ADMIRAL TURNER S SPEECH FILES REMARKS TO VINCE DAVIS SEMINAR AT PATTERSON SCHOOL, BY STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1974
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
3/RT71RKLp` 1lTit1"KoS 'SPERNi"ILW-2
6 APRIL 1974
REMARKS TO VINCE DAVIS SEMINAR AT
PATTERSON SCHOOL, by STANSFIELD TURNER
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
Saturday, 6 April 1974
It really is a delight to be here,a delight to have
this opportunity to exchange ideas with a distinguished
group of educators. My College is what we believe to be
mid-career. education, rather than what I imagine most of
you are dealing with, undergraduate and graduate education.
Our students are about 28 to 48 in age. They are people who
have achieved a great deal already .in their professional
experience instead of looking forward to starting in it,
as most of your students are. Still, I think there is a
great deal that we, have in common as educators and I.look
fr .r v-rl i n nnr rninct-i nn nnri nrl i-n chari nrr cnmc Cf those
things and discussing them.
I think that we in the military have been falling on
our swords too much in recent years.in_ the effort to explain
and articulate in a rational manner why we do need military
forces in the era of peace and detente that we have with us
today. I think it's quite understandable that the public
and the Congress are questioning the Defense budget these
days. After all the 1975 proposed budget is the largest
peacetime military budget in history despite at least 4
substantial pressures in the opposite direction.
First the perceived decline in the utility of military
force today. I think we only have to look back to our
experience in Vietnam, where the greatest and strongest military
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
power in the world was unable to force its political will
on a third or fourth rate military power. We only have to
consider that the nuclear balance backdrop that influences
all of our political and military decisions today is.a very
inhibiting factor on the use of military force by either of
the so called superpowers.
Second, I think we also perceive that there is a decline
in the acceptability of the use of military force, at least
in the major western democracies where. public opinion has
an influence on public policy. I attribute this to the
explosion in the communications capabilities of the world.
There is, as a result of this, a greater moral revulsion
towards the use of force today than there has been in the
past. There is also a greater public awareness of the
issues that could lead to the use of military force. In
short, the public is taking an interest in.the game earlier
today than it did in years past.,
Third you are more aware than I that there are great
clamoring demands for alternative uses of the funds that are
put into Defense today.
Fourth, we have this new word, "detente," and with it
the feeling that detente is.a reason for lessening the size
and investment in our military forces. Let me come back to
that a little bit later. But what I'm suggesting is that
we in the military, and all others who are interested in
2
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
national security affairs, need to be more articulate in
answering the question.: Why do we need sizeable standing
military forces in the peacetime circumstances with which
we are faced today, particularly, when a large standing
military is contrary to American tradition?
Let me try to run through for you briefly what I see as
some of the most cogent reasons for having this military
establishment today. To begin with, I think there is rather
little debate on whether we do need forces for strategic
nuclear deterrence. We really cannot run the risk of not
deterring the ultimate holocaust that could spell destruction
and doom for the entire world. Now, clearly, the amount
of strategic deterrent force we need and what kind we want
is open to great debate, but I think there would be general
agreement that we do need to fulfill that function.
I would think there would be equal agreement in our country
that we need to be able to defend the United States. There
is, though, great room for debate on how and where we must
accomplish that; on our shorelines, in some overseas location
where agression takes place, or even in some area-,where there
are economic influences on our national position. So I
think there is room for legitimate debate on what our overseas
commitments ought to be.'-If you take a concensus, I think you
would also find that most people would agree that we would
probably want to help to defend Western Europe. Some others,
I think, would extend that further and say we ought to help to
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-kDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 defend Western Europe and Israel. There are still others
who would say that this policy is too restrictive, that we must
be able to do more but they would probably be less precise
about where else they would be willing to commit American
military force.
The real issue I think we're grappling with in trying
to develop a rationale. for military forces of the conventional
type today is how far from our shore do U.S. vital interests
truly extend. I would submit that atone extreme a fortress
America concept of defending our shoreline is totally outdated!.
I also would submit to you a simple axiom for approximating
the sizing of U.S. military forces.
I would suggest that the United StaLes must have the plainly
evident capability to defend our vital national interests,
with military force if necessary, wherever those interests-
lie. Now this does not mean necessarily that resort to
military force would be our first response in-any kin&of a.
crisis situation. In fact I would suggest that the emphasis
in this axiom be on the words plainly evident. Now the
emphasis is on the evident part because it's perceptions that
we want to create, perceptions that will make our military
capability deter rather than have to be employed.
The essence of deterrence is perception - three basic
perceptions of principalconcern to us:
First, there are perceptions of the Soviets of our
military capability. I think it is very important that we not
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
encourage the Soviets', to perceive such an imbalance in
military capabilities that they might be tempted either to
apply leverage on us, or actually to ',employ military force
against us.
Another perception with which I think we must be most
concerned is our own estimate of our position in the world
balance of power. I think it's most important because we
hear many people saying today that the United States military
cannot aspire to be first'- in everything. But I think it
is very important that the public of the United States
not come to perceive that we are at such a military disadvan-
tage it would be better to be "Red than dead." I feel it is
very important we not come to a perception that we have lost
the pride and leadership on which the free world has been
dependent for over a quarter of a century. No matter what we
say today about our declining capabilities, about our
willingness to assume the burdens of being policemen to the
world, we the United;States are still the major power that
supports the dignity, the freedom and rights of individual
men.
Thirdly, I think we must be concerned about the perceptions
other nations hold towards us and the Soviet Union, both
individually and as we balance against each other. The
perceptions of these other nations will obviously influence
their diplomatic, economic, and military actions. So it is
important to us that we take the perceptions of these other
nations into account, because again, despite the pressures
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/1.8 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
in this country to retrench, to reduce commitments and
not be the world's policemen, I would suggest that our
national interests are, in fact, extending farther overseas
rather than receding today. Now I know that there are a lot
of people who would not agree with me; let me recite five brief
examples as to why I'believe that's the case:
First, let's look at the burgeoning economies of
Western Europe and Japan. We have a Gross National Product
of twelve hundred billion dollars. The European Economic
Community nations total is something over six hundred billion
and Japan about three hundred. If we were to add either of
those to the approximate five hundred billion of the Soviet
Union I think you can see the great economic power if either
one of those slipped into the Soviet orbit.
Secondly, U.S. reliance on the import of raw materials
from overseas is clearly increasing. We're not talking just
of the oil energy situation; we.`re talking of the ninety
percent of our chromium, rubber, manganese, cobalt, and
graphite that all come in from overseas. We're talking about
the fact that sixty nine of the seventy-one critical raw
materials that this country consumes are imported, in some
measure, from overseas. This contrasts with only two of
those seventy-one which are imported by the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, the more we import the more we clearly must
export to keep our payments balanced. So trade all around the
world is going to be increasingly important to this country
in the years ahead.
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : C16A-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
Next, it seems clear that the entire world is coming
to a greater dependence on exploiting the vast resources
of the oceans. This will involve us more in interests
overseas than in the past'-because exploiting the resources
of the. oceans does not simply mean going out to the limit
of our territorial jurisdiction. I live on the edge of the
Atlantic Ocean and only twelve miles away there is frequently
a very extensive Soviet fishing fleet. On top of that, a very
few nations of the world,today control some of the most
vital waterways through which this commerce on which we are
all going to depend must pass. Malaysia and Indonesia for the
Straits of Malacca; Egypt, if Bernie:'s (Abrahamsson) pre-
dictions are true,the Suez Canal which will be open before long;
Spain with the Straits of Gibraltar, etc. So again, we are
going to be involved. We are going to be concerned with
these strategic overseas areas.
Fourth, I see at least a continuing, if not an
increasing, resort to the use of military force as an in-
strument of national. policy by many of the countries that are
just below the major power level in the world. The Arabs
and Israelis, the Pakistanis, the Indians, the Iraqis the
North and South Vietnamese. The potential in the near future
for insurgency such as is-going on in Cambodia today, inspired
by the success of the North Vietnamese is very high. In short,
if these other powers do get involved in military conflict
there is always that danger of one or both of the major
powers being inadvertently and unwillingly dragged in and we
must Appeoved orWefease 2003/04/18 : Cl -RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
Lastly, I would like to mention there is a great
potential for international strive in the future as a
result of the growing disparities between the economies of
the lesser developed countries and the industrial nations.
We just cannot turn our backs on the severe problems within
the lesser developed countries in the years ahead.
Let me hastily emphasize that I do not necessarily see
this growing interest and concern with overseas areas as.
cresting an increasing probability of our intervention with
military force. I'm simply suggesting we must consider the
perceptions of these other countries. We must consider how they
view the power balance between us and the Soviet Union, par-
iti.a1u11Y ~v\~.. c.iUJCy VL 111G llltkJ Ql:L LL Will hLive on li.le-i L.1o1J L. cai
and economic decisions.
This brings me back to detente, There are some who say
that detente indicates the Soviets will never take advantage
of us. _in )%
any event, even if other nations perceive a
discrepancy between our capabilities and theirs. Well, that's
a very hopeful attitude. It's one we should try to encourage
becoming fact, a risky matter on which to base your policy.
In the first place, we see no sign of any decreasing emphasis
in the size and capability of military forces within the
Soviet Union. In fact, I think we can clearly establish that
the opposite is the case. Even more important, when we look
at detente from the Soviet point of view rather than through
rose colored glasses, I think we have to recognize that they
view detente not as a cessation of competition with the United
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
States, but as a continuation of that competition but in
non-military areas. That shift of competition may be-'a good;
thing, something we should encourage, but at the same time
we should not delude ourselves into thinking that the world
has become non-competitive.
We must recognize that, if we were to become too weak
in a military sense, we might actually destroy the incentive
for detente by tempting the Soviets to take advantage of us
through military force. We have to be particularly careful
here because we are dealing with a closed society. There
is no way we can be assured that we can predict when the
Soviets might suddenly turn 180? and reject the concept of
detente. Mutual reductions in military forces under a concept
of detente or limitations on forces are one thing. Unless
we have a mutually agreeable position, a unilateral re-
duction on the United States' part could_upset the basic-
balance of power between the United States and the Soviet
Union and injure the forces that are helping to encourage and
develop detente today. This is the reason, in my view, that
the defense budget must stay at its current`rlevel. However,
I would add that the real purchasing power of the 1975 budget
in constant dollars is under the pre-Vietnam level. It is
the smallest in real purchasing power since 1951.
Still, there are those who will misunderstand this budget.
They will raise the objection that the mere existence of military
forces will encourage their use. I cannot deny that there
exists some possibility with which we must be seriously-
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CJA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
concerned. At the same time all of us recognize fromhistory
that a lack of preparedness has, on occasions like World
War I, World War II and Korea encouraged aggression. So
we must look today at the alternatives.
We could of course, disarm more rapidly than the Soviets
and possibly risk upsetting detente. On the other hand, and
I think more feasible, we might simply exercise firm civilian
control so that having force does not necessarily encourage
its use unless that is truly a conscious, civilian directed
policy. In short, I don't suggest that turning into a
eunuch is the best possible way to avoid possible pregnancies.
Let me wrap up by saying that in our thinking in-national
security affairs today we must learn to separate our willing-
ness to-use military force from the'necessity for maintaining
forces,'which does._not mean we must employ them.
Too often we do
not appreciate that letting the balance of force slide against us.
and becom.ing`;,impotent relative to the Soviets could in fact,
push us into the commitment of military force that we would
like to avoid. I think it's important also that we separate
the desire to encourage detente from this--same necessity for
maintaining military forces. Too often we do not appreciate
that maintaining military forces does not necessarily mean we
must dampen our progress towards detente. Too often we do not
appreciate that, if we let the balance slide against us or b
come impotent relative to the Soviets, we could in fact kill
the very incentive that has brought the Soviets to agree to move
towards detente.l At the same time, we in uniform and all of
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIAQRDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
you who are interested in national security affairs -imust
certainly recognize the need for continually rethinking
the size and kind of military forces that are applicable to
this country, as well as the policies and tactics applicable
to them.
Essentially, I think we must ensure that our military
forces today are ready, not only to do combat, but to support
our national policy in all its aspects. Now this may seem
overly simplistic or trite; people like Clausewitz told us
this over a century ago. Today there is still a lingering
tradition that the American military is designed to fight,
to win, to destroy the enemy capabilities to resist. In
1 953, when we negotiated a settlement to the Korean War.
I think it became obvious that we had to begin looking at
our military purpose as being a bargaining instrument to help
obtain an acceptable political solution. Yet I believe that
one of the great problems during Vietnam, on both the military
side of the house and in the public, was that neither of us
fully understood this.
To go back to the beginning,--the utility and acceptability-___
of the employment of military force is declining today,
but I think this only means that we must be increasingly
aware that military force has to be an adjunct to national
policy.,not an end in itself. Yes, there are many alternative
uses for the resources that we're dedicating to military forces
today, but the defense budget is declining in purchasing power.
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : ClA RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
Hopefully, it is unlikely that the Congress will make risky
and substantial cuts in the defense budget. The answers
to the social ills-of this country do not really lie in
diverting resources from the defense of our nation, as too
often people are inclined to believe. And finally, detente
must have its impact on
certainly will, through
We must continue to
becoming multi-polar in
our military force
negotiations.
recognize that, while the world is
a political
it is still basically bi-polar in a
as it is, our decisions on military
must be taken against a backdrop of
the " S-o
.-1,e v.tCL 'v'iii Vii.
I'm delighted', to
and economic sense,
military sense.- As long
policy and posture
our overall balance versus.
see so many of you lfrom the educational
field here exploring this topic of national security interests.
I believe it is one of the most exciting fields of academic
endeavor today. We .require a much more sophisticated approach
to the use of military force, to the maintainence of'military
force, and to the conduct of national security affairs in
general. We in the military are trying hard to recognize that
there is that necessity for greater depth of thinking in these
areas. As Vince Davis said, we have tried at the Naval War
College to completely revamp the. program, to push and encourage
our students into deep probing and thinking in these areas.
I would like to conclude by saying that we very much need your
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
help, your stimulation, your probing, and that of your
students as well. That's why I'm so pleased that you've
taken the time to participate in this series of seminars and
I'm so grateful to Vince)for organizing it. Thank you.
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
QUESTIONS FOLLOWING THE ADDRESS:
1. How do we build a perception in our nation of our need
for a military--how do we regenerate conviction that
we need a military?
2. What are your views on SALT I and prognosis for SALT II?
3. Why did SecDef make the announcement on retargeting?
4. How can we.correct.cost overruns?.
5. How long do you foresee the world remaining militarily
bipolar?
6. What do you consider to be the effect of the Nixon
difficulties on the world's perception of our military
power and national will?
/. YYII CL L. UV YVU L~VIIJ LLL L L.V UC Q JGlUl1l-Y
ment, scarcity of resources, distribution of wealth)?
8. What is national interest and how do you define it?
9. There are those who claim that the existence of.a strong
military creates the tendency to use it.. How do we
prevent the military from becoming instigators not a
deterrent?
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
Saturday, 6 April 1974
It really is a delight to be here, .a delight to have
this opportunity to exchange ideas with a distinguished
group of educators. My College is what we believe to be
mid-career_.:education,.rather than what I imagine most of
you are dealing with, undergraduate and graduate education.
Our students are about 28 to 48 in age. They are people. who
have- achieved a great deal already in their professional
experience instead of looking forward to starting in it,
as most of your students are. Still, I think there is a
great deal that we have in common as educators and I.look
forward in our question period to sharing some of those
things and discussing them.
I think. that we in the military have been falling on
.our swords too much in recent yearsn the effort to explain
and articulate ina rational manner, why we do need military
forces in the era of peace and detente that we have with us
today. I think it's quite understandable that the public
and the Congress are questioning the Defense budget these
days. After all the 1975 proposed budget is the largest
peacetime military budget in history despite at least 4
substantial pressures in the opposite direction.
First the perceived decline in the utility of military
force today. I think we only have to look back to our
experience in Vietnam, where the greatest and strongest military
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
power in the world was unable to force its political will
on a third or fourth rate military power. We only have to
consider that the nuclear balance backdrop that influences
all of our political and military decisions today is a very
inhibiting factor on the use of military force by either of
the so-called superpowers.
Second, I think we also perceive that there is a decline
in the acceptability of the use of military force, at least
in the major western democracies where public opinion has
an influence on public policy. i attribute this to the
explosion in the communications capabilities of the world.
There is, as a result of this, a greater moral revulsion
towards the. use of force today than there has been in the
past. There is also a greater public awareness of the
issues that could lead to the use of military force.
short, the publieis taking an interest in the game earlier
today than it did in years past.
Third you are more aware than I that there are great
clamoring demands for alternative uses of the funds that are
put into Defense today.
Fourth, we have this new word, "detente," and with it
the feeling that detente is a reason for lessening the size
and investment in our military forces. Let me come back to
that a little bit later. But what I'm suggesting is that
we in the military, and all others who are interested in
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
national security affairs, need to be more articulate in
answering the question; Why do we need'sizeable standing
military forces in the peacetime circumstances with which
we are faced today, particularly, when a large standing
military is contrary to American tradition?
Let me try to run through for you briefly what I see as
some of the most cogent reasons for having this military
establishment today. To begin with, I think there is rather
little debate on whether we do need forces for strategic
nuclear deterrence. We really cannot run the risk of not
deterring the ultimate holocaust that could spell destruction
and doom for the entire world. Now, clearly, the amount
of strategic deterrent force we need and what kind we want
is, open to great debate, but I think there would'be general
agreement that we do need to fulfill that function. -
I would think there would be equal agreement in our country
that we need to be able to defend the United States. There
is, though, great room~for debate on how and where we must
accomplish that; on our shorelines, in some overseas location
where agression takes place, or even in some area-:where there
are economic influences on our national position. So I
think there is room for legitimate debate on what our overseas
commitments ought to be. If you take a concensus, I think you
would also find that most people would agree that we would
probably want to help to defend Western Europe. Some others,
I think, would extend that further and say we ought to help to
3
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
defend Western Europe and Israel. There are still others
who would say that this policy is too restrictive, that we must
be able to do more but they would probably be less precise
about where else they would be willing to commit American
military force.
The real issue I think we're grappling with in trying
to develop a rationale for military forces of the conventional
type today is how far from our shore do U.S. vital interests
truly extend. I would submit that at one extreme a fortress
America concept of defending our shoreline is totally outdatedQ,
I?also would submit to you a simple axiom for approximating
the sizing of U.S. military forces.
I would suggest that the United States must have the plainly
evident capability to defend oug5 vital national interests,
with military force if necessary, wherever those interests
lie. Now this does not mean necessarily that resort t
military force would be our first response in.any king of a
crisis situation. In fact I would suggest that the emphasis
in this axiom be on the words plainly evident. Now the
emphasis is on the evident part because it's perceptions that
we want to create, perceptions that will make our military
.capability deter rather than have to be employed.
The essence of deterrence is perception - three basic
perceptions of princip? concern to us:
First, there are perceptions of the Soviets of our
military capability. I think it is very important that we not
4
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
encourage the Sovelfts to perceive such an imbalance in
military capabilities that they might be tempted either to
apply leverage on us, or to ctuall employ military force
against us.
Another perception with which I think we must be most
concerned is our own estimate of.our position in the world
balance of power. I think it's most important because we
hear many people saying today that the United States military
cannot aspire to be first'.: in everything. But I think it
is very important that the public of the United States
not come to perceive that we are at such a military disadvan-
tage it would be better to be "Red than dead." I feel it is
very important we not come to a perception that we have lost
the pride and leadership on which the free world has been
dependent for over a quarter of a century; No matter what we
say today about our declining capabilities, about our
willingness to assume the burdens of being policemen to the
world, we the Un ied States are still the major power that
supports the dignity, the freedom and rights of individual
men.
Thirdly, I think we must be concerned about the perceptions
other nations hold towards us and the Soviet Union, both
individually and as we balance against each other. The
perceptions of these other nations will obviously influence
their diplomatic, economic, and military actions. So it is
important to us that we take the perceptions of these other
nations into account, because again, despite the pressures
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : Cl -RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
in this country to retrench, to reduce commitments and
not be the world's policemen, I would suggest that our
national interests are, in fact, extending farther overseas
rather than receding today. Now I know that there are a lot
of people who would not agree with me; let me recite five brief
examples as to why I believe that's the case:
First, let's look at the burgeoning economies of
Western Europe and Japan. We have a Gross National Product
of twelve hundred billion dollars. The European Economic
Community nations total is something over six hundred billion
and Japan about three hundred. If we were to add either of
those to the approximate five hundred billion of the Soviet
Union I think you can see the great economic power if either
one of those slipped into the Soviet orbit.
Secondly, U.S. reliance on the import of raw materials
from overseas is clearly increasing. We're not talking just
of the oil energy situation; were talking of the ninety
percent of our chromium, rubber, manganese, cobalt, and
graphite that all come in from overseas. We're talking about
the fact that sixty nine of the seventy-one critical raw
materials that this country consumes are imported, in some
measure, from overseas. This contrasts with only two of
those seventy-one which are imported by the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, the more we import the more we clearly must
export to keep our payments balanced. So trade all around the
world is going to be increasingly important to this country
in the year Ys ahead.
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
Next, it seems clear that the entire world is coming
to a greater dependence on exploiting the vast resources
of the oceans. This will involve us more in interests
overseas than in the past because exploiting the resources
of the oceans does not simply mean going out to the limit
of our territorial jurisdiction. I live on the edge of.the
Atlantic Ocean and only twelve miles away there is frequently
a very extensive Soviet fishing fleet. On top of that, a very
few nations of they wrld.today control some of the most
vital waterways through which this commerce on which we are
all going to depend must pass. Malaysia and Indonesia for the
Straits of Malacca; Egypt, if Bernie's. (Abrahamsson) pre-
dictions are true 1the Suez Canalll be open before long; Spain
with the Straits of Gibraltar, etc. So again, we are going
to be involved. We are going to be concerned with these
strategic overseas areas.
-Fourth, I see at least a continuing, if not an
increasing, resort to the use Of -nilitary force as an in-
strument of national policy by many of the countries that are
just below the major power level in the world. The Arabs
and Israelis, the Pakistanis, the Indians, the Iraqis the
North and.South Vietnamese. The potential in the near future
for insurgency such as is going on in Cambodia today,. inspired
by the success of the North Vietnamese is very high. In short,
if these other powers do get involved in military conflict
there is always that danger of one or both of the major
powers being inadvertentleMwillingly dragged in and we must
be concerned.
7
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
Lastly, I would like to mention there is a great
potential for international strive in the future as a
result of the growing disparities between the economies of
the lesser developed countries and the industrial nations.
just cannot turn our backs on the severe problems within
the lesser developed countries in the years ahead.
Let me hastily emphasize that I do not necessarily see
this growing interest and concern with overseas areas as,
cresting an increasing probability of our intervention with
military force. I'm simply suggesting we must consider the
perceptions of these other countries. We must consider how they
view the power balance between us and the Soviet Union, par-
ticularly because of the impact it will have on their political
and economic decisions.
This brings me back to detente. There are some who say
that detente indicates the Soviets will never take advantage
of us In any event, even if other nations perceive a
discrepancy between our capabilities and theirs. Well, that's
a very hopeful attitude. It's one we should try to encourage
becoming fact, a risky matter on which to base your policy.
In the first place, we see no sign of any decreasing emphasis
in the size and capability of military forces within the
Soviet Union. In fact, I think we can clearly establish that
the opposite is the case. Even more important, when we look
at detente from the Soviet point of view rather than through
rosel1colored glasses, Ithink we have to recognize that they
view detente not as a cessation of competition with the United
8
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
States, but as a continuation of that competition but in
non-military areas. That shift of competition mayfe a good
thing, something we should encourage, but at the same time
we should not delude ourselves into thinking that the world
has become non-competitive.
We must recognize that, if we were to become too weak
in a military sense, we might actually destroy the incentive
for detente by tempting the Soviets to take advantage of us
through military force. We have to be particularly careful
here because we are dealing with a closed society. There
is no way we can be assured'that we can predict when the
Soviets might suddenly turn 1800 and reject the concept of
detente. Mutual reductions in military forces under a concept
of detente or limitations on forces are one thing. Unless
we have a mutually agreeable position, a unilateral reduction
on, the United States' part could upset the basic
balance of power between the United States and the Soviet
Union and injure the forces that are helping to encourage and
develop detente today. This is the reason, in my view, that
the defense budget must stay at its curr level. Howeve
I would add that the real purchasing power of the 1975 budget
in constant dollars is under the pre-Vietnam, level. It is
the smallest in real purchasing power since 1951.
Still, there are those who will misunderstand this budget.
They will raise the objection that the mere existence of military
forces will encourage their use. I cannot deny-that there
exists some possibility with which we must be seriously
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : O A-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
concerned. At the same time all of us'recognizerjn history,
that a lack of preparedness has, on occasions like World
War I, World War II and Korea encouraged aggression. So
we must look today at the alternatives.
We could of course, disarm more rapidly than the Soviets
and possibly risk upsetting detente. On the other hand, and
I think more feasible, we might simply exercise firm civilian
control so that having force does not necessarily encourage
its use unless that is truly a conscious civilian directed
policy. In short, I don't suggest that turning into a
eunuch is the best possible way to avoid possible pregnancies.
Let me wrap up by saying that in our thinking in national
security affairs today we must learn to separate our willing
ness to use military force from e 'necessity for maintaining
forcedoes not mean we must employ them. Too often we do
not appreciate that letting the balance of force slide against
use ecoming impotent relative to the Soviets coul4n fact
push us into the commitment of military force'that we would
like to avoid. I think it's important also that we separate
the desire to encourage detente from this-same necessity for
maintaining military forces. Too often we do not appreciate
that maintaining military forces does not necessarily mean we
must dampen our progress towards detente. Too often we do not
appreciate that, if we let the balance slide against us or be-
come impotent relative to the Soviets, we could in fact kill
the very incentive that has brought the Soviets to agree to move
towards deter ee. At the same time, we in uniform and all of
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 CIAO--RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
you who are interested in national security affairs(! must
certainly recognize the need for continually rethinking
the size and kind of military forces that are applicable to
this country, as well as the policies and tactics applicable
to them.
Essentially, I think we must ensure that our military
forces today are ready, not only to do combat, but to support
our national policy in all its aspects. Now this may seem
overly simplistic or trite; people like Clausewitz told us
this over a century agooday there is still a lingering
tradition that the American military is designed to fight,
to win, to destroy the enemy capabilities to resist. In
1953, when we negotiated a settlement to the Korean W
I think it became obvious that we had to begin looking at
our military purpose as being a bargaining instrument to help
obtain an acceptable political solution. Yet I believe that
one of the great-problems during Vietnam, on both the.military
side of the house and in the public, was that neither of us.
fully understood this.
To go back to the beginning, y the utility and
acceptability of the employment of military force is declining
today, but I think this only means that we must be increasingly
aware that military force has to be an adjunct to national
policy not an end in itself. Yes, there are many alternative
uses for the resources that were dedicating to military forces
today, but the defense budget is declining in purchasing power.
11
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
Hopefully, it is unlikely that the Congress will make risky
and substantial cuts in-the defense budget. The answers
to the social ills of this country do not really lie in
diverting resources from the defense of our nationn as too
often people are inclined to believe. And finally, detente
must have its impact on our military force structure and it
certainly will, through negotiations.
We must continue to recognize that, while the world is
becoming multi-polar in a political and economic sense,
it is still basically bi-polar in a military sense. As long
as it is, our decisions on military policy and posture
must be taken against a backdrop of our overall balance versus
the Soviet Union.
I'm deligged to see so many of youp from the educational
field here exploring this topic of national security interests.
I believe it is one of the most exciting fields of academic
endeavor today. We require a much more sophisticated approach
to the use of military force, to the maintainence of military
force, and to the conduct of national security affairs in
general. We in the military are trying hard to recognize that
there is that necessity for greater depth of thinking in these
areas. As Vince Davis said, we have tried at the Naval War
College to completely revamp the program, to push and encourage
our students into deep probing and thinking in these areas.
I would like to conclude by saying that we very much need your
-Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
help, your stimulation, your probing, and that of your
students as well. That's why I'm so pleased that you've
taken the time to pticipate in this series of seminars and
I'm so grateful to N~,i.nce for organizing it. Thank you.
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
QUESTIONS FOLLOWING THE ADDRESS:
1. How do we build a perception in our nation of our need
.for a military--how do we regenerate conviction that
we need a military?
ment,-scarcity of resources; distribution of wealth)?
8. What is national interest and how do you define it?
9. There are those who claim that the existence of a strong
military creates the tendency to use it. How do we
prevent the military from becoming instigators not a
difficulties on the world's perception of our military
power and national will?
7. What do you consider to be a security issue (e.g. environ-
bipolar?
6. What do you consider to be the effect of the Nixon
2. What are your views on SALT I and prognosis for SALT II?
3. Why did SecDef make the announcement on retargeting?
4. Hbw can we correct cost overruns?
5. How long do you foiee the world remaining militarily
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
Saturday, 6 April 1974
It really is a delight to be here, a delight to have
this opportunity to exchange ideas with a distinguished
group of educators. My College is what we believe to be
mid-career,,._:education, rather than what I imagine most of
you are dealing with, undergraduate and graduate education.
Our students are about 28 to 48 in age. They are people who
have achieved a great deal already in their professional
experience instead of looking forward to starting in it,
as most of your students are. Still, I think there is a
great deal that we have in common as educators and I look
forward in our question period to sharing some of those
things and discussing them.
I think that we in the military have been falling on
our swords too much in recent years
the effort to explain
and articulate in a rational manner why we do need military
forces in the era of peace and detente that we have with us
today. I think it's quite understandable that the public
and the Congress are questioning the Defense budget these
days. After all the 1975 proposed budget is the largest
peacetime military budget in history despite at least 4
substantial pressures in the opposite direction.
First the perceived decline in the utility of military
force today. I think we only have to look back to our
experience in Vietnam, where the greatest and strongest military
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
power in the world was unable to force its political will
on a third or fourth rate military power. We only have to
consider that the nuclear balance backdrop that influences
all of our political and military decisions today is a very
inhibiting factor on the use of military force by either of
the so called superpowers.
Second, I think we also perceive that there is a decline
in the acceptability of the use of military force, at least
in the major western democracies where public opinion has
an influence on public policy. I attribute this to the
explosion in the communications capabilities of the world.
There is, as a result of this, a greater moral revulsion
towards the use of force today than there has been in the
past. There is also a greater public awareness of the
issues that could lead to the use of military force. In
short, the public is taking an interest in the game earlier
today than it did in years past.
Third you are more aware than I that there are great
clamoring demands for alternative uses of the funds that are
put into Defense today.
Fourth, we have this new word, "detente," and with it
the feeling that detente is a reason for lessening the size
and investment in our military forces. Let me come back to
that a little bit later. But what I'm suggesting is that
we in the military, and all others who are interested in
2
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
national security affairs, need to be more articulate in
answering the question: Why do we need sizeable standing
military forces in the peacetime circumstances with which
we are faced today, particularly, when a large standing
military is contrary to American tradition?
Let me try to run through for you briefly what I see as
some of the most cogent reasons for having this military
establishment today. To begin with, I think there is rather
little debate on whether we do need forces for strategic
nuclear deterrence. We really cannot run the risk of not
deterring the ultimate holocaust that could spell destruction
and doom for the entire world. Now, clearly, the amount
of strategic deterrent force we need and what kind we want
is open to great debate, but I think there would be general
agreement that we do need to fulfill that function.
I would think there would be equal agreement in our country
that we need to be able to defend the United States. There
is, though, great room for debate on how and where we must
accomplish that; on our shorelines, in some overseas location
where agression takes place, or even in some areawhere there
are economic influences on our national position. So I
think there is room-for legitimate debate on what our overseas
commitments ought to be. If you take a concensus, I think you
would also find that most people would agree that we would
probably want to help to defend Western Europe. Some others,
I think, would extend that further and say we ought to help to
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
defend Western Europe and Israel. There are still others
who would say that this policy is too restrictive, that we must
be able to do more but they would probably be less precise
about where else they would be willing to commit American
military force.
The real issue I think we're grappling with in trying
to develop a rationale for military forces of the conventional
type today is how far from our shore do U.S. vital interests
truly extend. I would submit that at one extreme a fortress
America concept of defending our shoreline is totally outdated?
I also would submit to you a simple axiom for approximating
the sizing of U.S. military forces.
I would suggest that the United States must have the plainly
evident capability to defendour+vital national interests,
with military force if necessary, wherever those interests
lie. Now this does not mean necessarily that resort to
military force would be our first response in any;kind of a
crisis situation. In fact I would suggest that the emphasis
in this axiom be on the words plainly evident. Now the
emphasis is on the evident part because it's perceptions that
we want to create, perceptions that will make our military
capability deter rather than have to be employed.
The essence of deterrence is perception - three basic
perceptions of principal ';concern to us:
First, there are perceptions of the Soviets of our
military capability. I think it is very important that we not
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : C1A4RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
encourage the, Soviets to perceive such an imbalance in
military capabilities that they might be tempted either to
apply leverage on us, or:actually employ military force
against us.
Another perception with which I think we must be most
concerned is our own estimate of our position in the world
balance of power. I think it's most important because we
hear many people saying today that the United States military
cannot aspire to be first'. in everything. But I think it
is very important that the public of the United States
not come to perceive that we are at such a military disadvan-
tage it would be better to be "Red than dead." I feel it is
very important we not come to a perception that we have lost
the pride and leadership on which the free world has been
dependent for over a quarter of a century. No matter what we
say today about our declining capabilities, about our
willingness to assume the burdens of being policemen to the
world, we the,United'States are still the major power that
supports the dignity, the freedom and rights of individual
men.
Thirdly, I think we must be concerned about the perceptions
other nations hold towards us and the Soviet Union, both
individually and as we balance against each other. The
perceptions.of these other nations will obviously influence
their diplomatic, economic, and military actions. So it is
important to us that we take the perceptions of these other
nations into account, because again, despite the pressures
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
5
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
in this country to retrench, to reduce commitments and
not be the world's policemen, I would suggest that our
national interests are, in fact, extending farther overseas
rather than receding today. Now I know that there are a lot
of people who would not agree with me; let me recite five brief
examples as to why I believe that's the case:
First, let's look at the burgeoning economies of
Western Europe and Japan. We have a Gross National Product
of twelve hundred billion dollars. The European Economic
Community nations total is.something over six hundred billion
and Japan about three hundred. If we were to add either of
those to the approximate five hundred billion of the Soviet
Union I think you can see the great economic power if either
one of those slipped into the Soviet orbit.
Secondly, U.S. reliance on the import of raw materials
from overseas is clearly increasing. We're not talking just
of the oil energy situation;
e:'re talking of the ninety
percent of our chromium, rubber, manganese, cobalt, and
graphite that all come in from overseas. We're talking about
the fact that sixty nine of the seventy-one critical raw
materials that this country consumes are imported, in some
measure, from overseas. This contrasts with only two of
those seventy-one which are imported by the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, the more we import the more we clearly must
export to keep our payments balanced. So trade all around the
world is going to be. increasingly important to this country
in the years
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIS-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
Next, it seems clear that the entire world is coming
to a greater dependence on exploiting the vast resources
of the oceans. This will involve us more in interests
overseas than in the past-,because exploiting the resources
of the oceans does not simply mean going out to the limit
of our territorial jurisdiction. I live on the edge of the
Atlantic Ocean and only twelve miles away there is frequently
a very extensive Soviet fishing fleet. On top of that, a very
few nations of the world today control some of the most
vital waterways through which this commerce on which we are
all going to depend must pass. Malaysia and Indonesia for the
Straits of Malacca; Egypt, if Bernie:!sk (Abrahamsson) pre-
dictions are true,; the Suez canal which will -open before long;
,Spain with the Straits of Gibraltar, etc. So again, we are
;going to be involved. We are going to be concerned with
these stra egic overseas areas.
Fourth, I see at least a continuing, if not an
increasing, resort to the use of military force as an in-
strument of national policy by many of the countries that are
just below the major power level in the world. The Arabs
and Israelis, the Pakistanis, the Indians, the Iraqis the
North and South Vietnamese. The potential in the near future
for insurgency such as is going on in Cambodia tod,,0y, inspired
by the success of the North Vietnamese is very high. In short,
if these other powers do get involved in military conflict
there is always that danger of one or both of the major
powers being inadvertently and unwillingly dragge in an we
must concernedi'
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIW RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
Lastly, I would like to mention there is a great
potential for international strive in the future as a
result of the growing disparities between the economies of
the lesser developed countries and the industrial nations.
just cannot turn our backs on the severe problems within
the lesser developed countries in the years ahead.
Let me hastily emphasize that I do not necessarily see
this growing interest and concern with overseas areas as;
cresting an increasing probability of our intervention with
military force. I'm simply suggesting we must consider the
perceptions of these other countries. We must consider how they
view the power balance between us and the Soviet Union, par-
ticularly because of the impact it will have on their political
and economic decisions.
This brings me back to detente, There are some who say
that detente indicates the Soviets will never take advantage
of us: in any event, even if other nations perceive a
discrepancy between our capabilities and theirs. Well, that's
a very hopeful attitude. It's one we should try to encourage
becoming fact, a risky matter on which to base your policy.
In the first place, we see no sign of any decreasing emphasis
in the size and capability of military forces within the
Soviet Union. In fact, I think we can clearly establish that
the opposite is the case. Even more important, when we look
at detente from the Soviet point of view rather than through
rose colored glasses, I think we have to recognize that they
view detente not as a cessation of competition with the United
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
States, but as a continuation of that competition but in
non-military areas. That shift of competition may e a go
thing, something we should encourage, but at the same time
we should not delude ourselves into thinking that the world
has become non-competitive.
We must recognize that, if we were to become too weak
in a military sense, we might actually destroy the incentive
for detente by tempting the Soviets to take advantage of us
through military force. We have to'be particularly careful
here because we are dealing with a closed society. There
is no way we can be assured that we can predict when the
Soviets might suddenly turn 1.80? and reject the concept of
detente. Mutual reductions in military forces under a concept
of detente or limitations on forces are one thing. Unless
we have a mutually agreeable position, a unilateral: re-
duction on the United States' part could upset the basic
balance of power between the United States and the Soviet
Union and injure the forces that are helping to encourage and
develop detente today. This is the reason, in my view, that
the defense budget must stay at its,current'level. However,
I would add that the real purchasing power of the 1975 budget
in constant dollars is under the pre-Vietnam level. It is
the smallest in real purchasing power since 1951.
Still, there are those who will misunderstand this budget.
They will raise the objection that the mere existence of military
forces will encourage their use. I cannot deny that there
exists some possibility with which we must be seriously
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : ClA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
concerned. At the same time all of us recognize from history
that a lack of preparedness has, on occasions like World
War I, World War II and Korea encouraged aggression. So
we must look today at the alternatives.
We could of course, disarm more rapidly than the Soviets
and possibly risk upsetting detente. On the other hand, and
I think more feasible, we might simply exercise firm civilian
control so that having force does not necessarily encourage
its use unless that is truly a conscious civilian directed
policy. In short, I don't suggest that turning into a
eunuch is the best possible way to avoid possible pregnancies.
Let me wrap up by saying that in our thinking in national
security affairs today we must learn to separate our willing-
ness to use military force from,thenecessity for maintaining
:forces, which does not mean we must employ them. Too often we do
not appreciate that letting the balance of force slide against us
and becoming' impotent relative to the Soviets could in fact,
push us into the commitment of military force that we would
like to avoid. I think it's important also that we separate
the desire to encourage detente from this-same necessity for
maintaining military forces. Too often we do not appreciate
that maintaining military forces does not necessarily mean we
must dampen our progress towards detente. Too often we do not
appreciate that, if we let the balance slide against us or be-
come impotent relative to the Soviets, we could in fact kill
the very incentive that has brought the Soviets to agree to move
At the same time, we in uniform and all of
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIArRDP80BO1554RO03600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
you who are interested in national security affairs-?must
certainly recognize the need for continually rethinking
the size and kind of military forces that are applicable to
this country, as well as the policies and tactics applicable
to them.
Essentially, I think we must ensure that our military
forces today are ready, not only to do combat, but to support
our national policy in all its aspects. Now this may seem
overly simplistic or trite; people like Clausewitz told us
this over a century ago. Today t ere is still a lingering
tradition that the American military is designed to fight,
to win, to destroy the enemy capabilities to resist. In
1953, when we negotiated a settlement to the Korean War,
I think it became obvious that we had to begin looking at
our military purpose as being a bargaining instrument to help
obtain an acceptable political solution. Yet I believe that
one of the great problems during Vietnam, on both the military
side of the house and in the public, was that neither of us
fully understood this.
To go back to the beginning, the utility and acceptability
of the employment of military force is declining today, _
but I think this only means that we must be increasingly
aware that military force has to be an adjunct to national
policy not an end in itself. Yes, there are many alternative
uses for the resources that we're dedicating to military forces
today, but the defense budget is declining in purchasing power.
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
Hopefully, it is unlikely that the Congress will make risky
and substantial cuts in the defense budget. The answers
to the social ills of this country do not really lie in
diverting resources from the defense of our nationpas too
often people are inclined to believe. And finally, detente
must have its impact on our military force structure and it
certainly will, through negotiations.
We must continue to recognize that, while the world is
becoming multi-polar in a political and economic sense,
it is still basically bi-polar in a military sense. As long
as it is, our decisions on military policy and posture
must be taken against a backdrop of our overall balance versus
the Soviet Union.
I'melighted to see so many of you from the educational
field here exploring this topic of national security interests.
I believe it is one of the most exciting fields of academic
endeavor today. We require a much more sophisticated approach
to the use of military force, to the maintainence of military
force, and to the conduct of national security affairs in
general. We in the military are trying hard to recognize that
there is that necessity for greater depth of thinking in these
areas. As Vince Davis said, we have tried at the Naval War
College to completely revamp the program, to push and encourage
our students into deep probing and thinking in these areas.
I would like to conclude by saying that we very much need your
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
help, your stimulation, your probing, and that of your
students as well. That's why I'm so pleased that you've
taken the time to participate in this series of seminars and
I'm so grateful to Vince for organizing it. Thank you.
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600220001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2
QUESTIONS FOLLOWING THE ADDRESS:
1. How do we build a perception in our nation of our need
for a military--how do we regenerate conviction that
we need a military?
2. What are your views on SALT I and prognosis for SALT II?
3. Why did SecDef make the announcement on retargeting?
4. Hbw can we correct cost overruns?
5. How long do you foresee the world remaining militarily
bipolar?
6. What do you consider to be the effect of the Nixon
difficulties on the world's perception of our military
power and national will?
7. What do you consider to be a security issue (e.g. environ-
ment, scarcity of resources, distribution of wealth)?
8. What is national interest and how do you define it?
9. There are those who claim that the existence of a strong
military creates the tendency to use it. How do we
prevent the military from becoming instigators not a
deterrent?
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600220001-2