism.
Certainly not all criticism has come from outside the
military. Captain W. R. Thomas, USN has commented on the
habit of officers to withhold criticism until retired. Since
I can't improve on his words, they are quoted:
"Military officers normally have weepy pens.
It is part of the equipment issued to them when
they are first commissioned so they can contradict
arguments of (1) senior officers when caught in
irrational acts; (2) foreign merchants, when
dunned; (3) civilian officials, when issued trivial
directives; (4) wives, when at sea; (5) foreign
policy analysts, when writing notes to editors;
or (6) congressmen, who want their constituents
transferred.
"This graceful art eventually results in the
acerbetic flood of timeless prose which retired
flag officers release as a long damned torrent of
abuse after they leave the service. It is then,
and only then, that they unveil their 'What's
Wrong with the Army/Navy/Air Force/Marines/Coast
Guard' epics -- the 'Why We Failed at (in) the
African/Italian/Mexican/Korean/Boxer Campaign'
stories -- and today, of course, those new dramas
titled 'How the President/Defense Department/
Military/Republicans/Democrats/Communists/Allies
Caused Us to Lose the War/Peace/Economic Leader-
ship in Kashmir/Vietnam/Outer Space/Antarctica.
"There are, admittedly, tedious and trivial
administrative obstacles which discourage these
officers from writing controversial articles while
they are on active duty; but these deterrents are
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not meant to be repressive. It is, therefore,
surprising to note that the sarcastically construc-
tive suggestions which many retired general officers
subsequently reveal to their former colleagues and
civilian leaders were singularly lacking when they
were on active duty. For some reason their literary
minds only started to function after their braid
was removed. (9-8) "
The symptoms so eloquently described by Captain Thomas
were undoubtedly intensified during the 1960's. Referring
to the McNamara era, Vincent Davis reports that many officers
used the term "reign of fear" to describe the situation
under which they worked, charging that those of their number
who were imprudent enough to differ or dissent with the
views of the Secretary as new policies were being hammered out,
no matter how loyal they might be to his policies once
established, found their professional careers severely
jeopardized if not terminated. (2-237) The firing of
Admiral Anderson as CNO is but one example, and undoubtedly
the professional integrity of other senior flag officers
soon became more flexible.
Few among us have not bent ideals a bit under certain
circumstances. For many of us the key seems to be to fall
back upon some pivotal or basic values. For example, most
of us won't lie, steal, cheat or kill to advance our careers.
However, most of us are guilty (if that is the correct word)
of some careerism in that we do try to advance our careers
as best we can. I find this wholly consistent with our
profession -- as well as with every civilian occupation.
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Careerism is present in varying degrees in the military
and civilian spheres. It exists in business, in the
universities and colleges, in all forms of the communica-
tions media, and probably most apparently in the political
processes of our nation.
SUMMARY
Careerism means different things to different people.
We in the military have become hyper-sensitive to charges
that we foster careerism, in part because we attach Webster's
odious meaning to it, and in part because of basic ideology
differences with our critics. There are a myriad of reasons
for the charges levied against us, but the changing socio-
political mores in our society, the Vietnam War, and the
move to all all-volunteer force are probably foremost
among them.
R. B. Gard, writing in Foreign Affairs, states that
the military profession faces what is probably the most
difficult challenge in its history in pursuing two key
and sometimes conflicting objectives: providing for the
military security of the United States and accomodating
present values of American society. Along with providing
a flexible military force relevant to political realities,
the armed forces must maintain an organization which is
sensitive and responsive to change. (4-703) Whether
adaptation to change will ever completely quell accusations
of careerism, however, seems unlikely.
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1. Bunting, Josiah, The Lionheads.. George Braziller,
New York, 1972
2. Davis, Vincent, The Admirals _Lobb'. The University of
North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1967
3. Feld, M.D., (Harvard University) Mass Armies and the
.Professional Officer. NEDERLANDSE ECONOMISCHE HOGESCHOOL,
Amsterdam, 1973
4. Gard, R.B. Jr., "The Military and American Society",
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 4, July 1971
5. Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State.
Vintage Books, New York, 1957
6. Janowitze, Morris, (University of Chicago) The End of
the Mass Army. International Sociological Association
Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society, Amster-
dam, March 1973
7. Rosser, Richard F., "American Civil-Military Relations
in the 1980's". Naval War College Review. Newport,
R.I., June 1972
8. "The Womble Report". Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of
Military Service as a Career that Will Attract and Retain
Capable Career Personnel", Department of Defense, Oct.
1953
9. Thomas, Walter R., From a Small Naval Observatory.
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1972
10. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, G & C
Merriam Company, Springfield, Mass. 1963
11. Wermuth, Anthony L., The Impact of Changing Values on
Military Organizations and Personnel. Westinghouse
E ectric Corporation, Advanced Studies Group, Waltham,
Mass., December 1970
12. Yarmolinsky, Adam, The Military Establishment, Harper
& Row, New York, 1971
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Chestertown, Maryland
March 24, 1974
ONE ADVERSARY TOO MANY
(STRATEGY MAKING UNDER THE 1969-1974 NSC SYSTEM)
Prologue
Page 1
Purpose
4
The Nixon Approach to Strategy
4
The Working Level NSC Organization
8
OSD Organization for Strategy and Policy
13
JCS Organization for Strategy and Policy
15
Other Forces that Affect the NSC System
19
How the Strategy for Europe has Developed
22
Some Possibilities for Doing It Better
31
Prepared for the USAF Academy
Annual Interservice Defense Policy Conference
3 April 1974
by
Colonel Louis G. Michael, USA
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Prepared for the USAF Academy
Annual Interservice Defense
Policy Conference
3 April 1974
Colonel Louis G. Michael, USA
ONE ADVERSARY TOO MANY
(Strategy Making Under the 1969-1974 NSC System)
Prologue
The officer finished his two-and-a-half minute statement to the
attentive group in the gold carpetted, well appointed conference room
in the offices of the Joint Staff. His voice broke at the conclusion
of his impassioned final plea. One was unconsciously reminded of the
prestigous and historic record of the U.S. Navy, somehow reflected from
the four gold braided stripes and stars on the sleeves of'the perfectly
tailored uniform. As he raised his hand to eyes beginning to well with
tears, he straightened his shoulders and looked toward the head of the
long, highly polished table.
The presiding officer, a distinguished looking general, rose, and
said, "Thank you, gentlemen." I closed a carefully indexed and tabbed
legal sized plastic covered notebook, handing it to one of three Army
lieutenant colonels seated directly behind me. They, in turn, gathered
books, papers, and data displays, and as they packed 'an assortment of
oversized briefcases, I shook-,each one's hand, thanking them in turn.
"Good job, Gary; thanks for-coming, Frank; Don, you've done a great piece
of work. Don, we need to have this wrapped up first thing in the morning
for the OPSDEP." "Right ...Congratulations." I turned to my colleagues
at the table -- a proud and, we believed, a professional group -- pro-
fessional representatives of each of the Services and professional
negotiating adversaries. We shook hands all around, "Good argument;"
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"Sorry about that comment . . ;" "We've worked a good paper." "Good
night." We were Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine "Planners" and our
Chairman at the meeting had been a general officer from the Office of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We were adversaries on every occasion that
we met -- two to three times a week. We were also Officers and Gentlemen,
careful to maintain a certain decorum at these ritual sessions with a
view toward enhanced efficiency and added luster to our common perception
of professionalism.
Within minutes, I was alone outside the Pentagon -- on my way to
North Parking, and home -- 15 minutes away in Alexandria. It was 3:00 a.m.,
a cool spring morning in 1971, a little more than two years into the
first term of the Nixon Administration. I reflected on a job "Well Done."
My colleagues and I had just succeeded in substantially narrowing a set
of strategy and force issues to be addressed by the OPSDEPS -- The
Operations Deputies (Lieutenant Generals/Vice Admirals) -- of the four
Services, in their regular sessions preparatory to the next meeting of
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps, I thought, the issues had been worked
to the point where the matter would not have to be raised for debate in
the "tank" among the Chiefs -- probably the OPDEPS could finalize the
paper -- the JCS would in that case merely be informed of the arrangements
reached to take action in their name. Good, I thought, we've helped take
some of the load off the Chiefs -- particularly, my own -- the Chief of
Staff of the US Army.
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Then I thought, what happens next? How will this paper ultimately be
turned into action? How many more hurdles will there be? Have we
used,the right timing, the best bureaucratic route to achieve what is
best for the Army? For the national security interest?
Questions of this sort were the bread and butter of the Army
"Planners" -- the "Three Wise Men," three colonels on the Army Staff
with the title of Assistant Directors of Plans, who between us "worked,"
reviewed and made recommendations on every paper or-"action" in the
JCS system. Some "actions" were finalized by telephone vote at our level,
some were JCS approved as a result of a "planners", like the session just
described. Others would require OPSDEPS addressal -- many would go to
the "tank" where a consensus among the Chiefs themselves would'emerge.
This is the system -- an adversary system -- which in turn is part
of a wider adversary relationship used to address strategy and forces
under the NSC. There are no votes in the system. There Is argument.
There is a sharpening of the issues. There is constant negotiation --
both formal and informal -- much of it "behind the scenes." The big
issues are addressed by the President, sometimes after consultation with
the National Security Council. Many issues are decided at the next
lower level -- as a result of work prepared for a set of committees --
all of them chaired by Henry Kissinger -- the Under Secretaries'
Committee, the Defense Planning Review Committee (DPRC), the Verification
Panel '(VP), the Washington Senior Action. Group (WSAG), etc. A great
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many actions are taken by lower level consensus in inter-agency working
groups which are in more or less continuous session - the DPRC/WG,. the
VPWG and many other ad hoc groups. There are no formal rules. There is
a structure for work - National Security Study Memoranda/National Security
Decision Memoranda (NSSMs/NSDMs) -- leading to decisions through which
some control is exercised. But personalities, other forces, and the
realities of the moment.often wrest control from the established system.
Sometimes the system itself kills a decision.
Purpose
This paper is about how the strategy system operates and how it might
work better - in particular how we, as Armed Forces officers, might best
contribute. The system relates to outside forces and adversaries, including
our Allies and opponents. However, the actors of most direct interest
to us work in the following adversary arenas:
-- The inter-agency NSC organization
-- The Department of Defense strategy and policy hierarchy
-- The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
-- The Service Staffs
The Nixon Approach to Strategy
The Nixon approach to the strategy problem has two aspects which
became apparent immediately after the Administration took office in 1969.
These were organizational, and substantive in character.
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Nineteen Sixty-Nine was a year of transition. A new organization
for national security strategy implementation was quickly established
with its roots in the Old Executive Office Building of the White House
complex. A greatly expanded staff began to manage work for the National
Security Council and the subcommittees associated with it. The organ-
izational change was revolutionary with respect to inter-agency dynamics.
In order to fit to the new system most effectively, the Dept. of Defense
should have made some correspondingly revolutionary organizational
adjustments. However, not many such compensating measures have been taken.
In 1974, the Offices of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) are still largely organized to react to the
leadership and philosophy of the 1960s.
The substantive aspect of the new Administration's approach was also
sketched rapidly. One of the first National Security studies led to the
early decision in 1969 to change our overall strategic concept from the
"2-1/2 war strategy" of the 1960s to a "1-1/2 war strategy." The "N.ixon
Doctrine" surfaced and was then refined in the NSC system so that the
Administration was in a position to develop the main directions of a
foreign policy for the 1970s in a comprehensive written report to the
Congress by February 1970.
The report divided the Nixon strategy for peace into three areas of
endeavor. They are:
--Strength
--Partnership, and
--Negotiation
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Clearly, OSD and OJCS should have rapidly adjusted their framework
for planning to adequately treat each of these new policy tracks and
relate each one to the other. In 1974, the Dept. of Defense is
thinking and working hard to implement initiatives related to all three
of these elements of the "Nixon Doctrine." However, the giant DOD
organization has still not been adequately tuned-to fully tie together
the strength, partnership, and negotiation threads of our strategy policy.
As we broke into the 1970s, everything about the strategy making of the
past decade had changed. Signals were sent out to supplement written
policy pronouncements and major strategic decisions. A strong pulse read
that the-Nixon Administration wanted to more effectively use military
advice within the structure of the new NSC decision making system and
in the substance of the Nixon strateqy for peace.
In the 1960s there was a concerted and successful effort to tighten
civilian control over our military establishment. With a reduced say
in how forces were to be used, the military staffs were turned inward
and their energies channeled to the task of more or less equitably
dividing the available resources among the Services in such a way that
each retained the most flexibility possible to do what might be
required by higher civilian authority. Military men became force
oriented. During this process, management in OSD became systems oriented,
as opposed to having a strategy/policy focus. Thus, papers in the
Pentagon in the 60s were written about numbers of divisions, airplanes,
and aircraft carriers and about the development and costs of highly
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sophisticated weapons systems. Not too much was thought or written about
strategy; how these forces and things might - or should be used, or if they
should be used at all.
Certainly, the current swing of the pendulum will never take us back to
the philosophy of the 1940s -- when, for example, no one bothered to tell the
Secretary of State that we were going-to invade North Africa -- or to the
1950s -- the era of Eisenhower, Bidell Smith, Marshall, Taylor, McCloy,
Gruenther, and MacArthur. But the 1970's heralds a period of significant
readjustment.
After more than ten lean years (not in terms of money but in terms of
participation in the policy making action) the Military Establishment is
poorly prepared bureaucratically and psychologically to do the strategy job
it has been asked to do under Nixon, Kissinger, Laird, Richardson, and now
Schlesinger. We have in uniform an overkill in PHDs and MAs in international
relations -- that is not our area of weakness. The problem is that
we are living in the past.
This is not a new phenomenon. In the 1950's we had "avant-garde thinkers"
espousing 1939 "blitzkrieg" doctrine. In the 1960's we spent some considerable
effort to construct a corps of "soldier-statesman" more appropriate to the
demands of the 1950s. In the 1970's "forward thinkers" are working on counter-
insurgency and operations research/systems analysis to be ready for the 1960's.
We also have a few men in uniform today who are intent upon worrying over
the military role; fighting to have a voice instead of organizing better to
play the expanded policy role that has been offered the Military Establishment.
These men are agonizing over the problems of the past and are missing the
opportunities of the present.
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I see little danger that military views will go unregarded in our
Government. The danger I see-is that.old fashioned organization and
procedure combined with outdated thinking will paralyze the decision
making process.
The Working Level NSC Organization
The working level in the . NSC system is usually made up of representatives
of the NSC staff, the Dept. of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Each Agency has at least one voice, if not one vote. In some
theoretical sense one would expect each to speak to an area in which it
had expertise and bureaucratic responsibility. Often this is not the
case -- in fact, it is usually not the case. Defense and JCS representatives
wax eloquent on diplomatic tactics and arms control negotiation -- CIA
men hold the floor expounding military tactics. State Department experts
take a big hand in military force structure discussions, and ACDA likes
a bi't of everything. The NSC staff has carte-blanche to cover the water-
front an(is burdened with a certain sense of overall responsibility for
every aspect of military, economic and diplomatic planning.
The lines of responsibility are confusing and often amusing. In
the early days of the current Administration, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense was represented by two different agencies -- ISA (Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs)
and SA (Systems Analysis). Frequently, these two agencies took different
positions on issues in interagency discussion. Today, this trend has
diminished as a result of a mellowing of OASD-PAE (Program, Analysis and
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Evaluation) -- the successor organization to SA (the"enfant terrible"
of the McNamara era) OSD now seeks to speak with one voice. However,
if PA&E bureaucrats don't like the sound of that voice, they have been
known to lobby directly among other agencies to insure that their
independent views are heard. This tactic is, of course, used by every
agency in Washington.
The Joint Chiefs representatives have little difficulty speaking
with one voice from an agreed position - in fact, they are given little
leeway to drift from what has been approved by all four Services. The
State Dept. is usually represented by a covey of officers speaking for
a variety of agencies. It is conceivable that representatives of State's
Office of Political Military Affairs, a Regional desk, the Counsellor's
Office, the Policy and Planning Staff, the Office of Intelligence and
Research and assorted supporters might all contribute different views
on the same subject. Being trained diplomats, they always carry this
off with a polish that is the envy of other agencies.
State is now feeling the bureaucratic benefits of having Mr. Kissinger
as their Secretary, particularly since he has brought a number of staffers
from the NSC with him to the Department. At the same time, the NSC Staff
is in the process of adjusting to this change and clarifying its bureau-
cratic lines of authority. NSC staffers might invoke the position of
the President's Advisor for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) only
to be told by State staffers that the Secretary of State (Kissinger)
doesn't feel the same way about the issue.
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ACDA has a starting disadvantage in that it is a small agency with
limited bureaucratic staff support, no overseas representatives, a
title with "Disarmament" prominently displayed therein, and an ambiguous
relationship with the Dept. of State. At the same time, one of the three
pillars of the President's foreign policy -- negotiation -- depends
heavily on ACDA for structural and philosophical support. Their
representatives have to work extra hard and be extra careful.
The CIA can sit back without worrying too much about operational
policy responsibility, but at the same time they must be ready to bear
the blame in case anything goes wrong. Their position seems to be one
of "honesty is the best policy," and they try to tell it like it is.
They work rather well with the Defense Intelligence Agency. Excellent
papers and information are routinely made available by the two. They
go much further on occasion and have -sometimes taken some lead in
making policy.
Each of these agencies naturally holds some suspicions about the
others from both a bureaucratic point of view and a theological
perspective.
The JCS representatives are viewed by some as having a political
stance to the right of Ghengis Khan, and inflexible military minds focussed
on building a bigger military machine. ACDA staffers are characterized
by some as pinko fellow-travellers willing to trade national
security for just about anything. The others are catalogued
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somewhere in-between and are probably viewed as being soft on either
the fascist militarists or on the pacifists, but unwilling to take a
firm position on anything -- except to join a consensus -- as long as
we don't anger our Allies, our opponents, or the NSC staff.
Each agency has constitutents to worry about. State has an
infinite' number of bureaus plus "The Ambassador" overseas whose views
must be taken into account. The Dept. of Defense can herald an even
greater number of bureaus and agencies plus the "commanders in the field."
In addition to a general unspoken reference to the salvation of all
mankind, ACDA falls back to invoking their Director. The NSC staff
doesn't-hesitate to allude to the interests of their chief constituent --
The President.
Though there is a certain sense of competition among them, the
players all have lofty goals and good motives. They are sometimes
stubborn in maintaining an agency position but are generally thoughtful
and flexible men ready to find grounds for adjustment which is in the
overall national interest. Some have more influence on the judgment
of their agency superiors than others. Some have more influence on their
adversaries than others.
Power and influence in the interagency arena derives from the same
sources as it generally does elsewhere:
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First, and most important, a very detailed and thorough
knowledge of every aspect of the subject at hand.
Next, a full understanding of the intricacies of the bureaucratic
state of play of the issue.
Third, a willingness to do more than one's agency's
expected share of the dirty routine study and work for the use of the
group as a whole, and
Fourth, an understanding of how to use one's negotiating
capital, i.e., using your big guns or "stone-wallinq" rarely
when absolutely necessary.
These levers of power are also used by a wide variety of individuals
outside the Government who seek to contribute to the development of U.S.
strategy for one reason or the other. It may be true that there are
more defense intellectuals outside the Government than there are in it.
Certainly, a good many have the time (and are willing to use it) to know
a great deal about the subject and the issues. Not so many have easy access
to an understanding of the current state of play. A good many are willing
to do the leg work and research to crank out "real world" papers and ideas
that are of some use. Some have an entree for using negotiating capital in certain
circles to give their views added impact. This set of actors constitute
another array of adversaries in the national strategy process.
They include confidents of high officials, members of the press,
lecturing and writing professors, miscellaneous pundits, employees of "think
tanks" and even.foreign governments. Whether or not we, could or should do
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without any of these extra-governmental contributions is not at issue.
They may constitute one adversary too many, but they are with us -
all in the adversary process - invited or not.
OSD Organization for Strategy and Policy
Today the NSC related strategy/policy function is split at least
four ways'within OSD. Some of it is handled directly in the private
office of the Secretary of Defense by. the Assistant to the Secretary and
the Deputy Secretary, and other personal advisors and assistants to the
Secretary. Some of the task falls to the Assistant Secretary for Program
Analysis and Evaluation. The JCS, of course, have a profound responsibility
in this regard, but a "chicken - egg" situation fogs the issue. Should
the JCS write limited strategy based on guidance from the President and
the Secretary of Defense - or should the civilian leadership develop strategy
after having received recommendations from their military advisors? Currently,
both these alternatives prevail because the bureaucracy is still operating
a system constructed for the 1960s and at the same time making ad hoc
responses to the new realities of the 1970s. The result is sometimes
inadequate or confusing military staff support for the Joint Chiefs and
for the Secretary.
The Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs has the
prime bureaucratic responsibility for interface with the NSC strategy
system but currently does not have adequate control, largely because of
the somewhat ambiguous situation associated with the four-way split for
strategy development within the Department.
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The strategy issues are generally presented by the NSC staff in a
straightforward, simple manner. "What should be our strategy and planning
force* for Europe?", for example. The answer is never simple. And getting
an agreed Department of Defense answer is never a simple process. A
minimum of 3 adversaries are involved at the DOD level in producing it.
A remarkable aspect of the problem is that it is rarely, if ever,
possible for DOD to draw upon an established position or an existing cell
of the staff to provide the necessary material. The strategies, plans,
and even the data that are being routinely produced by the bureaucracy
cannot be readily applied to the "real world" represented by NSC study
requirement. This is not to say the bureaucracy is in a state of chaos.
It just hasn't adjusted quickly enough to the new approaches.
The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel report prepared in 1970 did not
highlight the need for the Department,of Defense to manage strategy and
policy. The authors focussed on the issue. of adequate civilian control
of operations and freeing the Joint Chiefs of some of their workload.
The Panel recommended a reorganization of the Defense Department with
Deputy Secretaries for (1) Management of Resod rtes; (2),Evaluation; and
(3) Operations - with no one holding the overall brief for strategy and
policy. Though the intent of the recommendation was to free the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to perform as "principal military advisors to the President
and the Secretary of Defense" the net affect of such a structure could
be to shelve the Chiefs out of the strategy/policy main stream.
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Since the current Nixon approach involves (1) construction of
adequate US military forces ("strength"), (2) coordinating policy and
force interface with our Allies ("partnership"), and (3) the conduct
of international negotiations, the Office of the ASD(ISA) ties together
all the DOD strategy and policy participation in the wider NSC fora.
In practice, a loose ad hoc team is formed between ISA. PAE, and
the Joint Staff to address each issue that comes up. Under the present system, if
ISA doesn't actually coordinate DOD strategy, it doesn't get done.
JCS Organization for Strategy and Policy
The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel implied that the JCS were bound up
by procedural restraints, could not act effectively, and that the Joint
Staff process militates against the likelihood of the Chiefs clearly
resolving potentially divisive issues. There is some truth to a part
of this. However, the work of the JCS is divided into two basic categories:
(a) operations and (b) plans, policy, and strategy.
The same set of problems does not apply equally to both these
categories. Admiral Moorer, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
has said that he has no problems with rapid, effective operational
decisions in times of crisis. Command and control of our forces through
the JCS/NMCC system is the least of our troubles. This is, in fact,
where we have the greatest strength in the national security system.
Of all functions, this one should be tampered with the least -- assuming
some streamlining of our unified commands.
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The weaker link in the JCS system is the part that deals with plans.,
policy, and strategy. It is here that there is a risk that committee-type
negotiations could reduce major strategy issues to a level of compromise
which as the Blue Ribbon Panel suggested, might "either avoid the potential
conflicts or substitute a solution that can be accepted on a quid-pro-quo
basis."
In any case, it is here where the military connection to the NSC system
tends to break down. The key JCS strategy/policy document is the voluminous
JSOP (Joint Strategic Objectives Plan).
Volume I of the JSOP is the strategy volume. During the 1969-1974
period I have never known anyone involved in the NSC strategy process to
refer to Volume I of the JSOP. This means that something is wrong with the
system. The JCS are, of course, involved in making.NSC strategy - but on
an ad hoc basis - not through the JSOP. The effect is that the nation does
not have the full benefit of a complete coherent military evolution of
strategy.
The bulk of the JSOP specifies the objective forces needed to carry
out the Volume I strategy. The Services have a terrific interest in the
force volumes. In the 1960s when military strategy advice was not in high
demand, the numbers of divisions, airplanes, and aircraft carriers specified
in the JSOP (although greater than we could actually afford to buy) provided
the basis for a balance and interrelationship of our various types of forces.
Today, the tie-in of JSOP force books to the real world NSC strategy is
tenuous at'best.
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On the other hand, some most important force decisions - from a
strategy point of view - are made outside of the JSOP. Part of the NSC
system of European strategy decisions developed in 1970 called for
converting "tail" or "fat" into "teeth" or enhanced conventional combat
capability. The Army followed through vigorously on this decision and
has, since 1971 in fact, created the equivalent of more than a brigade
of combat forces in Europe out of whole cloth - at no cost in additional
manpower. This was done completely outside the JSOP main stream. Today,
the Chief of Staff of the Army is cutting more "tail" and indications are
that our combat punch worldwide could be increased from 13 to possibly 14
divisions - a far more realistic force to meet our "real world" strategy
requirements.
This increase in combat capability is also being generated at no
cost in additional manpower. The mechanism for getting it done is again
outside the JSOP structure.
The point is that under the present system, the link between national
policy/strategy and force construction is being forged (1) throuqh ad hoc
arrangements or (2) through personal interaction by a few men at the top
more than it is by the military and civilian bureaucracy. This is better
than nothing but it is not efficient use of the Defense staff.
Important elements of policy can "fall through the crack" where there
is no established bureaucratic "back-up" machinery to follow-up on the
ad hoc'process.
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The military bureaucracy is not geared to fully interrelate the
three pillars of the current strategy. The "Partnership" and "negotiation"
pillars are hard for the Joint Staff to link to the "strength" pillar,
which is the focus of the JSOP. The Army (and I'm sure the other Services)
does look at these three pillars as a coherent whole, but they begin to
diverge as they are worked through the JCS and OSD and I would argue that
they may never come back together again in the way they should.
In 1969 and 1970, I made a low-level effort to link the "partnership"
work being done under the JSOP rubric to the NSC process then underway.
There was at that time a big stack of JSOP books that analyzed the forces
of our Allies and suggested how these forces could be improved in our
interest and in the interest of our Allies - through military assistance
and other means. It seemed logical to put the Army staffers - and
eventually the Joint staffers - who worked this part of the JSOP into play
on the National Security study as it pertained to "partnership" with
Europe. This turned out to be bureaucratically impossible. It was argued
that theJSOP books did not exactly fit what we were doing - more
importantly, the necessary effort could not be diverted because JSOP dead-
lines had to be met.
Again, I must say that I haven't found anybody in the national strategy
business who knows about or makes use of the "partnership" set of JSOP books.
I suspect that they don't even play much of a role in the on-going military
sales and assistance actions managed by the Dept. of Defense. This constitutes
inefficient use of the Defense staff and our valuable manpower resources.
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The third pillar of our current foreign policy is "negotiation."
The operative negotiations bearing on our most central strategy interest -
Europe - are the talks which have just begun in Vienna on Mutual and
Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). MBFR is far more than a negotiation
about today. It is a political/military process that will have profound
effects on our national strategy and the future of European security
regardless of the outcome of the talks. The Plans and Policy section of
the Joint Staff includes an element responsible for JCS participation in
this process. This cell is not linked directly to the JSOP structure -
nor should it necessarily be. it is essential, however, that some measures
be taken to insure that Dept. of Defense contributions to the negotiating
thrust of national policy be very closely tied to our DOD strategy/policy
mechanism - as it is in the NSC arena.
Other Forces that Affect the NSC System
This paper has discussed the basic structure of the NSC system and
the Dept. of Defense structure that contributes to it.
Some additional outside forces impact on the decision process. These
(1) The research and development/equipment manufacturing process;
(2) The people;
(3) Economic fluctuations; and
(4) The Government bureaucracy.
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For example, the ad hoc strategists may wish to emphasize conventional
warfare capabilities and doctrine, but elements of the scientific and
research community may force, or seek to force, nuclear innovations on
the system - suggesting that strategy be built around them. The Davy Crockett
was actually pushed into our inventory more than ten years ago just because
it was there not because it matched doctrine and strategy - which It in
fact did not. Today the capability to develop improved "mini-nuts" is
generating a head of steam and influencing strategic thinking along lines
in opposition to the system which is seeking to build a strong conventional
strategy. Even conventional weapons like the CHEYENNE and the MBT 70 (Main
Battle Tank) have a way of taking over and becoming forces unto themselves
regardless of how they fit into a strategy, or how they steal resources from
other elements that may be more essential to a certain strategy. Fortunately,
these two systems were killed before they spun completely out of control.
But other systems are ready to rule if given half a chance. Strategy
logically yields to technological advances such as the stirup, gunpower,
the airplane, the atomic bomb, etc. but that is quite a different thing from
permitting evolutionary weapons development get control of policy.
The people keep a watchful eye through the Congress on weapons develop-
ment matters but sometimes it pushes a less than optimum system
because it means jobs. This factor also makes it difficult to consider non-
US products which might be cheaper, or better suited to the thrust of a
given strategy.
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The Congress also influences strategy policy in more fundamental ways.
For example, they have exerted meaningful pressure with regard to troop
deployments around the world - Europe in particular.
Economic fluctuations may influence force development more than
strategic planning. For example, important programs might be cut at
times when budgets must be trimmed for short term economic adjustments and,
conversely, last minute increases to-the budget may be implemented in order
to prime a sluggish economic trend.
With such forces at work, one cannot help but wonder how much impact
strategic thought can actually have on the nuts and bolts of construction of a
force structure.
Perhaps the biggest drag on strategy decisions is the bureaucracy
itself. There are so many experts and special interest groups within
the Government that see peril in change that it is almost beyond belief.
The weight of the bureauocracy can ultimately prevent decisions from
being carried out - usually this is done unconsciously - (a) because some
element of the bureaucracy doesn't know about the intent of the larger
decision, or (b) because the bureaucracy is a moving train that no man
can stop and few can divert. Sometimes, the effort to block policy in
the national security strategy area is quite intentional. In the olden
days this was called insubordination. Today, the system is so big it
often goes unnoticed or gets chalked up to ignorance or inefficiency.
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With a mass of vertical and horizontal obstacles to overcome, one
is left with the overall impression that our system of adversary strategy
and policy development has one adversary too many.
How the Strategy for Europe has Developed
The "planners" meeting in early 1971 where we began this quick tour
of the adversary system marked the culmination of one and a half years of
intensive effort to develop a U.S. approach to Europe. We thought at
the moment that the "European security equation" was close to solution.
Today we know better.
It all began in late 1969 with a NSSM signed by Mr. Kissinger, in
the name, of the President, which directed that the government develop on
strategy approach with regard to Europe.
Everyone knew that the change in the overall strategic concept from
2-1/2 to 1-1/2 wars implied some matching reductions in the baseline general
general purpose forces (Army, Navy, and Air). All the adversaries in
the NSC system therefore girded to (a) protect their interests against
unwarranted cuts or (b) to make sure cuts were made, and, (c) to hammer
out a force and strategy match that was in the national interest. The
"one" in the 1-1/2 wars that we were worried about was Europe. Thus, we
had to find out how we could best tackle such a conflict -- and more
important, what kind of posture and forces we and our Allies should
construct in order to deter it in the 1970's. Asian strategy details
would logically be addressed later.
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On the Army staff we were well prepared when the President's study
directive reached us through the Chairman of the JCS. We had just
studied and thoroughly staffed a proposed solution to the European
strategy problem. The Chief of Staff of the Army, the Vice Chief, and
all the Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff had met a number of times
in executive session and personally finalized the details of a new
program for Europe for the 1970's which had these essential features:
-- A more realistic assessment and. measurement of the
conventional balance in Europe.
-- A program for inspiring confidence in our Allies
that an improved conventional defense could be attained.
-- A program for specific force improvements without
increasing manpower in order to gain a credible
conventional defense.
-- A reduction of overhead and streamlining of the U.S.
forces in Europe in order to improve efficiency and
combat capability.
-- Further study with our Allies of the possibility of some
limited specialization and redefinition of roles among
the forces in the Central Region.
The Secretary of t-e Army and Chief of Staff were keenly aware of
the economic, political, and manpower constraints under which we and
our Allies would be operating in the 1970's. Their program for Europe
was detailed, complete, and geared to the realities of this decade. As
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a next step the Army needed to fit its ideas for Europe with the overall
force structure.
A small group was closetted in a suite in the subbasement of the
Pentagon, under the close supervision of the Army's Director of Plans
and the personal guidance of the DCSOPS (Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Operations). We undertook to mesh the European strategy concept with
our overall general purpose theater force requirements. The situation
which was most demanding was in NATO, and we had to have enough U.S.
Army divisions and Allied conventional forces to be able to defend NATO
Europe against a conventional Warsaw Pact attack and there to sustain
our deployed forces and those of our Allies. We computed this on the
basis of the views of commanders in the field, war games, the terrain,
the potential enemy, All.ied contributions, potential improvements, and
other critical factors.
There were, however, important and powerful elements on the Army
Staff which addressed the problem more from the budget and programming
point of view.. A long battle ensued within our own service over
the absolute minimum number of divisions. Thus, the adversary process
had advanced beyond the European question at the Army level by the time
we received the President's order in December 1969 to work that problem.
The Army did not, and does not, have a seat at the interagency
table. Otir first hurdle was to get the Army's program for Europe
even listed on the agenda being developed by "action officers" working
the problem for the JCS. This is to say nothing of the problem
of then getting the agreed joint staff positions into interagency play.
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Military advice on strategy direct from the Chief of Staff of the
Army was difficult, if not impossible, to get surfaced to the civilian
leadership. There are two types of military advice which can be particularly
useful to the national leaders. First is the detailed information and
knowledge that only service "action officers" (majors/lieutenant colonels/
commanders) have at their fingertips on certain subjects. Second is the
broader wisdom and judgment on strategy and policy matters available only
from the senior officers of services -- and the Chiefs themselves. The
JCS system routinely prevents both these categories of military advice
from surfacing. Service "action officers" are not permitted into the
interagency councils, and surrogate Joint Staff officers must do their
best to present the facts.
On the other hand, important positions become firmed up at the
service and joint staff "action officer" level and are put into the NSC
system at very high levels without the benefit of refinement resulting from
more senior military in-depth analysis and judgment.
Let me mention tangentially that in 1970 the President had
also asked the NATO Alliance to work the Europe problem -- with U.S.
participation, of course. This was called the AD-70 study (Alliance
Defense in the 1970's). To make a long story short, the adversary process
ground on in Washington and abroad during most of 1970.
Throughout, we in the Army continued our internal battles, travelled
overseas to win over the commanders in the field, presented our basic
case to almost every agency in the government, and still kept arguing to
keep our foot in the Joint Staff arena. Although the basic problem was
one of land warfare, the JCS system required concurrence from Navy,
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Marine Corps, and the Air Force "action officers" in every word that went
from the Pentagon into the inter-agency milieu.
The military view was then chiseled at by analysts who attempted
to quantify with minute precision every element of the European security
equation. We labored for weeks to expunge what we viewed as faulty
(and sometimes amateurish) perspectives from the studies -- only to
find the same points reintroduced in the next round. U.S. "think-tank"
types appeared on the scene with their own studies and ideas which
largerly ignored most of-the work done by official Washington. Not
only did we hear from our own "think-tanks", but foreign governments
weighed into the Washington process with their own stable of analysts.
There was no shortage of advice and "expertize". The outsiders set up
lobbies which attempted.to go directly to all the separate agencies within
and outside the Pentagon in order to make headway for their own theories,
which ranged from the sublime to the ridiculous.
Strategy and forces are, after all, everybody's business. The
planning of troop levels and weapons systems must meet the larger political
requirements of the nation. However', in the 1970 development of the
strategy and force papers for Europe, deliberations over the conduct
of the land battle, Army force structure and organization, and relative
weapons capabilities were carried on regularly among at least 8 agencies'
representives, only one of whom was a uniformed member of the armed forces
(a rear admiral). All kinds of alternatives were examined. Volumes of
studies were produced. Finally, just before the December 1970 NATO
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Ministerial meetings, the National Security Council met and assessed the
options. The President then signed.off on a NSDM which laid out a
decision with regard to our European st.rategy approach. It put into
motion a program essentially the same as the one developed internally by
the Army exactly one year before.
The NATO studies (AD 70) had reached similar conclusions as a
result of transatlantic coordination and specified "important areas
in NATO's conventional. defense posture to which attention should be paid
in the next decade," including armor/anti-armor potential, the air
situation including aircraft protection, the peacetime deployment of
ground forces, and further improvements in Allied mobilization and
reinforcement capabilities.
President Nixon sent a message to the NATO ministers which said,
"We have agreed that NATO's conventional forces must not only be
maintained, but in certain key areas, strengthened. Given a similar
approach by our allies, the United States will maintain and improve
its own forces in Europe and will not reduce them unless there is a
reciprocal action from our adversaries. We will continue to talk with
our NATO allies with regard to how we can meet our responsibilities together."'
To this point the strategy process had lurched rather inefficiently
to a sound conclusion despite itself. Decisions had been made; a
plan of action outlined. Many adversaries had been overcome in the
process. Many adversaries had made useful contributions. Some adversaries
had just slowed things up. But, the toughest adversary was yet to be
confronted -- the national and international bureaucracy.
The JCS and Systems Analysis drew on the President's instructions
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to produce a paper we would use to go to our Allies with specifics as
to how we should, as the President had said, "meet our responsibilities
together." A detailed and excellent Pentagon plan outlined in 150 pages
of charts, tables, and prose was in turn, carefully reviewed in the
interagency area, and dispatched to our U.S. Mission to NATO with White
House blessing. It then died a natural death.
This plan never fit exactly with what the force planning bureaucracies
in NATO, in Washington, and in other national capitals had underway.
Therefore, this critical step in U.S. strategy formulation never received
the boost it needed to achieve the best affect. The basic reason is that
the NSC system is not properly linked to the bureaucratic system.
This lack of connection has two bad aspects. On one hand, high
level policy cannot be fully imposed on a bureaucratic machinery which
marches to the sound of its own drum. On the other hand, a large part
of the bureaucratic process has little meaning because it cannot derive
the necessary power from high level policy thrust.
The three pillars of Nixon's foreign policy (strength, partnership,
and negotiation) were put into play in the European strategy decisions.
The piece associated with the "negotiation" element of foreign policy
was fully engaged with the launching of MBFR talks in 1972-1973.
The "strength" piece was relatively easy to fit into the bureaucratic
stream. From the Army's point of view this meant (a) maintaining the
current level of forces in Europe, (b) adjusting the JSOP, Defense
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Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG), and other force documents in
the DOD system to crank and the proper number of divisions, and (c)
undertaking certain improvements within the Army.
The "partnership" piece presented the difficulties. The Allies had
bought a general concept of the types of improvements they should under-
take, and did a good job under a special European Defense Improvement
Program (EDIP) sponsored by a consortium of European Allies (Eurogroup)
to make real progress in improving our overall conventional combat
capability. However, because (1) we did not come in strong in NATO with
the specific details of the program we had written -- and (2) we ourselves
did not link that program to what we were doing in our own national force
planning process, an adequate sense of seriousness and urgency was not
imparted to our Allies. We more or less left them to their own devices
except that we came up with general exhortations to do better.
Two years passed. This was an unfortunate loss of time that could
have been used to better advantage. During that period we were successful
in halting a general trend of force reductions in NATO. But we did not
give the Allies the powerful leadership, example, and guidance in the
defense area that we were, in fact, prepred to give them and capable of
giving them. Leadership and enlightened cooperation in defense in NATO
is, in my opinion, the essential prerequisite to the solution of the
economic and political issues that we face with the Europeans. In 1971
we should have given the NATO defense problem extraordinary attention and
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the full measure of our national effort.
In June 1973 when our Secretary of Defense designate, Dr. Schlesinger,
confronted the Allies for the first time at the NATO Ministerial Meetings,
he threw himself immedi.ately.at this problem. He began by stressing
to our Allies that the relative weight of the European contribution
to the common defense needed to be increased still further. He was
specific and proposed a set of explicit measures as well as a program for
putting them in effect -- this was, believe it or not, essentially the
program of 1970-1971. He has followed this up with vigorous personal
action.
The bureaucracy is still balking, however. Crystal clear initiatives
outlined at the highest level of our government are watered down,
interpreted, and general-ly gobbled up by the system. The consequences
that could result from such weaknesses in our our organization for
material security strategy and policy implementation could be very dangerous.
We must tie together in a real way the strength, partnership, and
negotiation threads of our policy framework in order to follow through
on a set of straightforward policy decisions and energize our Allies.
Europeans must have confidence in us and in themselves to overcome the
spectre of self-seeking divisiveness which looms today -- threatening
their security as well as our own. The hard facts can be masked by alot
of political science jargon and economic hocus-pocus theory. But the
simple.truth is that Europe needs our leadership now more then ever before.
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Dreams on their side of the Atlantic, and on our side, of some security
arrangement without true two way consultation with the U.S. followed by
U.S. leading dynamically are unrealistic, and very risky.
We can provide the necessary consultative framework and leadership
only if all of us work to improve the system -- and try to get rid of
that "one adversary too many."
Some Possibilities for Doing it Better
The whole approach to this paper may be wrong. Suggestions for
"doing it better" may already be outdated because they are based on the
problems of 1969-1974, rather than looking toward the solutions for
1975-1980. On the other hand, you may not be ready to really think
about 1980. The logic of this paper tells you that we should seriously
consider a single service -- a truely combined Army, Navy, and Air Force
supported by a single civil/military general staff. Enough of that, I
didn't think you were ready.
Some of the weakenesses identified in the preceding pages might,
however, be minimized by measures such as the following:
-- With no change to the present NSC system, establish a Strategy
and Policy Board (SPB). All members and the secretarial staff
of the board would have other full-time "mainstream" jobs. The
membership would consist of the Director of the Policy and
Planning Staff of State, the Director of Political-Military
Affairs of State, the Counsellor of the Department of State, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for Plans and Policy,
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a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (PAE), the Director of
the Joint Staff and,-the Operations Deputies (OPDEPS) of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force. The board would be charged with
(a) insuring that the logic for consistency of all NSC actions
and decisions was unambigious and understood at least by the
board, (b) following through on all NSC strategy and policy
decisions to see that they were being carried out, (c) recommending
strategy and policy initiatives for study or action in the wider
NSC system, (d) rendering reports on (a), (b), and (c) to all
agencies and to Mr. Kissinger in his capacity as Advisor to the
President on National Security Affairs.
-- Redesignate the ASD(ISA) as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategy and Policy Coordination (SPC) with the additional title
of Chairman, Defense Strategy and Policy Coordination Board
(DSPCB). The membership of this board would consist of the
Department of Defense members of the State-Defense SPB (above) and
the DSPCB would have similar responsibilities within the
Department of Defense.
-- With no major change to the present structure of the Joint Staff,
reconstruct the JSOP as the Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) made up
of three co-equal elements dealing with (a) our forces ("strength"),
(b) the forces of our Allies ("partnership") and (c) the impact
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of negotiation on the two: Modernize the strategy volume
of the JSP to be "real world" and tie it more tightly to the
NSC process. Shorten the JSP and leave much of the detail
of the forces to the services. Publish an updated JSP every
six months.
-- Insure that all actions and studies under the NSC system receive
the highest priority attention by the Joint and Service Staffs.
This should be a priority higher than any other actions. That
means that relatively high level officers should be involved
in the details from the start in order to tie other ongoing staff
work to NSC process.
-- Take steps so that the JCS do not take premature fixed positions
on most issues.- We will be in an increasingly dynamic planning
period throughout the 1970's, and we must avoid a situation
where military advice becomes outdated even before it becomes
agreed upon in the JCS system.
-- Issue guidance to all military officers to assume a positive
attitude reflecting an understanding that their advice is
necessary and is sought -- as it is. Proceeding from a contrary
assumption reduces confidence in such advice, and, in fact,
lowers the quality of the advice.
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-- Establish procedures to permit the Joint Staff and Service Staffs
to take an active lead in drafting objective and real world
papers for use in the interagency arena whether solicited or
not. These papers should be timely, short (not like this one),
and useful -- designed to fill a perceived need.
-- Insure that military officers take care to argue issues. A
hard line "action officer" stance based on the philosophy
that it doesn't matter what game you play (mush less how you
play the game) as long as you win, is nonproductive and
weakens confidence in military advice. We must know exactly
what game is being played and argue the issues on their merits.
We should be particularly wary about an approach that measures
success in terms of "we got our fix into the paper." Rather,
we should check our progress in terms of (a) what is the
substantive effect of "our fix?" (b) what is the substantive
impact of the paper? and (c) is it worth fixing?
-- Take steps so that every citizen and soldier fights to keep
"control of the bureaucratic machine. Staff officers and leaders
must challenge every assignment and every bureaucratic action
with a view toward testing whether it fits within a wider
policy or not. Continually ask the question is what I am
doing or about to do contributing to a goal or mission that I
understand? If not, don't do it -- or get a clarification of
the mission.
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-- Review curriculums of service schools and war colleges to
insure that they are.giving adequate emphasis to tactics, strategy,
and military history. These are the military arts. Economics
and political. science are important too, and military officers
must be proficient in those disciplines. However, the nation
has others on whom it can call to fulfill its needs in those
areas. Professional officers should be the nation's established
experts in the military arts.
-- Take action to improve institutional memory in the Joint and Service
Staffs and to provide continuing Pentagon staff experience
through a normal service career. Perhaps sel?ected Captains (USA)
could be assigned to strategy/policy staff positions with a view
toward repetitive tours in the grade of major/lieutenant colonel,
then colonel.
It is particularly difficult to make recommendations with regard to one
final area, and a deeper analysis should be undertaken to find some
answers. This is the question of interface with our Allies. In the coming
era we have to have a much smoother planning, programming, and operational
fit with certain key Allies. The reason this is not an easy problem is
because there are an awful lot of complex variables involved. We can
lick the problem and we must, if we are to prevent expensive mistakes.
The solution should include examination of:
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-- OSD organization for interface with our Allies.
-- The role and relationship of our military missions and
attaches abroad.
-- The connection of the overseas "Country Team" with the
Washington defense strategy/policy community.
-- The division of work and responsibility within the U.S.
Mission to NATO and the role of the Defense Advisor to
the Mission.
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DESIGN-TO-COST: MANAGEMENT INNOVATION?
~1SS:UIG F
BY
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER WILLIAM C. MILLER
APRIL 1974
The thoughts and opinions expressed herein are those of the
author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting any
official views of the U.S. Navy or the Department of Defense.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Department of-Defense weapon-system procurement has been
a major topic of discussion over the last several years, but
the debate appears to have intensified and focused most recent-
ly on ways to hold the costs of individual new weapon systems
to an affordable limit. The word "affordable" is key here
because it implies both parts of the weapon cost problem -- -
the absolute cost of the system and the size of the defense
procurement budget.
II. BACKGROUND
it is well known to attendees at this conference that for
the last decade the DOD budget has been under continuous socio-
economic pressure for a variety of reasons. Efforts to hold
down overall government spending, increased demand for non-
defense spending, lingering bitterness over an unpopular war,
the desire to apply a "peace dividend" to societal problems at
home, inflation, energy distribution problems, personnel costs,
and the fact that the very visible DOD budget is the largest
"controllable" segment of the federal budget have worked together
to cause this year's defense appropriation to buy less than at
any other time since before the Korean War. And Congress seems
disinclined to alter this downward trend in the forseeable
future.
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Against this background, weapon costs have been soaring.
The underlying causes are complex, but most frequently blamed
are the contracting and procurement regulations under which
many of the high visibility, high cost systems were developed.
There are other important, more ingrained psychological rea-
sons for these soaring costs, however. One of these might be
labeled the "nothing-but-the-best-for-our-boys-in-the-field"
syndrome.
Defense research and development is dedicated to placing
appropriate weapon systems and equipment in the hands of oper-
ational personnel. This has been interpreted over the years to
mean steadily and unfailingly advancing the state of technology
and ensuring that only the most modern, the most capable, and
therefore by default the most complex and expensive weapon sys-
tems are developed. In the process it was implicitly assumed
that funds would be available to procure the requisite number
of systems so developed, but it soon became evident that this
assumption ignored the basic economic realities. For example,
a recent DOD survey of ongoing weapon system development pro-
grams showed that in almost every area investigated, the esti-
mated cost of procuring the new system would substantially
exceed the dollars to buy it in the quantities required.1
General George-S. Brown, Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
put it this way,
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"We are going to be out of business if we don't
find ways to cut costs. We simply can't go on.
spending the kind of money we are spending now..
The rising costs of weapon systems - some 300
percent over the past decade - coupled with a
marked loss in buying power, leaves us only
three alternatives:
- We acquire fewer weapon systems.
- We cut the size of the force.
- We find ways to drastically reduce
the cost of acquiring and operating weapon
systems."2
Soaring weapon costs have not been just an Air Force prob-
lem though; they have been a DOD problem. General Henry A.,
Miley, Jr., Commanding General of the Army Material Command,,
addressed the problem thusly:
II
. . . one theme appears to dominate the thinking
of Army management: cost control and cost reduc-
tion. Although the world outside the Army may
not yet appreciate or believe it, the Army has
become more cost-conscious than perhaps ever be-
fore in its history."3
Congress has certainly not ignored this issue either, often
imposing across the board cuts on Defense research and develop-
ment funding, cuts much deeper than could be justified by iden-
tification of specific program ills alone.4 As a result of all
these factors, one of DOD's primary aims has been to establish
policies and regulations that would eliminate both the proce-
dural and the psychological causes behind soaring weapon costs..
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III. IMPROVEMENTS IN WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION
Weapon development and procurement policy revisions have
been phased in over time - - improved techniques and checks on
cost estimating, less concurrency of development and production
to reduce risk, increased use of prototypes to prove out new
ideas and provide more firm cost data, establishment of mile-
stones in developmental contracts with test and evaluation
goals at each phase, improvements to weapon system program
management by more clearly defining accountability and author-
ity and giving program managers direct access to the highest
levels of individual Service management, and the so-called
"high-low mix" approach to weapon system acquisition. This
last approach differs from the former in that rather than hon
ing managerial procedures, it seeks to alter the "nothing-but,
the-best" syndrome.
The high-low mix concept is founded on the observation that
while there are some missions for which numbers of units are
vital for success and other missions for which only the highest
performance systems can adequately meet an enemy's thrust,
today's fiscal climate will not permit acquisition of the high
performance systems in large numbers. The defense manager
espousing the high-low mix approach therefore compromises by
procuring for a particular mission small numbers of high per-
formance, sophisticated weapon systems capable of coping with
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the maximum enemy threat, and at the same time procures a
larger number of less sophisticated and less expensive but
still capable weapons for countering the lower capability
enemy threats.
There are many examples of the high-low mix approach
being applied to defense procurement; one particularly appli-
cable instance is the Navy's ship construction program, spe-
cifically the surface escort category. At one end of the
spectrum of capabilities (and cost) in surface escorts are
the nuclear powered frigates, DLGNs, the latest of which it
is estimated will cost $268 million before contruction is com-
plete.5 The Navy now has in commission or in various stages
of construction eight nuclear powered surface escorts. Clearly
at these prices the country could not afford many surface
combatants, yet the block obsolescence'of those escorts con-
structed during World War II demands their retirement. To
maintain the numbers of ships needed, the bulk of new escorts
are and will continue to come from the "low" side of the high-
low mix - - destroyer escorts and patrol frigates that are not
quite as capable as DLGNs but cost about one-fourth as much,
The most recent management innovation, however, is the
"design-to-cost" concept. While a precise definition of this
concept is still evolving, design-to-cost is generally con-
strued to mean that the average unit production cost of a major
system is viewed as a design parameter in the same way that
5
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schedule and performance have been in the past. It.is not
clea?5ho authored this concept within the Department of
Defense, if indeed there was a single author. However,
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., then Director of Defense Research
and Engineering, must be recognized as an early advocate of
design-to-cost. Speaking in 1970, Dr. Foster emphasized the
vital nature of cost consciousness.
"We shall insist relentlessly - - as a point with-
out peer in our management - - that price has as
much priority as performance. This does not rule
out vigorous pursuit of new technology where that
technology is required or can pay its way. And
frequently, new technology can be used to reduce
costs. Yet we must design-to-a-price, a much lower
price, or else we will not be able to afford what
we need. Defense budgets are going down. The
costs of what we need, just our essential needs,
are going up. Our only solution is to make cost
a prinicipal design parameter. That is how we must
now define what is 'best'. We have no other choice.
The first formalization of design-to-cost within the
Defense Department was embodied in DOD Directive 5000.1 issued
in July 1971. This directive prescribed the following regarding
cost management:
- That system cost shall be broadly defined to include
the cost of ownership and use, not merely original acquisition
cost.
- That before a system enters development, cost is
to be established as a design objective which then becomes one
of the principal focuses of the requirement definition process.
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- That modification of performance requirements and
scheduling will be considered in order to adhere to the design
cost objective.
The foundation laid by DOD Directive 5000.1 was reinforced
later by Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements in
a memorandum to the Service Secretaries dated 18 June 1973.
In it, he initiated the process of establishing design-to-
cost goals on all major Defense programs-that had not yet
received approval for production. This time the directive
was specific, both in the scope of the guidance and regarding
who could decide on the appropriateness of cost goals -
"It is the intent that in the future all new major programs
will have established Design to a Cost goals. Those new pro-
grams in which Design to a Cost goals are assessed to be inap-
propriate or not feasible will be forwarded for DSARC7 review
and approval."
So Defense has adopted the design-to-cost concept in
earnest. But what does design-to-cost actually mean? Is
it really new? Is it universally applicable? Can it actually
be imposed on the defense industry?
IV. DESIGN-TO-COST
James McCullough of the Institute for Defense Analyses
noted8 that there are at least three interpretations one could
make regarding design-to-cost:
7
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A "buzz word" meant to attract attention to the
cost problem.
- A concept whereby the DSARC establishes a cost tar-
get or cost "bogey" reflecting the latest estimate of unit
production cost at that point in the development cycle.
- The concept implied by DOD Directive 5000.1 whereby
cost is an important factor during trade-off studies of a sys-
tem during its design phase.
In the latter interpretation, considered to be most applicable
by this author, design-to-cost is related to the methodology
called Value Engineering that was employed widely in DOD
during -the mid-60s to analyze a product and determine if its
costs could be reduced without impairing its performance or
reliability.9 However, under design-to-cost the Services and
their project managers have the authority to make performance
and schedule adjustments as necessary to achieve cost goals.
Management of defense research and development has always
forced consideration of various factors: the threat to be met,
current and projected tactics, the sense of urgency, estimates
of enemy reaction, international implications,:the_basic sys-
tem concept, its technical feasibility, technical trade-offs,
cost effectiveness trade-offs, political considerations, etc.
In making decisions the defense manager must take into account
a subtle blend of the known, the predicted, and the unknown,
assessing in timely fashion each element of the mix. What is
8
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new about the design-to-cost concept is that in the past,
cost estimates for a new weapon system were made after its
"required" performance had been determined. Seldom were cost
and performance correlated during development. Under design-
to-cost, system cost has been established as a design param-
eter of equal priority with schedule and performance.
As the reader may have surmised, design-to-cost is not a
new concept; only its application to defense development pro-
grams can be classified as innovative. Examples of applying
design-to-cost abound in industry and private life. When
Ford Motor Company introduced their Pinto model line, that
was design-to-cost in action. Certainly a higher performance,
more luxurious automobile could have been designed, but aver-
age unit production cost was obviously a critical design
factor. The electronic digital computer industry provides
equally valid examples.
In private life, consider the man who is about to build
a new house for himself. His dream house may cost $150 thou-
sand to build while his budget may support construction of a
house worth $50 thousand. Cost is vitally important to this
man as he trades off spaciousness and convenience items he
may consider "essential" in order to get the final product
within his affordable range.
Applying design-to-cost to specific defense procurement
programs cannot be described in such simplistic terms and,
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in fact, may not even be possible under certain circumstances.
It has been arguedl? with some validity that design-to-cost is
really appropriate only when the defense program meets certain
narrow criteria for applicability. The argument states that
the development program must
- Still be in its early conceptual design phase so
that meaningful trade-offs among cost, performance and sched-
ule can be made.
- Involve low technological risk so that cost esti-
mates engender confidence. Past cost overruns have usually
been associated with high technology, high risk programs.
Potentially involve a long production run so that
advantages of learning curve, hard tooling, etc. may be uti-
lized.
Involve competition as far into production as pos-
sible rather than employing sole source procurement, another
cost reduction technique.
- Of course, be cost-effective relative to other pro-
curement methods, otherwise why bother? For example, if devel-
opment of a new system is less cost-effective than upgrading
an old system, then designing a new system (to-cost or any
other way) does not make sense.
While a purist may adopt these as valid rules for applica-
bility, it is postulated that such strict rules eliminate the
flexibility that effective managers require to be innovative.
10
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For example, it is admitted that cost estimates on high risk
programs tend to be risky themselves. But (1) parametric
cost estimating and close cost controls can reduce those risks.,
and (2) the fact that estimates may be in error should not
deter the prudent manager from making them. No, design-to-cost
is too useful a concept, too versatile in its application, and
too amenable to iterative solutions to restrict it. within the
narrow confines of such a set of rules. It is estimated that
only in isolated instances, such as designing a system like
Manned Orbiting Laboratory where extreme reliability is re-
quired for human safety, would design-to-cost techniques prove
inapplicable. Even then some sub-systems may be so designed.
As for the defense industry, how does it view this new way
of doing business? One reading was made available approxi-
mately a year ago when the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task
Force on Reducing Costs of Defense Systems Acquisition pub-
lished a report1l on the subject. This task force was made
up of a wide range of senior management and engineering per-
sonnel who had been personally associated with defense procure-
ment for many years. The task force was unanimous in its sup-
port for the design-to-cost concept and produced a series of
definitive recommendations on how best to implement it within
DOD. While the group had some reservations (to be discussed
later in Section VI), these reservations were focused on how
DOD must change itself to effectively design-to-cost rather
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than on how industry would respond.
For completeness, the next section will outline the se-
quence of steps that might take place in designing a hypothet-
ical weapon. system by applying design-to-cost techniques.
V. HYPOTHETICAL DESIGN SEQUENCE
This section will consider in two parts a hypothetical
sequence of steps approximating the design-to-cost of a new
weapon system; the first part will consider the sequence from
DOD's viewpoint, the second will illustrate how industry must
adapt.
Within DOD the steps are these.
- As in any system design, define the military require-
ment. No amplification of this step is considered necessary.
Decide whether the requirement can be met by design-
to-cost techniques, recalling from the previous section that
the approach selected must be the most cost-effective and that
there may be some overriding factor militating against select-
ing design-to-cost.
- Establish the cost threshold and performance speci-
fications. Both of these are key ingredients to the success
of following steps. The cost decision requires trade-off
analyses which consider funds available to buy new-weapons,
the capability of existing systems to meet the stated require-
ment, the feasibility of upgrading existing systems, the
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magnitude of research and development funding that reasonably
can be expected to be available, etc. The performance charac-
teristics should be sufficiently flexible to allow meaningful
trade-offs to be made; typically they might be expressed as
a range of allowable performance. For example, when specify-
ing performance for a new tank, the XMl, in the development
contracts the Army constrained only the weight (58 tons), width
(l44 inches), and not less than a stated minimum accept-able
reliability, availability, maintainability, and durability.12
- Issue a Request for Proposals for developmental con-
tracts; include the cost threshold and functional performance
specifications.
- Evaluate proposals received.
- Award contracts for competitive prototypes. These
contracts should include incentives for the contractor to pro-
duce a design that will be relatively less expensive to produce
if selected.
- Evaluate prototypes and select one for production
with or without modifications.
- Award competitive production contracts. The original
contract was for development of a prototype only and included
no commitment to production or option to produce.
Note that competition is maintained throughout the sequence
as a lever to force costs down. The DSB cost reduction task
force felt very strongly on this issue, stating that
13
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"The ultimate price of a weapon system is a
complex of many variables - - not the least of
which are the contract incentives and competi-
tion. The use of competition can in many in-
stances be a more effective incentive than
profit alone. Competition faces the contractor
with potential loss of business and, therefore,
organizational stability or continuity. This
is often a stronger motivation than maximization
of profit. r"13
From industry's viewpoint there is also a great deal to
be done.14 Proper coordination between design and producing
departments at an early stage is mandatory in providing the
cross--fertilization necessary to meet the design-to-cost
objective. Accordingly, a talent-laden team must be set up
right at the beginning made up of people from design, tooling,
purchasing, accounting, and manufacturing. If a part or assem-
bly is to be procured outside the home plant, careful consider-
ation should be given to possible procurement sources and
alternative sources and to the availability of the material
and processes required to produce that part. If the part is
to be made in-house, it should be designed so that it is com-
patible with available in-house equipment and facilities.
Careful selection of design specifications can also make
a big difference in ultimate cost. Wherever possible, stan-
dard hardware, thread sizes, fasteners, and electrical connec-
tors should be called out. Ease of assembly of the final
design would, of course, tend to hold labor costs down, while
prescribing less restrictive tolerances on non-critical parts
14
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will help to avoid unnecessary rejections.
Implementation of design-to-cost in the Department of
Defense is a big job, a challenging job from both DOD's
standpoint and from industry's. It sounds promising, but
there are potential pitfalls that lie in the path.
The most prevalent, sometimes unspoken objection to the
design--to-cost concept is a visceral one - - it may be that
tight cost ceilings, relaxed specifications and trade-off
freedom at the contractor level will combine to produce weapon
systems not worth buying relative to currently available hard-
ware. The prevalence of this reaction may stem in part from
the fact that no adequate answer to this objection has been
heard. It appears that constant scrutiny at each stage of
system development and effective DOD-contractor communication
provide the only barricades around this pitfall.
Mr. J. Fred Bucy, Executive Vice President of Texas
Instrument Corporation and Chairman of the DSB Task Force on
Reducing Costs of Defense Systems Acquisition, voices another
objection.
"Continual reference to this effort as 'design-
to-cost' gives us real concern. The danger is
that lip service to this new 'buzz phrase' will
be used in place of any real substance in ac-
complishment of 'design-to-cost'."15
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He then goes on to summarize the Task Force's one overriding
reservation with the entire concept,
major changes in the defense acquisition culture that now
exists, the outlook for effective 'design-to-cost' will not
be at all promising. "16 The cultural changes the Task Force
considers essential are these.
- "The present process of contract negotiation and
award for production phases should be changed from one that
focuses on cost justification to one which is based on
price . . .
"DOD personnel . . . at all levels must be moti-
vated and held accountable through a more effective system of
awards and penalties."
- "DOD's hierarchy of defense acquisition management
must be simplified, and the project managers given full author-
ity . . . ?
- "Hardware competition must be maintained throughout
the life of many major products .
- "More emphasis must be given to prior performance
and responsiveness to DOD's hardware needs, in the selection
of contractors."17
Their first point is probably the most perceptive of all.
How can a system that begins by establishing a cost base in
negotiations, and then allows a profit as a certain percentage
of that cost, hope to motivate contractors toward cost
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reductions? Such a system is patently self-defeat.ng!
Their third point cannot be let to pass, though, without
a hearty "hurrah". Given DOD's track record on organiza-
tional reductions, however, one is tempted to despair and to
side with Admiral Hyman Rickover who reportedly once remarked
that the only feasible method of getting the DOD hierarchy
down to size would be to come in on a Sunday night and brick
over every door on the fifth floor of the Pentagon. Then,
the next Sunday night, . . .
There are several other basic questions outstanding regard-
ing implementation of design-to-cost:18
- In DOD, how can sufficient latitude be injected
into current procurement regulations to permit relaxation of
specifications as necessary to ensure attainment of perfor-
mance and cost objectives?
- How can industry be motivated to propose realistic
rather than optimistic technical objectives when proposing to
a specified cost goal?
- How can design-to-cost best be passed down through
the layers of subcontractors?
- How can both DOD and industry personnel be effec-
tively motivated to take full advantage of the concept?
Motivation may be the real key to making design-to-cost work.
This is where the most difficult challenge may lie. LTG Robert
E. Coffin, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering
17
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(Acquisition Management), put it succinctly, "Without question,
it is more fun to design way out, pushing the state-of-the-art,
sophisticated, gold-plated and therefore ultra expensive sys-
tems. But there just aren't going to be any new programs where
cost is no object."19 How does one get that fact across?
VII. CONCLUSION
These and other difficult pitfalls lie ahead, possibly
the deepest and broadest are yet to be found, yet design-to-
cost is definitely here to stay. As Dr. Foster said four
years ago regarding soaring costs and shrinking budgets, "Our
only solution is to make cost a principal design parameter.
That is how we must define what is 'best'. We have no other
choice." 20
VIII. EPILOGUE
I cannot end this paper without addressing its title and
the question it poses; afterall, "Innovation in the Military"
is the theme of our conference. Is design-to-cost a manage-
ment innovation? For the answer I'd like to paraphrase Thomas
A. Edison who was commenting on the essence of genius - -
Innovation is one percent inspiration and
ninety-nine percent perspiration.
With this as a definition I would submit that design-to-cost
in the Department of Defense qualifies as innovation and the
most difficult ninety-nine percent is ahead of us.
18
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FOOTNOTES
1. Leonard Sullivan, Jr., Director Defense Program Analysis
and Evaluation, "Comment", Defense Management Journal,
Vol. 9, Nr. 3, Jul 1973.
2. Edgar Ulsamer, "At Stake: USAF's Economic Survival";
Air Force, Vol. 56, Sep 1973.
3. General Henry A. Miley, Jr., Commanding General Army
Materiel Command, "Cost is the Arbiter in Weapons Design",
Army, Vol. 23, Oct 1973.
4. Dr. John S. Foster, Director Defense Research & Engineering,.
The Department of Defense Program of Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation, FY197 , statement before the 93rd
Congress, 1st Session, Apr 1973.
5. James F Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, Report to the
Congress on the FY1975 Defense Budget and FY1975-1979 Defense
Program,Mar 197 .
6. Foster, comment to the National Security Industrial
Association on the occasion of his accepting the annual
James Forrestal Award, Mar 12, 1970.
7. DSARC is an acronym for Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council.
8. James D. McCullough, "Design to Cost" - Buzz Word or Viable
Concept, Institute for Defense Analyses Cost Analysis Group,
Arlington, Va., 1973.
9. Vice Admiral Eli T. Reich, "Value Engineering & Design to
a Cost: Kissin' Cousins?", Defense Management Journal,
Vol. 9, Oct 1973.
10. McCullough, op. cit.
11. U.S. Defense Science Board, Report of the Task Force on
Reducing Costs of Defense System Acquisition: "Design-
to-Costs, Commercial Practice vs. Dept. of Defense Practice",
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, 1973.
12. Miley, op. cit.
13. Defense Science Board, op. cit.
19
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(Footnotes, cont.)
14. Paul W. Holt, "Controls i n _ .:at .Home ...in D.e.sgn to Cost
Contracting", Defense Management Journal, Vol. 9_, Nr -2,
Apr 1973.
15. J. Fred Bucy, ltr forwarding Final Report of Defense
Science Board Task Force on Reducing Costs of Defense
Systems Acquisition, Mar 1, 1973.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. T. A. Wilson, "Reducing Costs Can Be Fun: Judgement,
Flexibility Needed", Defense Management Journal, Vol. 9,
Nr. 2, Apr 1973.
19. Lieutenant General Robert E. Coffin, "Design to.Cost:
Department of Defense Concepts", Army Research and
Development News, Vol. 14, Sep-0ct 19973?
20. Foster, comment op. cit.
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15 February 1974
The institutions of highest education in the military, the War
Colleges, recently have come under increasing scrutiny from within and
without the military services. Congress and a small element of the
university world have questioned the utility and costs of the War
Colleges. Several of the War Colleges are now undergoing an evaluation
of their curricula to insure that focus and content are appropriate to
the challenges facing the military today. The Army and Navy War Colleges
have within the past two years made major changes in their curricula to
this end. This scrutiny and these changes are desirable and necessary.
Change is inherent in the educational process. It is especially
important in the military professional schools as the United States
leaves Viet Nam and the "cold war" and moves into a new world.
To avoid change for change's sake, it is necessary for the War
Colleges to have a clear understanding of their functions. This essay
offers some reflections on this matter. To provide a framework for
discussion, three questions will be broadly considered. Why educate the
military? Who should be educated? What should be taught?
Why Educate the Military?
The answer to this question is in many parts. Some answers come
quickly to mind; the complexity of managing an extensive, expensive,
technology-based organization requires periodic updating on what is new
in the "business." The reflection associated with a period of education
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allows the redefinition of professional goals and the development of
new initiatives for the solution of old problems. These are two of the
principal reasons justifying advanced education for business executives.
They also support education of military executives.
But the most important reasons for educating senior officers stem
from two salient characteristics of the military profession. First, the
profession spends most of its time not doing what it is ultimately
organized and intended to do which is to fight and win wars.* The point
here is that the educational needs of an organization which spends most
of its time not doing what it was organized and intended to do must be
quite unique. The implications of this "uniqueness" must be identified
and examined by the War Colleges. Second, the profession has a strong
and most important ethical content. The ethical issues involve ultimately
the life and death of the nation and its citizens. For this reason the
ethical issues of the military profession are profoundly different from
those of other professions. There is a tendency for the values, the
ethics, of the military profession to be taken for granted. This must
not happen. The military must continually refresh and invigorate its
values. These values must be tested and reconfirmed in a society which
has changing and often antagonistic values. The War Colleges have a
vital task here.
Before the unique aspects of the military profession and its values
are studied, it is necessary to establish a conception of. the role of
*In the 29 years since 1945, Korea and Viet Nam have involved
approximately 11 years of active fighting. Approximately 72% of the US
military's time since 1945 has not been in combat.
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force and policy in the achievement of national ends. It is necessary
to examine the purposes for which force is employed both in peace and
war. The implications of Clausewitz's dictum "from which war is regarded
as nothing but the continuation of state policy with other means" are
far more complex than either military or civilian leaders appreciate.
The military are the handmaidens of policy in peace as well as war.
How the military defines its relation to the policy process is vital to
the profession and to society. It is under this rubric that the func-
tions, the unique characteristics and the values of the profession can
be studied as an integrated whole. Through this approach the War Colleges
establish their legitimacy as the apex of military education.
The War Colleges cannot teach everything. They should teach the
profession. To the extent that the military need specialists in manage-
ment, international relations, psychology and the like, they should be
trained at civilian educational institutions. War Colleges should
educate their students in the most demanding and complex of all profes-
sions--the military profession in a democratic society.
The phenomena of war and the military profession as objects of
research and special concern are sadly neglected children in today's time.
The American intellectual community has at best a thinly veiled distaste
for the subject. Sadly, the American military, which has.a long history
of winning wars with organizations, weapons and strategies derived from
other countries, also has the pragmatist's dislike of philosophical
speculation.* Further, it is also almost inevitable that, during periods
*How many officers, colonel and above, have read, let alone studied,
On War?
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of peace, successful "management" becomes the sine qua non for profes-
sional advancement. Management becomes a surrogate for war fighting.
In order that the American military can best respond to its future
responsibilities it must fully understand its role and functions in
peace and war. The War Colleges can perform this function. American
society should insist that they do so.
What has been emphasized here is not intended to exclude the con-
ventional academic disciplines from the War College curriculum or to
establish a "cult" of the military. Disciplines such as history,
economics, public and business administration, sociology and inter-
national relations have real value when taught in the context of what
has been described above. In fact, their value to the profession is
directly dependent upon the context in which they are taught,
Who Should Be Educated?
Remembering that we are dealing at the highest level of military
education, selection for this education should probably be restricted to
the top 10% of the officers of the grades of colonel/captain and
lieutenant colonel/commander. It is probable that future policymakers
and future advisorsto policymakers will come from this group. This
would be a fairly large number, for to restrict it to a smaller, more
carefully selected group would likely leave a significant number of
officers destined for higher places as "uneducated," Further, the
selection of only a small number has the real danger of generating a
self-perpetuating group of military elitists within the services. The
military cannot afford intellectual elitism because in time elitism
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becomes conservatism and resistance to change. In this selection it is
important that there be a representative cross-section of all major
functional elements within the services and also from the senior
civilian employees within the Department of Defense. The first value
of having a disparate group educated together is the effect of having
men of mixed experiences, prejudices and perceptions all addressing the
same issues. The enrichment is remarkable. A second value is that, if
indeed the top 10% have been selected, these people will meet each other
with increasing frequency as they move towards positions of greater
responsibility. The respect, understanding and friendships established
at a War College do much to facilitate the operation of the massive
military bureaucracies.
What Should Be Taught?
The curriculum of a War College as a professional institution should
focus on the nature of the military profession and the three broad
functional responsibilities of the profession. Once these responsibil-
ities have been established the supportive disciplines will be taught to
illuminate the complexities that the profession faces today. Let me
define these and then briefly outline a curriculum that would support
these responsibilities.
As suggested before, every War College has the obligation to define
the nature of the military profession to its students. This is so because
the large majority of the officers attending a War College can be char-
acterized as having little understanding of the nature and history of the
military profession. They are, indeed, skilled aviators, intelligence
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specialists, infantrymen, submariners and so forth. A useful analogy
is to consider them as master craftsmen who know relatively little of
the architectural principles which govern the work that they do. To meet
their increasing responsibilities, it is necessary to lift their horizons
to the level of the architects of military policy.
The historical processes which transformed the warrior class into
a profession need to be explored. The internal values of loyalty,
integrity, discipline and obedience need to be discussed. The clash
between these values and those of a liberal society must be examined.
The compatibility of military organizational principles and modern manage-
ment techniques should be considered. These issues should be raised not
with intent of resolving them but for the purpose of identifying them
as current and continuing problems for the military profession and for
society at large.
It is in this portion of the study that the three inherent functions
of any military organization should be identified. To refresh those who
may have forgotten:
The first responsibility of the military profession is to organize,
train, equip, maintain and employ forces as directed. In peacetime this
is largely a management function. The object of this function is to main-
tain the highest level of combat readiness possible with the resources
available. It occupies most of the time and resources of most of the
Armed Forces. It is the area of professional responsibility that most
officers understand best and to which they devote most of their concern.
The study of resource allocation, economics and organizational psychology
would be keyed to this responsibility.
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The second responsibility is to provide military advice to national
political leaders. This proposition, as stated, is probably agreeable
to most thoughtful military and civilians. The interpretation of what
is "proper or appropriate" military advice is a subtle and'complex
problem. This issue can be stated in the form of two questions: What
are the limits of military power in the support of policy? What are the
obligations of policy to military power once military power is engaged
in combat? There are no simple answers to these questions, Yet these
questions must be addressed and addressed again if the military is to
understand its proper role in our society, The complex, almost unde-
finable process which selects and elects national political leaders
generally prepares them well for dealing with domestic issues, It seldom
provides any real preparation for the awesomely difficult task of directing
the armed forces of the United States. As is evident by the institutional
changes of the Department of Defense and the Executive Staff of the
White House which have occurred over the past 20 years, there is a
recognized need for increased civilian control of the processes of form-
ulating and implementing national security policy. There are several
implications to the increased civilianization of the national security
organizations. The implication of most importance here is the inevitable
role confusion which has occurred at the highest levels of policy formu-
lation.
This role confusion is reflected not only in the fact of senior
civilians within the Defense Department planning air strikes and determining
weapons systems characteristics but also in the military's own concept of
the soldier-statesman. This hermaphrodite role raises serious questions
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about the civilian control of the military. The controversy over
General Haig's position in the White House is only the latest example.
What issues are properly the primary concern of the military? What
is the proper role of the professional military in policy formulation?
As has been suggested above, it is not likely that a President or his
civilian staff assistants will have the background to be especially
well qualified to deal with these questions except in broad generali-
ties. For this reason, it is doubly important for the military to have
a firm conception of its role in the policy process. This role is
always subject to interpretation and modification by the President, but
at least a clear understanding of the nature of its role by the military
provides a point of departure for establishing effective civilian con-
trol. Some in our society would resist the idea that the military
profession has the right and obligation to define its role; yet, if the
military fails to do so, it is possible that the question will either
go begging or, more likely, be resolved through the increased civilian-
ization of the armed forces.` Both will result in the erosion of the
military as a profession and weaken the character of the armed forces
with serious consequences in time of conflict. I have deliberately
belabored this point because it is the responsibility most difficult to
carry out and most subject to catastrophic consequences when not properly
executed. The study of historical case studies will best address this
area of concern,
* For a discussion of some of the implications of civilianization
of the Armed Forces see Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment,
Chapter 6, "The Civilianized Military Command."
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The third responsibility is to define the future. Simply stated.
Most difficult to do. That this is difficult may account to some degree
why the military have been so partial, traditionally, to preparing for
the last war. The lead time for change in the military is very long.
Longer today than it has ever been. It takes years to develop and
produce not only hardware but also to make significant changes to
organization and training. Near term conflicts will always be fought
with resources and doctrine in being. The process of renewal of the
military organization, if it is to be fruitful, requires that the mili-
tary assess the nature of likely conflicts and likely peacetime roles
in the years to come. This problem is particularly acute today. The
United States detente with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples'
Republic seriously weakens the "cold war" rationale for large military
forces. The fraying NATO scenario also weakens the rationale for the
kinds of military force that the United States presently has. Increasing
costs are likely to price conventional force structures out of existence.
This portion of the course would serve as the capstone of the year. It
would integrate the. previous studies.
A curriculum so designed does not prevent a War College from teaching
subjects peculiar to the interests of its own service. To the contrary,
the special functions and responsibilities of each service can be best
highlighted in such a course.
To sum up: the approach discussed in this paper provides a coherent,
intellectual framework for organizing a War College curriculum. Concomi-
tantly, it provides a totally defensible raison d'etre for the War Colleges.
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Most important, however, is that it provides a context for the student
which makes his studies professionally meaningful. For years the War
Colleges have been providing the student with pieces of the professional
puzzle; now is the time to reveal the cover to the puzzle box.
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15 February 1974
Col. John B. Keeley, USA
Thp,institutions of highest education in the military,' the War
Colleges, recently have come under increasing scrutiny from within and
without the military services. Congress and a small element of the'''
university world have questioned the utility and costs of the War
Colleges. Several of the War Colleges are now undergoing'an evaluation"
of their curricula to insure that focus and content are appropriate to
the challenges facing the military today. The Army and Navy War Colleges
have within the past two years made major changes in their curricula to
this end. This scrutiny and these changes are desirable and necessary.
Change is inherent in the educational process.. It, is especially
important in the military professional schools as the United States
leaves Viet Nam and.:th.e "cold war" and moves into a new world.
To avoid change for change's sake, it is necessary for the War
Colleges to have a clear understanding of their functions. This essay
offers some reflections,on this matter. To provide- a framework for
discussion, three questions will.be broadly considered. Why educate the
military? Who should be educated? What should be taught?
The answer to this question is in many parts. Some answers come
quickly to mind; the complexity of managing an extensive, expensive,
technology-based organization requires periodic updating on what is new
in the "business." The reflection associated with a period of education
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
allows the redefinition of professional goals and the development of
new initiatives for the solution of old problems:. These are two of the
principal reasons justifying advanced education for business executives.
They also support education.of military executives.
But the most important reasons for educating senior officers stem
from two salient characteristics of the military profession. First, the
profession spends most of its time. not_ rloin! what it is ultimately
organized and intended to do which is to fight and win wars.* The point
here is that the educational needs of an organization which spends most
of its time not doing what it was organized and intended to do must be
quite unique. The implications of this "uniqueness" must be identified
and examined by the War Colleges. Second, the profession has a strong
and most important ethical content. The ethical issues involve ultimately
the life and death of the nation and its citizens. For this reason the
ethical issues of the military profession are profoundly different from
those of other professions. There is a tendency for the values, the
ethics, of the military profession to be taken for granted. This.must
not happen. The military must continually refresh and invigorate its
values. These values must be tested and reconfirmed in a society which
has changing and often antagonistic values. The War Colleges have a
vital task here.
Before the unique aspects of the military profession and its values
are studied, it is necessary to establish a conception of the role of
*In the 29 years since 1945, Korea and Viet Nam have involved
approximately 11 years of active fighting. Approximately 72o"of the US
military's time since 1945 has not been in combat.
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force and policy-'in the achievement of national ends. It is necessary
to examine the-purposes for which force'is employed both in peace and
war.' The implications of Clausewitz's dictum "from which war is regarded
as nothing but the continuation of state policy with other means" are
far more complex than either military or civilian leaders appreciate.
The military are the handmaidens of policy in peace as well as war.
How the military defines its relation to the policy process is vital to
the profession and to society. It is under this rubric that the func-
tions, the unique characteristics and the values of the profession can
be studied as an integrated whole. Through this approach the War Colleges
establish their legitimacy as the apex of military education.
The War Colleges cannot teach everything. They should teach the
profession. To the extent that the military need specialists in manage-
ment, international relations, psychology and the like, they should be
trained at civilian educational institutions. War Colleges should
educate their students in the most demanding and complex of all profes-
sions--the military profession in a democratic society.
The phenomena of war and the military profession as objects of
research and special concern are sadly neglected children in. today's time.
The American intellectual community has at best a thinly veiled distaste
for the subject. Sadly, the American military, which has a long history
of winning wars with organizations, weapons and strategies derived from
other countries, also has the pragmatist's dislike of philosophical
speculation.* Further, it is also almost inevitable that, during periods
*How many officers, colonel and above, have read, let alone studied,
On War?
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of.peace, successful "management" becomes the sine qua non for profes-
sional advancement. Management becomes a surrogate for war fighting.
In order that the American military can best respond to its future
responsibilities it must fully understand its role and functions in
peace and war. The War Colleges can perform this function. American
society should insist that they do so.
What has been. emphasized here is not intended to_exclude.the con-
ventional academic disciplines from the War College curriculum or to
establish a "cult" of the military. Disciplines such as history,
economics, public and business administration, sociology and inter-
national relations have real value when taught in the context of what
has been described above. In fact, their value to the profession is
directly dependent upon the context in which they are taught.
Who Should Be Educated?
Remembering that we are dealing at the highest level of military
education, selection for this education should probably be restricted to
the top 100 of the officers of the grades of colonel/captain and
lieutenant colonel/commander. It is probable that future policymakers'
and future advisor to policymakers will come from this group. This
would be a fairly large number, for to restrict it to a smaller,. more
carefully selected group would likely leave a significant number of
officers destined for higher places as "uneducated." Further, the
selection of only a small nu,;iber has the real danger of generating a
self-perpetuating group of military elitists within the services. The
military cannot afford intellectual elitism because in time elitism
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becomes conservatism and resistance to change., In this selection it is
important that there be a representative cross-section of all major
functional elements within the services and also from the senior
civilian employees within the Department of Defense. The first value
of having a disparate group educated together is the effect of having
men of mixed experiences, prejudices and perceptions all addressing the
same issues. The enrichment is remarkable. A second value is that, if
indeed the top 10% have been selected, these people will meet each other
with increasing frequency as they move towards posi=tions of greater'
responsibility. The respect, understanding and friendships established
at a War College do much to facilitate the operation of the massive
military bureaucracies.
What Should Be Taught?
The curriculum of a War College as a professional institution should
focus on the nature of the military profession and the three broad
functional responsibilities of the profession. Once these responsibil-
ities have been established the supportive disciplines will be taught to
.illuminate the complexities that the profession faces today. Let me
define these and then briefly outline a curriculum that would support
these responsibilities.
As suggested before, every War College has the obligation to define
the nature of the military profession to its students. This is so because
the large majority of the officers attending a War College can be char-
acterized as having little understanding of the nature and history of the
military profession. They are, indeed, skilled aviators, intelligence
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specialists, infantrymen, submariners and so forth. A useful analogy
is to consider them as master craftsmen who know relatively little of
the architectural principles which govern the work that they do. To.meet
their increasing responsibilities, it is necessary to lift their horizons
to the level of the architects of military policy.
The historical processes which transformed the warrior class into
a profession need, to..be explored... The internal values.: of loyalty,
integrity, discipline and. obedience need to be discussed. The clash
between these values and those of a liberal society must be examined.
The compatibility of military organizational principles and modern manage-
ment techniques should be.considered. These issues should be raised not
with intent of resolving them but for the purpose of identifying them
as current and continuing problems for the military profession and for
society at large.
It is in this portion of the study that the three inherent functions'
of any military organization should be identified. To refresh those who
The first responsibility of the military profession. is to organize,
train, equip, maintain and employ forces as directed. In peacetime this
is largely a management function. The object of this function is to main-
tain the highest level of combat readiness possible with the resources
available. It occupies most of the time and resources of most of the
Armed Forces. It is the area of professional responsibility that most
officers understand best and to which they devote most of their concern.
The study of resource allocation, economics and organizational psychology
would be keyed to this responsibility.
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The second responsibility is to provide military advice to national
political leaders. This proposition, as stated, Is probably agreeable
to most thoughtful military and civilians. The interpretation of what
is "proper or-appropriate" military advice is a subtle and complex
problem. This issue can be stated in the form of two questions: What
are the limits of military power in the support of policy? 'What are the
obligations of policy to military power once military power is engaged
in combat? There are no simple answers to these questions. Yet these
questions must be addressed and addressed again if the military is to
understand its proper role in our society. The complex, almost unde-
finable process which selects and elects national political leaders
generally prepares them well for dealing with domestic issues. It seldom
provides any real preparation for the awesomely difficult task of directing
the armed forces of the United States. As is evident by the institutional
changes of the Department of Defense and the Executive Staff of the
White House which have occurred over the past 20 years, there is a
recognized need for increased civilian control of the processes of form-
ulating and implementing national security policy. There are several
implications to the increased civilianization of the national security
organizations. The implication of most importance here is the inevitable
role confusion which has occurred at the highest levels of policy formu-
lation.
This role confusion is reflected not only in the fact of senior
civilians within the Defense Department planning air strikes and determining
weapons systems characteristics but also in the military's own concept of
the soldier-statesman. This hermaphrodite role raises serious questions
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about the civilian control of the military.. The, controversy. over
General Haig's position in the White House is only the latest example.
What issues are properly the primary concern of the military? What
is the proper role of the professional military in policy formulation?
As has been suggested above, it is not likely that a President or his
civilian staff assistants will have the background to be especially
well qualified to deal with these questions except in broad generali-
ties. For this reason, it is doubly important for the military.to have
a firm conception of its role in the policy process. This role, is
always subject to interpretation and modification by the President, but
at least a clear understanding of the nature of its role by the military
provides a point of departure for establishing effective civilian con-
trol. Some in our society would resist the idea that the military
profession has the right and obligation to define its role; yet, if the
military fails to do so, it is possible that the question will.either
go begging or, more likely, be resolved through the increased civilian.-
ization of the armed forces.* Both will result in the erosion of the
military as a profession and weaken the character of the armed forces
with serious consequences in time of conflict. I have deliberately
belabored this point because it is the responsibility most difficult to
carry out and most subject to catastrophic consequences when.not properly
executed. The study of historical case studies will best address this
area of concern.
* For a discussion of some of the implications of civilianization
of the Armed Forces see Adam 1'armolinsky,'The Military Establishment,
Chapter 6, "The Civilianized Military Command."
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The third responsibility is to define the future. Simply stated.
Most difficult to do. That this is difficult may account to.some degree
why.. the military have been so partial, traditionally, to preparing for
the last war. The lead time for change in the,military is very long.
Longer today than it has ever been. It takes years to develop and
produce not only hardware but also to make significant changes to
organization and training. Near term conflicts- will always be fought
with resources and doctrine in being. The process of renewal of the
military organization, if it is to be fruitful, requires that the mili-
tary assess the nature of likely conflicts and likely peacetime roles
in the years to come. This problem is particularly acute today. The
United States detente with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples'
Republic seriously weakens the "cold war" rationale for large military
forces. The fraying NATO scenario also weakens the rationale for the
kinds of military force that the United States presently has. Increasing
costs are likely to price conventional force structures out of existence.
,
This portion of the course would serve as the capstone of the year. It
would integrate the previous studies.
A curriculum so designed does not prevent a War College from teaching
subjects peculiar to the interests of its own service. To the contrary.,
the special functions and responsibilities of each service can be best
highlighted in such a course.
To sum up: the approach discussed in this paper provides a coherent,
intellectual framework for.organizing a War College curriculum. Concomi-
tantly, it provides a totally defensible raison d'etre for the War Colleges.
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 Most important, however, is that it-provides a:.context for the student
which makes his studies professionally meaningfull. For years the War
Colleges have been providing the student with-pieces of the professional
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puzzle; now is the time to reveal the cover to th6 puzzle box.
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UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
RESEARCH PAPER
DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO' RACE RELATIONS EDUCATION
"IDENTIFYING MILITARY MIDDLE MANAGEMENT~RESISTANCE"
BY:
PETER H. CRESSY, LCDR, U.S.N.
ADVANCED RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
IN COLLABORATION WITH:
DR. LOUIS R. DESFOSSES
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
This paper is a student research paper prepared at the Naval War College. The thoughts and opinions
expressed in this paper are those of the author and, not necessarily those of the Department of the Navy or the
President, Naval War College.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Past Program Effectiveness . . . . . . . ? . 4
Prior Program Shortfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Survey Results . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . ? . 6
Some Possible Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? 8
IDENTIFYING AND OVERCOMING MIDDLE MANAGEMENT RESISTANCE. 9
Probable Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anxiety and Race Relations Education . . . . . . . . . 10
Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Family Work Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Prejudice Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Leadership Contradiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Decision Making. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Reward and Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? 18
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Behavior and Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Two Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Racism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Skill Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 27
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
ANNEX A . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . 31
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This paper discusses a new approach to race-relations
education for military middle management. Previous efforts
have relied on an approach which too often resulted in emo-
tional confrontations and anxiety arousing situations. Such
techniques often threatened participants, causing them to
reject new information.
The new approach concentrates on giving an intellectual
understanding and a rational background of the nature of
prejudice before exposing the manager to the emotions which
accompany it. This approach will allow an appreciation of
prejudice and racism to be developed in the relative safety
of a classroom or seminar. It encourages the participant
to examine his values, attitudes, and behaviors in a non-
threatening environment. It explores the concept of pre-
judice not as a simple problem of irrational hatred but as
a problem of individual and societal rigidities.
The new approach will encourage affirmative action by
concentrating on not only an individual?s awareness but also
on relevant problem solving skills. The Navy in previous
programs has done an adequate job of increasing awareness
of individual and institutional racism. It has confronted
the Navy man with the reality of race problems. The time
has come to move forward from awareness to the consideration
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of cognitive theories that may prove useful in providing
increased understanding and tools for problem solution.
Once the middle manager has an understanding of the problem
and has been equipped with relevant skills he may be ready
and more willing to deal with it.
Background
The following is background material which may be
helpful to the reader for understanding the imperative nature
of the pursuit of an effective and acceptable race relations
program. On the sixth of August 1973, the Navy Human Goals
Plan became a formal Naval Instruction with the force of
law. The Human Goals plan is viewed as an extension of the
Personal Affairs Action Programs begun-in 1970. in a per-
sonalized sense it can be viewed as an institutionalization
of Admiral Zumwalt's manifest concern for humanism in the
Navy. It is also a response to the Department of Defense
Human Goals Credo which begins with an encompassing state-
ment:
Our nation was founded on the principle
that the individual has infinite dignity and
worth. The Department of Defense, which exists
to keep the Nation secure and at peace, must
always be guided by this principle. In all
that we do, we must show respect for the service-
man, the servicewoman and the civilian employee,
recognizing their individual needs, aspirations
and capabilities.
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The Human Goals Credo goes on to say more specifically that
. . . to make military and civilian service in
the Department of Defense a model of equal
opportunity for all regardless of race, sex,
creed or national origin, and to hold those who
do business with the Department to full com-
pliance with lthe policy of equal employment
opportunity.
The Navy Human Goals Plan responds to this challenge by
making a commitment:
To reemphasize the important role of middle
management in implementing policy 2 and in giving
strength to the chain of command.
It is furthermore important to note that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1973 strengthens the original
act of 1964 and requires that minority groups be propor-
tionally represented in all employment categories. Com-
plete commitment is required to the spirit of these laws
if their intent is to be fulfilled within a reasonable period
of time. Prior programs have substantially increased aware-
ness of the problem. The Human Goals Program must move
from this base and provide a process which encourages com-
mitment to the implementation of equal opportunity.
Purpose
The primary purpose of this paper is to present the
rationale and design for an alternative approach to race
relations education for the naval (military) middle manager.
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It is an approach which is designed to capitalize on the
success of previous programs, but to avoid their short-
comings. It is designed to encourage a modification of
behavior and prejudicial attitude by building on the basically
sound values of the military officer. The military middle
manager is defined here as one who is responsible for the
implementation of policy. In this sense both the senior
non-commissioned officer and senior commissioned officer
are sometimes considered as middle managers. Junior and
middle grade officers to the 06 level are considered here,
however, as the bulk of middle management.
The middle manager is targeted for particular concern
because by definition and practice he is charged with the
implementation of policy; and furthermore, because affirma-
tive action policies designed to ensure equal opportunity
for all minorities are likely to be successful only if they
are supported by middle management.
Past Program Effectiveness
Evaluation of past programs is presently being con-
ducted by the Systems Development Corporation of California.
The areas of race relations education toward which they are
particularly directing their attention are the Executive and
UPWARDS seminars. These seminars are currently the major
thrust of the Navy's race relations program. The objectives
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of these programs are essentially two: first, to increase
awareness of individual and institutional racism; second,
to increase commitment to deal with racism through affirma-
tive action.
By 30 September 1973, 185,000 E5 thru 06 personnel had
attended UPWARD or Executive seminars.3 The evaluation of
the impact of these programs in terms of their goals is not
yet complete. In an interview with project analysts, however,
it was learned that past efforts appear to have increased
somewhat the awareness of racism,4
Prior Program Shortfalls
At this point in the evaluation of past programs it is
not possible to demonstrate that the UPWARDS and Executive
seminars have significantly increased commitment to deal af-
firmatively with racism.5 It is clear, however, that past
programs were not primarily designed to provide skills for
handling racial problems.
Furthermore, the approach taken by such programs has
created a reaction among much of middle management which may
have caused a lack of commitment to the intent of affirmative
action. This reaction may be typified by the words of Admiral
Hyman S. Rickover who said,
"Can you imagine what these paid vacations are
doing to the readiness of ships that are already
undermanned? The'amateurish programs enacted thus
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far by the Navy have been poorly conceived, poorly
executed, are a joke in the fleet and are inimical
to building a strong fighting force."
"Sociological experimentation of this nature,
including group dynamics and sensitivity techniques,
must not be permitted."
"A return to the more traditional concepts of com-
petence in doing the job at hand, hard work, good
example, and commonsense reasonableness, without
sociologist interplay, is what is needed."6
A survey was conducted at the Naval.War College to
determine if the feelings expressed by Admiral Rickover re-
flected those of the Navy's middle manager. The survey uti-
lized a Likert, six point, forced choice format. It was
administered to the Naval officers of the class of 1974
at the War College. The main thrust and result of the
survey will be briefly reviewed. A complete copy of the
results is available from the author at the Naval War College.
Survey Results
148 Naval Officers responded
57 were CDRs or CAPTs,91 were LCDRs or Senior LTs
10 were less than 30 years of age. 47 were between
30 and 34 years
53 were between 35-39 years. 40 were older than 40 yrs
98 officers had taken part in a race relations seminar
50 officers had not taken part in a race relations
seminar
Six statements about Admiral Rickover's three para-
graphs comment were directed to the respondents asking them
to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement. Our
review of the results here will lump all degrees of agreement
percentage for each category. The attached appendix gives
a complete breakdown of the results and may be of considerable
interest to some readers. These are prelimary breakdowns and
further statistical analysis is currently being conducted.
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Statement 1) "Overall this statement (Admiral Rickover's)
concurs with my feelings about past Navy efforts with
Human Goals Programs."
49 % (percents rounded) CDR/CAPTs agreed.
38 % LCDRs/LTs agreed
45 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar
agreed
37.5 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar
0
agreed
% under 30 years agreed, 49% between
30-34
yrs agreed
41.5
% between 35-39 years agreed, 47.5 %
over
40 yrs agreed
Statement 2) "Navy Human Goals programs have been 'amateurish,
poorly conceived and poorly executed.'"
68.5 % CDR/CAPTs agreed. 50% LCDR/LT agreed .
58 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
55 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar
agreed
30 % under 30 years agreed, 48% between 30-34 years agreed
66 % between 35-39 years agreed, 63% over 40 years agreed
-Statement 3) "Navy Human Goals programs are a 'joke in the
fleet.""
36.5 % CDR/CAPTs agreed. 38.5% LCDR/LT agreed
41 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar
agreed
30.5 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar
agreed
20 % under 30 years agreed, 45.5% between 30-34 yrs agreed
31.5 % between 35-39 years agreed, 42% over 40 years agreed
Statement 4) "Paragraph number 2 expresses my view. ('So-
ciological experimentation')"
34 % CDR/CAPTs agreed. 24% of LCDR/LT agreed.
29 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar
agreed
25.5 % who had not taken part in a race relations agreed.
11 % under 30 years agreed, 26% between 30-34 years
agreed.
27.5 % between 35-39 years agreed, 22% over 40 years
agreed
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Statement 5) "Paragraph number 3 expresses my view. (?a
return to more traditional concepts o . .1)"
65 % CDR/CAPT agreed. 56% LCDR/LT agreed.
55 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar
agreed.
70 % who had not taken part in a race relations
seminar agreed.
50 % under 30 years agreed, 58% between 30-34 agreed.
58.5 % between 35-39 years agreed, 63% over 40 years
agreed.
Statement 6) "This statement is aimed primarily at race-
relations program."
66.5 % CDR/CAPT agreed. 58% LCDR/LT agreed.
Some Possible Conclusions.
It can be argued in a strict statistical sense that
because Naval officers are selected for the War College they
may not comprise a true random sample. These authors are
inclined to argue, however, that in terms of attitudes and
reactions War College attendees are a representative
sample of the whole naval officer population of similar
rank. We therefore believe the survey accurately represents
a rather adverse reaction to past efforts and is worthy of
note. This suggests that at least the following points
can be tentatively concluded.
1) That a large percentage of naval management
has misgivings about past programs especially with the way
they were conducted. That senior officers have more mis-
givings than junior officers. That older officers have more
misgivings than younger. That officers who have actual ex-
perience in Navy race relation programs have more misgivings
than those who do not.
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2) That most Naval officers are not against
sociological efforts in the Navy.
3) That most officers desire a return to
traditional concepts and values.
4) That most officers tend to equate Human Goals
Programs to race relations efforts.
Identifying and Overcoming
Middle Management Resistance
Probable Causes
It may be possible to identify five probable causes for
middle management resistance to past race relations programs:
1) Some middle managers who are aware of their racial
prejudices fear the potential exposure of their attitudes in
the group process: some simply resist having the security of
their prejudices disturbed.
2) The middle manager, particularly the officer, is
uncomfortable in a seemingly confronting and often emotional
group process which includes all enlisted rates and officer
ranks.
3) The group process employed by some programs (UPWARD)
often involves the normal work group of the participants. This
tends to place the regular leaders (middle managers) of the group
in unfamiliar and unsettling roles.
4) The middle manager perceives these programs as a
challenge to his concept of leadership and as damaging to
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"traditional" Navy discipline. He is, furthermore, reluctant
to entertain a process which may appear to suggest abandoning
what he believes to be a personally successful leadership
formula.
5) The middle manager resists these programs because
he is not yet convinced that a system exists which will reward
the leadership behavior proposed by such programs.
Anxiety and Race Relations Education.
Personal anxiety may be at the.core of the resistance of
middle management to race-relations education. Our first three
probable causes relate to this concept. It is hypothesized
that-the prejudiced middle manager is often threatened by cur-
rent programs and as a result of raised anxieties can be ex-
pected to resist these programs.
The works of Rokeach, Adorno,'and others deal with the
personal anxiety experienced by prejudiced people. Rokeach,
in his book entitled The Open and Closed Mind develops the
concept of closed mindedness. He found a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between this concept and anxiety.? His work
elaborated on that of Adorno et al. Adornovs several works
analyzed the relationship between authoritarianism and ethno-
centrism. A high correlation was found between them.8 Rokeach
found that dogmatic or closed minded (prejudiced) individuals
were more anxious and tended to have difficulty dealing with
new ideas. Rokeach?s dogmatic or closed minded individual is
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similar to Adorno?s authoritarian or dogmatic individual
with one notable exception. Rokeach?s concepts deal with
individuals of all political persuasions. Adorno's original
concept dealt only with the right and particularly with the
anti-Semitic facistm
Exposure
The group process format of past programs has tended to
border on confrontation. A critical variable in this seems
to have been the attitude of the facilitators.* Some facili-
tators direct their efforts toward making each participant
"deal with" or "own up" to his prejudice. This environment
of exposure is not comfortable for the anxious or threatened
individual. He may well "own up" to his prejudices but that
is no insurance that he will alter or control them. Programs
which are perceived as confronting may well be restricting
their success by turning off that participant who is most in
need of the program.
Dr. James Thomas, a black researcher, instrumental in
the Army?s efforts in race relations, said in an interview
that the Army believes it has come upon evidence of an actual
*These facilitators, however sincere, are perceived by many
officers as unprepared to handle a group process dealing with
such intense subjects as racism and prejudice. They are the
products of a four week Navy School and do not always have any
prior relevant background. Informal interviews conducted at
the Naval War College suggest strongly that facilitator cre-
dentials may have increased skepticism about these programs
among the officer corps.
11
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hardening of prejudical attitudes after training. He
theorized that those persons who were open-minded may have
benefited from the training while those who were closed minded
or dogmatic may well have become more so.9 This kind of think-
ing tends to be supported by the work of Howland, Janis, and
Kelly, whose extensive studies led them to state: "when the
(emotion arousing) communication contains no reassurance or
immediate way of obtaining reassurance then the emotional re-
action may lead either to avoidance of thinking about the com-
munication or to minimization of the importance of the communi-
cation."10
The anxious individual, therefore, can be expected to
raise his defensive barriers and block confronting communica-
tion in a group process which threatens exposure of certain
deep seated personality traits.
Family Work Group.
For the closed minded or anxious middle manager a group
process which deals with racism and prejudice within his im-
mediate work group becomes an ordeal. The patterns of rela-
tionships and leadership hierarchy which are developed over
time are difficult to maintain. A group process which appears
to impinge on these relationships is bound to be threatening
to the manager. The recent work of D.J. Hanson and A.M. Bush
supports this notion. Their studies, reported in the Psycho-
logical Reports, showed that anxiety created by situational
threat increased closed mindedness'. 11
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This is important because it suggests that even those
officers who are normally open minded may tend to become
closed minded when placed in awkward or threatening situations.
When the participants of a group process are of the same
family work group the normal manager or leader of that group
is in a new and threatening situation. This kind of con-
fronting process might work with groups formed voluntarily
and dedicated to solving problems of reasonable proportions.
However, when these problems are buried deep inside the
individual, when these problems relate to basic belief systems
and where these problems are obscured by an overlay of
emotion the confronting atmosphere of a family work group
is not the answer. Awareness of the problem.may be increased
but an increased commitment to deal with it is not a likely
outcome.
The Prejudiced Personality
Our first three probable causes have dealt with the
relationship of anxiety and resistance created by threatening
situations. It has also been suggested that the prejudiced
person is likely to be anxious and resistant. Before pro-
ceeding to our final two probable causes a short discussion
of some of the characteristics often exhibited by the prejudiced
personality is appropriate here.
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A variety of terms has been used to describe the
prejudiced personality. These terms dogmatic, authoritarian,
closed minded - through not precisely synonoymous, may be
considered so for our purposes. Sanford?s view of the
authoritarian is usefully summarized into subparts. They
are:
1) Conventionalism. Rigid adherence to conventional
middleclass values.
2) Authoritarian Submission, Submission, uncritical
attitude toward i ea ize moral authorities of the in-group.,
3) Authoritarian Aggression. Tendency to condemn,
reject, and punish pe?p e who violate conventional values.
4) Anti-intraception. Opposition to the subjective,
the imaginative, the tenderminded.
5) Su erstition and Stereot e. The disposition to
think in rigid categories.
6) Power and Toughness. Preoccupation with the
dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension
7) Destructiveness and Cynicism.
8) Projectivity. The projection outward of un-
conscious emotional impulses.
9) Sex. Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings on,"
and punitiveness toward violations of sex mores.l2
An educational effort in an academic non-threatening
environment which focuses on these personality characteristics
might allow a useful process of internalization to ensue. Such
a process should lead the middle manager to a better under-
standing of the specific components of his personal prejudices.
Better understanding should help allay anxiety and thereby
reduce his resistance to dealing with prejudice.
14
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Leadership Contradiction
Two final causes for middle management resistance are
cited here as existing in the ur;willingness of military
leaders to abandon the values and behavior of a leadership
style which they perceive as (1) successful and as (2) re-
warded.
The results of the survey conducted at the Naval War
College showed that 65% of the senior officers and 56% of
the junior officers polled agreed with Admiral Rickover's
statement that,
"A return to the more traditional concepts of
competence in doing the job at hand, hard work,
good example, and commonsense reasonableness,
without sociologist interplay, is what is needed."
The Hicks Congressional subcommittee report lends
further support to this interpretation of middle management
resistance. It stated as a finding,
of o obviously there has not been any removal
of the tools to maintain discipline aboard ship
or anywhere else in the Navy, but the attitude
toward the use of such tools has changed.
The change in part has been occasioned by the
use of minority affairs representatives, human
relations councils and human resources staffs 13
which too frequently bypass the chain of command."
The Naval officer has an ingrained leadership value
system which has been identified in two independent studies,
one by G.W. England (University of Minnesota) 14 and a second
by A.L. Wermuth (Center for Advanced Studies and Analysis).15
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Programs which tamper with a value system so pertinent to a
manager's daily life are bound to raise resistance. Recently
a visiting consultant at the Naval War College asked a class
of senior students "what would you say if I told you I intended
to show you how to lead!" One of the printable responses was
"incredible."16 Effective leadership behavior is for some
learned at great personal cost. Attempts to change it can
expect to meet with resistance.
Decision Making
To be effective a race relations education program must
be perceived not as threatening to but as relevant to leader-
ship concepts. G.W. England, in his studies of naval officers'
values, cites decision making ability as one of those traits
most valued by Naval officers. Commitment to dealing con-
structively with prejudice might therefore be increased by
associating it with being an effective decision-maker.
Rokeach's concept of belief systems offers an excellent way
for middle management to recognize the potential detriment
of prejudice to good decision making. Rokeach asks rhetorically,
"If we knew something about the way a person believes, is it
possible to predict how he will go about solving problems
that have nothing to do with his ideology?"17
Although Rokeach straightforwardly criticizes certain
methodological shortcomings of some of the findings cited in
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the Authoritarian Personality, he manifests considerable
agreement on findings which pertain to the dynamics of
decision making. In referring to the Adorno effort he
states:
. . . some major findings that come out of
such studies are that persons who are high
in ethnic prejudice and/or authoritarianism,
as compared with persons who are low, are more
rigid in their problem-solving behavior, more
concrete in their thinking, and more narrow
in their grasp of a particular subject; they
also have a greater tendency to premature
closure in their perceptual processes and to
distortions in memory, and a greater tendency
to be intolerant of ambiguity."18
In a variety of experiments conducted to measure per-
ceptual synthesis,Rokeach found considerable support for the
hypothesis that prejudiced or closed minded persons have more
difficulties in certain kinds of decision making or problem
solving situations than do unprejudiced open minded individ-
uals.19
These are vital points because they suggest that an ef-
fective race relations education program should deal with the
dynamics of decision making. The behavior (decisions) of the
prejudiced manager is likely to be made discriminatory by
virtue of the decision making process he uses. It is pre-
cisely this sort of behavior that race relations education
is designed to control. To be effective, an alternative
approach must deal with the dynamics of decision making.
Indeed, to ensure effectiveness an alternative approach to
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race relations education should be made relevant to as many
leadership values as possible.
Reward and Behavior
Relevancy is not, however, enough. Behavior modification
is not likely to occur without the impetus of reward. Rudolph
Winston of Harvard Business School (Dr. Winston is black and
has done work in race relations for the U.S. Army) discussed
at length in an interview at the Naval War College the re-
lationship of reward to behavior change. He concluded his
comments by saying emphatically "reward for change must be
evident if change is to take place."20 Dr. Wendy Wyatt,
behavioral consultant for Associates for Human Resources Inc.,
stated recently that her experience both in industry and
in the military indicates that change is likely to occur
only when the reward-punishment system is perceived as
encouraging change.21 The well knotnn Porter and Lawler Model,
which relates reward and the perceived probability of reward
to performance, gives added credence to this concept.22
Naval officers do not yet perceive that the "system"
will reward human goals oriented behavior. Officer detailers
at the Bureau of Naval Personnel generally do not encourage line
officers to take human resource development billets unless they
want to "take a chance with their careers." Senior officers
associated with field activities known in the past as HRMC's
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(Human Resource Management Centers) have been regularly passed
over for the next rank while in such billets or prior to assign-
ment to such billets. The Rear Admiral selection board just
concluded did not nominate for the rank anyone with a specialty
in the human resource management field. While no. doubt justi-
fiable on the basis of normal selection criteria, these actions
are nonetheless often perceived as a failure of the system to
reward concern in this field.
A race relations education program cannot of course ensure
the middle manager that he will be rewarded for affirmative
action. That is the purview of the military hierarchy. An
education program might, however, succeed in relating concern
for race relations to those leadership,and management traits
which the middle manager already perceived as being rewarded.
This parallels and reenforces our efforts to make race rela-
tions education relevant to leadership.
We know, for example, from Wermuth?s efforts that the
Naval officer values organizational and battle efficiency.23
He is assumed to perceive reward for attaining such efficiency.
A program designed to demonstrate that race relations educa-
tion-is relevant to organizational efficiency should capture
the attention of the military middle manager. Modern behavioral
literature on the organization lends support to such efforts
to relate prejudice to low personal achievement and contribu-
tion within the organization. Professor David C. McClelland,
a well known organizational psychologist, has said,
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"data show that lower-class Negro-Americans.have a very low
level of achievement need (n-ACH). This is not surprising.
Society has systematically discouraged and blocked.their
achievement striving."24 Professor David Bowers of the
University of Michigan has made a related observation based
on his research,""A management system which denies him (the
individual) influence, appreciation, respect and confidence
diminishes his motivation to be contributing member of the
organization.'?25
Hopefully a rationale of this sort will cause the middle
manager to relate his leadership value system to the reward
system in a manner which will reduce resistance to race
relations education.
This paper has thus far examined some of the probable
cause of middle management resistance to past race relations
programs. It turns now to describe briefly. what an
alternative program might be.
An Alternative; Approach
Objective
The objectives of an alternative race relations program
must of course be compatible with the Navy Human Goals Plan.
That is they must contribute to the determination of the Navy
"to ensure equal opportunity in the Navy by making prejudice
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of any kind an unacceptable practice and to identify and
eliminate individual and institutional racism." More specifi-
cally the education considered here will be targeted at the
middle management population of the Navy. This population can
be considered to be rationally versus emotionally oriented.
The alternative approach would be based on an educational
framework designed to avoid initial anxiety arousal. It would
attempt to control communication avoidance and to maintain
relevancy.
Behavior and Attitude
Every effort would be made to relate the entire process
to the present value system of middle management and hopefully
by extended logic to the perceived reward system. In this
sense the program is not designed to alter present leadership
values. It is designed rather to utilize those values to en-
courage both a behavioral and an attitudinal modification. The
unemotional approach of the process allows the rationally
oriented manager to see the contradiction between his leader-
ship values and his prejudical attitudes. This will hope-
fully lead to a modification of those attitudes. The
practical case study aspect of the process should allow the
manager to experiment with new behavior and relate it to the
reward system. It should at the very least increase his
confidence in dealing with racial problems and thus encourage
a modification of behavior.
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This paper wishes to avoid the debate of whether a race
relations education program should be designed to alter
attitude or behavior. Morally, one might wish that attitudes
be changed; pragmatically changing behavior may be more fea-
sible if only because it is more visible and measurable and
therefore more subject to the reward system. C.A. Insko in
concluding his comprehensive work, Theories of Attitude Change
for the Century Psychology Series,state4 after an extensive
review of the literature;
. . from the present vantage point the most
glaring weakness of contemporary theorizing is
the lack of emphasis upon the relation between
attitudes and behavior. A different approach
to the relation between attitude and behavior
is to concentrate not on behavior change fol-
lowing attitude change but2?n attitude change
following behavior change.
Both for practical and theoretical reasons then, this
paper suggests that an alternative approach to Race Relations
should strive for both behavior and attitude modification,
and not just attitude changes.
Two Aspects
An educational process designed to alleviate racism
must deal with both the personal and societal aspects of
prejudice. Simpson and Yinger give credence to this approach
in their well known work Racial and Cultural Minorities: An
Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination. They regard
prejudice as a complex phenomenon resulting from various
22
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societal structures and cultural norms. By this reasoning
situational, cultural and personality inputs can be said to
affect the learning and expression of?'ihto'lerance.27
Rokeach also establishes the distinction between two
kinds of prejudice (1) that which results as an aspect of the
personality trait closed mindedness and (2) that which is a
matter of social and cultural norm.28 G.W. Allport breaks
down the dynamics of prejudice into a variety of societal and
personality factors with special emphasis on the power of the
group.29 In a more specific but similar vein Professor J.C.
Brigham, in recently discussing one important dimension of
ethnic prejudice--stereotyping,--cited two causes for stereo-
typing and two potential cures. First, stereotypes are some-
times based on conformity and should be cured by reality
oriented education. Second, stereotypes are also based on
ego defense functions or personality and may be cured by
insight. 29
Racism
Once the bases of racism--personal and societal prejudice--
have been presented in an intellectual and relevant manner, the
specifics of institutional and individual racism will be
dealt with. Racism is often rationalized away on the bases
of educational or talent differentials. To avoid this our
alternative approach will first present a body of carefully
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collected data which manifest the reality of racism in the
Navy. Secondly, the dynamics of racism will be dealt with
in the classic forms of position, influence and power denial.
Thirdly, the manifestations and habits of racism such as
avoidence, address, and assumption will be considered.
Skill Development
With the intellectual approach complete the middle manager
will then be given an opportunity to deal with the problems
of racism and equal opportunity through the case study method.
This method allows the individual to compare his personal
reactions with those of his peers, to obtain feedback relevant
to his behavior, and to acquire practice and confidence in
dealing with problems which involve race. Each case will be
formed on a critical incident which has multiple complica-
tions and implications. The cases are not designed to scrutinize
an officer's values or attitudes. They are designed rather
to allow him to test his perceptions and behavior against
some model solution. The model solution is not considered
sacrosanct but it does give some basis for comparison.
In conjunction with the case study method,a decision
making game designed to be run under the pressure of time
and operational objectives is being developed. The decision
game atmosphere is established with some competition in the
environment to ensure that the middle manager personally
wrestles with the concepts and difficulties of human oriented
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management that is also mission directed. The considerable
involvement with peers encouraged by this process should allow
for some confrontation of ideas - but a controllable con-
frontation founded on a substantial amount of academic back-
ground.. Confrontation can thus be resolved within some
rational framework.
The decision game is designed furthermore to reward
results. Results would be measured both in terms of the degree
to which mission objectives are met and the cost of the human
resource involved. A series of decisions would be called for
in a build up phase, an incident phase, and a post incident
phase. Each decision would have some bearing upon follow-on
situations.
The case study method and the decision game are self
educational in concept and are designed to give both the
junior and senior officer practice with sensitive problems
in a feedback environment. It is a way of moving from theory
to application in a manner which hopefully will increase a
leader's skill in handling emotionally charged situations and
the change process itself. It should at least increase
awareness of the limits of an individual's perception. In
doing this there is some hope that better decisions will be
made and fewer prejudices enacted into discrimination.
The administrators of the Human Goals Program at the
United States Naval War College are attempting to mold this
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suggestion for an alternative Approach to Race Relations
Education into the overall Human Goals Program of the Naval
War College in a manner which makes it compatible with the
goals of that institution. If this is accomplished, an
evaluation of its effectiveness is planned. Hopefully an
evaluation will suggest that the integrated process suggested
here will be worthy of consideration by other military insti-
tutions which deal primarily, with the military middle manager
or officer.
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NOTES
l.. OPNAVINST 5300.6, Navy Human Goals Plan, 6 August 1973,
p. II-6m
2. Ibid., p. 11-2.
4. Statement by'Edward Emerson, telephone interview,
January 21, 1974.
5. ibid.
6. .Admiral H.G. Rickover, is quoted by Navy Times, October
24, 1973.
7. Milton Rokeach, The O en.anddCClosed Mind. (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., l970)pp. 351-357.
8. T.W. Adorno, et.al., The Authoritarian.Personalitya
(New York; Harper, 1950) p. M.
9. Statement by Dr. James Thomas, personal interview,
Washington, D.C., November 25, 1973.
10. C..A. Insko, Theories ?of Attitude,Chan e, (New York:-
Appleton-Century-Croft-s, 1997), p. 35.
11._ D.J.. Hanson and Bush, "Anxiety and Dogmatism,"
Psychological Reports. October 1971, vol 29 (2).
12. J.P. Kirsht and R.C. Dillehay, Dimensions of Authori
tarianism: A Review of Research and Theory. Lexington-
University of Kentucky Press, 1967 , p. 6.
13. United States Document, House of Representatives,
"'Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S.
Navy.". January 2, 1973 [HASC. No. 92-811
14. G.W. England et al., Personal value systems and their.
relationship to administrative behavior simulations and per-
ce tions of organizational effectiveness of Naval Officers.
(The center for the.study of organizational performance and
human effectiveness, University of Minnesota) January 1972,
pp. 25-39. .
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15. A.L. Wermuth, The Instituti.onal..Valuesof theNaaVy
(Center for Advanced Stu ies and Analyses, Falls Chur-C'S,,
Virginia, 1973) pp. 51-56.
16. Statement by Dr. Louis Desfosses, personal.'interview,
Naval War College; Newport, R.I., February 17, 1974.
17. Rokeach, off. cit., p: 7.
18. Ibid., p. 16.
19. Ibid., pp, 267-269.
20. Statement by Dr. Rudolph Winston, personal interview,
Naval War College, Newport, R.I., January 22, 1974.
21. Statement by Dr. Wendy Wyatt, personal interview,
Naval War College, Newport, R.I., January 1:7, 1974.
22. L.W. Porter and E.E. Lawler, Managerial Attitudes and
Performance, (Homewood, Ill. Irwin,,Thc., 1968) p. 165.
23. Wermuth, op, cit., p. 52.
24. D.C. McClelland, Think Magazine, IBM 1966.
25. D.G. Bowers, System 4: The ideas of Renis Likert.
(New Yprk Basic Book in Press p. `4.
26. Insko, op. cit., p. 348.
27. Kirscht & Dillehay, o cit.,,p. 87
28. Rokeach, op. cit., pp. 132-168.
29, G.W. Allport,.The Nature of.P:.rejudice. (New York:.
Anchor Books, 1958) pp. 17-27.
30. J.C. Brighman, "Ethnic Stereotypes," Psychological
Bulletin. Vol. 76, July 1971.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adorno, T.W., Trenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, P.J.,
Sanford, R.N., The . Authoritarian Personalty. New York:
Harper, 1950.
Allport, G.W., The Nature of Prejudice. New York:. Anchor
Books, 1958.
Bowers, D.G.,.S stem 4.'.The ideas of Rensis Likert. New.
York: Basic Books, (in Press):
Brighman, J.C., "Ethnic Stereotypes," Psychological Bulletin.
Vol. 76, July 1971.
Emerson, Edward, System Data Corporation. Telephone. interview.
.Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: January 16, 1974.
England, G.W., Personal value systems and their relationship
to administrative behavior simulations and exceptions
of organizational effectiveness o Naval officers. (The
center for the study of organizational performance and
human effectiveness, University of Minnesota) January
1972.
Hanson, D.J. & Bush,.A.M., "Anxiety andDpgmatism."
Psychological Reports. October 1971, vol 29(2).
Insko, Cf.A.,Theories of Attitude Change. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1967.
Kirsht, J.P. & Dillehay, R.C., Dimensions. of Authoritarianism:
A Review, of Research and Theory. Lexington: University
of Kentucky Press, 1967.
McClelland,D.C.,.."That Urge to Achieve." Think Magazine.
International Business Machine, 1966.
Rickover, H.S., Navy Times. October 24, 1974
Rokeach, Milton, The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1960.
Thomas, James, personal interview. Washington, D.C.
November 25, 1973.
United States Document, House of Representatives, "Special
Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy."
HASC. No. 92-81.. January 2, 1973.
29
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
Wermuth, A.L., The Institutional Values of the Navy.
Center for Advanced Studies and Analyeeso Falls Church,
Virginia, 1973.
Winston, R., Harvard University, personal.interview. Naval
War College, Newport, R.I., January 22, 1974.
Wyatt, W., Associates for Human Resources. Personal inter-
view. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: January 17,
1974.
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NUMBER CUM
QUESTION RESPONSE RESPONDING PRCNT PRCNT
1
1 57 100.00 100.00 RANK 11CAPT9CDR 2)LCDR,LT.
2 0 2.00 100.00
0 0-.00 .100.00
4 0 0.00 100.00
5-.. 0 2.00 100.00
6 0 0.00 100.00
0.00 0.00 AGE'. 1)LESS THAN 30, 2)36-34, 3)35-399 4)40 OR MORE,
0.00 0.00
36.84 36.84
63.1.6 100.00
0.00 100.00
0.00 100.01)
71 .93
28.07
2.00
0.00
5.00
0.00
1;.53
24.56
15.79
24.56
17.54
7.02
57
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE,., RESPONSE IS 4
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.4
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5
5 11 19.30 84.21
- q._..-..__ 15e'T9 100.00
71.93 1 HAVE TAKEN PART IN
100.00 1)YES .2)NO
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
10.53 OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH
35.49 HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS,
50.88
75,44
92.98
100,06
1 0 0.00 0.00 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN AAMATEURISH,POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
I n 17.54 17.54 EXECUTED. A
3 8 14.04 31.58
-57
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
THE- MODE-RESPONSE IS 4
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 4.0
STANDARD -DEVIA TION _1)_...1 .3
2 3.64 3.64 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE FLEET??
r- -- 22 - - Q.0o 43.64
3 11 20.00 63,64
-4 12 --21.82 85.45
5 5 9.09 94,55
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
_ _T#E-MODE-RESPONSE. Is--?-
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.1
E-_S1 ANDARO -DEVIATION IS---...10-3
# 7 - --4:50 ... 92.86
6 4 7.14 100.00
1 '~~ -"-iE~O'-"_" 76:07 PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
2 17 39.36 46.43
.2 ----- ------ri---- ----- 1-9 64 66.47
4 8 14.29 80.36
56
ME--MEDIANSPONSE- IS _ 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
-NY-RESPONSE -25--- 3-.0- -
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5
3 8 14,04 36,84
#- - -16 2807- 6491
5 9 15,79 80.70
X g .30---3 d$; 00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
THE MODE RESPONSE-IS- 47------
THE MEAN. RESPONSE IS 30
4 12 21,82 56,36
5 20 J6* 3'97 -73
6 4 7.27 100,00
3 - -5.43 - 3,45 THIS- STATEMENT' IS
2 11 26.00 25.45
--T9:09 X4.55 .
3
55
-4---
THE. MODE RESPONSE IS 5
E5F-ONSt- IS ?
.TmE-STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1,4
AIMED-PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
AGREE:. AGREE AGREE.. DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
5 4 3 2 1
31
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
CUM
0.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
In 16.99 10.99 AGE 1)LFSS THAN 30, 2)30-34. 3)35.39, 4)40 0R MORE.
47 51.65 62.64
32 35.16 97.80
2 2.20 100,00
6.00 100.00
6.00 100.00
2
34
3
n
4
5
6
1
13
2
24
3
17
4
17
5
11
6
.5
37.36 100.00 11YES 92)NO
0.00 100.00
0.00 100,00
6.00 100.00
0.00 100.00
14.94 14.94 OVERALL THIS STATEMENT.CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS, WITH;
27.59 42,53 HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS,
19.54 62.n7
19.54 81,61
12.64 94.25
5.75 100.00
87
THE MEDIAN
RESPONSE
IS
3
THE MODE
RESPONSE
IS
2
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
IS
3.0
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
IS
1.5
7
7.78
3 17
18.89
4 18
2r.00
5 21
23.33
-b-- - ---6-
- -6-.-67-
7,78 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN SAMATEURISH?PQORLY.CONC.E KEQ-.*NAPQORLY,
50.00
70.00
93.33
10.0-? 0 0
9n
THE MEn.IAN
RESPONSE
IS
4
THE MODE
RESPONSE
IS
5
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
IS
3.5
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
IS
1.4
1 13 14.77
14,77
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS. ARE A *JOKF..IN tME-FLEET'..>t.
2 27 36.68
45.45
3 14 15.91
61.36
4 21 23.86
85.23
5 10, 11936
96.59
6 3 3.41
100100 _
8A
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE I5 3.0
THE STANDARD DEVIATION I5 1 .4
-
19
21.84
21.84
PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW,
3? 36.78
58.62
15 17.24
75.86
14 16009
91.95
3 3.45
95.40
4 4.60
100.00
87
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE'MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.6
THE STANDARD DEVIATION-IS 1.3
1 8 8.99
809
PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
2 19 21.35
30,34
3 12 13.48
43.82
4 15 16.85
60,67
5 24 26.97
87.64
1--- 1
6 1
?.36
100.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
THE MODE R
SPO
SE I
E
N
S S
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7
--TF+E-4
q-rA"AR
ff
ON..I
AT
--
-
-
D
f
VI
T
1.6
5
1
7 8.24
8,24
2
25 29,41
37
65
.
.3..
4
4.71
42.35
4
12 14.12
56.47
6
11 12,94
100.00
+ 85
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY
SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
-----Tt1E--M
DIAN-RESPONSE IS---4-
AGREE . AGREE-.....--. AGREE---..DISA FF_..--nTRAGRF.E DISArRRR
THE
MODE RESPONSE IS 5
f HE
MEAN RtSPONSE I~S? T -
- -
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 196
32
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
HUMAN GOALS SURVEY PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT
NUM ER CUM
QUESTION RESPONSE RESPONDING.--- PRCNT. .-_PRCNT
4 n Q.00 100.00
2 57 58.16 100.00
RANK 1)CAPT9CDR 2)LCDR,LT.
1 6 6.12 6.12 AGE i)LESS THAN 30, 2)3n-34, 3)3539, 4)4o OR WIRE.
35 35.71 71.43
28- -28.57 100.00
n 0.00 100.00
100.00
9R
98 100.00 100.00 I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A
n 0.00 100.00 1)YES .2)NO
--0.._-. ..._._ .._p600 .10.0..00
0 0.00 100.00
Q,00 100.00
0.00 100.00
9R
12 12.50 12.50
27 28.12 4n.62
14 14.58 55.21
19 19,79 75.00
16 16.67 91.67
8 8.33 100.00
96
THE MEDIAN -RESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
-THE ME-AN RESPONSE IS 3.2
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5
5 5.10
21 21.43
15 15.31
22 22.45
2A 20.41
5 . 1.5.31
9B
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
T1E-MODE RESPONSE IS 4
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8
--7+4E- STAND -- DEVIATION. IS I i'3-
5.10
26.53
41 .R4
64.P9
84.69
100.00
NAVY-SPONSORED RASE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.
OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH
HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS,
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN *AMATEURISH,POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
EXECUTED,*
12
12.37
12.37
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE FLEET.s
_.2
- 29
29:-90
42.27
3
16
16.49
58.76
4
23
23.71
82.47
5
11
11.34
93.81
6
6.19
100.00
THE MEDIAN
THE--14ODE
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
IS 3
IS 2
IS 3.1
THE-STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4
7
---------r--
2e
2R.83
20.83
PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
2 32
33.33
54.17
-3- 16
16.67
70.83
4 15
15.62
86.46
5 7
7.29
93.75
6 6
6.25
100.00
96
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
THE MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
IS 2
IS 2
IS 2.7
EYTATI0N
E S T A
N D A D D
T H
IS
-
.
_
11
11.46
11.46
PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
2 2A
20.83
32.29
3 14
14.58
46.87
4 i5
15.62
62.50
S 2.0
20.83
83.33
16
16.67
100,00
9F
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
THE MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
IS 4
IS 5
IS 3.6
--------THE ST-A14OARO- DEVIATION
I5 1.7
I 8
P.70
8.70 THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
2 20
21.74
30.43
3 8
8.70
39.13
4 15
16.30
55.43
---.
-5.....__.... 30
32.61
88.04
11
11.96
100.00
----
STRONGLY
SLIGHTLY
SLIGHTLY
STRONGLY
9?
AGREE
AGREE
AGREE.
DISAGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE
THE MEDIAN
RESPONSE
IS
4
THE MODE
'
RESPONSE
IS
5
6
5
4
3
2
1
-.__
MEAN
E
RESPONSE
IS
3.8
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
IS
1,6
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 361A-RDP80B01554R003600260002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600260002-7
NUMBER
QUESTION, RESPONSE RESPONDING
1
1 16
2 34
3 ,. P
4 o
S 0
6 0
1 4
2 18
3 18
4 10
5 n
6 0
1 n
2 5~
3 n
4 D
5 n
6 n
CUM
PPCNT PRCNT
32.00 32.00 RANK 1)CAPT9CDR 2)LCDR,LT.
68.00 100.00
x..00 109.00
0.00 100.00
Q.00 100.00
0.00 100.00
8.00 8.00
36.00 44.00
36.00 80.00
26.00 100.00
0.00 100.00
0.00 100.00
AGE 1)LESS THAN 300 2)3034. 3)35.39, 4)40 OR MORE,
0.00 0.00 I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR,
100000 100.00 DYES 92)NO
0.00 100,00
0.00 100.00
6.00 100,00
0.00 100.00
1 7
2 11
3 12
4 12
5 5
6 1
4A
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS
THE MODE RESPONSE IS
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS
1 2
2 l0
3 1n
4 15
5 12
6 n
49
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS
THE MODE RESPONSE IS
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS
1 3
2 2A
3 9
4 in
5 4
6 n
46
14.58 14.58 OVERALL THIS STATEMENT-CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST-NAVY EFFORTS WITH
22.92 37.50 HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
25.00 62.50
25.00 87.5x1
10.42 97.42
2.08 100,00
3
4
3.0
1.3
4.08 . 4.08 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN *AMATEURTSH.POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
2x.41 24.49 EXECUTED.*
2.41 44,91) -
3^.61 75.51
24,49 100.00
0.00 100.00
4
4
3.5
1 .2
6.52
43.48
19.57
21.74
8.70
6.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.8
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.1
1 8 17.02
2 17 36.17
3 1 n 21928
4 7 14.89
5 ? 6.38
6 2 4.26
47
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.7
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3
1 2 4.00
2 7 14.00
3 A 12.00
4 16 32.00
5 13 26.00
6 6 12.00
5'+
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 4.0
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3
1 2
2. 16
7 1
4 9
5 16
6 4
4A
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS
THE MODE RESPONSE IS
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS
4.17
33.33
2.08
18.75
33.33
A.33
4
5
3.7
1 .5
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
Approved For Release 2001/09/ : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
6.52 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE FLEET.*
50.00
69,57
91.30
100.00
100.00
17.n2 PARA
53.19
74.47
89,36
95.74
100.00
4.nn PAPA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
18.00
30.00
62.00
88.00
100.00
4.17 THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT PACE+RELAT-IONS PROGRAMS.
37.50
39.58
58.33
9-1.67
100.00
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
W!STYON RESPONSE RESPONDING PRCNT PRCNT
q9E - LESS THAN- U
HUMAN
1 0. 0.00 0.00 RANK 1,)CAPT,CDR 2)LCDR,LT.
10 102.00 100.00
3 0 . 0.00 100.00 -00 100 00
- .
0 2.00 100.00 - -
0 0.00 100.6-0--
3 0 2000 100.00
4 0 2.00 _ 100.44..__ _
S - 0 0.00 100.00
6 0 0.00 10000
1 10 100.00 100.00 AGE
2 0 g.00 - O -- ..-
1)LESS THAN 30, 2)3p-34+ 3)35-39. 4)40 OR MORE,
1 6 6 Q______64~00 -I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR-SEMINAR..
2 4 42.00 100.00 1)YES +2)NO
3 0 0.00 100.0-_------___.__.
4 0 0.00 100.00
5 0.--_-- . 00 6 A 0.00 100.00
1 2 20.00 20.00 OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH My FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH
2 3 3Q.00_____50.00__MUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
3 5 X9.00 100.00
4 - 0 __2_.00 ___-_1_00.00 . ..
5 0 0.00 100.00
6 n 0.00 100,00.__
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 3
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.3
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 0.8
I NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN *AMATEURISH?POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
2 5 54.00 50.00 EXECUTED.*
3 2 x.00----_70..00 -
4 3 32.00 100.00
5 e 9.00 100.00 __
6 -- - - 0 - -0.00 - 100,00 - - --
10
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE__IS__3 r..__._
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.8_-~
THE STANDARD-DEVIATION IS-0
1 2 2n.00 .2,0.0.0.__.NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE FLEET,*
2 4 4.00 60.00
--
4 2 2Q.00 100.00
5
6 n 0.00 100.00
- In
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS__2 THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
_.
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.1
7
1 2 22.22 22.22 PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
3 2 22.22 88.89
4 14 0.0.0 -- -
5 0 0.00 100,00
6
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2
THE__MODE-RESPONSE_IS.---2__---__-
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.2
THE_ST-ANDAQ~ nCVTSTTON to 1'
.00 0.00 PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
2 2 22.00 20.00
3 3 32.00 50.00
- 0.00 80.00
X
5 2 26.00 100.00.
0 0.00 13-0...00..
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
SHE--MODE-RESPONSE-s4 ----
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.5
2
SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2 6 5 4 3 2 1
FSPONSE is
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7
Approved For Release 2001/09/0535CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
- - - -74i00 20.00
3 32.00 50.00
----- ------ -1~-00 60.00
2 2.00 50.00
i - . --qo , o 0 1yovu 1 10.00 100.00
AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE?RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
10 AGREE. AGREE AGREE
RESPONSE IS 3
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
0 9.00 0.00 RANK 1)CAPT,CDR 2)LCOR,LT,
-4r TO0.~0__ 1-00 0
3 0 9.00 100.00
5 0 9.00 , 100.00
- -0--- 0 pO
-tT- ? ~- O:IID- Ate - -t 1 LESS T1t*N 30 2131 X34 i . Er
47 109.00 100.00
0:00---- 100.00-
0 9.00 100.00
0 0.00 100.00
cum
1UESTION RESPONSE RESPONDING PRCNT PRCNT
61.70 61.70 I HAVE TAKEN PART IN'A NAVY-SPONSORED RACEiRELATIONSPROGRAM DR''SEMINAR,
38:30 100.00 DYES"?2?NO
0.00 100,00
9.00 100.00
I..._ ---- __ '6 .... _ __ ._1.3.~ T3_0)5_, "OVERALL THIS. ST TEMENT- CONC S"uWXTW_ MY "FJtELTNWA_96WfA5T NAVY EFFORTS' WITH
2 13 3n.23 44.19 HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
3 3 6.98 51;16
4 9 2.93 72.69
5 9 26-93 93,02
6 3_. ....... 6.98 100000
43
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.3
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6
5 15.87 10.87 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN *AMATEURISH,POORLY CONCEIVED AND'P00RLM
8 17.39 28.26 EXECUTED.*
11 23.91 52.17
5 1'n.87 63.A4
14 __...3.43 93,48
3- 6T5--1-00:00-
29
18
0
A
6
11
7
12
6
2
1 3
2 11
3 5
4 it
5 14
6 9
44
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
THE MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
THE STANDARD DEVIATION
46
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
THE MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
E STANDARD.DEVIATION
1 9
2 16
3 9
4 8
5 1
6 3
46
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
THE MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
THE- STANDARD DEVIATION
45
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
THE MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
THE STANDARD DEVIATION
1 3
2 12
3 3
4 4
5 15
6 6
4-
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
.- THE- MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
THE STANDARD DEVIATION
IS
IS
IS
IS
3
5
3.5
15
13.64
.13.,64
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE FLEET?.!_
25.00
38.64
15.91
54,55
27.27
81.82
13.64
95.45
4.55
100.00
IS
3
I5
4
IS
3.2
IS
1.4
19.57
19.57
PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
34.78
54.35
19.57
73.91
17.39
91,30
2.17
93.48
6.52
100.00
IS
2
IS
2
IS
2.7
IS
1.4
6.67
6,67
PARA
24.44
31.11
11.11
42.22
6.67
48.89
31.11
80.00
2;.00
100.00
IS
5
IS
IS
IS
5
3.9
1.7
6.98
27.91
6.98
9.30
94.88
13.95
6.98
34.88
41.86
86.n5
100.00
THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
IS
4
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
IS
5.
IS
3.8
IS
1.7
36
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003'600260602-7
NUMBER UM
'QUESTION RESPONSE RESPONDING PRCNT PRCNT
39.62 39.62 RANK 1)CAPT.CDR 2)LCDR9LT.
3Q.38 -0.00
0.00 100.00
0.00 100.00
6,00 tOO-.00
53
-=-THE MED -AN--RESPONSE IS
3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS
4
---- T-$E--MEAN -RESPONSE IS
-3.2
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS
1.4
1
2
3.77
2
9
16.98
3
7
13.21
5
11
2.75
-53- -IpQ.O0--_ 100.00
0 9.00 100.00
- yl- - 0.00. 100.00
0 0.00 100.00
53
1 35 66.04
18- ..33.96
3 n 6.00
5 n Q.00
AGE 1)LESS'TMAN'30, 2)30-349 3)35-399 4)40 OR MORE.
66.64 I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.
100.00 1)YES .2)NO
100.00
-100;00
100.00
100.00
13.21 OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS AROUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH
2 12 22.64 35.85 HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
3 -... 12- . .22:64 58.49
4 13 24.53 83.62
6 1102 94.34
6 3 5.66 100100
- 53
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
--14E-MODE RESPONSE I S 4
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3:8
Tu E STANDA-RD- 1 tvT 1TTON _TS 1-04
3,77 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE REEN #AMATEURTSH.POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
20.75 EXECUTED,*
33.96
67.92
88.68
100.00
7.84 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE FLEET.*
49.n2
68.63
84.31
96.;8
100.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.9
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3
1_ 5 9943
2 In 18.87
3 7 13.21
4 13 24.53
-5 12 22.64
6 6 11.32
51
THE MEDIAN
RESPONSE
IS
2
THE MODE
RESPONSE
IS
2
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
IS
2.7
THE STANDARQ.DEYIATIo.N4
53
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7
__TH-E_-9AN6A06_DEVIATION IS 1.5
. 0 X00' .
n 0.00 0.00
11 19.61
19 37.25
8 15.69
8 15.69
4 7.84
2 3.92
2 3.92
14 27.45
3 5.88
11 21.57
15 29.41
6 11976
51
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
IS
4
THE MOOE.RESPONSE
IS
5
THE MEAN RESPONSE
IS
3.8
THE STANDARD DEVIATION
IS
1.5
19.61 PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
56,86
72.55
88.24
96.1?8
100.00
9.43 PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
28.36
41.51
66.;4
88.68
100.00
3.92 THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
31.37
37.25
58.82
88.24
100.00
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
37
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R00360026000'2-7
QUESTION
RESPONSE RESPONDING PRCNT
PRCNT
1
36
94 .74
94.74
RANK 1)CAPT,CDR 2)LCOR.LT.
2
5
.26
100.00
3
4
0
0.00
100.00
5
A
0.00
100.00
6
0
0.00
100.00
38
2
1
0.00
0.00
AGE
2
0
9.00
0.00
3
n
0.00
0.00
4
38
149.00
100.00
5
0
0.00
100.00
6
A
0.00
100.00?
8
3
3
I
28
73.68
73.68
I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS' PROGRAM DR SEMINAR.
2
1n
26.32
100.00
DYES 92)NO
3
0
6.00
100.00
6.00
100.00
x.00
100.00
0.00
100.00
4
1"n.53
10.53
OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFDRTS-W14rM-
In
26.32
36.94
HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
6
15,79
52.63
9
23.68
76.32
15.79
92.11
7.89
100.0n
THE MEDIAN
THE MODE
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
IS 3
IS 2
IS 3.3
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
IS 1.5
n
0.00
0.00
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN *AMATEURISH,POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
9
23.68
23.68
EXECUTED.*
S
13.16
36.84
11
28,95
65.79
7
18,42
84.21
6
15.79
100,00
38
THE MEDIAN
THE MODE
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
IS 4
IS 4
IS 3.9
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
IS 1.4
1
3.
7.89
7.89
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE FLEET.!
2
13
34.21
42,,11.
3
6
15.79
57.89
4
11
28.95
86,84
5
3
7.89
94.74
6
2
5.26
100.00
38
THE MEDIAN
THE MODE
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
IS 3
IS 2
IS 3.1
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
IS 1.3
1
7
18.92
18.92
PAPA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
2
1A
27.03
45.95
3
7
18.92
64.86
4
5
13.51
78,'18
5
5
13.51
91.89
6
3
9.11
100.00
37
THE MEDIAN
THE MODE
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
RFSPONSE
RESPONSE
IS 3
IS 2
IS 3,0
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
IS .1.6
1
5
13.16
13.16
PARR 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW,
2
4
1x.53
23.68
3
5
13.16
36,84
12
31
58
42
68
4
5
5
.
13,16
.
81.58
6
7
18.42
100.00
THE MEDIAN
THE MODE
THE MEAN
THE STANDARD
38
RESPONSE IS
RESPONSE IS
RESPONSE IS
DEVIATION IS
4
4
3.8
1.6
1
.3
A.33
8.33'-.THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
2
7
19.44
27.78
3
2
5.56
33.33
4
7
19.44
52.78
5
15
41.67
94.44
6
2
5 .56
100.00
35
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
AGREE -.AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
Approved For Release 2001/09/d : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600260002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
HUMAN GOALS SURVEY
RANK
'-'- NUMBER
CUM
QUESTION
-
RESPONSE RESPONDING
PRCNT
PRCNT
i
57
1
100.00
100.00
RANK 1ICAPT.CDR 2)LCOR.LT.
_
2 n
2.00
100.00
. n
0.00
100.00
4 0
0.00
100.00
5
n
2.00
100.00
-
A n
0.00
100.00
07
__2- - 0
0.00
0.00
3 21
36.84
36.84
_ 36
?
63.16
100.00
_
5 n
0.00
100.00
6 n
0.00
100.00
57
1
41
71.93
71.93
1 HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE.RELATIONS PROGRAM nR SEMINAR.
_
2 16
28.07
100.00
DYES .?)NO
3 n
5.00 .
100.00
j"------- - n
0.00
100.00
5 ^
_
-- -
5.00
100.00
- "" -
0
n
0.00
100.00
6
1n.53
10,53
OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURq WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH
2 14
24.56
35.29
HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
3 9
15.79
50.88
4 14
24.56
75.44
-- -"----
-- --5 In
17.54
92.98
6 4
7.02
100.00
57
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
I5 3
THE MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
IS 4
IS 3.4
THE STANDARD DEVIATION
IS 1.5
1 ^
0.00
0.00
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN OAMATEURTSH,POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
2---" - In
17.54
17.54
EXECUTEO.0
3 8
14.04
31.58
4 _ " - 19
- 33.33
64.91
5 11
19.30
84.21
_...9.-.
1579
100.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
SPO
SE
-R
IS 4
4
I
N
THE MODE
E
THE MEAN RESPONSE
S
IS 4.0
--THE-STANDARD fVt*TtOtt_t5-_1.3
2
;.64
3.64
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE FLEET.*
--* :OD
43.64
3 11
20.00
63.64
4-- - - --- -- -]2 ---
21.82
85,45
5 S
9,09
94,55
E- --- 3
5,45
100.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
THEMODE-RESPONSE IS -2--
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.1
----ENE--STANDARD-"DEVIATION IS 1 .3
-T-------1--Jis-OT - -16.21
2 17 3;.36 46.43
3- - II -I9:b4 - 66.27
4 B 14.29 80.36
--ar----- --1- --- - -t-Y30 92.86
6 4 7.14 100.00
56
-THE"MEUTAW-RESPONSEIS 3
- - THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
ENE MEAN RESPONSE IS-- 3-.0
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1,5
1 5 8.77 8.77
-~--- - - 6- - - -- " - t4.04 -- - 22.81
3 8 14.04 36,84
-4-- -----Ia- -- "- 28:07- - 64.91
5 9 15.19 80,70
0
--106.0
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
-1`NE--HODE SPONS9 IS- 4- - - THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.9
aP ..
9
---6----"~t.4i------5-.45 THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
2 11 20.00 25.45
r- -T9.04 --- 34,SS
4 12 21.82 86.36
36.36
z_7 loo,00 _ _
6
SS STRONGLY SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
AGREE. AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
-
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 PiCIA-RDP80B01554R003600260002-7
THE
THE MODE RESPONSE IS S
THE MEAN Re5vON5r-T9--".
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
CUM
PRCNT
1
n
0.00
0.00
RANK 11C4PT,CDR 2)LCDR.LT.
2
91
100.00
100.00
3
4.00
0
.0
IN
4
n
0.00
0
.0
5
n
4,00
100.00
6
n
0.00
100.00
i
In
10.99
10.99
AGE 1>LFSS THAN 30. 2)30-34, 3)35-39. 4)40 OR MORE.
2
47
51.65
62.64
3
32
35.16
9780
.
4
2
2.20
100
,0(1
5
n
0.00
100.00
6
0.00
100.00
1
57
67.64
7
34
37.36
100,00
11YES 22)NO
3
n
0.00
100,00
4
^
0.00
100.00
S
0.00
100.00
6
n
0.00
100.00
1
13
14.94
14.94
OVERALL THIS STATEMENT. CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH
7
24
27.59
42.53
HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS. ----
3
17
19.54
62.07
4
17
19.54
81.61
-------
5
11
12.64
94.25
6
5
5.75
100.00
------
--y
THE MEDIAN
7
RESPONSE IS
3
THE MODE
THE MEAN
RESPONSE IS
RESPONSE IS
2
3.0
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION IS
1.5
1
7
7.78
7.78
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN ?AMATEURISH,POORLY CONCELVEQ.ANQOOORLY?
7
21
23.33
31.11
EXECUTED.*
-- -- --
3
4
17
18
18.89
20.00
50.00
70.00
5
21
23.33
93.33
6
6
6.67
100.00
THE MEnTAN
THE MODE
THE MEAN
THE STANDARD
On
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
DEVIATION
IS 4
IS 5
IS 3.5
IS 1.4
1
13
14.77
14.77
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE.FLEET.0
2
27
30.68
45.45
3
14
15.91
61.36
4
21
23.86
85.23
5
1 ^
11 .36
96.59
6
3
3.41
100.00
THE MEDIAN
THE MODE
THE MEAN
THE STANDARD
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
DEVIATION
IS 2
IS 2
IS 2.6
IS 1.3
_-
1
8
8.99
8.99
PARA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
2
19
21.35
30,34
3
12
13.48
43.82
4
15
16.85
60.67
24
26.97
87.64
11 -
- 12:36
100.00
---
89
THE MEDIAN
THE MODE
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
IS 3
IS 2
IS 3.0
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
IS 1.4
1
19
21.84
21.84
PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW. '-
2
37
36.78
58,62
3
15
17.24
75.86
4
14
16.09
91.95
5
3
3.45
95.40
6
4
4.60
100.00
87
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7
-. -TME-ST-ANDARO-'DEVIATION IS- 1.6
1 - 7 8.24 8.24 THIS STATEMENT'IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT-RACE-RELATIONS-PROGRAMS':'
2 25 29.41 37.65
3 - --- - 4 4.71 42.35
4 12 14.12 56.47
~J-----Y6 .__ ---x:54 -- ....87. f}6.
AGREE AGREE DTCAGREE nTCACRRR.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 g2ClA-RDP80B01554R003600260002-7
as
--THEMEOTAN RESPONSE IS -4--
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5
T+e-t*I!AN RESPONSE 13 3.1
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
MUMAN GOALS SURVEY PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT YES
--'-- --CUM
RESPONSE- RESPONDING . PRCNT- . PRCNT
I R 0.70 8.70
2 20 21.74 30.43
3 8 8.70 39.13
4 15 16.30 55.43
19 19.79 75.00
16 16.67 91.67
g 8.33 100.00
98
". _
--- --"-- _
3 35 35.71 71.43
4 28 _28.57 100.00
S "- "--_ -- - 6 .00 100.00
100.00
6 6.12 -"""- 6.12 AGE ])LESS THAN 30, 2)30-34.
29.59 . 35.71
29
9R
---"-- _ 98 100.00 100.00 I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.
2 ---- n 0.00 100.00 11YES .2)NO
3 .0- __ _0.00 - +OV..Vu
4 '---- n 0.00 100.00
5 n 9.00 100.00
6 "--~"-- - - n 0.00 100.00
1 5 5.10 5.10 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE REEN 4AMATEURISH.P00RLY CO
2 21 21.43 26.53 EXECUTED.*
3 1S 15.31 41.84
-4 22 22.45 64.29
5 2n 277.41 84.69
15".31 100.00
99
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
TME- MODE RESPONSE IS 4.
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8
OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MV FEELINGS AROUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH
HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
96
THEMEDIANRESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.2
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5
---------- - - NCEIVED AND POORLY
1 12 12.37 12.37 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE FLEET.*
-7_-- -29 .2990 42.27
3 16 16.49 58.76
4 23 23.71 82.47
5 11 11.34 93.01
6 -" - 6 6.19 100.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
---- TM MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.1
THE STANDARD DEVIATION I5 1.4
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.6
-----
1 11 11.16 11.46 PARR 3 EXPRESSES MV VIEW.
2 2n 2^.83 32.29
3 14 14.58 46.87
4 15 15.62 62.50
5 2n 20.83 83.33
---6----- 16 16.67 100.00
_-1 ---- - -- --20 2i.03 20.83
2 32 33.33 54.17
3 16 16.67 70.83
4 15 15.62 86.46
5 7 ? 7.29 93.75
6 6 6.25 100.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.7
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5
-- 12 _ 12.50 12.50
27 28.12 46.62
14 14.58 55.21
30 32.61 88.04
11 11.96 100.00
--02
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4 2 1
__ 4 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5 6 5
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.6
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
QUESTION
-
RESPONSE
-NUMBER
RESPONDING
PRCNT
CUM
PRCNT.
1
16
32.00
32.00
RANK 11CAPT,CDR 2)LCDR,LT.
2
34
68.00
100.00
3
0
p.00
100.00
4
0
0.00
100.00
5
0
Q.00
100.00
6
0
0.00
100.00
50
4
8.00
8.00
AGE 11LE55 THAN 30, 2)30-34. 313539, 1040 OR MORE'?
18
36.00
44.00
2
3
18
36.00
80.00
'4
1n
20.00
100.00
- ---- --------
5
0
0.00
0
0
100.00
00
100
- -"
6
0
.0
.
..
100.00
100.00
11YES .2)NO
0.00
100,00
0.00
100.00
0.00
100.00
0.00
100.00
1
7
14.58
14.58
OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH
2
11
22.92
37.50
HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
3
12
25.00
62.50
4
12
25.00
87.50
5
5
10.42
97.02
6
1
2.08
100.00
48
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.0
THE STANDARD DEVIATION I5 1.3
1 2
2 In
3 1n
4 15
5 12
6
4.08 4.08 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN $AMATEURISH.POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
2x.41 24.49 EXECUTED.*
2j.41 44.90
3- .61 75.51
24.49 100.00
0.00 100.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS
THE MODE RESPONSE IS
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS
1 3
2 2^
3 9
4 l0
S 4
6 0
--46
4
4
3.5
1.2
6.52 6.52 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE FLEET.*
43.48 50,00
19.57 69.57
21.74 91.30
8.70 100.00
0.00 100.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.8
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.1
1 8 17.02 17.62
2 17 36.17 53.19
3 1, 21.28 74.47
4 7 14.89 89.36
5 7 6.38 95.74
6 2 4.26 100.00
47
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE 15 2
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE I5 2.7
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3
1 2 4.00 4.0m
2 7 14.06 18.80
3 A 12.00 30.00
4 16 32.00 62.00
5 13 26.00 88000
6 6 12.00 100,00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4
THE MEAN RFSPONSE IS 4.0
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.3
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
6 5 4 3 2 1
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 :3CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
1 2 4.17 4.17
2 16 33.33 37,50
3 1 2.08 39.58
4 9 18.75 58,33
5 16 33.33 91,67
6 4 5,33 100.00
4P
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
THE MODE RESPONSE IS S
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.7
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
0 0 00 100.00
2 4 44.00 100.00 1)YES .2)NO
3 0 9.00 100.09
4 0 0.00 100.00
5 0 __460-0- 100.90 -
100.0.0_..
100.00
00 00 . .
100.00
100.00
10 -
2 - 20.00 20.00 OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH My FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH
3_ 39.00____50._00- HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
S 54.00 100.00
0 __x40 _100,00
1 __-- 0 04_-_-._0.00 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN ?AMATEURISH,POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
2 5 54.00 50.00 EXECUTED.*
2 4 49.00 60.00
4 2 29.00 100.00
S ----Qs60-_ 100.00
0.00 100.00
In
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS
THE MODE RESPONSE IS
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS
3
4 3 34.00 100.00
5 6 0 0.00 0 100.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE 15 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.8
THL STANDARD DEVIATION -.9
1 2 2n.00 .20.00 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A *JOKE IN THE FLEET.A
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE2_.-.
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.1
1 2 22.22 22.22 PARR P EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
2 44 4A - 6667 .
3 2 22.22 88.89
A 100.00
5 0 0.00 100.00
4.00_ 0.00 PARA 3 EXPRESSES My
2 2 29.00 20.00
3 3 _ _ _39.00 50.00
_9 __ _ _
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2
THE MODE_ESPONSE-_IS 2 - THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.2
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.0
5 2 22.00_ 100.00
6 0 O . 160.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4
-THE MODE RESPONSE--IS--A .
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.5
----r--- -2- ----Z4o00 - - 20.00
2 3 39.00 50.00
3- -1-. _. ...-- 10.00- 60.00
4 2 24.00 80.00
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 PCIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
I-19.- --
1 10.00 100.00
10
-TME-MEDTAN-RESPONSE-IS 3 -
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
?ME MM RESPONSt--t-S- 7:0'----.._
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7
0.00 100.00
0.00 1000
3
3-------
2.3
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
RESPONSE RESPONDING PRCNT PRCNT
1 0 .Q.00 0.00 RANK 11CAPT.CDR 2)LCOR,LT.
-41- T60.00
3 0.00 100.00
5 0 Q.00 100.00
- -6 -0- - - --0.00----Y00.O0
--tr---- :40----0.-00- -*G! --I 1tESS- THAN 30' 2J36- . . i
47
100.00
100.00
--e
-------O-00--
- 100.00
e
0.00
100.00
0
0:00
-100.00.
e
6.00
100.00
1
29
61.70
61.70
I HAVE TAKEN PART IN'A NAVY'SPONSORED RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAM DR SEMINAR.
2
16
38.30
100.00
ITY!S.2INO
3
0
0.00
100.00
5
0
2.00
100.00
V
0.00
100.00
2
13
3i.23
44.19
HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
3
3
6.98
51.16
4
9
2n.93
72.09
5
9
26.93
93."02
6
3
6.98
100.00
43
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
THE MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
THE STANDARD DEVIATION
IS 3
IS 2
IS 3.3
IS _1.6
5 16.87
8 17.39
11 23.91
S 1'.87
14 3?.43
3 - -'--_.. 6.52
10.87 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN AAMATEURISM.POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
28.26 EXECUTED.?
52.17 - - --------
63.n4
93.48 -- - ----'-----
100.00
46
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.5
E STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.5
5 6
6 2
6 13.64 13.64 NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS ARE A $JOKE IN THE FLEET.!_
ll 25.00 38.64
3 7 15.91 54.55
4 12 27.27 81.82
13.64 95.45
4.55 100.00
44
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 3
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 4
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.2
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4
1 9 19.57 19.57 PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
2 16 34.78 54.35
3 9 19.57 73.91
4 8 17.39 91.30
5 1 2.17 93.48
6 3 6.52 100.00
46
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 2
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 2
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 2.7
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4
1 3 6.67 6.67
2 11 24.44 31.11
3 S 11.11 42.22
4 ? 6.67 48.89
5 14 31.11 80.00
6 9 2n.00 100.00
45
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 5
THE MODE RESPONSE IS 5
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.9
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7
1 3 6.98 6.98 THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
2 12 27.91 34.88
3 6.98 41.86
4 4 9.30 51.16
-----
5 15 34.88 86.65
6 6 13.95 100.00
4'1 STRONGLY SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE IS 4 - AGREE AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
THE MODE RESPONSE IS S
THE MEAN RESPONSE IS 3.8 6 5 4 3 2 1
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.7
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
cuw---
,OUESTION RESPONSE RESPONDING PRCNT
PRCNT
1 21 39.62
39.62
-
.
0?
1
06?00
3 0 0.00
100.00
5 0 0.00
100.00
6 -0-- x.00-
- 100.00
2 1' 0.00
4:00
0.00
3 - 51 -III O0-
100.00
4 0 2.00
100.00
5---0--- ----4:00
100.00
6 0 0.00
100.80
-- 18- - 33.96
100.00
n 0.00
100.00
--0 0.00 '
I0-0,00
5 1' Q.00
100600
0---"-- - -- 0 0.00
100.00
I ---'7----------11:21
13421
2 12
22.64
35.85
_-3___._.__ 12.
22.64
58.49
4 13
24.53
83.62
S-. 6
11.32
94.34
6 3
5.66
100.00
53
--_7$4E--MEDIAN- RESPONSE
13 3
THE MODE RESPONSE
-T-$4!-MEAN RESPONSE
IS 4
IS 3.2
THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS 1.4
t 2
3.77
3,77
- - --2-- ---- 9
16.98
20.75
3 7
13.21
33,96
------
--- ;---- - .. 18
33.96
67,92
5 11
2+.75
88.68
--- ---a -
. 11.32
100.00
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
-- .-THE-MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
IS 4
IS 4
IS 3.8
IRESTANDARD DEVIATION "IS 1.4
-~ --------- -.
... 4
.7.84
7.84
2
21
41.18
49.1'2
3._
11'
19.61
68.63
4
8
15.69
84.11
5
6
11.76
96,18
6
2
3.92
100,00
RANK i)CAPT.CDR 2)LCDR.LT.
AGE 1)LESS THAN 30, 2)30-34. 3)3539, 4)41' OR MORE.
11YES ,2)NO
OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS AROUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS WITH
HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE REEN ?AMATEURTSH.POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
EXECUTED.!
51
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
THE MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
THE STANDARD DEVIATION
11'
2 19
3 8
4_ 8
5 4
6 _,___,-,___? 2
51
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
THE MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
IS 3
IS 2
IS 2.9
IS 1.3
19.61
37.25
15.69
15.69
7,84
3.92
IS 2
IS 2
IS 2.7
19.61
56.86
72.55
88.24
96,18
100.00
PARA 2 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
5
9.43
9,43
PAPA 3 EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
2 I1'
18.87
28,36
3 7
13.21
41,51
4 13
24.53
66,114
12
22.64
88.68
6 6
11.32
100.00
53
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
THE MODE RESPONSE
THE MEAN RESPONSE
IS 4
IS 4
IS 3.7
THE-STANDARD-DEVIATION
IS 1,5
STRONGLY
SLIGHTLY
SLIGHTLY
STRONGLY
51
AGREE
AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE
THE MEDIAN RESPONSE
THE-MODE.,. RESPONSE
IS
IS
S
6
5
4
3
2
THE MEAN RESPONSE
IS
3.8
THE STANDARD DEVIATION
IS
1.5
1
2
3.92
3.92
THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT PACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
2
14
27.45
31.37
3
1
5.88
37,25
?
-
11
21,57
58.82
5
15
29.41
88.24
6
6
11.76
100,00
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 }7CIA-RDP80B01554R003600260002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7
QUESTION
RESPONSE RESPONDING
PRCNT
CUM
PRCNT
1
1
36
94.74
94,74
RANK 1)CAPT,CDR
2
2
5.26
100.00
0
D .00
100
.00
4
_
_
0.00
_
-
100.00
5
n
2.00
100.00
6
n
0.00
100.00
38
2.00
0.00
AGE 1)LESS THAI' 30. 2)30-34. 3)35-39. 4)40 OR MORE.
9.00
0
.00
-9.00
0.
00
38
109.00
100.00
n
0.00
100,00
n
0.00
100.00
38
1
28
73.68
73.68
I HAVE TAKEN PART IN A NAVY-SPONSORED RACE.RELATIONS PROGRAM OR SEMINAR.
2
In
26.32
100,00
DYES .2)NO
3
n
6.00
100.00
4
0
6.00
100.00
- -
5
2,00
100.00
6
0.00
100.00
1
4
1+.53 -
10.53
OVERALL THIS STATEMENT CONCURS WITH MY FEELINGS ABOUT PAST NAVY EFFORTS-WlTM-
2
In
26.32
36.84
HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS.
3
6
15,79
52.63
4
9
23.68
76.32
S
6
15.79
92,11
6
3
7.89
100.00
-1A
THE MEDIAN
RESPONSE
IS 3
THE MODE
RESPONSE
IS 2
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
IS 3.3
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
IS 1.5
1
^
6.00
0.00
NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN IAMATEURISM,POORLY CONCEIVED AND POORLY
2
9
23.68
23.68
EXECUTED.!
3
0
13.16
36,84
4
11
28.95
65,79
5
7
18.42
84.21
6
6
15.79
100.00
THE MEDIAN
RESPONSE
IS
4
THE MODE
RESPONSE
IS
4
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
IS
3.9
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
IS
1.4
1
3
7.89
7.89
2
13
34.21
42.,11
3
6
15.79
57,09
4
11
28.95
86.84
5
1
7.89
94,74
6
2
5.26
100.00
THE MEDIAN
THE MODE
THE MEAN
THE STANDARD
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
RESPONSE
DEVIATION
IS
S
IS
IS
3
2
3.1
1.3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
In
7
5
5
3
18
27
18
13
13
8
.92
.03
.92
.51
.51
.11
18.92
45.95
64.86
78.30
91.89
100.00
THE MEDIAN
PESPONSE
IS
3
THE MODE
RESPONSE
IS
2
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
IS
3.0
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
15
1.6
1
5
13
.16
13.16
PARA I EXPRESSES MY VIEW.
2
4
1.
.53
23.68
3
5
17
.16
36,04
4
12
31
.58
68.42
5
5
13
.16
81.58
6
7
--;R-
18
.42
100.00
THE MEDIAN
RESPONSE
IS
4
THE MODE
RESPONSE
IS
4
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
IS
3.8
THE STANDARD
DEVIATION
IS
1.6
STRONGLY
SLIGHTLY
SLIGHTLY
STRONGLY
36
AGREE
AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE
THE. MEDIAN
RESPONSE
IS
4
THE MODE
RESPONSE
IS
5
6
5
4
3
2
1
THE MEAN
RESPONSE
IS
3.8
THE STANOAPD
DEVIATION
IS
1.5
1
3
8.33
8.13
THIS STATEMENT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT RACE-RELATIONS PROGRAMS.
7
7
19.44
27.78
3
7
5.56
33.33
4
7
19.44
57,78
5
15
41.67
94,44
6
7
5.56
100.00
Approved For Release 2001/09/050 CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600260002-7