ADMIRAL TURNER S SPEECH FILES PACEM IN TERRIS III CONFERENCE: REMARKS BY STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003600160001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 429
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 11, 1973
• Content Type: SPEECH

pproved For Release 20
NAVY
Declassification/R
elease Instructions
on File ,
,
ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH FILES
8-11 OCTOBER 1973
PACEM S III CONFERENCE; REMARKS
IN TERRI
by STANSFIELD TURNER
(
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8 - 11 OCTOBER 1973
NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY
Sheraton-Park, Washington, D.C.
- Mr. Hutchins ltr with completed program
- Mr. Hutchins ltr of 9 May
- VADM TURNER's outgoing ltrs to Mr. Hutchins and
Sander Vanocur
A
A
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nter? the Study of Democratic Institutions/The Fund for the Republic, Inc.
* * *
Vice-Admiral Stansfield Turner
President
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode'Island 02840
Dear Admiral Turner:
July 23, 1973
I enclose a virtually completed program for the Center
convocation on NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY to be held at the Sheraton-P.ark_Eotel, Washington, D.C.,
October 8-11, 1973. We regard the remarkable response from so
many very busy people as heartening evidence of the timeliness
and importance of this undertaking.
As you will recall from my original letter, we set a
deadline of September 1 for advance texts of major addresses.
We will distribute appropriate texts to panelists as soon as
they are available. Each panelist is asked to prepare a
three to five minute_opening.response, and if possible, we
would like to have these in writing by October 1. This will
help insure the widest possible dissemination through the
print and broadcast media. Provision will be made to accommo-
date ad libbed remarks in published material, and our $500
fee covers these rights.
Your appearance is scheduled for the session on THE
NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER and DETERRENCE BY MEANS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION beginning at 8 p.m. on Tuesaay evening,
October 9.
The convocation opens with a reception and buffet at
the Sheraton-Park on Monday evening, October 8, at 6:30 p.m.
You are, of course, invited, and I hope you will be able to
attend other sessions of the convocation. The enclosed form
will enable us to make the necessary arrangements.
I know you will make a significant contribution to our
effort to open up a constructive national dialogue on foreign
Policy, and I am looking forward to greeting you in Washington.
Sincerely yours,
Robert M. Hutchins
Chairman
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Sox -406S, San t:7 Baiharfz, California 93103/ Telephone: [phone]/Cable: CENTER SANTABARBARA (CALIF
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DP80601554R003600160001-9
_pavizc, Inc.
Program participants for the euLivocation on New Opportunites for
United States Foreign Policy are requested to fill out appropriate
sections of this form and return it to the Center in the enclosed
envelope
ALL SESSIONS WILL BE AT THE SHERATON-PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
OCTOBER 8-11.
For All Program ,Participants:
I () (will not) attend the reception and buffet, 6:30 p.m.,
Monday, October 8, 1973.
My spouse (will) (will not) accompany me. I expect to bring
( ) guests.
-
Please reserve tickets for attendance at the following regular
sessions of the convocation. If more than one, indicate number
desired.
Monday, October 8
p.m.
(
Luncheon, 1 p.m.
Evening, 8 p.m.
(
(
Opening session, 8
Tuesday, October 9
Morning, 9:30 a.m.
Afternoon, 2 p.m.
Wednesday, October 10
Morning, 9:30 a.m.
(
)
Luncheon, 1 p.m.
(
)
Afternoon, 2 p.m.
(
)
Evening, 8 p.m.
(
)
Thursday, October 11
Morning, 9:30 a,m,
Luncln.eon, 1 icim
Afternoon, 2 p.m.
For
Out-of-Town i 'Program Participants:
E1
?lease make hotel reservations (single) (double) at the.
Sheraton-Park Hotel for arrival on
and departure on
I will make my own housing arrangements and can be reached at
(hotel) or (Phone number)
NOTE: Arrangements will be made for those staying at the Sheraton-
Park to sign hotel bills upon departure. Travel and other expenses
may be submitted for reimbursement at the Convocation office at the
Sheraton-Park, or submitted later by mail to the Center in Santa
Barbara. Details on arrangements may be obtained in Washington
from Mrs. Sharon Arnan, Center, 12th *Floor, 1156 15th Street, N.
Washington, D.C. 20005. Telephone: [phone]
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SztiiL 5,b;. fornia 9310.3/Te!epho:e: (59.5) 96-g-321 /Ca171e: CEN'TER SANT:=1,eARSARA ((TN !F)
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'U., g LC-i for the Study of Democratic institutions/The Fund for the Republic, Inc.
Pacem in Terris III.
NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
A convocation to be held by the
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions
October 8-11, 1973
Washington, D. C.
Notes:
1. Those listed on the attached outline
have accepted invitations to participate
unless marked by (*), which indicates
formal acceptance has not been received.
2. These sessions are timed on the
assumption that formal speeches ordinarily
will not exceed forty minutes. Panel
members will be expected to make three to
five minute opening responses in rotation,
with the remainder of the time available
for free exchange. Principal speakers and
session chairmen are expected to partici-
pate in the panel discussions.
3. All sessions will be open to the press,
and extensive television coverage is being
arranged.
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MONDAY EVENING, October 8
8:00 to 11:00
PRESIDING: Robert M. Hutchins
I. THE NEW GLOBAL SETTING
(Opening session to be announced)
II. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED
YSTATES
2
? A. The view of the Administration
Henry A. Kissinger
B. A Congressional View
J. William Fulbright
(The opening addresses are intended to
set forth the current range of agreement
and disagreement among those officially
charged with responsibility for creation
Nand execution of U.S. foreign policy.)
TUESDAY MORNING October 9
9:30 to 12:30
PRESIDING: Fred Warner Neal
III. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (cont'd).
A. An Independent View
1. Stanley Hoffmann
2. Robert Tucker
3. Richard Barnet
(These addresses are intended to be
representative of more detached views
among the experts who operate in the
academic/intellectual community. The
central questions are: How are the
national interests of the U.S. '
currently defined in terms of its
international relations? How are they
threatened? How can they be defended
and advanced?)
*Invitation under consideration
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?
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CRITIQUE
Panel Members: Frances FitzGerald,
Leslie Gelb, Stanley Karnow,-Hans
Morgenthau, Harvey.,Wbeeler;-'George F.
TUESDAY AFTERNOON, October 9
2:00 to 5:00
PRESIDING: Norton Ginsburg
IV. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (contid)
A. Relations with Allies
Paul Warnke
B. Relations with Adversaries
Marshall Shulman
. Relations with Less Developed
Countries
Theodore M. Hesburgh
D. The Special Case of Japan
,Edwin 0. Reischauer*
CRITIQUE
Panel Members_: Herschelle Challenor,'"'
Jerome Cohen; John Paton Davies,
Morton Halperin, David Horowitz
Ronald Steel./
'Invitation under consideration
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TUESDAY EVENING, October 9, 1973
8:00 to 10:00
PRESIDING: Stanley R. Resor*
V. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY
POWER
Clark Clifford
(What kind of military establishment is
required to maintain national security
in the new global setting?)
VI. DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Herbert York
(Possible new developments in armaments,
the limitations of arms control, and the
possibilities of disarmament.)
CRITIQUE
Panel Members: .Gloria Emerson, William
Foster. Admiral Gene La Rocque, Jeremy
Stone-,' Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Albert Wohlstetter
WEDNESDAY MORNING, October 10
9:30 to 12:30
PRESIDING: W. Michael Blumenthal* v/
VII: TRADE AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION
Peter G. Petersen
(The possible replacement of security
by economics as the primary factor in
international relations; credits and
currency; the multinational corporation.)
*Invitation under consideration
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VIII: DEVELOPMENT
5
Kenneth Thompson
(Can we transfer resources and technology
from developed to developing countries on
terms acceptable to both?)
CRITIQUE
v7
Panel Members: Frank Church, Richard N.
Cooper.; Neil JacobK Abraham Ribicoff,
.Walter Surrey Paul SweeZy-//
WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, October 10
2:00 to 5:00
PRESIDING: Lord Ritchie-Calder //
IX. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
A. The Scientific/Technological
Challenge to Traditional
Concepts of Sovereignty
'Alexander King
B. The Necessity of Common or Shared
Resources, including Science and
Technology
Gerard Piel
CRITIQUE
Panel Members: George Brown, Jr.;
Harrison Brown*;/Seyon Brown*, Jonas
Salk, Louis Sohn i/ John Wilkinson-f'
*Invitation under consideration
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WEDNESDAY EVENING, October 10
8:00 to 11:00
PRESIDING: Bradford Morse'/
X. THE IMPERATIVES OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING
Philip Jessup
(The basic questions of sovereignty,
nationalism, interdependence, and the
role of law.)
XI. THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE
-FORMULATIONS
Richard Gardner ,/
(Charter revision and/or the creation
of new regional or interest groupings
to deal with peace-keeping, and the
increasing demands upon the specialized
agencies.)
111 CRITIQUE
?
Panel Members: Elisabeth Mann BorgeseY
George Bush, Richard Falk' Pauline
Frederick; Sol Linowitz, Charles Yost/
THURSDAY MORNING, October 11
9:30 to 12:30
PRESIDING; Rexford G. Tugwell
XII. INTERNAL CHECKS AND BALANCES:
EXECUTIVE vs. CONGRESS
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
(Divided powers as stultification of
policy-making vs. lack of account-
ability as a force toward authori-
tarianism.)
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PRESIDING: Harry S. Ashmore
XIII. THE ROLE OF THE PARTISAN OPPOSITION
Hubert Humphrey.
Evene McCarthy
George McGovern
Edmund S. Muskie
George Wallace
(Political parties as the focus of
interest-centered and ideological
pressures on the allocation of
priorities. Can politics stop at the
water's edge? If possible, is bi-
partisan foreign policy desirable?
What are the proper limits to the
adversary process in a political
campaign?)
THURSDAY AFTERNOON, October 11
2:00 to 5:00
PRESIDING: John Cogley
XIV. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC
FOREIGN POLICY
A. The Establishment and Foreign
Policy
J. Kenneth Galbraith
(Can a self governing people tolerate
the concentrated power, self-interest
and social pretense inherent in a
closed elitist foreign policy process?)
B. The Relationship of Government and
Media
James C. Thomson
(Secrecy, deception, and manipulation
of public opinion. The First Amend-
ment issue.)
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8
CRITIQUE
Panel Members: Alfred Balk, Tom Cronin,
David Halberstam, Richard Holbrooke,
Peter Lisagor, Gevge Reedy
CONCLUSION: Robert M. Hutchins
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-In .
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n? er
for the Stud/of Democratic Institutions/The Fund for the Republic, Inc.
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---;(79--- -/ / . .._ ,:.e,.:-'
-
9-, 1973
,
Vice-Admiral Stansfield Turner
President
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840
Dear Admiral Turner:
In the belief that we have come to a critical turning point in
American foreign policy, the Center for the StUdy of Democratic
Institutions is arranging a national convocation to consider the
new imperatives that have brought about a fundamental change in
the Cold War strategy that determined the state of the world for
the last quarter of this century.
I hope you will be willing to take part in Pacem in Terris
III: New Opportunities 'ted-Ztates Foreign Policy, to
convene in Washington -01Lc_tober 8=i1. As in previous convoca-
tions under this title in NeYor-k..andGeneva, we shall consider
ideas presented by leading foreign policy experts and practi-
tioners. The Convocation proceeds on the assumption that there
is general agreement that the end of the bi-polar power balance
that dominated the post-World War II era is in sight. It should
not explore old divisions and controversies, but take a prospec-
tive look at the new and profoundly different world that has
emerged while the great, powers were occupied w16h the aftermath
of World War II.
A general outline of the Convocation is attached. We shall
Present a series of major statements by persons whose experience
entitles them to speak with authority on crucial areas of agree-
ment and disagreement about foreign policy. Each of these
presentations will be followed by a critique panel of specially
qualified experts.
We hope you will consent to serve on the panel addressed to
"The National Interest and Military Power" and "Deterrence by Means
of Mass Destruction" at the
Texts of of major addresses will be circulated in advance, and each
panelist will be expected to respond with a three to five minute
statement. We would appreciate having these-In writing
by October 1 so that they may be made available to the other
orticipnts.
We can offer an honorarium of $500, plus expenses, to
include publication -01'0-htc--.
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SIWerely yours,i
/ 17-1/ 4-177- tie"
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Pacem in Terris III
NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATESFOREIGN POLICY
A convocation to be held by the Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions, October 8-11, 1973, Washington, D. C.
WORKING DRAFT, May 9, 1973
Notes:
1. Those listed on the attached outline
have been invited to participate.
Those who have accepted are designated
by asterisks.
2. These sessions are timed on the
assumption that formal speeches
will not exceed forty minutes.
Panel members will-be expected
to make five minute opening
responses in rotation, with the
remainder of the time available for
free exchange. Wherever practicable
principal speakers will be expected
to participate in the panel
discussions.
The ballroom will be set up with
tables at all sessions for the
convenience of those making notes
and to insure,a tolerable density of
about 1,000 in the invited audience.
14 Lunch will be available in the ball-
room.for each of the three days for
those who buy tickets in advance.
No dinner is presently scheduled.
6. All sessions will be open to the
press, and extensive television
coverage is being arranged.
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MONDAY EVENING, October 8
8:00 to 11:00
PRESIDING: Robert M. Hutchins
I. THE NEW GLOBAL SETTING
(Opening session to be announced)
II. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
A. The view of the Administration.
Henry M. Kissinger
B. A Congressional View
*J. William Fulbright
TUESDAY MORNING, October 9
9:30 to 12:30
PRESIDING: *Norton Ginsburg.
III. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED
111 STATES (cont'd)
A. An independent view.
1. *Stanley Hoffman
2. *Zbigniew Brzezinski
3. *Richard Barnet
(The opening addresses are intended
to set forth the current range of
agreement and disagreement among those
officially charged with responsibility
for creation and execution of U.S.
foreign policy. These addresses are
intended to be representative of more
detached views among the experts who
operate in the academic/intellectual
community. The central questions are:
How are the national interests of the U.S.
currently defined in terms of its inter-
national relations? How are they threatene
How can they be defended and advanced?)
CRITIQUE
Panel Members: *Harvey Wheeler, George
F. Will, *Frances Fitzgerald, *Hans
Morgenthau, Leslie Gelb
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TUESDAY AFTERNOON, October 9
2:00 to 5:00
PRESIDING: *Fred Warner Neal
IV. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (contyd)
A. Relations withvAIlies -
*Paul Warnke
B. Relations with Adversaries -
*Marshall Shulman
C. Relations with Less Developed
Countries -
Theodore M. Hesburgh
CRITIQUE
Panel Members: Herschelle Challenor,
*John Paton Davies, *Ronald Steel,
*David Horowitz, *Morton Halperin, *Jerome
Cohen
TUESDAY EVENING, October 9, 1973
8:00 to 10:00
PRESIDING: Gen. M. B. Ridgway (USA, Ret.)
V. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER
Clark Clifford
(What kind of military establishment
is required to maintain national
security in the new global setting?)
VI. DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
*Herbert York
(The limitations of arms control, the
possibilities of disarmament, and,
prospectively, possible new develop-
ments in armament.)
*Acceptances
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Panel Members: Albert Wohlstetter,
*Admi *Jeremy Stone,
Stansfield Turne .Gloria
Emers
? WEDNESDAY MORNING, October 10
9:30 to 12:30
-
PRESIDING: *Lord Ritchie-Calder
VII. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
A. The Scientific/Technological
Challenge to Traditional
Concepts of Sovereignty -
*Alexander King
B. The Necessity of Common or Shared
Resources, including Science and
Technology. -
*Gerard Piel
CRITIQUE
Panel Members: *Jonas Salk, *John
Wilkinson, *George Brown, Harrison
Brown, Louis Sohn, James Akins
WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, October 10
2.00 to 5:00
PRESIDING: William M. Roth
VIII: TRADE AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION
Peter G. Petersen
(The possible replacement of questions
of security by economics as the
primary factor in international
relations; credits and currency;
the multinational corporation.)
*Acceptances
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IX. DEVELOPMENT
Kenneth Thompson
(Can we transfer resources and
technology from developed to
developing countries on terms
acceptable to both?)
CRITIQUE
Panel Members:*Neil Jacoby, *Richard
N. Cooper, *Frank Church, *Abe Ribicoff,
Walter Surrey
WEDNESDAY EVENING, October 10
8:00 to 11:00
PRESIDING: *Bradford Morse
X. THE IMPERATIVES OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING
*Philip Jessup
(The basic questions of sovereignty,
nationalism, interdependence, and
the role of law raised by sovereign
nations.)
XI. THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE
FORMULATIONS
*Richard Gardner
(Charter revision and/or the creation
of new regional or interest groupings
to deal with peace-keeping, and the
increasing demands upon the specialized
agencies.)
CRITIQUE
Panel Members: *Elisabeth Mann Borgese,
*Richard Falk, *Pauline Frederick,
*Charles Yost, *Sol Linowitz, *George Bush
? *Acceptances
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THURSDAY MORNING, October 11
9:30 to 12:30
PRESIDING: Earl Warren
XII. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN
POLICY
A. Checks and-Balances: Executive
vs. Congress
*Sam Ervin
(Divided powers as stultification of
policy-making vs. lack of account-
ability as a force toward authoritar-
ianism.)
B. Checks and Balances: The Partisan
Role
Barry Goldwater
*Hubert Humphrey
*George McGovern
George Wallace
Nelson Rockefeller
*Eugene McCarthy
(Political parties as the focus of
interest-centered and ideological
pressures on the allocation of
priorities. Can politics stop at
the water's edge? If possible, is
bi-partisan foreign policy desirable?
Are there proper limits to the adversa
process in a political campaign?)
* Acceptances
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THURSDAY AFTERNOON, October 11
2:00 to 5:00
PRESIDING: *Harry S. Ashmore
XII. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC
FOREIGN POLICY (cont'd)
C. Power, Self-Interest and
Social Pretense...- The
Establishmentand Foreign
Policy.
*J. Kenneth Galbraith
D. The Relationship of Government and
Media.
*James C. Thomson
(Secrecy, deception, and manipulation
of public opinion. The First Amend-
ment issue.)
CRITIQUE
Panel Members: *John Cogley, *David
Halberstam, *George Reedy, *Alfred
Balk, *Peter Lisagor, *Richard Holbrooke
CONCLUSION: *Robert M. Hutchins
(Can a self governing people tolerate
a close elitist foreign policy process?
Can international relations be baseu on
open convenants, openly arrived at? Is
there a practical balance?)
*Acceptances
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Proposed PIT III Budget
I. Participants Expenditures?
A. Honoraria and publication rights
B. Travel
C. Accomodations and Maintenance
II. Arrangements
A. Meetira. facilities
$ 51,000.
13,350.
12,000.
$ 76,350.
76,350
2,000.
B.
Office Exp. and rent
3,750.
C.
Staff
7,000.
D.
Travel
3,500.
$ 16,250.
16,250.
A.
Consultants and planning meetings
34,500.
B.
Public relations and information
.5,400.
$ 39,900.
39,900.
IV. Supporting Services
A. Transcription
B. Secretarial (special)
C. Duplication
1,000.
650.
1,000.
$ 2,650.
2,650.
sub total
$135,150.
Indirect EXpenditures 15% (overhead)
20,272.
20.272,
Total
$55,422.
V. Publication and Distribution
24,000.
Audiotape editing and production
3,000.
$ 27,000.
27,000.
Grand Total
$182,422.
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or e ease
Dear Dr. Butehins,
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?
My thanks for Your letter of May 9th and the invitation
to serve as a panelist in "Pacem in Terris Hit New Oppor-
tunities for United States Foreign Policy." I would
appreciate the opportunity to join the panel on the evening
of October 9th, but with one caveat. As a uniformed military
officer, I would prefer not to be the only "establishment"
ramher of the panel. With a fairly balanced group, the dis-
cussions should be tremendously stimulating and challenging.
On a new subject, I would like to invite you to come to
the Naval War College on November 15-14 to serve as napporteur
or our annual military-media conference. More than 60
n7ttional and regional media raoresentatives are-being invited
to attend this vearls conference to meet and talk candidly
ith the 047f4,-,--r%s in the s8-?di=.nt both,.
The title for the conference is, The Military and the
2-!adia: utua1 Resnonsibilities." A general outline of the
two-day program, an information brochure on the College and
a copy of last year's proqram are enclosed for your review.
Wn hone the interchange between the media on the one hand,
and our students and faculty on the other, will promote an
tln,2nrstanding and a respect for, cils mission's ,,nd prac-
tices of both professions. Past experience indicates a free
and candid flow of ideas is possible in our academic environ-
ment.
Because of the existing military-media malevolence, we
want to mal:a our students (many of whom will be future leaders
of the a.7",,A forces) aware of the nature of the present
-7-elationshin and to do what we can to improve that relation-
ship, 1 think our conference can provide a proper platform
for the military and the media to put aside their visceral
rnat.J-ions and en=lage in annroductive and intelligent discussion
of ?-h-7111.- ,--especti7e professions,
The conference will convene Thursela-, afternoon at 2
0 1 ?
?
by -r.,=dia representatives on issues
relation3hir). The dialogue
--fill then be discuzsed in a Da--t1
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Approved For e ease
discussion up of other media guests and will include
free interchange with the audience. Following the opening
plenary session we will breakup into seminar groups each of.
about 10-12 students with two media representatives serving
as moderators to continue the discussions in greaterdepth.
The format will be duplicated in morning and afternoon
segments on Friday concluding with your wrap-up speech and
my final comments.
I am aware of your keen interest in the freedom of the
press and of the immense-importance you Place on information
flowing creditably and freely to the American public. I have
read of your efforts in this rer/ard dating back to 1947 when
you headed a Commission on the Freedom of the Press. Your
wide professional knowledge of and personal involvement in
tbe general area of press freedom would certainly serve as
the approoriate anchor to put our conference in perspective.
We can offer an honorarium of $500, plus expenses.
I'm sure you will agree that good relations between the
rilitary and the media are vital to our country. Our confer-
ence aims at eroding the misunderstanding that exists between
the two orofessions and at reestablishing a firm footing
characterized by mutual respect. We would be deeply honored
if you could arrange to be with us in Novembr and help us
work toward that important goal.
With very best wishes, I ,am
Sincerely,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Vice ?emiral, U.S. Navy
Dr. Robert M. Hutchins
Chairman, The Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions/
The Fund for the Republic, Inc.
P.O. Box 406.
-Santa Barbara, California 93102
Enclosures
Written by: CDR White, PAO (003:eh) 1 June 73
b^c: 01, 02, 022, RADM Thompson, Profs. Delaney, Bunting, 003A
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Dear:Sandy,
It was- a pleasant: surprise- to-meet_ ya-uTin the airport -
last-week. I'm thrilled you plan to .be- with us for another.- _
military-media conference., Although- we're still. in the ea.rly -
plArtring stages it.- looks, like we'll_ have a bigger_ and better
turnout than last_ year._
- I'm also looking- forward to -part.icipating in Pacenv n -
Terris III in New York-- this fall. Thanks for pacing my name-
in the hat. I thought you night like to see my- reply to br.
Hutchins' letter of invitation. As a participant in our first
me.dia conf.erence, perhaps you could give it a boost with_Dr.
Hutchins. We'd very much like to have him as the rapporteur..,_
In answer to your question about other military officers
who yonionicht like to invite to the October conference, I would
suggest Brigadier General Bob Gard whose address is,: - Brigadier.
Ceneral Robert G. Gard, U.S. Army, Director, Human Resources -
Telooment, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C. 20310
A candidate- from the Air Force who I would. endorse equally-
would be: Major General-Leslie W. Bray, Jr., U.S.- Air Force.-
Director of Concepts and, Objectives, 'DCSXP&O'' 4b1003.,
Pentagon, Washington,- D.C--_20301.-
.A.,-treal.Ly thought- provoking- Navalz.ts_offiCeri'll.r1G'uat re
a fe*:'mont22sf ago,-?who- would add. a.,---great-'.deal.-. is: :.--?Vicer. Admiral_
John Lee, USN.' (Bet:: ) 704 Bldg 2, _ Brittany-/
510a Brit'atnr- Drive. Sou#4,-,--_- St. PetersbUrg,, Florida; 33715..
Again r- I --forward-- -seeing..you'In.:October_
-iith yehes-h-:_-wishes, ram- - :
-- ?
Hr-. Sander Vanocur
The Center- for the Study-: -
of Democratic Institutions
12th Floor-
1156- 15th Street,
ashingt trri, D.C. 20005
TE 71 closure
-
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-Written by : CDR. White (003:eh) .-
19 June 73 boot_ 01. 02,022,?Profs-.
Delaney, 003.A.
7ZPRES1JENT
MEMORANDUM FOR 003
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
02340
While walking down the corridors of National Airport on
Wednesday I saw Sandy Vanocur. I hailed himdown. He asked
me if I had received an invitation to Robert Hutchins confer-
ence next October. I said I had and had accepted. I asked if
he had prompted the invitation, and he said he had. I thanked
him. He asked if there were other military people whom I
thought would do well at that conference, I suggested BGEN Bob
Garth
I then mentioned that I had just written him a letter
inviting him to our second Military-Media Conference. When I
told him the date he said that he would accept.
Let's drop him a note and tell him that I am delighted that
he can come, enclose a copy of the letter. to Hutchins and
gently urge him to encourage Hutchins to accept.
STANSFIELD TURNER
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ocnLerior the Study of Democratic Institutions/The Fund for the Rcpublicinc.
* * *
Memorandum
?To: Participants in Pacem in Terris III Date: January 18, 1974
From: Harry S. Ashmore
Subject: Publication of Proceedings
Fred Warner Neal has completed editing of the Pacem in
Terris III proceedings and we are preparing for publication.
The attached tables of content will indicate the scope and
arrangement of the four volumes. A limited edition in hard-
back will be published for use by libraries, and paperback
editions will be offered for general distribution.
We are not submitting for clearance prepared texts used
in whole or extensively excerpted. The attached excerpts are
transcribed from the audiotape record or are excerpted out of
their original context. Would you please check your own state-
ment and let us know by return mail if you desire changes in
the published version?
If the transcript is satisfactory there is no need to
reply. If we have no response by February 1, 1974. we will
assume approval.
Sander Vanocur has completed editing of five one-hour
television programs taken from the 27-hour videotape record of
the convocation, and we are now negotiating for showing of these
programs on the Public Broadcasting System network and else-
where. We will let you know when these are definitely scheduled.
Edited audiotape cassette transcription of the program
is being completed by Bernard Norris and will be available as
apart of the Center's regular audiotape distribution. If you
would like to have a set of these for your own use, please let
me know.
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Box 4068, Santa Barbara, California O3103/Teleplione: [phone]/U1Lnc: CLN sAIN iAboAkbARA (CALIF)
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
THE MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY
Edited by Fred Warner Neal
Volume II of four volumes edited from the proceedings of Pacem in
Terris III, a National Convocation to Consider New Opportunities
for United States Foreign Policy, convened in Washington, D.C.,
October 8-11, 1973, by the Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions
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PACEM IN TERRIS. Volume II
PART I
PART II
The Military Dimensions of Foreign Policy
TABLE OF CONTENTS
. Introduction
The Military Establishment: Oversize and
Overkill
The National Interest and Military
Power
--Clark Clifford
Nuclear Deterrence: How to Reduce
Overkill
--Herbert F. York
The Debate on Military Policy: How Much
is Enough? How Mad is MAD?
Albert Wohlstetter, William Foster,
Jeremy Stone, Gloria Emerson, Rear
Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, Vice Admiral
Stansfield Turner, Clark Clifford,
Herbert F. York
PART III Alliances, Entangling and Otherwise
The National Interest and Our Allies
--Paul C. Warnke
The Special Case of Japan
--Edwin 0. Reischauer
PART IV
A Spectrum of Views on Military Alliances
? Morton Halperin, Ronald Steel,
Herschelle. Challenor, Paul C. Warnke
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_
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PART II
The Debate on Military Policy:
How Much is Enough? How Mad is MAD?
In the sharp discussion that followed the addresses by
.644
0. Clifford and 4 York, it is significant that no member of
6
the panel opposed reduction in the size of our armaments,
although Vice Admiral Turner, President of the/ Naval War
'
College, insisted i--should be mutual, contending that detente
depends on a general balance between American and Soviet
forces. Mr. Clifford came back with arguments for unilateral
restrain5 within limits. He was supported by Rear Admiral
La Roque, recently retired from active
independent nstitute
?
duty)and now heading
efense analysis, who maintains Our
present balancing policies "serve to escalate and continue the
arms race.' ',1
Wohlstetter, the University of Chicago disarma-
?oV
ment expert, opened the debate with a critique of Zia.'" York's
position on "mutually assured deterrence," which he feels is
needlessly dangerous both militarily and politically, even if
the number of nuclear weapons is reduced-1s/0.2N, Stone, expanding
Mr. Clifford's attack on the present defense budget, strongly
supported the opposing view.
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f
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(4/
etre
,
lit III te-til'
rA.Tabels-ra-doT Foster who
-2-
"--- l
4,s?et." '\.? .,,-????^.( 114"(- "
- -
negotiated the ?atmos-pher-4.-= test
e
ban treaty, suggested that the way to cut down on nuclear
weapons is through an agreement limiting missile testing and
prohibiting underground nuclear testing altogether.
Emerson, the panel's pessimist, expressed doubt that the
American people will ever insist on reducing Oile nuclear stock-
pile.
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Albert Wohlstetter:
PART II
On the important subject of deterren,
the two main speakers agree on relying on assured nuclear
destruction of civilians. I feel called upon to introduce -on
pl..i.s?p1?14-i-ett-l-a-F?rAkia-j-eet a note of discord and if questioni=ng,er".
My questions center mainly on eer York's praiseworthy
effort to*make a little saner what he himself has called an
essentially mad strategic doctrine, deterrence by threatening
the mass destruction of a civilian population. However, in
considering whether alternative forms of, deterrence entail
a strategic arms spiral, I shall question theCieCe?-i?\-re?dnotions
reflected by Mr. Clifford as well as by Praftcs-s-ar York as to
the nature and actual history of strategic arms competition.
C The(receivedptrategic doctrine in the foreign policy
1- establishments today calls not only for keeping civilians
?!:`'1/
A,A4
_r-
defenseless on both sides but for deliberately aiming whatever
strategic forces are available exclusively to kill the
adversary's civilian population. This doctrine oft-mutual
assured destruction, ai411 .-1;LG144.1.41? identifieji
,Q by its
acronym "MAD," has never been officially acknowledged as
policy by either the Soviet or the American governments. Nor
do the forces of either side conform to such a policy. The
Albert Wohlitetter is Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago.
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Soviet Union, for example, continues to spend roughly as much
on defense of its civilian population as the United States
spends on strategic offense and defense. Official statements
on both sides insist that, whatever the capabilities for
reciprocal mass civilian destruction, in the event of a nuclear
war the governments would use their forces against a, variety of
military targets.
,
As Priefc&eer
York has pointed out,
the
increase in accuracy
of these weapons, and therefore the ability to reduce unintended
destruction, has improved dramatically, and is likely to con-
tinue improving on both sides. Systems analysts gave currency
to the ghastly and most unassuring phrase, "mutual assured
destruction." They stress, however, that this is an accounting
device, measuring only how the forces could be used, rather
than a reflection of the policy for their actual use in the
event of war. The relevance and meaning of such macabre
accounting are dubious, and cast doubts on both the doctrines
and the forces of the superpowers.
A responsible nuclear policy would move away from, rather
than toward t e targeting of civilians.. The diverse critics
A
range from the respected
Princeton theologian and student of the ethics of war, Paul
Ramsey, to the current director of the Arms Control Disarma-
ment Agency, .;0Fred Ikle to LOMichael May, who, like
York,accepts one of their most powerful objections,
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namely that even if MAD were a persuasive deterrent to,a
thoroughly rational decision-maker, such rationality is hardly
universal. Even if no one "deliberately takes the responsi-
bility for the appalling destruction and sorrow that war would
bring in its train," as the Pacem in Terris Encyclical defined
it, the conflagration may be set off by some uncontrollable
and unexpected chance. In that event, to execute the doctrine
would mean an unprecedented mass slaughter of unoffending
civilians.
York therefore propose5 to limit the damage
that would be done in such a case by altering not the aiming
points but the size of the force aimed, leaving essentially
intact the MIR' (to (to use the jargon) missile force, Poseidon
and Minute Man III. To these remaining missiles he would limit
the yield of each warhead, if I understand him, to twelve-and-
a-half kilotons. I presume he would welcome....lif not insist on
cutting the Soviet force to the same total of small warheads.
Now I want to stress that I am completely sympathetic
with attempts to modify so harsh a doctrine, though I never
supported it in the first place. I favor reducing the weight
of the explosives that can be launched by strategic forces.
I would like to see each side with the same total, and that
total much lower than the present U.S. capacity.
However, one must question-Riaafessor York's reduced .
force on these grounds: First, if it is still deliberately
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aimed at killing civilians, will the reduction in fact signifi-
cantly limit the slaughter? Second, would the alternative of
aiming such a reduced force at military targets provide a
useful deterrent and yet destroy fewer bystanders? As for the
C-(()}^t 1r
V's n)-)
(I tsC
first question, even if the 12 and a half)kiloton limit were
monitorable, ?and the successful launching of three-quarters of
Minute Man III missiles, and less than half the Poseidon
capacity, when aimed solely to kill Russian civilians, would
promptly destroy nearly 100 million. The delayed effects from
fallout would be small only in comparison with this enormous
immediate slaughter. In short simply reducing the forc5
lAAA
as he proposesiwould not accomplish,Balaefee,ssa, York's goal.
Even more drastic cuts in the strategic force to a size that
still remains reasonably secure against attack in the face of
uncertainties or unmonitorable increases, will not make it small
enough to keep the slaughter less than catastrophic, so long
as the force is aimed exclusively at defenseless population
centers.
A nuclear war will in any case be terrible, but if deter-
rence failst he alternative to aiming at civilians is to aim
jl
at military targets, to limit these targets in number, to
choose them in part precisipt for their geographical separation
from civilian population centers so as to keep the destruction
of civilians as low as one can; to select weapons and yields
and accuracy with that purpose in mind; and, specifically, to
reduce fallout by using weapons with low fusion fractions and
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by avoiding surface bursts. Further, the aim/ should be to
maintain command and control of nuclear weapons throughout the
conflict, to avoid destroying adversary command centers and to
try to bring the war to an end as rapidly as one can with as
?
much as possible left intact of civil?-society.
This suggests an answer to the second question raised by
York's proposal. There are tens of thousands of
possible military targets, just as there are at least equal
ed<
numbers of villages and farms containing civilians that could
be attacked. But there is no legitimate military need to
attack every single military target, not to say every civilian
target. The force that L) York proposes, given the accuracies
that heIlmself has predicted, could destroy any of several
selected military systems, either long-range or general purpose
forces and their means of sup ort. This would be felt as an
enormous disaster by political-military leadership,
leaving it and the natiOn naked to its enemies. Why wouldn't
the prospect of such a loss be an excellent deterrent? Must
we aim
kill noncombatants?
4
or York is concerned that if we aim at anything
other than population centers this would mean more and larger
weapons, and so more unintended damage to civilians than would
be done deliberately by use of a smaller force. On the face of
It, given the concentration of populations and their vulner-
ability to even a few weapons, this seems implausible. With the
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accuracy Profcsoor York and others expect, fewer and smaller
weapons than those deployed in the present forces -- which may
be agreed to under SALT II - - would do very well for attacking
military targets. For one thing, SALT I already limits numbers,
and SALT II ?can add further limits.
The hypothetical "spiral" model5popular in the academy,) _
seem to me quite remote from the realities. For years claims
have been repeate9rithout supporting evidenc!)that there has
been a spiral increase in strategic budgets, in megatonnage,
or in the area that could be destroyed by strategic weapons.
And it has been argued that this spiral would continue its
upward turn unless civilians become the exclusive targets.
These claims are simply inconsistent with actual developments.
The United States has always aimed its nuclear arsenal at
military targets, and this has not meant an exponential increase
in destructive power in the past. In constant dollars,
strategic budgets in the mid-1954-were two and a half times
what they are now. Strategic defense vehicles)which current
arms race theory supposes to be particularly destabilizing,
peaked at times what they are now. Offensive vehicles, as
Clifford and 4424Zezzahr York observe, have been roughly
constant.
Not only has strategic megatonnage climbed drastically,
but the geographical area that could be destroyed by the many
smaller warheads has been declining for many years, and in 1972
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was the same as in 1956. We may reach agreements, and I hope
we do, on still lower strategic budgets. But can we justify
PrIour nuclear weapons at civilians simply because they're easy
i\
.to reach and cheap to kill? Because, so to speak, these non-
combatant populations are available in the large, economy size?.
We should question not only the familiar arguments about budget
Instabilities occasioned by the arms race, but also the argu-
ment that strategic forces aimed exclusively at civilians can
provide a stable deterrent, while a. force aimed at military
targets cannot.
To deter, one needs to possess not only a capability to
destroy something that's important to an adversary, but also
an ability to convince him that the capability would actually
be used in response to the action one wants to deter. One of
the many problems with when used
as a threat, is that the destruction it promises would)in factj
be mutual and therefore is quite obviously unassured. On
the other hand, a policy of attacking military targets that
minimizes unintended civilian fatalities would offer incen-
tives for an adversary to reciprocate Under similar restraints
by attacking military targets, therefore obviating both mass
homicide and mass suicide.
In any case, military attacks, even with the proposed
reduced force, could scarcely remove the possibility of the
A-C c-
urban destruction to which proponents of
tri-e-n- claim. 'A responsible deterrent calls for a less reckless,
less homicidal and les
A s suicida
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/1
One final point concerns detente. The process of con-
structing common interests and warranted mutual trust among
sovereign nations with a long history of divergence is likely
to be lengthy and painful. The Pacem in Terris Encyclical
had something to say about the disabilities of threats and
fears as a way of moving men toward common goals. In the long
run, mutual threats to kill innocent populations seem an
especially poor way of building a community of interests between
the Soviet Union and the United States.
William Foster: LA-. York made two important main points. First,
deterrence through the threat of mutually assu eA destruction
is a terrible and uncivilized strategy,nd Ahigh priority
must be given to developing something better. It is unworthy
of civilized mankind to have to deal in terms of annihilation.
The plain fact is that no President of the United States and
no leader of the USSR, could bring himself to launch such an
attack .ed lat2y_Dx.--Yericl?Mreerrrge-eurrd-y---s-trtYngly- support ed
t...Vaat-uiew. Aside from the immediate consequences to the nuclear
adversaries, they would have to recognize that thee actions
would produce millions of casualties outside their own territories.
There is no way to contain the inhumane consequences of a
nuclear exchange.
kr4-5 William Foster Foster al.gt fo,.max 2rectorA U.S. Arms Control ad Dis-
armament Agency and Sox- r Deputy Secretary of Defense.
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Mr. York's second point emphasizes the insane potential
/164" 07 4,:i.71W
magnitude of overkill ineota.r nuclear. weapons-trheee+-ef
,e-aartet--Unkoltan- Certainly, most experts in nuclear science
agree that these excesses exist. fitc4.- York also provides back-
ground on how and why we arrived at where we are, in strategic
weapons, and states sound reasons why, with the -passage of
time, with the changes that have taken place in the global
political situationiz. we should begin to reduce our nuclear.
inventories and and the threat. t.144.y-..e.acks.
There ought to be less burdensome and wiser ways to
achieve and maintain stability. ? It is true that for some
time now the MAD concept -- an appropriate acronym -- has led
at least to temporary balance among the great powers. How-
ever, the only ultimate answer is to alter our defensive
attitudes and recognize the crucial fact that we dwell on one
spacecraft, and that damage to the craft would be a universal
calamity.
York introduces a suggestion for reducing
large inventories of nuclear weapons so as to make
th4P
an eventual elimination of dependence on the strategy1,44Z
Even with his recommended reduc-
the over-
possible
or ?
tion, both sides would still have the capability of threatening
destruction at a lower level. But at least the threat might
be confined to the cities of the two adversaries, eliminating
much of the generalized threat to the rest of mankind.) ,4 the
great powers' mutually.destroyed or removed some of the older,
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Foster - 10
very powerfu)but less efficient devices.
. York is hopeful
that effective containment of the nuclear threat might follow
and be certified.
However, United States attempts back in 1964 to do something
of this sort by matching destruction of U.S. B-47s and Soviet
TU-16s ran into stubborn resistance. There seems to be a universal
tendency to hang onto weapons that may have outlived their initial
broad usefulness. We all remember the horse cavalry and how
long it survived the advent of the internal combustion engine.
history
In view of that/I venture another suggestion which might either
? supplant or supplement Dr. York's idea and over time, might have
a major effect. It is obvious that for a military establishment
to be certain its inventory of weapons is ready and effective
_)
it must maintain continuous proof-testing. The testing of
nuclear missile delivery vehicles is done in the atmosphere and
is readily detectable by the other side. Also, the development
of new devices depends on a multitude of tests. My suggestion
is that we negotiate a mutual agreement limiting all tests of
missiles to a modest number. This would have two effects.
First, gradually, weapons and inventory would become less depend-
able, and second the ability to deploy new devices would be
restricted. I would strengthen the restrictive effect of these
aerial proof tests by a comprehensive itme.t ban on nue ear
/?
Our capability to detect such tests from
a distance and to distinguish them from earthquakes has, by the
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massive expenditure of funds and scientific effort gradually
improved over the years so that the risk of an adversary
making tests of significant value without detection is minimal.
pi,. York says that after ears not one single nuclear
weapon has been destroyed as a result of an agreement to do so.
That could lead, he states, to a feeling of utter hopelessness,
or to renewed determination to accomplish something at long last.
Certainly, the time is ripe for the latter. SALT, if vigorously
pressed by our leaders, can make progress in this direction.
Our new Secretary of State hasin the past>been deeply engaged
in negotiations in the nuclear field, including SALT. With
his new formal authority he can, by vigorous participation, give
new momentum to United States efforts on that front.
. York's formula, and my own, plus SALT, are all we can
perhaps realistically expect in the way of arms control for
the time being. Obviously this falls far short of a final
answer. That answer, as everyone knows, is to focus the great
technology and resources of the world on undertakings that are
beneficial to the march of man rather than those that contem-
plate his destruction.
After many years of grappling with the problem and count-
less hours in negotiations and in preparation for negotia-
tions, it seems clear that the answer is not in the hands of
men but in their hearts. Given what we are given
right. Let us do what we can.
. York is
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Jeremy Stone: What Mr. Clifford's excellent paper says is that
whether the strategic planning of the country was done by
civilians, or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or by Joseph Alsop,
5
the history of the last years suggestAthat the Alarming, and
the reasoning behind it,
ought to be taken with a very large
grain of SALT. That's one bad joke made at the expense of the
experts. I would like to offer one other. It concerns a
man at a dinner party who turned to the woman next to him and
\Nii tl??
said, Mrs. Post? She replied, Yes. Mrs. Emily Post? Again
she said Yes.
He said, well, you're eating my salad. Now, I
put it to you:our problem begins with the fact that the Defense
Department is eating our salad, and has been 'doing so for the
last
years, and has gotten into the habit. Our job now is
to avoid making the same mistakes that we made in the last
quartericentury.
Our chance to avoid these mistakes is much improved by
the current economic crisis. Twenty years ago one eminent
critic of defense spending, President Eisenhower, was already
claiming that the Pentagon's budget would bankrupt America, but
he was widely advised to study Keynes. Today the dollar is
badly devalued, and there are fears expressed about the over-
.rid of dollars around the world. Sometimes we even refuse
payment for those dollars when we only have enough soybeans for
ourselves.
Jeremy Stone is director, the Federation of American Scientists
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Stone._ 13
It is clear that President Eisenhower threw away an
argument which looks a lot better now than it did then. Ten
years ago, defenders of defense spending changed this subject
to emphasize domestic security but even those who took them
seriously were entitled to ask whether there wasn't a difference
in emphasis, and in cost, between Chicago insurrection9and
A
nuclear war. Today, even the ArnT1 Services Committee wonders
whether manpower and rising weapons costs have priced the
military out of the market.
Our country is now in the budgetary position other
countries have been in for most of thier existence. We have
to realistically consider civillggilitary priorities. As
long as the economic spiral was assumed to be permanently
upward, objections on the basis of cost could be dismissed as
slogan opposition to the military. Now, those who oppose. such
expenditures command the countrys attention.
What is still missing i$tanalysis of the calculus of
priorities of exactly what it meant over the last two decades
when we depleted the civilian sector and withdrew from the
civilian economy resources that might have increased productivity.
Some facts are self-evident. The United States is now last
in the rate of growth of industrial productivity among all the
&R&D countries ,--44at.as, in ee.f-e?e-t-s?t.14-Pekit+rett* the indus-
trialized world. Even Great Britain, the founder of the
industrial revolution and the first inheritor of its tribula-
tions, has a higher rate of growth of industrial productivity
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than weo-do. The inflationary effect of protracted deficits
occasioned by the Vietnam war -- or at least by the political
decision to disguise its costs -- are now translated into
the costs of failing to heal social ills.
ao?Gr-e.t.a.r-y- Clifford's observation that the military estab-
lishment hasn't changed its mind)pven though the situation
changed is a warning not to take geopolitical and military
planning too seriously. We've seen two wars mishandled.
Alleged "missile gaps," have revealed our compulsive response
to politically-motivated misinformation. In our political
system, with all of its benefits, the two-party system
polarizes and exacerbates this debate. And except for this
Administration, which called into question its own strategic
efforts, every other Administration throughout the Cold War
was attacked by the "outs" for being too soft and was forced
to defend the adequacy of its strategic stance. Our system
reduces the concern over our national security to the question
of whether we are spending enough.
Even the Defense Department can fall into this trap now
that :Befell-be Zudget is not going to go up in constant dollars.
A /
- No administration can be expected to be more favorable to
defense spending than the current incumbents. So if the current
Oministration is having trouble finding the money for a B-1
bomber, and for all the rest of those Pentagon priority items,
It seems to me that the Defense Department is going to have to
recognize that, although they can put on a big scare campaign
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stone 15
to ramrod these systems through Congress, they can't3in the
long...ru->n pay for them without a squeeze that will push out of
_
the budget all kinds of things which, in retrospect they'll
find they really preferred.
This year the Pentagon came on with a hard-hitting, and
I would say" very unscrupulous public relations campaign. The
spokesmen sounded as though the Russians were marching on
Capitol Hill, and surprisingly enough, this still work_lj
/2(
ven though the White House is snuggled down with the Kremlin.
It reminds me of that cartoon in which two crows are looking
down at a scarecrow in a cornfield and one says to the othel?
"I know its a scarecrow, but it still scares the hell out of me!"
I think we may have seen everything now: ad hoc explanations
for strategic systems, weapons systems in search of missions,
scare stories timed to the spring appropriations season -=4r-id
.1
finallthe Pentagon switchd from a two,and-a-half war strategy
to a one-and,a.thalf. war strategy without any significant change
In the infrastructure required to keep the war machine going.
As for Herbert York's paper, I'm very sympathetic with
his proposal f r,throwing away the large strategic weapons on
4ch side. as he pointed out, would
Ii
mvemewuch of the threat of fallout on each side, and on the
? bystanding civilians. These large land-based missiles are also
? Oa'''.
the most provocative and most
destabilizing)and the most vulner-
able in terms of the international standoff -- which is another
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Stone - 16
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good reason for throwing them away. Unfortunately, the case
isn't good enough to persuade either government without saying
something more. Because, as Herbert York advanced the case,
It is based on humanitarian considerations ireducing ovOrkilly
\i?
..w.ftd these e4.4.11x are not going to motivate governments which
have already persuaded themselves to spend money to improve the
prospects of overkill.
I would like to try one additional argument: It isn't
very expensive to maintain/ nuclear weapons system-7 s9 we
can't argue we would save a lot of money by throwing them away.
But it is very expensive to modernize such systems and to keep
improving them. We have abundant evidence in our own country...,
and in the Soviet Union, that neither suPerpower can resist the
Impulse to keep modernizing what it has. I suggest that the
best argument for containing, and ultimately eliminating these
systemsiand for reducing the size of our strategic force, is
that you can't modernize what you don't have.
I think its very important to recognize that even if you
-71kA OVA ?
threw away those weapons, as both ZI-/40... Wohlstetter and York
agreed in principle should be done, you don't do more than
reduce overkill. The weapons are still there in large enough
numbers to kill almost everyone who might be killed with them.
We have to ask ourselves whether or not we've given enough atten-
tion to preventing the use of those weapons. There are still
things to be done in that area.
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Of the five nuclear powers, only one -- the People's
Republic of China -- has formally declared that it would never
be the first to use the doomsday weapons. The United States
has never said .1v, would not be the first to use nuclear weapons;
in fact, our stated policy is quite the opposite. We've openly
thr.eatened to use them first if necessary.
(r-ii---seems to me we should move away from this policy as
rapidly as possible.
? In the Congress there is a widely-supported movement to
place restrictions on the President's war powers, proper restric-
tions in my view, which would require him to consult with
Congress before exercising his authority as 2ommander-in7phief.
4%
Surely such limitations begin with the authority to use the nuclear,
striking capacity, for this is to turn conventional warfare
? into an entirely different thing. It is like starting a new war.
No president would have to be in a hurry in responding with
s a first step I suggest the fo1lowi_f5)
nuclear weapons to a conventional attack. If it is to continue
to be our policy to deter our presumed adversaries with our
? Al 0
capacity to launch nuclear holpcaust, whether as a second or
first strike, it is fair to ask whether we have ever had a
es'
)6' ICIAVeN
president, not excluding George Washington) we would entrust
F\
.341,,Q1 such responsibility. No one man should have the right
and authority to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Perhaps
it is necessary to give the president the right to retaliate
against a nuclear attack with nuclear weapons. I think so.
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But is it necessary to give him the right to use nuclear weapons
first? I think not.
We are the greatest power in the world, and nuclear weapons
are the great equalizer. It seems to me our security would be
badly undermined if the idea got around that nuclear weapons
were usable. We have a 5year precedent against the use of ---1*
these nuclear weapons, and I think we should cherish it. We
should seek to persuade people that nuclear weapons are in a
category like biological weapons, something that should not be
used first by anyone, something it would be criminal to use.
I think by adopting this policy we could at least persuade our
military forces to plan on the assumption -- which they do not
now, I think, accept -- that they will not be permited to use
these nuclear weapons except as a very, very last resort.
Wohlstetter discusses a very important and very
current problem, but it is one we can think about too much and
reach conclusions which in my opinion,offend common sense.
/'
At the present time we have a very large number of nuclear
weapons. There will soon b
thousand warheads. There are
only 50 large cities in the Soviet Union. We obviously have
more than enough weapons for aiming at all their cities. So
we could aim the rest at some of their military targets. We
don't put too much emphasis on this because we couldn't destroy
all of their military targets anyway since now they have
.430e4.11?st4-c missile-firing submarines .band,pneath the ocean-v, These
can't be targeted ;.aa they can't be hit. How much effort,
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19
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under these circumstances, should be spent in trying to main-
tain the capability to attack their military targets? I say
not much. Some say.?-w.e.a. ia another option to use instead
of attacking their cities. But we have this option now. If
you'd like to fire a few missiles off at some of their dams
or some of their military targets, you can do that now. What's
really under discussion is whether we should take these ten
r4s4Y"-
thousand warheads which are now being planned and t tr?:74-1
sufficiently high accuracy so they could
threaten to destroy at once at least everything we could see,
even if not the submarines that we can't see.
While this won't improve our strategic situation one iota)
since Moscow maintains the ability to destroy us with sub-
marines, it will be sufficient to unnerve and offend the
Russians and persuade them to build further land-based missles.
We. can know this for a fact from introspection because in the
last strategic debate, where it was argued that we nped d the
v-474
ABM to protect our lan asedsaid,
m ssile-Vecretary 'Laird
Yes, they're-trying to get a first strike against us because
they're try to get the ability to destroy our land-based
,I?1Let-rat.s-1-__If)
missiles. A what kind of a first strike is this, since
f .. ...2 p 1k.
they can't hit our submarines. Laird said, Look, it is only a
li
first strike. So what is being talked about-l.ceeeel as if it
were a humanitarian doctrine of avoiding attacking their cities
and preserving another option is nothing of the kind. No one
is proposing in any way shape or form that we should put aside
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or downgrade or in any way remove the ability we have to destroy
Soviet cities. It is simply a new form of argument for some-
thing which Secretary MacNamara a decade ago said was impossible
and not worth pursuing p/counteqorce strategy of being able
to attack everything you can see in your sights, that is, all
the Soviet land-based missiles. So I think its something that
should be roundly opposed and not in any way misunderstood
'those humanitarian instinctsode-strunTd-n777-777=ntacIls
The solution to attacks on cities is not to fire
the weapons an?n the long-run)to get rid of them.
ate C-
Gloria Emerson: We have no national memory, We forget every-
thing. We do not remember Hiroshima, and evidently we cannot
even remember the murderous bombing of North Vietnam last
December and the unimaginable destruction of Cambog. I say
. this because here at-thIs.-QQ,41Aoe-at-i-en most of the audience
rose to applaud Henry Kissinger, the man who symbolizes to me
the murder of Indochina and our criminal tendencies when we wish
to punish other countries for not obeying us. It was a
sickening moment for me, and it reminded me of the great and
terrible moral disgrace I felt being an American during two
years in Vietnam.
We are a curious people, we are a movie audience. Let us
be wiser about ourselves and who we are and what we are willing
? ,;)
Gloria Emerson,n FellowA Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard and New York Times foreign COr-
.........
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to do and what we want. There is no possibility at all of
reducing the nuclear weapons we already possess. It would be
quite hopeless to say that this will happen. If we do not see
our limits now, we never will. I suspect most Americans want
us to have 'a huge stockpile,)for they see these weapons, if they
think about them at all, as being against other people, to be
used against other people who do not conform with what we wish
them to be.
Regarding Vietnam, they used to say, win the war, or get
out.. Winning,of cours5meant destroying Vietnam.\
_ ?
is my impression that nuclear weapons are not a Major
deterrent. It is also my impression that had we used nuclear
weapons against North Vietnam the five surviving people would
have formed a squad and continued the war. As a nation we
cannot imagine any country doing to us what we did for so long
to the Indochinese. Since we permitted this to be done, do we
really have the optimism here to talk about diminishing our
stockpile of nuclear weapons? That is an optimism so insane
I can barely stand to think about it. We will never become
sufficiently disturbed and persistent enough to see our
nuclear weapons diminished because we do not really want to
expend the effort. We will neither struggle nor sacrifice nor
devote
years to something. We will just go on
talking to each other in our pleasant, wellbred little voices
no scenes, please, no shouting, good manners above all.
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A nation which makes Henry Kissinger its superstar is not
a nation able to appraise itself, let alone effect the very huge
and radical changes which are needed in our society. Vietnam
VT1A
ws. not an isolated catastrophe. It was not a series of well-
meaning mistakes. It was the natural result of the short-
comings of our society and the arrogance on which we have
nourished ourselves for a very long time. Mr. Clifford's
address saddened me. At one time I considered him an heroic
figure and was indeed grateful to him for his policy on the
Vietnam war. He feels the war is over. He says we are no longer
involved in the Indochina war. How is it possible anyone in
this room could believe this? We have pulled out American
troops because their presence there was an embarrassment to the
Administration, not for humanitarian reasons. We have stopped
bombing because we had to, but we continue to make the war
possible in Vietnam. We choose to forget this. We provide
assistance and money to what is a ruthless police state. We
give two and a half billion dollars for the fiscal year of '74.
There are five thousand Americans in Vietnam, and they are not
there for their health. There are 100,000 political prisoners
in their jails)and many of them probably were put in jail
because of the Phoenix program which the Central Intelligence
Agency thought up in 1968. The war is not over. There is still
blood on our hands.
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Gene R. La Rocque: As a military man I find I am not as militant
elifor as bright and clever or as dedicated as Gloria Emerson, whop
I sincerely supporthowe I also support strongly the state-
ments made by Meftifford and-10. York as well as the explanation
by my good friend Jeremy Stone. Anyone who for the past 20'years
has had an knowledge of U.S. and n military affairs
knows n well that we've been way out ahead of the Soviets
in the development of every major weapons systems. You name it.
The atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, the nuclear-power,ed sub-
0/0-$"-- ?
marines, thea-based missiles, the ICBMs, the MIRVs7Ighich the
Soviets are just getting. We've been way out ahead. The trend
and our position as far as the Soviets are concerned in con-
)
ventional forces is the same thing. We've been years ahead of
them. The Warsaw Pact, let's not forget, was formed five
years after we formed NATO and aftc;" had ringed the Soviet
Union with missiles and other weapons. Only now, aftert30 years
of dominance on the, sea, are the Soviets building two tiny
11-Q aircraft carriers.
? We've been overwhelmingly dominant in military power, and
it has been quite natural for the Soviets to try to catch up.
If I were nFtUrilli'tary planner and I saw what the United States
was developing, I would be pushing my bosses year in and year
out, to make some movement to increase forces. The thrust
of what I'm saying here tonight is this:- We have some influence
1/21
Rear Admiral Gene R. La Roque (Ret.), USN, Director Center for
/ '
Defense Information
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24
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on our government, very little on the Soviet government, and
we ought to look at the facts as they are and see what we've
done and where we are vis-a-vis the Russians. If we're going
to make any change)people like those at the Pacem in Terris III
/donvocation are the people who can do it, with our own govern-
ment.
Let me just give you some more figures. Everybody here
has talked about nuclear weapo . Let me give you some compari-
sons, comparisons that Senator Symington dragged out of the
Pentagon. Just two years ago, the Soviets had 2300 nuclear
weapons to shoot at us; we had 4700 to shoot at them. Today
the Soviets have 2300, they have increased by 200. Today we
have 7100 to shoot at them. These are Pentagon figures.
If we go ahead with the Trieci submarine and the B-1
e4
bomber in the earl 484'S we're going to, have14-t4+9.11.g...and-
nuclear weapons to shoot at the Soviet Union, which is just
totally insane. Somehow, we)he strongest nation in the world,
have been made fearful of nations which do not deserve this
fear. We've been .Ererrti-e-f chasing our own shadow in the arms
race. Just one more weapon, one more force) and we'll be
secure .ZP I think right now the time has come to tell it
like it is.
Every admiral, ever, general?knows that in a nuclear war
with the Soviet Union there is no defense. There is no system,
no amount of money, which can defend the United States against
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0-)
?t b
3?
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ocque ? 25
a missile attack. The American government, the Soviet govern-
ment; the American military and the Soviet military)all recognize
that, and they hav!)as a matter of fact,made it the primary
statement and position of their governments. In the/SALT talksi
which took place in Moscow in May of 1972, both .e? agreed to
be vulnerable to each other's missile attacks. The President
didn't like to sign that agreement, but he admitted that there
was no way to defend the United States against a missile attack.
You would have thought that having agreed that we're not even
going to try to defend the United States against a missile
attack, and that the Soviets are not going to try to defend
themselves, that there would be some sort of arbitrary limita-
tion on our offensive weapons. But that's not the case. We
continue to build more and more.
The important thing is to recognize that we ought to stay
within the limits of an adequate military defense of the United
5 /45 Pi/V
States. As Senator5ymington and CongressmanAAspen- have so
eloquently said, so many times, we need to stop this extravagant
spending.for.military forces we do not need and which only
serve to accelerate and continue the arms race.
14"4 iE Q9 4 .7
Stansfield Turner: rom the fionvocation audience and its
responses, I have received the message that you would like to
see a smaller Un.iptdiad St.a.tawa Military establishment. This message
4
CI 14 a'5. /4241r-
Stansfield Turnert Vice?Admiral; and Presidentiplaval War
5
College.
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is, of course, not new to us in uniform, but it is one which we
must take seriously and studiously. Another message or signal,
which does not come through as clearly to me, however, is just
what purposes you would want your military establishment to be
capable of serving. Defining what the military should not do
or what weapons they should not have really does not provide
adequate guidance to carry out your mandates.
-S
There seemed to me to be unresolved issues here as to the
criteria, that we should establish for selecting military forces,
and as to the degree of burden which carrying those forces
imposes on our economy. For instance,
. York has made a very
constructive suggestion for reducing nuclear weapons, based
on the criteria of minimizing collateral damage to innocent
bystanders if nuclear war should occur. I support that sugges-
tion. However, I would suggest that our primary objective>above
all others is to prevent nuclear war from ever occurring. I
would welcome a discussion as to what effect . York's pro-
posed reduction of nuclear forces might have on that primary
objective. There is more to this than the issue of the numbers
of missiles or the numbers of warheads. The problem is com-
pounded first by technical issues of warhead yields, of accuracy,
of throw weight and of survivability. But5ven more im ?qtant,
it is also compounded by the perceptions which are f d by
ourselves, our allies, the uncommitted nations, and our
potential antagonists. And I have heard very little here about
the impact of perceptions of military power.
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In my view, a key factor in the present detente policy is
a perceived balance of strategic nuclear power between our-
selves and the Soviet Union. If either of us today felt
vulnerable to the other, detente would simply be out of the
question. So the test to me of any steps to reduce' strategic
nuclear forces should be whether it promotes equilibrium and
mutual confidence. For this reason, although I support the
intent of
44?
is proceed step by step, in a series of negotiations to limit
strategic nuclear weapons on both sides.
. York's proposal, I feel that the practical method
We need equilibrium or balance also in the area of
A...
conventionalforces if detent is to remain a reality. Therefore,e,
I believe that the central criteria for shaping and sizing our
non-nuclear forces must be the resultant state of balance with
those forces of the Soviet Union. Mr. Clifford does not appear
to agree with this, but I raise this cardinal issue in the
hope of providing our dialogue a focal point of logic. I am
concerned with our strength relative to the Soviets' because
I find few instances in history when a major nation which
possessed a marked military advantage over another one
voluntarily forsook that advantage. This applies, I would
suggest, even to the nation I consider the most magnanimous
in the history of the world, a nation that when it possessed a
-)
monopoly of nuclear weapons,)pressed a policy of containment,
not detente. Hence, I cannot accept Mr. Clifford's plea for
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further force reductions on our part based solely on considera-
tions on our side of the equation.
Now, don't misinterpret me. Acknowledging the importance
of considering military balance does not necessarily lead to
larger U.S. military forces. The Soviets may be very foolish
in what they are doing with their military buildup. The
Soviets may be benign. They may just be waiting for a signal
0-C-04-7/
from us to do the same. Or ma4zheit is not improvident for us
to allow an imbalance of some sort. I personally do not sub-
scribe to these views. But I do suggest that it is not meaning-
ful for us to talk about a69 billion de:a, defense budget
without being explicit as to the impact that that would have on
the military balance. If it would appear that tria* would result
In a balance markedly unfavorable to us, it could well lead the
Soviets away from detente.
Advocates of detente, then, should
be those who are most anxious to consider this point.
Finally, and again for the purpose of focusing our
dialogue, I would like to set a few basic facts straight.
No matter how you manipulate the statistics, there is no way
that you can prove that our defense budget is increasing in
purchasing power or that it is distorting the economy of the
-)
United States_. It is unfair and inaccurate to cite military
tl, fv,e4y,
fat
spending as the\cause of inflation or a shortage of funds for
other purposes. ?The facts are that defense expenditures have
increased only /billion 4e4441:Js in current dollars since
1968, while total federal budget expenditures have increased
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490 billion 40,11.17.A.. -Defense doea_rigit_ahar_e-the burderrof
inflatlpn. Mr. Clifford states that the purchasing power of
this year's non-Vietnam budget is higher than last year's.
And he pointed out that this comparison was based an an assump-
tion that the Congress will pass the full request asked for by
the President this year, which of course it almost never does.
But event beyond that questionable assumption, there are two
new_-_-_,aharges that we must levy against budget and which
produce no defense power. The first is a promissory note in
the form of military retirement benefits which is coming due.
This is t cost of past wars. It takes about -f-ettAbillion
^de.1.1;1 of today's defense budget. The second is that an
artificial subsidy to the defense budget, or a free good, in
the form of the draft has been removed. This has added about
43 billion 441,212.Z., to At-
budget.
?
.Writh this budget situation, the hard facts are that
our #restructure is going down. You simply cannot obscure a
/
drop from pre-Vietnam levels of4
;7% of the Navy's ships and r ,
u
,
(20 of its aircraft or:20%)of the Army divisions or 1I%>of the
,-...._
, ?-----
. tN.',1114..
manpower of all of the services)gj I'm not
'
arguing for the moment that our forces should necessarily be
Gdik
larger. BA Il-ra simply pointing out that there has been a
very real decline in our military force levels over the past
five to eight years. And, in contrast, the Brookings Institu-
tion states that Soviet expenditures on defense in real
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purchasing power have increased at the rate of at least
year for the last years.
All this is not to say that force reductions are not
possible, either on our side, or on the Sovietsl)or.by mutual
action. 1. am only concerned that, if military balance has
been one factor opening the door to detente, we may want to
Ilsod?O?Mirmonro001.."
proceed cautiously before upsetting that balance. We do not
want to engageinq---taiRea-l--c--d-n-t-radit,--i-e-rr-erf ove/7reaction1
v10
We all want to place more emphasis on improving our
environment, raising our standards of living, preventing crime
in the streets, and generally enhancing the quality of American
life. But we would be ill-advised to delude ourselves into
hoping that a slice of the defense budget can solve all of these
problems of a1.3 trillion dal11721" economy. Nor, in conclusion,
do we want to judge our military strength on whether or not
we believe we are wise enough to employ it properly. We are
a rational people with all the capability that we need to shape
our destiny through positive choices, not negative ones.
This COnvocation of private citizens is evidence of that, and
it should help us to make the difficult choices which lie ahead
in a positive manner.
Clark Clifford: The statements of members of the panel are
very valuable. They have enlightened the program, and have
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brought home illustrations that I think you will remember.'
value Miss Emerson's c-Lumuliaaa.cla.14-41-4941- reference to our
joint efforts on Vietnam. I am sorry she finds some sense of
disappointment in my position this evening. I think it is
explainable because I was not asked to speak on Vietnam,
although I would certainly have been prepared to. I was asked
to speak on the Defense *dget. And therefore, in commenting
upon one reason why we should cut our expenses, one reason
was we had actually withdrawn American troops from South
Vietnam. I did not suggest that
activities in Indochina. The
my prepared address)wZ that,
Indochina draws too slowly to a halt,
we had concluded our
is, ette--s4etrernent--1-44acla in
i*??
tragic intervention in
still have 50 =and
troops in Thailand and are still sending arms and funds to
South Vietnam. I would like to withdraw our troops from
South Vietnam, whatever capacity they are in. I would like
to get our troops out of Southeast Asia. I think we've
learned a lesson, and we do not need to keep any troops
at all.
I think that Admiral Turner stated his position admirably
well. I'm only grateful that Admiral Turner chose tie Navy
7640""
competitor at the bar. But whenAtalks
about our relative strength compared to that of the Soviet
'111'
fact
as
our
we
there
Instead of being a
Union, I. find ?Ii4,s a salacious comparison. If the Russians
choose to have a standink army of four or five million men, it
'
'
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is suggested in some quarters that we should have an army of
four or five million men. I think that is an erroneous con-
cept. I get back to the statement that what we must do is
protect the United Statesv haat's*".O17first obligation.
And, second, we must be prepared to help defend those nations
whose survival and security are a question of importance to
the United States. We are doing that.
We have erred in the past. We erred when we went into
Vietnam becaupe we thought that the result of the war in
Vietna,2 an impact either upon our national security or
upon our national welfare. That was a tragic and lamentable
error on our part. I think we've learned from it. I do not
believe that we should be prepared militarily to go into every
area of the world where there is trouble. At one stage, I
think, we felt we should do that. I v changed certainly
notions in that regard, and I hope that persons in high places
today have changed in that regard also.
W hear .a.....194-44.-44,mie.s. about having bargaining chips when
we sit down idith the Soviets. I have grave difficulty with that
concept. When we say to,.the Russians, we are now going to build
) t, 1).tel,4,b.i: .11 t
the Trident submarine)lathey cost a-43-1-1--1-?-e.974141aee--talaieae,I eeiwir
-.1" A !I -00 A /
/ 4) i a4-)
we're going to build the B-1 bomber and we are going to build
the F-14 Navy carrier-based plan //those are supposed to be bar-
gaining chips. They are supposed to persuade the Soviet
Union that they should make some agreement with us. What I
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Clifford -
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think ,tbtat does is to lead the Soviet Union to build bigger
submarines and bigger bombers and bigger fighters. I
believe we would do well to say to the Soviets, #11.n.tr.7-?-?ilurve-'..1'r?
-ri-d. We are not going to build new
t!,"1 - /1-iat 1:.-k 4-4 #
Aa4rubmarihe474. Xau.kaarokyVe've never tried that, and it would
be interesting to see the result. Its entirely possible that
C'w-t,?,Cr?
if we said, Mr. 41, we're not going to build A,neW
L14--ii4.T"5)
face might light up and he might put ?out his hand
and say, if you don't, then we won't. And I think its worth
a try.
ength-aluaut-the rclatwkonahip
13.ttre-err-ffgfense exp-enditurea end-inflation. Regarding the
relationship between inflation and defense expenditures, I would
4 IS) 0
only point out that we spent vicimtaallMd.ath billion
pdgeZ7Don the war in Vietnam nd I suggest to you that we
should not have spent any part of that. Now, even though the
war is over, even though we have detente with China, even
'
though we have a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union, our
expenditures ccording to the Navy and the defense figures, ,
are tia?rwaa....a.13,d,...a--14a-3:billion over last year. They go up
14 Li
another 4R4948.7\billion next year. I think that every saving that
we can make in defense expenditures will reduce the deficit
that we have, and by reducing the deficit we will become
14.'54
ier4
economically sound again. If we could,one year balance the budget
4191-449e?U494.t.e.d.,..atataz I believe the international attitude
toward our dollar would change overnight.
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With regard to Professor Wohlstetter's comments, it sounds
good to say we will aim exclusively at military targets, but I
believe it generally does result in more weapons and therefore
more deaths, more potential deaths. The only way to reduce the
danger to us is to reduce the number of weapons the Russians
possess and vice versa. I don't think that administrative
arrangements about targeting will produce the desired result.
Also, my suggested reduction was not meant to be to a level
which we would then permanently maintain. It was meant to be
a substantial step for once in the right direction. The long?
range goal, as I said, remains to get rid of the deterrence
doctrine and also the nuclear weapons that back it up, and not
just to change or to claim to change their targets. I take
seriously the various statements of/residents and party chair-
men and kings about the nuclear disarmament. I'm sure that
those men were always sincere when they made them, but I think
we should use their' statements and hold their feet to the fire
all the same.
Admiral Turner has said that one should consider what
would be the effect of something, such as my suggestion on the
probability of nuclear war. I agree that's a good question; its
not something that I'm prepared to answer right now. But I
would only repeat what I just said, that it is meant to be
a step towards a situation in which there aren't any nuclear
weapons, and under those circumstances there can't be any
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-Li lora 35
nuclear war, no matter what other kinds of mistakes people may
make,
One last comment: Gloria Emerson is probably right (at
least the oddsare on her side hen she said it was probably
hopeless to get upV*Treduce the number of weapons-Te-nave-T-ft194-
/A
Ctlitefft-a-1- But I think that even with
the odds being on her
side, we simply have to keep trying, especially 11 itho were so
involved in getting us in this situation in the first place.
She may be right, but I'm going to keep trying to get the
number down.
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Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 8 Oct 1973
Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the
fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situa-
tions in which they are appropriate are quite different today
than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this.
Some reasons such as the achievement of nuclear balance by
the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent. Others such
as the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic
and economic purposes may change tomorrow.
The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military
balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford
detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or con-
quest. The primary role of our military forces7today is t
preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish.
This balance, is a dynamic matter. This means that we must
continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces
and how we employ them to meet the demands of balance.
In doing this we must first achieve equilibrium of
strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was an attempt to dampen
strategic arms competition, but I do not believe we and the
Soviets have yet reached a state of sufficient trust and
confidence necessary to achieve an assuring balance. Dr. York
may be correct then. Today there is already substantial over-
kill capacity on both sides. Yet, what he calls overkill or
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overinsurance may be the only practical substitute for mutual
trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers on the triggers
of nuclear holocaust it may not be all bad. The primary viture
in reducing overkill, Dr. York contends, is in reducing the
effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear exchange should
occur. It seems to me, though, that our primary concern should
be to ensure that no such exchange ever occurs.
We must search for a new strategy for world security
which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war.
For instance, perhaps deliberate efforts to translate some
of our investment in nuclear Weapons into joint economic
adventures within each other's territory could eventually
put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in
super power relations.
In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance
should be a positive one of searching for steps that will
promote equilibrium and confidence. The result, hopefully
will be a smaller and less costly force, but its composition
may be somewhat different from what we have today and
additional investment expenditure may be required to attain
it. In short much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting
strategy it may be incompatible with the requirements to
achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic
multi-polar world.
2
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Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so
it is in (what we label as) general purpose forces. As
enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, we must rely on our
principal allies for assistance in maintaining enough
warfighting capability to deter aggression. It is, how-
ever, the U.S. military contribution to this common objective
which provides the essential linkage to our nuclear power.
Without that, our allies would be subject to nuclear black-
mail. This does not mean that we must maintain a capability
for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining defense
?budget simply does not permit us to do that in any event.
The defense budget of $79 billion in outlays being considered by
the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in purchasing
power. In fact President Nixon's FY 1974 National Defense Budget
is the lowest in real terms since FY 1951. There are three
fundamental factors which push the size of the defense budget
upward in terms of current dollars, but which have no effect on
the actual defense we are purchasing. These are:
? First, a promisory note in the form of
military retirement benefits is coming
due. This is a cost of past wars. It
makes today's budget of $5 billion
higher than that of a decade ago.
3
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? Second, an artificial subsidy to the
defense budget in the form of the draft
has been removed. This has added several
billions to the defense budget in FY 1974.
? Third, the Defense Department suffers from
the same general inflation which affects us
all. This has been over 64-percent since
1964. This amounts to $33 billion in FY 1974,
when compared with FY 1964.
We also have an obligation to provide military balance
in relations with the Third World. Hopefully this will
induce abstension of the major powers and discourage
adventurism on the part of those nations themselves, either
of which could be dangerously escalatory. Clearly the
Soviets are increasing their military activities in the
Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air
defense forces, and by the increasing display of their
growing naval forces. We need not try to match meter by
meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability
cn our part, we can expect these Third World nations to
succumb to military pressures. For example one might
reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President
Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their
"advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the
United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediter-
ranean Sea. To express a personal opinion, even though the
U.S. is not an ally of Egypt our visible military force on the
scene might well have been the latent potential support which
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In summary, our military force structure and employment
practices must change under these new circumstances, as Mr.
Clifford mentioned. The motivating pressure to achieve this
must not be an obsession simply to cut forces and defense
dollars. Such an approach could upset the delicate balance
of force which we have sought and which has made the current
steps toward detente feasible. Rather, our purpose should
be to examine continuously What minimum size and shape
military force will best preserve that balance. We have a
responsibility here not only to ourselves, but to all those
others who aspire to freedom 'and human dignity. While we
clearly must achknowledge the limits on our power and on the
scope of our national interests, the people of this country,
I am confident, are not willing to turn their backs on the
contribution that our example and support can give to those
struggling for what we have been given as our heritage.
5
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Remarks Delivered by VADM Stansfield Turner
at Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 October 1973
At least one or two of you want a lesser military establish-
ment in this country. That is not a new message to those of us
in uniform, but it is one we should be careful to understand.
At the same time, I receive less than a clear signal as to
exactly what purposes many of you wish our military forces to
serve. Defining what the military should not do or weapons it
should not have, does not provide adequate guidance to carry
out mandates. There seem to be unresolved issues both as to
the criteria for cltermining military forces add as to the
burdeh which such forces impose on the resources of the nation.
For instance Dr. York has made a constructive suggestion
for reducing nuclear weapons based on the criteria of minimizing
collateral damage to innocent bystanders if nuclear war should
occur. I support this objective. However, our primary objec-
tive above all others, it seems to me, is to prevent nuclear
war from ever occuring. I would welcome a discussion as to
what effect Dr. York's proposed force reductions would have
on this primary objective. There is more to this issue than
mere numbers of missiles. The problem is compounded first by
technical questions of warhead yield, accuracy, throw weight,
and survivability. But even more important it is also com-
pounded by the perceptions shared by us and our allies as well
as those of any potential antagonist.
For instance, one key reason that we are easing into
detente today is that there is a perceived balance of strategic
weapons between us and the Soviets. If either of us felt
vulnerable to the other, detente would be out of the question.
The test of any step to reduce strategic nuclear forces should
be whether it promotes equilibrium and confidence. For this
reason I support the intent of Dr. York's proposals, but feel
that the practical method of approach is to proceed step by
step in a series of negotiations to limit strategic weapons.
We need equilibrium or balance in the field of conventional
weapons as well, if detente is to remain a reality. Therefore,
I believe that the central criteria for shaping our non-nuclear
forces must be the resultant state of balance with those of the
Soviet Union. Mr Clifford does not appear to agree with this,
but I raise this cardinal issue in the hope of providing our
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dialogue a focal point of logic. I am concerned with out
strength relative to the Soviets because I find few instances
in history when a thajor nation voluntarily forsook a marked
military advantage over a rival. This even applies to what
I consider the most magnanimous nation in history, a nation
which, when it possessed a monopoly in nuclear weapons, pressed
for a policy of containments, not detente. Hence, I can not
accept Mr. Clifford's plea for further reductions on our
part based solely on considerations of our side of the equation.
Now acknowledging the value of considering military balance
need not lead automatically to larger U.S. forces. The Soviets
may be foolish in building up their forces; the Soviets may
indeed be benign, the Soviets may in fact just be waiting to
follow our example or it may not be inexpedient for us to be
out of balance somewhat. I doubt these possibilities, but I
do suggest that it is not meaningful to talk about aL$69 billion
defense budget without being explicit about the impact it would
have on military balance. If it appears that it would result
in a balance markedly unfavorable to us, it could well lead
the Soviets away from a policy of detente to one of isolating
the united States. Advocates of detente should be those most
anxious to consider this point. Finally, and again for the
purpose of focusing the dialogue, I would like to set some
basic facts straight.
No matter how you manipulate the statistics, there is no
way that you can prove that our Defense budget is increasing
in purchasing power or that it is distorting the economy of
the United States. It is unfair and inaccurate to cite the
military budget as the cause of inflation or of shortages of
funds_for other purposes. The facts are that defense expen-
ditures have increases only 1 billion in current $ since 1968
while total federal budget expenditures have increased by $90
billion. So defense is not the primary cause of inflation.
Mr. Clifford states that the purchasing power of this
year's non-Vietnam defense budget is higher than last year's.
He pointed out that this comparison was based on the assumption
that the Congress would give the President all he requested for
Defense. This is highly unlikely.
2
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Even disregarding this unlikely assumption, there is no
trend of real increase because we have two new bills to pay:
? First, a promissory note in the form of
military retirement benefits is coming
due. This is a cost of past wars. It
takes about $4 billion more of today's
budget than that of that a decade ago.
? Second, an artificial subsidy to the
defense budget, or a free good in the
form of the draft has been removed.
This has added about $3 billion to the
defense budget.
The hard facts are that our force structure is going down.
You simply can not obscure a drop from pre-Vietnam levels of
47% of the Navy's ships, or of 20% of the Army's divisions,
or of 17% of the manpower of all of the services, for instance.
I am not arguing for the moment that our forces should
necessarily be larger, but simply pointing out that there has
been a very real decline in military force levels over the
past 5 to 8 years. In contrast, the Brookings Institution
states that Soviet expenditures on defense in real purchasing
power have been increasing at a rate of at least 5 percent
a year for the past 14 years.
All this is not to say that force reductions are not
possible on our side, on the Soviet side or by mutual actions.
I am concerned, though, that if military balance has been
one factor in opening the door to detente, we may want to
proceed cautiously in upsetting that balance. We do not want
to engage in the American tradition of over-reaction to a
war. We all want to place more emphasis on standards of
living, on the prevention of crime, on ,improving the atmosphere ?
and on the general quality of American life. We do not want,
however, to delude ourselves into hoping that a slice off the
defense budget can solve all the problems that beset a $1.3
billion economy. Nor do we want to judge how much military
strength we need on whether we believe that we are wise enough
to utilize it sagely. We are a rational people with all the
capability that we need to shape our destiny through positive
choices not negative ones. This convocation is evidence of that
and should help us to make the difficult choices which lie ahead
in positive manner.
3
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10/6/73
Version II
Proposed Short Form
Remarks by VADM. StanSfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 Oct 1973
The essential ingredient of today's moves toward detente
is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets
could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military
pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces
today is to preserve that strategic balance so that detente
can flourish. Balance is a dynamic matter. This means that
we must continuously adapt the size and shape of our military
forces and how we employ them to meet the demands of balance.
In doing this we must first achieve equilibrium of
strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was an attempt to dampen
strategic arms competition, but we and the Soviets have not
yet reached a state of sufficient trust and confidence
necessary to achieve an assuring balance. Today there may alrea-di -
substantial overkill capacity on both sides, as Dr. York contends.
Overkill or overinsurance may be the only practical
substitute for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes
fingers on the triggers of nuclear holocaust itmay not be
all bad. The primary virtue in reducing overkill, Dr. York
points out, is in reducing the effects on innocent bystanders
if a nuclear exchange should occur. I submit, though, that
the proper measure for sizing nuclear arsenals is the
resultant probability that no nuclear exchange ever occurs.
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We must search for a new strategy for world security
which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war.
For instance,-f5dfhaps deliberate efforts to translate some
of our investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic
adventures within each other's territory could eventually put
elf interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in super
power relations.
Our approach to strategic nuclear balance
should be a positive one of searching for steps that will
promote equilibrium, and confidence, to reduce force levels
and not just a search for ways. In shortimuch as we may wish
to adopt a force-cutting strategy it may be incompatible with
the requirements to achieve and .sustain a nuclear equilibrium
in a dynamic multi-polar world.
To mei this means that we should consider the size and
scope of Soviet military power as the central criteria for
shaping U.S. forces. This is a fundamental proposition with
which, I suspect, Mr. Clifford and others of you here would
not agree. I believe it not because I suspect the Soviets of
less than honorable intentions when they speak softly of
detente while they simultaneously increase the size of their big
stick. I believe it for two reasons, First, I do not want
to put our security and the freedoms that we defend at the
sufferance of the good will and unilateral restraint of any
other nations, especially any that place a markedly different
2
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value on the individual and his rights. Secondly, I believe
that history shows that if one nation holds a clear advantage
over another, it is not likely to forsake that advantage in
favor of detente. We certainly did not during our nuclear
monopoly. We can use detente to encourage mutual force
reductions. But any unilateral impulse to military imbalance
willsurely?kill?tiet-ente.
Whether you can agree with this or not, I think that we
should get some basic facts straight. Budget numbers can be
manipulated in many fashions. There is no way, however, that
numbrology can prove that our military force posture is
improving relative to the Soviets. According to estimates
of the Brookings Institution, real Soviet defense expenditures
have been increasing at the rate of over 7% a year since 1960.
IN the past 5 years, the military force structure of the United
States has been cut by 30%. Now military men like their
forces, as Mr. Clifford well knows. They do not cut like this
if they are receiving more each year than the last. The
Brookings statistics clearly show that in terms of constant
dollars this year's defense budget is as low as any since 1964.
This does not even consider two quite new charges that must
be paid from that budget:
3
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? First, a promisory note in the form of
military retirement benefits is coming due.
This is a cost of past wars. It makes
today's budget about $4 billion higher
than that of a decade ago.
? Second, an artificial subsidy to the
defense budget in the form of the draft
has been removed. This has added about
$3 billion to the defense budget in FY 1974.
Thus in comparable purchasing power today's budget is
about $7 billion below that of a decade ago before we even
talk of inflation.
In the past five years defense spending has dropped from
40%' to 20%, of the federal budget, and to the lowest.;percentage
of GNP in 2 decades. Thus, the defense budget can not be a
principal cause of inflation. If you want to slash at
Defense, do so in recognition that either you are following a
tradition of American over reaction following a war, -
or that with Soviet forces going up and U.S. forces coming
sharply down, you are willing to base national security more
on the intent of the Soviets than on the capability of the
United States.
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Remarks Delivered by VADM Stansfield Turner
at Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 October 1973
At least one or two of you want a lesser military establish-
ment in this country. That is not a new message to those of us
in uniform, but it is one we should be careful to understand.
At the same time, I receive less than a clear signal as to
exactly what purposes many of you wish our military forces to
serve. Defining what the military should not do or weapons it
should not have, does not provide adequate guidance to carry
out mandates. There seem to be unresolved issues both as to
the criteria for determining military forces and as to the
burden which such forces impose on the resources of the nation.
For instance Dr. York has made a constructive suggestion
for reducing nuclear weapons based on the criteria of minimizing
collateral damage to innocent bystanders if nuclear war should
occur. I support this objective. However, our primary objec-
tive above all others, it seems to me, is to prevent nuclear
war from ever occuring. I would welcome a discussion as to _
what effect Dr. York's proposed force reductions would have
on this primary objective. There is more to this issue than
mere numbers of missiles. The problem is compounded first by
technical questions of warhead yield, accuracy, throw weight,
and survivability. But even more important it is also com-
pounded by the perceptions shared by us and our allies as well
as those of any potential antagonist.
For instance, one key reason that we are easing into
detente today is that there is a perceived balance of strategic
weapons between us and the Soviets. If either of us felt
vulnerable to the other, detente would be out of the question.
The test of-any step to reduce strategic nuclear forces should
be whether it promotes equilibrium and confidence. For this
reason I support the intent of Dr. York's proposals, but feel
that the practical method of approach is to proceed step by
step in a series of negotiations to limit strategic weapons.
We need equilibrium or balance in the field of conventional
weapons as well, if detente is to remain a reality. Therefore,
I believe that the central criteria for shaping our non-nuclear
forces must be the resultant state of balance with those of the
Soviet Union. Mr Clifford does not appear to agree with this,
but I raise this cardinal issue in the hope of providing our
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dialogue a focal point of logic. I am concerned with out
strength relative to the Soviets because I find few instances
in history when a Major nation voluntarily forsook a marked
military advantage over a rival. This even applies to what
I consider the most magnanimous nation in history, a nation
which, when it possessed a monopoly in nuclear weapons, pressed
for a policy of containments, not detente. Hence, I can not
accept Mr. Clifford's plea for further reductions on our
part based solely on considerations of our side of the equation.
Now acknowledging the value of considering military balance
need not lead automatically to larger U.S. forces. The Soviets
may be foolish in building up their forces; the Soviets may
indeed be benign, the Soviets may in fact just be waiting to
follow our example or it may not be inexpedient for us to be
out of balance somewhat. I doubt these possibilities, but I
do suggest that it is not meaningful to talk about a-$69 billion
defense budget without being explicit about the impact it would
have on military balance. If it appears that it would result
in a balance markedly unfavorable to us, it could well lead _
the Soviets away from a policy of detente to one of isolating
the united States. Advocates of detente should be those most
anxious to consider this point. Finally, and again for the
purpose of focusing the dialogue, I would like to set some
basic facts straight.
No matter how you manipulate the statistics, there is no
way that you can prove that our Defense budget is increasing
in purchasing power or that it is distorting the economy of
the United States. It is unfair and inaccurate to cite the
military budget as the cause of inflation or of shortages of
funds .for other purposes. The facts are that defense expen-
ditures have increases only 1 billion in current $ since 1968
while total federal budget expenditures have increased by $90
billion. So defense is not the primary cause of inflation.
Mr. Clifford states that the purchasing power of this
year's non-Vietnam defense budget is higher than last year's.
He pointed out that this comparison was based on the assumption
that the Congress would give the President all he requested for
Defense. This is highly unlikely.
2
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Even disregarding this unlikely assumption, there is no
trend of real increase because we have two new bills to pay:
? First, a promissory note in the form of
military retirement benefits is coming
due. This is a cost of past wars. It
? takes about $4 billion more of today's
budget than that of that a decade ago.
? Second, an artificial subsidy to the
defense budget, or a free good in the
form of the draft has been removed.
This has added about $3 billion to the
defense budget.
The hard facts are that our force structure is going down.
You simply can not obscure a drop from pre-Vietnam levels of
47% of the Navy's ships, or of 20% of the Army's divisions,
or of 17% of the manpower of all of the services, for instance.
I am not arguing for the moment that our forces should
necessarily be larger, but simply pointing out that there has
been a very real decline in military force levels over the
past 5 to 8 years. In contrast, the Brookings Institution
states that Soviet expenditures on defense in real purchasing
power have been increasing at a rate of at least 5 percent
a year for the past 14 years.
All this is not to say that force reductions are not
possible on our side, , on the Soviet side or by mutual actions.
I am concerned, though,.that if military balance has been
one factor in opening the door to detente, we may want to
proceed cautiously in upsetting that balance. we do not want
to engage in the American tradition of over-reaction to a
war. We all want to place more emphasis on standards 'of
living, on the prevention of crime, on improving the atmosphere
and on the general quality of American life. We do not want,
however, to delude ourselves into hoping that a slice off the
defense budget can solve all the problems that beset a $1.3
billion economy. Nor do we want to judge how much military
strength we need on whether we believe that we are wise enough
to utilize it sagely. We are a rational people with all the
capability that we need to shape our destiny through positive
choices not negative ones. This convocation is evidence of that
and should help us to make the difficult choices which lie ahead
in positive manner.
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1/1 (
\
f
Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 October 1973
the last 24 hours I have gained the impression that
a military 's opinion might not be auto'- ically accepted
as valid by thi audience. When I c. e up _ on the platform
this evening and looked down i 0 this group here assembled
I was instantly reminde
before he entered the
retribution this
Colleg
subjec
1
how paniel must have felt just
' den. Then I realized what just
? 1
ight be. For
past year at the Naval War
have recruited many non-
litary speakers and
d them to the test of appearing befo
s ? ? ? -
several hundred
So far my experiences at this convocation have_ r
messa e that
/view
\..cappiamalt. at least one or t ouipiant a lqx,ser
military
141,va40, m;,,/
)c establishment in this country. HouemPr T Alq.n rrInfinue+te receive
less than a clear signal/1 as to exa tly what purposes many of you
wis our military foce t
(APIZ
should nor does not/provide adequate guidance
Defining what the milit ry
unrpsolved issues both as to the criteria
itary forces and as to the burden, which such
forcgjimpose on the resources of the nation
For instance Dr. York h,s made a constructive suggestion
for reducing nuclear weapons based on, the criteria of r-edur-krtg
There seem to be
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the-probraiso+4itTmePf collate al damage innocent bystanders if
nuclear war should occur.
I support thgo4jective
:-,
co..11a4eaAmmiaamaqe .2 ever, our &aterg'S abbve all others, it
seems to me,/
is to prevent nuclear war from ever occur ng aIT
/
I would welcOme a discrsion as to what effect( toposed force
I
reductions would have /on this primary objective . There is more
to this issuelthth mere numbers of missiles. The problem is
i
1 , I
compounded jtechni
r'
throw
\
throw weight, and survivabilityto-lipso7ttre". But even more
4,/ i,-.=)64,-, 0 ,.-., f -e
t e
important than-44eae-quentittive-i-ssues., -iiever, awn the pf_r_22ELions
shared by us and our allies as well as those of any potential
//1 questions of warhead
yield, accuracy,
antagonist.
or instance, one key reason that we are easing into detente
/toda is that there is a perceived balance of strategic weapons/
/I between us and the Soviets. If either of us felt vulnerable to
the other,/ detente would be out of the question./ The test of
//
any step to reduce strategic nuclear forces should be whether it
promotes equilibrium and confidence
aRagiaiDa. For this reason I support
/
the intent of Dr. York 6 proposals but feel that the practical
method of approach is to proceed step by step in a series of
/negotiation,s with-the-Snvie*M,
and-rinde.ed-a-1-1---Fitte-kear potAre rs, to ,
gradually limit strategic weapons
We need equilibrium or balance in the field of conventional
weapons as well, if detente is to remain a reality.
that
have--lear ned that a capability
fox massive
,...Le.taliat.44344--does-not automatIcally make? us fee/ safe from superior
2
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cara-v.e.m.t.thaal.tazzga,-
lo/9/73
Version II
Therefore, I believe that the central
criteria for shaping our non-nuclear forces/
must be the
resultant state of balpnce with thpse of the So 'Union.
,-?
-,- ' ,---V ' I 4-' ,0 J."4 _,.,-,7 ",' I-
Clifford appekar.e-te-hee s force leyel requIrements- on .an )
/
--1
jaP.X'PAsian of Soviet intent rather- than the realities of
? f.", '
th.
/raise this cardinal issue. in the hope of providing
I am concerned with our
our dialogue a focal point of logic
strength relative to the Soviets because I find few instances
in history whefte a majoi nation voluntarily forsook/a marked
\
military advantage over a rival./
This even applies to what I
/consider the most magnanimous nation in history a nation which,
when it possessed a monopoly in nuclear weapons,/ pressed for a
i
policy of containment, not detente./ Hence, I can not accept
Mr.
1 Clifford's plea for further reductions on our part/based
& -,
n considerations aiani4Mkt- Palk- -k
/
14e)
acknow1ed4Ithe value df onsidering militar balanc
Aoneed not lead aut atically to larger U.S. forces./ The
Soviets may be foolish in building up their forces; the Soviet
I
may indeed be benign the Soviets may in fact just be waiting
/7

to follow our example. /It may not be inexpedient for u to be out
rk...,-) i
/of balance somewhat- I d9ubt these possibilities, but I do suggest
ithat it is not meaningful to talk about a $69 billion defense
----,,
budget/ without be ng explicit about the impact/it would have on
military balance. If it appears ?that it would result in
a balance markedly unfavorable to us,
3
could well lead the
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Soviets away from a policy of detente to one of isolating the
/United States./ Advocat s of detente 'should be those most anxious
to consider this point. Finally, and again for the purpose of
focusing the dialogue I would like to set some basic facts
straight.
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il
No matter how you manipulate the statistics, there is no
I
way that you can prove that our Defense budget is increasing
s,-....,-?,?.....
in purchasing power or that it is distorting the economy of the
United States. It is unfair and ina curate to cite the military
/
or
budgeti as the cause of inflation/, hortages of funds for other
6
purposes.
The facts a reCthat defen expen
CA/ .
dollars' have increased 41)billion since 1968
tures i41.-imaamee-rime
while total federal
budget expenditures have increased by $90 billion
_114r. Clifford states that the purchasing power
Awv''VAt't41041\
'defense budget is igher than last year's.
A
tlale.,...ElasIdala,t-reali&coted this
Grang-tas.s-appr-epimi-erted--1-tear- and_aast___yg_a_rConjoed
$5chil1ion-off the Preside
's
Even dismarding thOtattacy of-this-apple ,nd_clranges
-simp.r.oach, the cridget-does-h-ot show any. trend of increase because
we have two new bills to pay:
0 First, a promissory not
retirement benefits
in the form of military
coming
past wars. It bout
/today's budget than of that a decade ago.
due. This is a cost of *4,,
$4 billion more of
4 Second, an artificial subsidy to the defense budget,
or a free good in the form of the draft has been removed.
This has added about $3 billion to the defense budge
The hard hard facts are that our force structure is going down. /1
You simply can not obscure a drop from pre-Vietn m levelsof 47
/
4
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1
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Version II
of the Navy's ships or of 20% of the Army's divisions, oro
17% of the manpower of all of the services for instance. I am
not arguing for the moment that our forces should necessarily be
larger, but simply pointing out that there has been a very
real ecline in military force levels over the past 5 to 8 years.
In contrast, the Brookings Institution states
that Soviet expenditures
on defense in real purchasing power have been increasing at a
11 ----'
rate of at least 5 percent a yeaj for the past 14 years
///All this is not to say that force reductions are not Possible/
on
l
on our side, on the Soviet side or by mutual actionsj I am
concerned, though, that if military balance
in opening the door
to detente
in upsetting that b lance.i/f
We do not want to
has been one facto
we may want to proceed cautiously
engage in the
American tradition/of over-reaction to a war. We all want to
Tr'
place more emphasis on standards of living, on the prevention of
crime,// on improving the atmosphere and on the general quality of
American life. We do not want, however, to delude ourselvesl//
in hoping that a slice off of the defense budget can solve all
,t41Qe problems that beset a $1.3 billion economy Nor do we
want to judge how much litary stre gth we nee on whether we
believe that we w4,-314- lize it
/ We are a rational
/
.-----0,
peopl with all the capability that we need/t shape our destiny
through positive choices not negative ones.
/7
ffitAfv0V
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PROPOSED AD LIB COMMENT
What do our national interests require that we be able
to accomplish with military power? I believe that there are
3 things:
The first is to deter strategic nuclear warfare. There
is, of course, room for considerable debate on what kind and
size of forces are required for deterrence. Dr. York, however/
has led our debate away from this issue by working from a simplistic
assumption that fewer forces are better.
The second objective in having military forces today is to
deter Soviet military adventures in Western Europe and to
reassure our European allies that they need not accede to the
threats and btandishments of Soviet military and political
power. Again there is room for debate on how much and what kind
of force this requires. Mr. Clifford has. led us away from
this basic issue by arguing over whether this year's force
structure is larger. or smaller than last.
Thirdly, we need military force today to preserve a military
balance in the so-called Third World. How other than with the
Sixth Fleet would we this very evening be able to show U.S.
determination that the present hostilities in the Mid East not be
allowed to expand and to engulf us. Our national interests in
obtaining raw materials from the Third World, including oil,
and exporting to pay for these imports are greater today than
ever. Admiral La Rocque in his written diatribes continually
attempts to steer us away from this issue. He downgrades aircraft
carriers because they are not needed, in his view, to defend our
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continental shores. He Egnores the fact that our national in-
terests have, do and for the indefinite future will extend well
past that continental shore line.
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Version III
Remarks by VADM Stansfiled Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 9 OCT 1973
The subject of this portion of our conference is "National
Interests and Military Forces." Our-task\is to define our
national interests, and then determine what military forces
are desirable to support those interests. The approach offered
by both Mx. Clifford and Dr. York is that they simply would
reduce the size of our military forces. This "out of context"
approach to defining military force levels is quite unconvincin4.
Dr. York comes closest to a constructive statement of
national interests when he states that we should reduce the
probability of collateral damage to innocent bystander nations
if nuclear war should ensue. I suggest that this is not of
primary national interest. Our interest above all others,
it seems to me, is to prevent nuclear war from occuring at
all. Surely Dr. York owes us an explanation of the impact
his proposed reductions in strategic nuclear forces would
have on this primary objective. If a redundancy or overkill
does exist, is it not likely that this reduces the urgency
of response in a crisis? Overkill or overinsurance may be
our only practical substitute for mutual trust and confidence.
Additionally, one key reason we are easing into detente today
is that a near balance of strategic weaponry exists between
us and the Soviets. If either of us felt vulnerable to the
other, detente would be out of the question.
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We must at least weigh whether Dr. York's humanitarian
impulses toward those innocent bystanders in the event of a
holocaust, might, then, impair detente and increase the likelihood
of the kind of war we must avoid at all costs.
I would suggest a more positive approach to this problem
of nuclear weapons. We must search for a new strategy -for
world security which contains inherent incentives for avoiding
nuclear war. For instance, perhaps deliberate efforts to
translate some of our investment in nuclear weapons into joint
economic adventures within each other's territory could
eventually put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor
in super power relations. In the interim, our approach to
strategic nuclear balance should be a positive one of
searching for steps that will promote equilibrium and confidence.
We need equilibrium or balance in the field of conventional
weapons as well, if detente is to remain a reality. Surely
both we and the Soviets have learned that we cannot feel safe
from superior conventional forces simply because either could
retaliate massively. In short, I believe that we must consider
the size and scope of Soviet military forces as the central
criteria for shaping our own. It is curious that Mr. Clifford
makes no mention of either the Soviet positions or actions. Surely
he has reasons for not being concerned whether comparative
trends in conventional military forces will give us an advantage,
or the Soviets, or neither.
2
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While I doubt that I can persuade Mr. Clifford on this
point. I will, state my. reasons for not ignoring this cardinal
issue so that our debate can have a focal point in logic.
I am not concerned with our strength relative to the Soviets
simply because. Mr..Brezhnev states .as he did publicly on 19.
September; "It stands to reason that the class war in the inter-
national arena - the opposition of socialism and capitalism-
will continue. As before, the social structure of.states
belonging to different social systems with different reigning
ideologies remains diametrically.opposed." After all, the
nuances of public rhetoric are subject to misinterpretation,
especially between different cultures and ideologies. I do
not even base my positionon the views of a man like Professor
Sakharov who shares Brezhnev's culture and ideology. Rather,
prefer to survey the record of history. I find no instance
where a major nation voluntarily forsook a' markedmilitary
advantage over a rival. This even applies to what I consider
the most magnanimous nation in history, which when possessing
a monopoly in nuclear weapons- pressed for containment, not
detente. Hence,. I can not accept Mr. Clifford's willingness
to consider further force reductions on our side based on
unilateral actions alone.
At least we must ask what the Soviet response might be.
We do not have to impute malevolence to them to understand that
they are not likely to follow suit. With a Chinese threat
3
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to the east any Soviet leader would be cautious in reducing
force levels. With restive satellites to the west, he would
think twice before reducing force levels. With a long tradition
of using force to ensure domestic security and order, any
Soviet leader would go slowly in lowering military readiness.
A Soviet force level compatible with these requirements is very
likely to be seen by us and others as a threat. It will
certainly express political leverage. Whether we care about this
or not, we should not talk of $69 B defense budgets without an
awareness that a balance unfavorable to us would inevitably
result; and this in itself would likely force the Svoiets away
from a policy of detente to one of isolating the United States.
Finally, before we debate whether the Soviet's
comparative military position should be taken into account,
we must set some basic facts straight.
No matter how you manipulate statistics, there is no
way you can prove that our Defense Department is getting
wealthy, healthy or more powerful at present budget levels.
Mr. Clifford has, of course, shown that this year's
budget is higher than last by comparing what the President
requested this year with what Congress appropriated last
year, after lopping $51B off the request.
Even disregarding this fallacy, there is no way the
purchasing power of this year's budget can show any trend
of increase over the past. Over and above inflation, we
have two new bills to be paid:
4
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? First, a promisory note in the form of
military retirement benefits is coming due.
This is a cost of past wars. It requires
about $4 billion more of today's budget
than of that a decade ago.
? Second, an artificial subsidy to the
defense budget in the form of the draft
has been removed. This has added about
$3 billion to the defense budget in FY 1974.
The point is, our force structure is going down - you
just can not obscure a drop from 976 to 527 ships, in the
Navy, or of 410,000 men in all Services. Leaving aside
for the moment the issue of whether we want or need to
increase or even maintain our force capability; there is
no way hard statistics can obscure our precipitate
decline in military capabilities over the past 5 - 3 years.
statistic that Soviet expenditures on defense in real
purchasing power have been increasing 7% yearly for 14
years. If it was an approximate military balance that
opened the door to detente - the present trends will kill
it. If you want to slash at Defense, do so in recognition
that either you are following a tradition of American over-
reaction following a wax or that with Soviet forces going
up and U.S. forces coming sharply down, you are willing
to base national security more on the intent of the
Soviets than the capability of the United States.
5
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ADMIRAL LA ROCQUE
? Admiral La Rocque would be more helpful if he would give us some
idea what he is for. Nowhere in his writings is there any expresion
of what he wants the U.S. military establishment to accomplish. If
he would tell us that, we could offer professional judgment on what it
would require.
Without any idea of what Admiral LaRocque wnats the Navy to
accomplish, it is senseless to argue over 12 carriers or 11 or 20.
!PRIM-NT _SUB _STRETCH-DUT _1020E & CONS
1. Trident has been attacked regularly tonight.
2. I note that no one says that he wants to dispense with it - just delay
it. I hope that is what they intend.
3. If so let us look at the benefits & liabilities. The benefit is
deferring an immediate expenditure of money for a year or two, perhaps
800 million $. We all like to defer expenses because of the cost_of
money. Against the two year's of interest charge on this $800 m
we must balance_the risk that we will need Trident sooner than 1980.
T assume that everyone wants to proceed with Trident because sea
based deterrent forces are recognized as the most survivable element
of our deterrent. Now no one can say with certainty that 1978 will
be the critical year, or 1979 or 1980, but, so much rests upon
maintaining our second strike deterrent, that I suggest that prudence
may be on the side of caution of paying the small expense of being
ready sooner rather than too late.
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ADMIRAL LA ROCQUE
Admiral La Rocque would be more helpful if he would give us some
idea what he is for. Nowhere in his writings is there any expresion
of what he wants the U.S. military establishment to accomplish'. If
he would tell us that, we could offer professional judgment.on what it
would require.
Without any idea of what Admiral LaRocque wnats the Navy to
accomplish, it is senseless to argue over. 12 carriers or 11 or 20.
TRTnENT _SUB -STRETCH-_OILT___PMDS & CONS
1. Trident has been attacked regularly tonight.
2. I note that no one says that he wants to dispense with it - just delay
it. I hope that is what they intend.
3. If so let us look at the benefits & liabilities. The benefit is
deferring an immediate expenditure of money for a year or two, perhaps
800 million $. We all like to defer,expenses because of the cost,of
money. Against the two year's of_interest.charge on this $800 m
we must balance_the risk that-we will. need Trident sooner than.1980.
T assume that everyone wants to proceed with Trident because sea
based deterrent forces are recognized as the most survivable element
of our deterrent. Now no one.can say .with certainty that 1978 will
be the critical year, or 1979 or 1980, but, so much rests upon
maintaining our second strike deterrent, that I suggest that prudence
may be on the side of caution of paying the small expense of being
ready sooner rather than too late.
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ADMIRAL LA ROCQUE
? Admiral La Rocque would be more helpful if he would give us some
idea what he is for. Nowhere in his writings is there any expresion
of what he wants the U.S. military establishment to accomplish. If
he would tell us that, we could offer professional judgment on what it
would require.
Without any idea of what Admiral LaRocque wnats the Navy to
accomplish, it is senseless to argue over. 12 carriers or 11 or 20.
?TIRTnRNT _SUB ,c1,Rprprm-pn9'_T1OS 4s, CONS
1. Trident has been attacked regularly tonight.
2. I note that no one says that he wants to dispense with it - just delay
it. I hope that is what they intend.
3. If so let us look at the benefits & liabilities. The benefit is
deferring an immediate expenditure of money for a year or two, perhaps
800 million $. We all like to defer expenses because of the cost of
money. Against the two year's of_interest charge on this $800 m
we must balance_the risk that_we will need Trident sooner than 1980.
T assume that everyone wants to proceed with Trident because sea
based deterrent forces are recognized as the most survivable element
of our deterrent. Now no one can say with certainty that 1978 will
be the critical year, or 1979 or 1980, but, so much rests upon
maintaining our second strike deterrent, that I suggest that prudence
may be on the side of caution of paying the small expense of being
ready sooner rather than too late.
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ADMIRAL LA ROCQUE
Admiral La Rocque would be more helpful if he would give us some
idea what he is for. Nowhere in his writings is there any expresion
of what he wants the U.S. military establishment to accomplish. If
he would tell us that, we could offer professional judgment on what it
would require.
Without any idea of what Admiral LaRocque wnats the Navy to
accomplish, it is senseless to argue over. 12 carriers or 11 or 20.
min= StV sTIRPTCH-OUT _PROS _& CONS
1. Trident has been attacked regularly tonight.
2. I note that no one says that he wants to dispense with it - just delay
it. I hope that is what they intend.
3. If so let us look at the benefits & liabilities. The benefit is
deferring an immediate expenditure of money for a year or two, perhaps
800 million $. We all.like to defer expenses because of the cost of
money. Against the two year's of_interest charge on this $800 in
we must balance_the risk that_we will. need Trident sooner than 1980.
T assume that everyone wants to proceed with Trident because sea
based deterrent forces are recognized as the most survivable element
of our deterrent. Now no one.can say with certainty that 1978 will
be the critical year, or 1979 or 1980, but, so much rests upon
maintaining our second strike deterrent, that I suggest that prudence
may be on the side of caution of paying the small expense of being
ready sooner rather than too late.
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
ADMIRAL LA ROCQUE
Admiral La Rocque would be more helpful if he would give us some
idea what he is for. Nowhere in his writings is there any expresion_
of what he wants the U.S. military establishment to accomplish. If
he would tell us that, we could offer professional judgment on what it
would require.
Without any idea of what Admiral LaRocque wnats the Navy to
accomplish, it is senseless to argue over. 12 carriers or 11 or 20.
TIRTnPNT_SUB STRETCH-011T_PROS & CONS
1. Trident has been attacked regularly tonight.
2. I note that no one says that he wants to dispense with it - just delay
it. I hope that is what they intend.
3. If so let us look at the benefits & liabilities. The benefit is
deferring an immediate expenditure of money for a year ortwo, perhaps
800 million $. We all like to defer_expenses because of.the cost.of
money. Against the two year's of_interest charge on this $800 m
we must balance_the risk that-we will. need Trident sooner than.1980.
assume that everyone wants to proceed with Trident because sea
based deterrent forces are recognized as the most survivable element
of our deterrent. Now no one can say with certainty that 1978 will
be the critical year, or 1979 or 1980, but, so much rests upon
maintaining our second strike deterrent, that I suggest that prudence
may be on the side of caution of paying the small expense of being
ready sooner rather than too late.
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 8 Oct 1973
Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the
fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situa-
tions in which they are appropriate are quite different today
than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this.
Some reasons such as the achievement of nuclear balance by
the Soviets, are almost Certainly permanent. Others such
as the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic
and economic purposes may-change tomorrow.
The. essential ingredient of today's detente is the military
balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford
detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or con-
quest. -The primary role of our military forces -today is .to
preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish.
This balance is a dynamic matter. This means that we must
continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces
and how we employ them to meet the demands of balance.
In doing this we must first achieve equilibrium of.
strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was an attempt to dampen
strategic arms competition, but I do not believe we and the
Soviets have yet reached a state of sufficient trust and
confidence necessary to achieve an assuring balance. Dr. York
may be correct then. Today there is already substantial over-
kill capacity on both sides. Yet, what he calls overkill or
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
overinsurance may be the only practical substitute for mutual
trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers on the triggers
of nuclear holocaust it may not be all bad. The primary viture
in reducing overkill, Dr. York contends, is in reducing the
effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear exchange should
occur. It seems to me, though, that our primary concern should
be to ensure that no such exchange ever occurs.
We must search for a new strategy for world security
which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war.
For instance, perhaps deliberate efforts to translate some
of our investment in nuclear weapons into jointleconomic
adventures within each other's territory could eventually
put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in
super power relations.
In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance
should be a positive one of searching for steps that will
promote equilibrium and confidence. The result, hopefully
will be a smaller and less costly force, but its composition
may be somewhat different from what we have today and
additional investment expenditure may be required to attain
it. In short much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting
strategy it may be incompatible with the requirements to
achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic
multi-polar world.
2
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so
it is in (what we label as) general purpose forces. As
enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, we must rely on our
principal allies for assistance in maintaining enough
warfighting capability to deter aggression.. It is, how-
ever, the U.S. military contribution to this common objective
which provides the essential linkage to our nuclear power.
Without that, our allies would be subject to nuclear black-
mail. This does not mean that we must maintain a capability
for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining defense
budget simply does not permit us to do that in any event.
The defense budget of $79 billion in outlays being considered by
the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in purchasing
power. In fact President Nixon's FY 1974 National Defense Budget
is the lowest in real terms since FY 1951. There are three
fundamental factors which push the size of the defense budget
upward in terms of current dollars, but which have no effect on
the actual defense we are purchasing. These are:
? First, a promisory note in the form of
military retirement benefits is coming
due. This is a cost of past wars. It
makes today's budget of $5 billion
higher than that of a decade ago.
3
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
? Second, an artificial subsidy to the
defense budget in the form of the draft
has been removed. This has added several
billions to the defense budget in FY 1974.
? Third, the Defense Department suffers from
the same general inflation which affects us
all. This has been over 64percent since
1964. This amounts to $33 billion in FY 1974,
when compared with FY 1964.
We also have an obligation to provide military balance
in relations with the Third World. Hopefully this will
induce abstension of the major powers and discourage
adventurism on the part of those nations themselves, either
of which could be dangerously escalatory. Clearly the
Soviets are increasing their military activities in the
Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air
defense forces, and by the increasing display of their
growing naval forces. We need not try to match meter by
meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability
cn our part, we can expect these Third World nations to
succumb to military pressures. For example one might
reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President
Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their
"advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the
United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediter-
ranean Sea. To express a personal opinion, even though the
U.S. is not an ally of Egypt our visible military force on the
scene might well have been the latent potential support which
permitted him to take the action he did.
4
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
In summary, our military force structure and employment
practices must change under these new circumstances, as Mr.
Clifford mentioned. The motivating pressure to achieve this
must not be an obsession simply to cut forces and defense
dollars. Such an approach could upset the delicate balance
of force which we have sought and which has made the current
steps toward detente feasible. Rather, our purpose should
be to examine continuously What minimum size and shape
military force will best preserve that balance. We have a
responsibility here not only to ourselves, but to all those
others who aspire to freedom and human dignity. While we
clearly must achknowledge the limits on our power and on the
scope .of our national interests, the people of this country,
I am confident, are not willing to turn their backs on the
contribution that our example and support can give to those
struggling for what we have been giv..In as our heritage.
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003628'yr91-9
Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference,9 Oct 1973
Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the
fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situa-
tions in which overt force may be an appropriate instrument
of foreign policy are quite different today than a decade ago.
There are many complex reasons for this. Some factors are
almost certainly permanent, such as the achievement of nuclear
balance by the Soviets. Others may change tomorrow, such as
the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic and
economic purposes.
The
balance
detente
quest.
essential ingredient of today's detente is the military
that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford
if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or
The primary role of our military forces.7today
con-
is to
maintain a strategic balance so that detente can flourish.
This means that we must continuously adapt the size and
shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet
the demands of a changing world order.
We must first achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear
forces. SALT I was a successful attempt to dampen strategic
arms competition, but we and the Soviets have not yet
reached a state of sufficient trust and confidence to
achieve a statict-balaride. Today there may well be substantial
excess nuclear weapons capacity on both sides, as Dr. York points
out. Overinsurance may be the only practical substitute,
however, for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers,
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
Appreved-F.F_Fweasp2M12/01/10:CIA-RDP801301554R003600160001-9
on the triggers of nuclear holocaust it may not be all badd
The virtue in reducing overkill, Dr. York points out, is in
reducing the effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear
exchange should occur- This is desirable, but it is even
more important that we ensure that no such exchange ever
occurs. This means searching imaginatively for a new
strategy for world security - for a strategy which contains
inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. Perhaps
deliberate efforts to translate some of our investment in nuclear
weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's
territory could eventually put self interest above mutual
fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations.
In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance
must be a positive one of searching for steps that will
promote equilibrium and confidence, not just a search for ways
to reduce force levels or minimize damage if we fail. In short,
much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting strategy, it may
not be the safest way to the essential of nuclear equilibrium
in a dynamic multi-polar world.
Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so it'is in
the conventional forces that we label as General Purpose Forces.
We must rely on our principal allies, Western Europe and Japan for
more assistance in maintaining enough conventional warfighting
capability to deter aggression in their areas. It is, however, the US
military contribution to this common objective which provides
the essential linkage between our nuclear power and the threat
of either conventional or nuclear assault under which these nations
live. Without that assurance, our allies would be subject
to military blackmail. This does not mean tnat.zite
Approved For Release 2002/0y10 : CIA-RDP801301554Kuu3afItOdthigtain
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
a capability for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining
defense budget simply does not permit us to do that in any
event. The defense budget of $85 billion being considered
by the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in
purchasing power. In fact it is the lowest defense budget
in real terms since FY 1951. Looking back to the last
pre-Vietnam defense budget in FY 64, it would take $87 billion
in today's currency to match it; or $2 billion more than
currently requested. In addition, there are two entirely
new charges which eat into the defense budget today:
? First, a promissory note in the form of
military retirement benefits is coming
due. This cost of past wars artificially
makes today's defense budget about $5 billion
higher than that of a decade ago, without
adding a single rifleman to our current defenses.
? Second, a 33 year subsidy to the defense
budget in the form of the draft has been
removed. This has made it necessary to increase military
pay over and above inflationary rises and has added'at
least $8 billion to the defense budget.
Thus in comparable current real purchasing power today's
budget is about $15 billion or 17 percent below pre-Vietnam
levels. In contrast, The Brookings Institution
estimates that the Soviet defense budget is up over 52% from
1964 levels in real Durchasina power.
Approved For Release 2002/014 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
Despite these reduced funds the U.S. still has an interest in
providing military balance in relations with the Third World
as well as in Europe and Japan. Hopefully this will
induce abstension by the major powers and discourage
adventurism ?on the part of those nations themselves, either
of which could be dangerously destabilizing. Clearly the
Soviets are increasing their military activities in the
Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air
defense forces, and by the increasing display of their
growing naval forces. We need not try to match them meter by
meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability
on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to
succumb to military pressures. For example one might
reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President
Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their
"advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the
United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediter-
ranean Sea. Even though the U.S. is not a formal ally of
Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well
have been the latent potential support which permitted him
to take the action he did.
4
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
In summary, our military force structure and employment
practices must change to match ever changing circumstances.
Pressure for change must be more than simply an obsession to
cut forces and defense dollars. Our discussions here need
to be on a positive note. First we must ask what we want to
be capable of achieving through the maintenance of military
forces. Next we must ask what is the minimum size force to
achieve this.
without could
which we have
Adopting the negative approach of what we can do
unwittingly upset the delicate balance of force
sought and which has made the current steps
toward detente feasible. While we clearly must acknowledge the
limits on our power and the scope of our national interests.
We have a responsibility not onlyto ourselves,
aspire to freedom and human digiityi to maintain
of military capability with which to defend our
but to others who
a viable spectrum
vital interests.
Approved For Release 2002/01/16: CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R0036004aa43
Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference,9 Oct 1973
Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the
fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situa-
tions in which overt force may be an appropriate instrument
of foreign policy are quite different today than a decade ago.
There are many complex reasons for this. Some factors are
almost certainly permanent, such as the achievement of nuclear
balance by the Soviets. Others may change tomorrow, such as
the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic and
economic purposes.
The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military
balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford
detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or con-
quest. The primary role of our, military forceszttoday is t
maintain a strategic balance so that detente can flourish.
This means that we must continuously adapt the size and
shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet
the demands of a changing world order.
We must first achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear
forces. SALT I was a successful attempt to dampen strategic
arms competition, but we and the Soviets have not yet
reached a state of sufficient trust and confidence to
achieve a static-balance. Today there may well be substantial
excess nuclear weapons capacity on both sides, as Dr. York points
out. Overinsurance may be the only practical substitute,
however, for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
on thkPeavnieFig IFIeIERHP1/118iPA-NT8P/PAVIVR699A69pp111Dad
The virtue in reducing overkill, Dr. York points out, is in
reducing the effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear
exchange should occur. This is desirable, but it is even
more important that we ensure that no such exchange ever
occurs. This means searching imaginatively for a new
strategy for world security - for a
strategy which contains
inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. Perhaps
deliberate efforts to translate some of our investment in nuclear
weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's
territory could eventually put self interest above mutual
fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations.
In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance
must be a positive one of searching for steps that will
promote equilibrium and confidence, not just a search for ways
to reduce force levels or minimize damage if we fail. In short,
much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting strategy, it may
not be the safest way to the essential of nuclear equilibrium
in a dynamic multi-polar world.
Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so it is in
the conventional forces that we label as General Purpose Forces.
We must rely on our principal allies, western Europe and Japan for
more assistance in maintaining
capability to deter aggression
enough
conventional warfighting
in their areas. It is, however,
military contribution to this common objective which provides
the essential linkage between our
of either conventional or nuclear
nuclear
assault
power
under
and the threat
which these
live. Without that assurance, our allies would be subject
the
nations
to military blackmail. This does not mean that we must maintain
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
2
UE
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
a capability for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining
defense budget simply does not permit us to do that in any
event. The defense budget of $85 billion being considered
by the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in
purchasing power. In fact it is the lowest defense budget
in real terms since FY 1951. Looking back to the last
pre-Vietnam defense budget in FY 64, it would take $87 billion
in today's currency to match it; or $2 billion more than
currently requested. In addition, there are two entirely
new charges which eat into the defense budget today:
? First, a promissory note in the form of
military retirement benefits is coming
due. This cost of past wars artificially
makes today's defense budget about $5 billion
higher than that of a decade ago, without
adding a single rifleman to our current defenses.
? Second, a 33 year subsidy to the defense
budget in the form of the draft has been
removed. This has made it necessary to increase military
pay over and above inflationary rises and has added at
least $8 billion to the defense budget.
Thus in comparable current real purchasing power today's
budget is about $15 billion or 17 percent below pre-Vietnam
levels.
In contrast, The Brookings Institution
estimates that the Soviet defense budget is up over 52% from
1964 levels in real ourchasina power.
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
3
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
Despite these reduced funds the U.S. still has an interest in
providing military balance in relations with the Third World
as well as in Europe and Japan. Hopefully this will
induce abstension by the major powers and discourage
adventurism on the part of those nations themselves, either
of which could be dangerously destabilizing. Clearly the
Soviets are increasing their military activities in the
Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air
defense forces, and by the increasing display of their
growing naval forces. We need not try to match them meter by
meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability
on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to
succumb to military pressures. For example one might
reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President
Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their
"advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the
United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediter-
ranean Sea.
Even though the U.S. is not a formal ally of
Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well
have been the latent potential support which permitted him
to take the action he did.
4
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
In summary, our military force structure and employment
practices must change to match ever changing circumstances.
Pressure for change must be more than simply an obsession to
cut forces and defense dollars. Our discussions here need
to be on a positive note. First we must ask what we want to
be capable of achieving through the maintenance of military
forces. Next we must ask what is the minimum size force to
achieve this. Adopting the negative approach of what we can do
without could unwittingly upset the delicate balance of force
which we have sought and which has made the current steps
toward detente feasible. While we clearly must acknowledge the
limits on our power and the scope of our national interests.
We have a responsibility not only to ourselves, but to others who
aspire to freedom and human dignity to maintain a viable spectrum
of military capability with which to defend our vital interests.
Approved For Release 2002/01/105: CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
Harry S. Ashmore
Admiral Stansfield Turner:
We will handle the dis-
tribution of additional papers
for Pacem in Terris from our
Washington office. Please
mail your prepared statement
to:
Ms. Sharon Armann
Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions
12th Floor
1156 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
If there are questions
about travel or other arrange-
ments, call Ms. Armann at:
202/833-1932
"? ? A -'11"?I'HI A ?11
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
PACEM (Version 442) 9/19
York/Clifford clearly identified fact that the useful-
ness of military force and the situations in which it is
appropriate today are quite different than a decade ago.
The reasons for this are several and complex. Some of them,
such as the achievement of nuclear balance by the Soviets,
are almost certainly permanent. Others such as the mutuality
of interest in detente for domestic purposes may change
tomorrow.
The key ingredient of today's detente, though, is the
strategic military balance that exists. Neither we nor the
Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to
military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our
military forces today is to preserve that strategic balance so
that detente can flourish. That does not mean preserving the
precise size and shape of today's forces. It means something
quite different - the adaptation of our force structure and
its employment to meet the changing demands of that balance.
First and foremost we need balance in the strategic
nuclear area. Balance is a dynamic matter in this area
because the Soviets still have momentum from their climb toward
equality. Where equilibrium will be established remains to
be seen. Surely there is already substantial overkill capacity
on both sides, as Dr. York points out. It may be that overkill
or over-insurance against nuclear checkmate or technological
breakthroughs is an essential ingredient of the feeling of
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
mutual assurance that currently stabilizes this awesome field
of military might. It would be nice to reduce this overkill
to protect the lives of innocent bystanders to a nuclear
exchange. It is far more important to take every step to
ensure that no exchange ever occurs.
Dr. York'Is specific proposals might lull us into falsely be-
lieving that they had moved us in this direction, whereas
they are not intended to do so and quite likely would have the
reverse effect of lessening our sense of security. In short,
we should approach this problem from the positive side of
what do we need for balance; not the negative one of Dr.
York's what can we dispense with. The result hopefully will
be a smaller and less costly deterrent force, but the
composition might be quite different.
Much the same applies to second area of military balance,
that surrounding the position of our principal allies,
Western Europe and Japan. We are not maintaining the capability
for sustained warfare in Europe which Mr. Clifford would have
us forsake. Our declining budget simply does not permit
such extravagence. The current Defense Budget being considered
by the Congress is well below pre-Vietnam figures in constant
dollars. On top of that the country has elected to dispense
with the draft. This has forced considerably increased
incentives to personnel, which come from this already reduced
budget. Unless we are magicians, Mr. Clifford's preferred
2
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
$69B is not far from reality today.
Our third military function is to provide a balance in
relations with the Third World that will induce abstension of
the major powers and discourage adventurism in those nations
themselves. Clearly the Soviets are increasing their military
activities in the Third World, by adventurous positioning of
forces, deployments first in Egypt and now in Syria, and by
the increasing display of their growing naval forces. We
need not match meter by meter. Without a reasonable countervail-
ing capability on our part, we can expect these Third World
people
attitude nations to succumb to military pressures alone; for far from
sensing an mutality of military force today, countries such
Cold
Warrior as Israel, India, Indonesia and North Vietnam all find it very
no
meaningful and useful.
There are, of course, those myopics who see no U.S.
interests in the Third World. They ignore our growing dependence
on imported rew materials and our necessity to export more to
balance our outflow. More importantly, such shallow critics
overlook the basic soundness of the American public's approach
to our nation's responsibilities. Who else can supply the
inspiration that gives many others around the world hope
for tomorrow? Our resources are stretched too thin to
continue to carry this burden alone, but we still are the only
source of leadership and direction. After all, the world is
not five sided any more than it is bi-polar today. It is
3
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
triangular in military matters with the Soviet Union, China
and ourselves. It is also triangular in economic affairs
with Western Europe, Japan and ourselves. We are the common
element.
The military element of these responsibilities has clearly
changed from the defensive preparedness for combat of Cold
War days, to the deterrence function of these days of strategic
balance and its accompanying detente. Our military force
structure and employment practices must change under these
new circumstances. The motivating pressure to achieve this
must not be an obsession to cut because less for is bound
to be better suited to this new purpose. This will only
stimulate artificial and unwanted resistances. Our pressure
should be to reexamine in a positive way what forces best
ensure deterrence, and let the size and shape shake out as
they may.
4
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, 8 Oct 1973
Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the
fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situa-
tions in which they are appropriate are quite different today
than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this.
Some reasons such as the achievement of nuclear balance by
the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent. Others such
as the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic
and economic purposes may change tomorrow.
The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military
balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford
detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or con-
quest. The primary role of our military forces7-today is t
preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish.
This balance, is a dynamic matter. This means that we must
continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces
and how we employ them to meet the demands of balance.
In doing this we must first achieve equilibrium of
strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was an attempt to dampen
strategic arms competition, but I do not believe we and the
Soviets have yet reached a state of sufficient trust and
confidence necessary to achieve an assuring balance. Dr. York
may be correct then. Today there is already substantial over-
kill capacity on both sides. Yet, what he calls overkill or
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
overinsurance may be the only practical substitute for mutual
trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers on the triggers
of nuclear, holocaust it may not be all bad. The primary viture
in reducing overkill, Dr. York contends, is in reducing the
effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear exchange should
occur. It seems to me, though, that our primary concern should
be to ensure that no such exchange ever occurs.
We must search for a new strategy for world security
which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war.
For instance, perhaps deliberate efforts to translate some
of our investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic
adventures within each other's territory could eventually
put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in
super power relaticns.
In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance
should be a positive one of searching for steps that will
promote equilibrium and confidence. The result, hopefully
will be a smaller and less costly force, but its composition
may be somewhat different from what we have today and
additional investment expenditure may be required to attain
it. In short much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting
strategy it may be incompatible with the requirements to
achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic
multi-polar world.
2
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so
it is in (what we label as) general purpose forces. As
enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, we must rely on our
principal allies for assistance in maintaining enough
warfighting capability to deter aggression. It is, how-
ever, the U.S. military contribution to this common objective
which provides the essential linkage to our nuclear power.
Without that, our allies would be subject to nuclear black-
mail. This does not mean that we must maintain a capability
for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining defense
budget simply does not permit us :to do that in any event.
The defense budget of $79 billion in outlays being considered by
the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in purchasing
power. In fact President Nixon's FY 1974 National Defense Budget
is the lowest in real terms since FY 1951. There are three
fundamental factors which push the size of the defense budget
upward in terms of current dollars, but which have no effect on
the actual defense we are purchasing. These are:
? First, a promisory note in the form of
military retirement benefits is coming
due. This is a cost of past wars. It
makes today's budget of $5 billion
higher than that of a decade ago.
3
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
? Second, an artificial subsidy to the
defense budget in the form of the draft
has been removed. This has added several
billions to the defense budget in FY 1974.
? Third, the Defense Department suffers from
the same general inflation which affects us
all. This has been over 64-.percent since
1964. This amounts to $33 billion in FY 1974,
when compared with FY 1964.
We also have an obligation to provide military balance
in relations with the Third World. Hopefully this will
induce abstension of the major powers and discourage
adventurism on the part of those nations themselves, either
of which could be dangerously escalatory. Clearly the
Soviets are increasing their military activities in the
Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air
defense forces, and by the increasing display of their
growing naval forces. We need not try to match meter by
meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability
cn our part, we can expect these Third World nations to
succumb to military pressures. For example one might
reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President
Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their
"advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the
United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediter-
ranean Sea. ?To express a personal opinion, even though the
U.S. is not an ally of Egypt our visible military force on the
scene might well have been the latent potential support which
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permitteu nim to taKe the action he did.
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In summary, our military force structure and employment
practices must change under these new circumstances, as Mr.
Clifford mentioned. The motivating pressure to achieve this
must not be an obsession simply to cut forces and defense
dollars. Such an approach could upset the delicate balance
of force which we have sought and which has made the current
steps toward detente feasible. Rather, our purpose should
be to examine continuously What minimum size and shape
military force will best preserve that balance. We have a
responsibility here not only to ourselves, but to all those
others who aspire to freedom and human dignity. While we
clearly must achknowledge the limits on our power and on the
scope of our national interests, the people of this country,
I am confident, are not willing to turn their backs on the
contribution that our example and support can give to those
struggling for what we have been given as our heritage.
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP801301554R00360016ada73
Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Pacem in Terris III Conference, ,8'Oct 1973
Dr. York and Mr. Clifford have clearly identified the
fact that the usefulness of mijtarY forces and th situra;?,?
tions in which overt force t'appropriateare qh e ififerent today
than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this.
Some factors such as the achievement of nuclear balance by
the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent. Others such
as the current mutuality of interest in detente o domestic
and economic purposes may change tomorrow.
The
-
The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military
balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford
detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or con-
quest. The primary role of our military forces todayis to
maintain a strategic balance so that detente can flourish.
This means that we must continuously adapt the size and
shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet
the demands of a changing world order.
We must first achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear
forces. SALT I was a successful attempt to dampen strategic
arms competition, but we and the Soviets have not yet
reached a state of sufficient trust and confidencery
to achieve a static balance. Today there may well be
iimuloovo
substantial excess capacity on both sides, as Dr. York points
out. Overinsurance may be the only practical substitute,
however, for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers
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on thlkl3PECITIEFHIleimg-M214.18ic9CPAET8IT?'15a5r ROPCIPeinCriltad.
The virtue in reducing overkill, Dr. York points out, is in
reducing the effects on innocent bystanders if a nuclear
exchange should occur. This is desirable, but it is even
more important that we ensure that no such exchange ever
occurs. This means searching imaginatively for a new
strategy for world security - for a strategy which contains
inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. Perhaps
deliberate efforts to translate some of our investment in nuclear
weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's
territory could eventually put self interest above mutual
fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations.
In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance
must be a positive one of searching for steps that will
promote equilibrium and confidence, not just a search for ways
to reduce force levels or minimize damage if we fail. In short,
much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting strategy, it may
not be the safest way to the essential of nuclear equilibrium
in a dynamic multi-polar world.
Just as balarIcenis necessary in nuclear weaponry, so it
is in theAforces that we label as General Purpose Forces.
We must rely on our principal allies, Western Europe and Japan
for more assistance in maintaining enough4warfighting capability
to deter aggression in their areas. It is, however, the U.S.
military contribution to this common objective which provides
the e sential linkage between our nuclear power and the threat
of conventional or nuclear assault under which these nations
live. Without that assurance, our allies would be subject
to milWLAWRIalia6A d204161
?801k-gBb8661.5k0366616/615-9maintain
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a capability for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining
defense budget simply does not permit us to do that in any
event. The defense budget of $85 billion being considered
by the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in
purchasing power. In fact it is the lowest defense budget
in real terms since FY 1951. Or oking back to the last
pre-Vietnam defense budget in FY 64, it would take $87 billion
in today's currency to match it; or $2 billion more than
currently requested. In addition, there are two entirely
new charges which eat into the defense budget today:
? First, a promissory note in the form of
military retirement benefits is coming
due. This cost of past wars artificially
makes today's defense budget about $5 billion
higher than that of a decade ago, without
adding a single rifleman to our current defenses.
embOA1/1
? Second,0,33 year subsidy to the defense
A
budget in the form of the draft has been
L,ivt-o-424.-Zr itezz,itiot-ox_
removed. It-requires at least U$8 billion of-the 7,1:
defense budget, -t-ereray-te-corre-n-s-a-te=fa=this
Thus in comparable current real purchasing power today's
budget is about $15 bi lion or 17 percent below pre-Vietnam
levels. 1--n-terftts-o real purchasing power Brookings Institute
-(- )7-Ae-
estimates that the S iet defense budget is up over 52% from
1964
3
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Approved For Release 02/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
? Second( an artificiaf subsidy to,,,the
//
def4nse budget 4 the form of ,the draft
as been remched. This has added abodt
$6 billi2n
to the dee budget/Zn FY 1974.
/
us in compa able purchas,ing power t6 day's budget is
bt $13 bill/on below that of a decpde ago.
Despite these reduced funds the U.S. still has an interest in
providing military balance in relations with the Third World
as well as in Europe and Japan. Hopefully this will
induce abstension by the major powers and discourage
adventurism on the part of those nations themselves, either
of which could be dangerously destabilizing. Clearly the
Soviets are increasing their military activities in the
Third World, by adventurous positioning of air and air
defense forces, and by the increasing display of their
growing naval forces. We need not try to match them meter by
meter. But without a reasonable countervailing capability
on our part, we can expect these Third World nations to
succumb to military pressures. For example one might
reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President
Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their
"advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the
United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediter-
ranean Sea. Even though the U.S. is not a formal ally of
Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well
have been the latent potential support which permitted him
to take the action he did.
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In summary, our military force structure and employment
practices must change to match ever changing circumstances.
Pressure for change must be more than simply an obsession to
cut forces and defense dollars. Our discussions here need
to be on a positive note. First we must ask what we want to
be capable of achieving through the maintenance of military
forces Next we must ask what is the minimum size force to
Aci o/01/ net
achieve this. 1\the negative approach of what
without could unwittingly upset the delicate balance of force?
which we have sought and which has made the current steps
toward detente feasible. While we clearly must acknowledge the
limits on our power and the scope of ?our national interests;
M4E.
-We have a responsibility not only to ourselves, but to others who
aspire to freedom and human dignity .e: 1 -/0
ckt?t I I; (.1 (' kt
s' 14 C .s ?
ill 1k "I k
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L/1.
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DRAFT REMARKS FOR PACEM IN TERRIS III
The key thrust of this Convocation is how to obtain
enduring peace - peace founded on rationale choice not
on delicate balances of tertor. As Robert Hutchins said
at Pacem in Terris II, peace through the medium of war
is too dangerous a game to play in today's world, and
peace through common fear is not much better.
Unfortunately war and fear have dominated relations
between nation states for longer than we care to recall.
The issue before us in this era is whether there are
adequate forces abroad to encourage manking to shake the
old habit. As Pope John pointed out, we can recognize
that everyone inside the world enclosure is potentially
vulnerable to miscalculation in the war and fear equation;
it is not just the lives of the warriors, the kings or
even the combatant nations that are at stake. Will these
factors allow rationality to rise above habit?
Perhaps a good analogy is that of an individual
attempting to drop the hard drug habit. How does he
bring rationality to the fore? Not by sudden and total
disanoval of his tools of hallucination. Rather by the
physical process of attenuation of the drug habit.
Equally important, there must be a mental process of
awakening to the dangers of continuing on this course
of appreciation of the sweetness of another course.
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So, too, it seems to me, must be our prcess of weaning
from the war - fear habit in the relations of nation -
states. A drug addict who instantly forsakes his habit,
is subject to delerium tremens (7). He is neither
physically or mentally prepared. So, too, a major nation
that moved too precepately toward disarming could today
induce international vibrations of the most alarming
nature. The necessary concomitant physical steps, it
seems to me, are the mutual agreements between nations
to deemphasize armaments in their relations. The
concomitant mental transformation must come from savouring
the benefits of rational cooperation.
I recognize that this argument or analogy could be
interpreted as an attempt at excusing a go slow-rib-I-icy
with respect to lessening our reliance on armaments as
an operating force among nations. It need not be that
if properly and conscientiously construed. That
conscientiousness in finding the right attentuation of
war machinery in an attempt at international decompression,
must come from both sides - that is from those inclined
to be cautious in not withdrawing too fast, and from
those whose idealism and asperations are perhaps running
gaster that the physical and mental readiness of the world
community. I submit that with respect to the size and
shape of the war machine of the United States, this means
accenting a positive approach to what kind of military
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we need and how we are to employ it. We have, in the
emotional wake of Viet Nam, ample rehetoric (?) about what
elements of our military forces we do not want. I have,
for instance, read all of the published position papers
of my former compatirot Gene La Roque's Center for Defense
Information. I am distressed to find that while I know
many things that he does not want our military to possess,
I can not identify the shape of the military power which
he would endorse our possessing. If our disucussions on
the military power of the United States are going to be
constructive and toward our goal of safe withdrawal from
reliance on the war - fear syndrome, it is high time
that we began talking of the positive role that we want
our military forces to play in this process. Advocating
simply less force is an irresponsible and negative
approach to a world - sized problem that requires all
of our positive contributions.
I believe that there are three very useful contributions
which United States military forces can make to the furthering
of the peace habit. One is clearly the deterrence of
strategic nuclear warfare. We simply cannot by lack of
military preparedness or by lack of national resolve, tempt
some other nuclear power to seek advantage by use of those
weapons. In many ways we will be well advised to err on
the cautious side here of too much rather than too little.
The consequences of too little are too high. The
consequences of too much are twofold. One is possible
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3
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impairment of international attitudes of cooperation.
Unecessary expense, that need Et be a serious problem
unless it is allowed to impact on our other forces to
the point where they are incapable of performing their
contribution to movement towards peace.
The primary mission of what are termed general
purpose forces is also deterrence or perhaps better
termed disuasion. This is primarily a matter of disuading
others from starting armed conflicts, be they against us
or others. It is also a question of dissuading others
from establishing destabilizing dominance in areas of the
world. These functions of deterrence or discuasion are,
of course, the classic resort to at least fear of war
against which Robert Hutchins has inveighed. It is a
necessary part of winding down to peace by rationality,
but the critical point is that we recognize that this
is our purpose and employ our military froces deliberately
for it. This is different than holding the military in
the wings until diplomacy fails or considering combat
employment of military force an extension of diplomacy
by other means. The employment of military forces in
peacetime must have a clear political purpose. What we
buy as well as how we employ will be affected by this
purpose. To be persuasive or disuasive, our military
forces must be a credible to the nation to be dissuaded.
For a sophisticated opponent this means matching him in
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quality and quantity. For an inferior opponent, it means
havin9 forces that appear to be relevant to his situation.
These requirements are quite different and need to be
recognized separately. They must also be amployed in a
menacing manner only deliberately in orchestration with
other forms of pressure or suasion. In short, the
careful political control of the deterrent use of
military force is the essential distinction between
the dangers of common fear and the benefits of common
respect. Those who in effect advocate military castration
because of the dangers of misapplication of military power,
clearly distrust our political processes and would
risk the vibrations of preemptory withdrawal from the
world power structure and it actually exists. How
much and how long military forces will be needed for
disuasion will be a function of how rapidly the nations
of the world progress toward cooperation for peace. A
third use of our military forces should be to promote
such cooperation. As antithecal as this may sound,
the opportunities for exploring cooperation through
military organizations is multiplying today. Take a few
examples:* How are we ever to control aircraft hijackings?
The cooperative efforts of Air Forces could possibly be
brought to bear. Or even militarly punitive ventures
reminiscent of our handling of the Barbay pirates, but
today as multi-national undertakings.
5
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
o All the world is concerned with our hazarding
the ecology. Much of this is multi-national in import;
pollution of the oceans and from it coastlines;
atmospheric pollution that crosses national boundaries
with impunity. Detection and monitoring systems for
these types of things are natural extnsions of military
systems, and so, too, might be the policing function.
o Protection and resuce of life at sea and
in the air is another area where military systems have
potential for cooperative action.
o Meteorology, oceanology, and oceanography are
areas where the exchange of data could benefit mankind,
and all are related to military missions .
The opportunities for using military organizations
and systems to promote understanding of the benefits
of multi-national coordinated actions are presently
barely being tapped.
Withdrawal from our entrenched habits of war and fear
as primary constraining elements in the relations
between nations has breat opportunity for success in
today's environment. It will gake very practical
physical and mental steps to bring it about. Lofty
idealism and metaphysical appeals are not likely to
suffice. We must tread a fine line with respect to
the role of military forces in the process we all hope
to bring about. That line is between obdurate persistence
in old habits of employing military pressures and rushing
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6
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madily into new habits that will be more upsetting than
beneficial. The military portion of this equation can
only be properly written if we all together approach
it from an affirmative point of view, seeking postive
ways to tap a potential, not negative means of avoidind
risks or evading the difficult issues of force size,
shape, employment and control. It was a Roman who
siad "If you want peace, be prepared for war" (check quote)
The theme of this Convocation understandly questions
that dictrum. Two thousand years of adherence to it,
however, can not be swept away over night, but clearly
the time is opportune to start a withdrawal.
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Revised May 9, 1973
Approved orJeIe 002/01 10 Alikplin0B01554R003600160001-9
- the Study of Democratic IUstitutions/ The Fi id for the I public, Inc.
Pacem in Terris III
NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
A convocation to be held by the Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions, October 8-11, 1973, Washington, D. C.
WORKING DRAFT, May
Notes:
9,
1973
1. Those listed on the attached outline
have been invited to participate.
Those who have accepted are designated
by asterisks.
2. These sessions are timed on the
assumption that formal speeches
will not exceed forty minutes.
Panel members will be expected
to make five minute opening
responses in rotation, with the
remainder of the time available for
free exchange. Wherever practicable
principal speakers will be expected
to participate in the panel
discussions.
The ballroom will be set LID with
tables at all sessions for the
convenience of those making notes
and to insure a tolerable density of
about 1,000 in the invited audience.
4. Lunch will be available in the ball-
room.for each of the three days for
those who buy tickets in advance.
No dinner is presently scheduled.
6. All sessions will be open to the
press, and extensive television
coverage is being arranged.
Approved For Release 200,2/01/10 ?,CIA-RDP,801301554R00360016000170
Box -,
Truxton :t - Active 1967.
Bainbridge .2 _ ';_I,7,600- -.. Active ; -'t , . 1962 ? '
CONVENTIONAL DESTROYERS A-ND'ESCORTS-:I''
83 Missile.' :' Active 1953-67
Destroyers .,:6 570
- 30' Soruance :16,000 (est) Under' construCtiori:::-,;:, late-19703,4;r,
50 (' Patrol Frigate.. 3,400-(est.) Requested.. FY1973 ,2,-t.:.:late-19705,,.t.t
:_ $192 million for'
lead
'(-Kncx I ? ' Active,
(14 stilt untie
construction).-
(The US has'-atiiiiiit(ttE-addltional olderdestroyers,andIescorts.),-
USSR
No. of. Class or-
Operational
Ships Type Tonnage Status Dates
2- None"-, -?
Moskva
(Possible-carrier .
or merchant ship)
HELICOPTER CARRIERS
15,000 Active, - ' 1967-8
35,000 (est.) Under construction late 1970s
NUCLEAR CRUISERS
CONVENTIONAL CRUISERS
10 Sverdlov 15,450 Active 1951-60
1 Dzerzhinski 15,450 Active 1962
2 Chapaev- 11,500 "Probably" being 1948-50 2
_
deactivated (old)
1 Missile Cruiser 9,000 (est.) Under construction late 1970s
Kirov /.:??, ,, 8,500 "Probably" being 1938-44 -
- -
deactivated (old)
(The following Soviet cruisers are smaller in size than US destroyers.)-
-
,
Kresta II ', 6,000 Active 1968-? -
Kresta I ' 5,140 Active 1967-8
Kynda : 4,800 Active 1962-5'
NUCLEAR DESTROYERS
None-
t,-CONVENT_IONAL,DESTROYERS ANO ESCORTS:- :
: ?? 2,850-- - Active 1954-?:,
Destroyers-, ' , 5,200 :
(The ? USSR-Alas:: abOut-::155 ? additional:: older non-missile destroyers an
escorts.: Some are- being- converted to-missile ships.)
NUCLEARSPBMAIRINES-WITH BALLISTIC: MISSILES
Polarts/Poseidon:.):,-.-?,,5,900-,'"?:,-, ;Active:, t 1959-67:-
ULMS 16,000-(est) Requested FY1973?I('. :late 1970s
"I? : $945 million
advanced- developMentf--
(Est. total cost-'-.-
DIESEL-SUBMAF,11i4ES,WITH BALLISTICt'MISSILES-
None
---- NUCLEAMSUBMARINESAVITH-EALLISTIC MI55ILES,,--.7
Yankee:',..:-- 7,300 : 'Active- - :--,:i.:1969-?-?,:?
Hotelii:11 , .3,700: -- ? : Active---. -r-II1961'L?"
NUCLEAR ATTACOLIBMARINES WITH'CRUISE:MISSILES-
None ?
(The US decided.:rioi-ta: .OtiFitia, this weapon system,iri? the late 1950s,but,----
a cruise missile weapont(system, is presently under development:)
DIESEL ATTACIO-SUSMARINES WITH:CRUISE MISSILES.-
, .
None
NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES'
58- Sturgeon " .? Active ' -1954-7-
and others t.,3,860'".'? (Nine more under'.
?' construction)---: ? ?
-. 12 5,000 (est) Loa Angeles Under construction- 1967-7 -
? (Six more requested in
FY1973 budget)"
DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES' :,-
41- t-iu,soy and ' Active ? ' 1943-59- --
-2,145 (But being- :?
deactivated)
(Ail total program cost. estimates are. based on Department- of Defense a
5gures.)
I The surface-to-surface' missile- (Harpoon) will be put on these units and .
- almost ad orner destroyers, by the late 1970s.. These units are snown-
-- because of tnis fact and their large size.
....:-,)DIESEL.SUBMARINEE WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES"- _
oil-- II 2,300 - Active .1950 65
'NUCLEAR-ATTACK- SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES:
Echo 5,000 Active 1961-8
' 4,000 Active 1969-?
ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES
2200, Active
1,200 ? - Active
NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES
3,600 Active
3,500 Active
25 Victor
November
190 Fox Trot -
and others
DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES
? 650-
2,000
Active
(Most being
deactivated)
(Question marks-?denote continuing construction.)
Cruiser forward with large ASW helicopter deck aft
? Construction began in 1938
Approved For Release 2002/01/1Q_: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600160001-9
1962-7
1950-7:
1969-? "
1959-65 ?
1950-67
A rovett For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
?-9.17,):C9".119NA41. (M119.N.
; oFtstAANo
oitrogowo on'
X.%
WEFOoVi
SAL IALINORAD
SEA 05 PALLOr
NOMI,1 AII1141,19
BLAC A
ACK A
OoFos
KAPP/091
SON,.
OF (900,11,4
riSuil'AAu ITAA4
,
DITERFIAN .AN F
$LLCA,AA ISLAND
FAIINFA PA11101
PARTIAL WINTER FREEZE':
CHOKE POINT (aroo whe:
? US and
? allies can?
SOVIOt
latBbi BrI009ITICITItS)
. MAJOR FACILITY
55iLLEB LpLLQB
INDIAN OCBAN
THE DEFENSE repOrEgavat-el For- Rele."44o'lwurfni Pi ft- -"tIA-011PR-ORO`l554R0036.0434600134-4'.
PAGE.E1GHT-',
THE. CENTER: FOR ::DEF
The enormous-. and oOmplexitY, of--; inilitary'effort. :
in this countrY,haaautrun the instinitians 'established ? for.--1-
citizen understanding.3. and control:of- publiepolicy, An
formed public::.opinion on., national defense:, and- foreign -
commitments is lacking; in our societyi,'"
For these reasans,,,the?center. for; Defense Information
;has been established4OeFtindforzPeace has: encourage
and .made. possibleLitheinitiation:-OrthisCenter: Further,'
funding will: be Iprovidedby private foundations foiindations, and
terested individuals4The,?.Center:-.:WilI;be;!Under;absblutelY;'''
no financial or Oilierabligation.:ta;thiy, government, .
industrial or individual special interest..-
'The Center ,.,-;Vd15concentrate5 ?,analyzing
and: circulating3 public Informationi on Matters:: of national:::
'defense and overs-e_ns.:06-imitment..i:;"*,?,well as scrutinizing ?
, Our national: defense program on a day-t6day basis. .Its
appraisals ,wiT;challenge existing:: assumptions about
defense and .provide the basis-for:rational alternative-.
ENSE INFORMATION
policies. and budgets, to be' Measured against those?or,.
Department af,. Defense:::
The Center wilL dissemirtats research and:informa-
tion to ,r . the., brOadest:pUblic.,,-ipoSsible.,;,through',.:position
papers; -a journal; The'Def ense,.Mory-tor,-: of which this-, is
? the first. ertlitia;,;and: materiaLdesigned for: the- news and.:A
other media Tnaddition, the Center::,.. 'respond, to-
4uests for inforinatiorr on.defensa.matters.- Future edition.S4,
of The Defense Monitor will include .analysis of the.f..de
ferise.::budgetULMS,(Underwater.:: Lang-range Missile.
,System);;the;i:P7t: Bomber; technological . superiority; ?the.,:.-L-'
,--proposedj,attaCk:Carrier;-,US forces overseas and militaryit
commitments:, to -Threlin nations,. as well:as other topics
, of vital natiOnal!and'militarY concern.'
The Center: and its rapidly developing inventory of
formation will. be-a reliable and non-partisan resource:for:
all individualSand groups:.- insisting. upon:.a military: that::.
will genuinely defend .'and,,Streng,then- American society;-':?:
not weaken it,by Overcornmitthents and waste. of resoinces.,,,
STAFF:::
Rear ''Acliplikal:Qene R La Rocque,.US,'Navy (Bet:
Directori?-
Lindsay-Mattison?
.4ssistant:Dfreeiori
f'?Donald MaY7'
scictantDtrecw
Sally Anderson
ea] :A dniiral:.G 'Roaluireti`recElrotrr.':
ta te& Na Director of
enter'. for;t.Defen.,.InfarmatiOn=
1-16, conimandeCt.,,deSiiayers-Titi-thel;
-7Vici:and'holds.06;13ranz' bnirriendatiOn
Medal:, Be conitriairided*,:faSticar..rietitask,gratip':'.with5the_
Sixth Fleet, a-divisibit?,,aftdestraYeirSWaiis
iefa
Cruiser-
Destroyer flotilla. Heserved on the' itaffofthe Naval War
,callege, and more' recently,- '1Plans
vision of the Joint ChiefS of Staff Admiral La Rocque received the Legion o'fMeri(attcr,:jeft:hiS, position
as Director oUth-e,.litter-AmeriCaii..DefenSe.College:,..t
direct the Center-foiDefeiiseInforthion
enterjoiT'Defense. I pfdijnatiort
Massachusetts Avenue NE
?
?-
When quoting-any.materiaLfrom-,,The Defense Monitor, please ?,giv
Credit. to -th-Centeryfor. Defense Information
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Norman p.tmor ?
6917 Nodwillo Road
Kingswood, Lanham, Marylancl
New Address:
4302 Dahill Place
Alexandria, Virginia 22312
July 27, 1973
The Honorable Jonathan B. Bingham
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Bingham:
Your letter of July 24 stating that "Mr. Norman Polmar... offered no
data comparable to the tables (presented by Rear Admiral La Rocque)"
struck me as being inaccurate and misleading.
As you will recall, (1) I asked if I could use slides to present
information to the group and was told "no," that I would only be expected
to speak informally for about 15 minutes, and (2) after Rear Admiral
La Rocque's presentation of his "quantitative" material, at your
invitation, I spoke for more than 30 minutes providing corrections to
his data.
I am enclosing a copy of the working papers that I distributed at
the session which you sponsored. These contain quantitative and qualitative
data.
Please note that these working papers address trends. Simple numerical
such as Rear Admiral La Rocque presented at the session, are
i too often misleading, especially when takgol__AK.IJU'mt._.T4t.
-
In addition, Rear Admiral La Rocque presented EEELIal, inaccurate,
and extraneous material that supported his recommendations that all naval
programs were of questionable, if any, value. Attached are corrections and
additions to his qualitative data that represent broader and more-balanced
perspective.
Obviously, more significant than simple numbers in today's complex
military environment are trends and force missions. The trends with
respect to the Soviet Navy are most interesting: Today the Red Navy
has reached some degree of equality or surpassed the US Navy in several
areas. This, sir, is fact. (Please see the final chart in my working
paper packet.)
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' (continued)
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July 27, 1973
Page 2
If we simply look at numbers how, for example, could we have won
World War II? When one looks at the comparison of Allied and German sub-
marines in the Atlantic, the Germans had several times more submarines,
but were defeated at sea in the various Battles of the Atlantic because
all allied ASW forces (air, surface, and submarine) were the comparative
counterpart of the German U-boats.
Also, age of ships is most important. The capability of sustained
readiness as well as certain combat capabilities decline with age. If
new ship programs are (in large part) for replacing existing ships, then
we must look at ships that will not be available (e.g., 25 years and
older) when new-program ships are completed.
Accordingly, I submit that simplistic comparisons such as those
offered by Rear Admiral La Rocque are meaningless and too often mis-
leading. We cannot afford such an approach to the vital subjects of
national defense and national expenditures.
I would be most pleased to discuss this matter further with you and
your colleagues at your convenience. Indeed, I would be pleased to have
the opportunity to present a brief slide talk on Soviet naval/maritime
activities to graphically show some of the rather dramatic developments in
this field.
NP:bw
Very respectfully,
i
orman Polmar
United Stated Editor
JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS
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Distribution
Attendees at meeting on July 18, 1973
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Les Aspin
Pierre du Pont
Elwood Hillis
Marjorie Holt
Edward Koch
Robert Leggett
William Lehman
Robert McClory
George O'Brien
Robert Price
Patricia Schroeder
Henry Smith
Floyd Spence
Fortney Stark
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SCHEDULE: WASHINGTON (8-11 OCT)
'Monday, ' 8 ' OCT
1003 - Dep Prov, Al 774
1159 - Arr DC
1330 - Dep D.C. Pied 934
1407 - Arr Charlottesville
1630 - Dep Charl Pied 935
1707 - Arr D.C. Met by CNO Driver
1800 - 2000 Reception (P in T III)
2000-2300 I Opening Session
Session II The National Interests of the U.S.
Presiding: Robert M. Hutchins
Tuesday, 9 OCT
0930 - 1230 - Session III
The National Interests of the U.S.
Presiding: Morris L. Levinson
1300 - 1400 - Luncheon
1400 - 1700 - Session IV
The National Interests of the U.S.
6m a 1 kAe.
0.0 -ZAmMR ?004uP3 -PaNnw), 4A?scpg.-vot:ii'-x
*2000 - 2230 - Session V The National Interest and Military Power
Session VI Deterrence through the Threat of
Mutual Assured Destruction
Presiding: James H. Douglas
* Member of Critiquing panel
Wednesday, 10 OCT
0930
- 1230 -
1300
- 1400 -
1345
-
1415
- 1700 -
Session VII: Trade & Economic Competition
Session VIII: Development
Presiding: Charles H. Dyson
Luncheon
The Special Case of Japan
Presiding: Seniel Ostrow
Session IX: The Emergence of Transnational Issues
Presiding: Edward Lamb
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Wednesday, 10 OCT
2000 - 2230 - Session X: The Imperatives of Institution-
Building
Session XI: The U.N. and Alternative Formulations
Presiding: Frances McAllister
Thursday, 11 OCT
0930 - 1230 - Session XII: The Requirements of Democratic
Foreign Policy
Presiding: J.R. Parten
1130 - Pick up by CNO driver
1230 - Lunch vri-Lia--Mid.denderrf? OrVL
1400 - To Airport by CNO driver
1430 - Dep DC Amer 481
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?
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PACEM IN TERRIS
A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
III
Circulated: September 14, 1973
Address
THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER
by Clark Clifford
Former Secretary of Defense; Special Counsel to
President Truman
FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY
Scheduled:
Session V-VI, beginning at 8 p.m., Tuesday, October 9, 1973
Also Scheduled:
Address by Herbert York
Critique: Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque,
Jeremy Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner
A Paper prepared for delivery at a national convocation sponsored by the
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to convene at the Sheraton-Park
Hotel, Washington, Oct. 8 - 11, 1973. Press inquiries should be directed to
Frank K. Kelly, The Center, PO Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103.
Telephone: Area Code 805 969-3281.
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Speech of Clark M. Clifford
Pacem in Terris III
October 9, 1973
THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY POWER
Out of the welter of conflicting views regarding the world today,
there is one development upon which we can all agree. That is the profound
and far reaching manner in which our world_h_as, clan_ged these last few years.
The major thrust of my remarks on this occasion is that,
(A) The world has changed; and (B) The United States defense establishment
and the defense budget have not. I cannot state the problem more simply.
My hope is that I may offer thoughts tonight that will lead to a better
understanding of the defense policy that our country needs in today's world.
There exists a gap -- an undeniable gap -- between a foreign
policy that purports to deal with a world of detente, and a defense policy
that is mired in the backward looking attitudes of the Cold War...
Like many of you here, and in a sense like the military establish-
ment which we are examining tonight, I am a product of the Cold War. I
was with President Truman from 1945 to 1950 and I recall with vividness and
pride those dramatic days. But the military forces devised to meet the
44.11.???????????
problems that existed then still exist today. They are enormous, unwieldy,
terribly expensive and unnecessary.
Times change, and the challenge of our era is whether we can
change with them.
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As our tragic intervention in Indo-China draws too slowly to
a halt, we look at the world around us and we see a near total transformation.
Contrast the world as it appeared immediately after the second World War,
and for much of the period up until the middle 1960's, to the world as it
appears now. In this contrast we will find the guides for reshaping our
defense policies and budgets.
During that earlier era, the Soviet Union seemed intent on
threatening the United States, if not directly, then through pressure on other
nations whose survival and independence were, and to a great degree remain,
vital to our interests. We had no alternative but the firmest common
resistance.
For all but the last few years of that period, there appeared to be
allied to the strength of the Soviet Union the massive population and immense
potential of China.
In that era, the Soviets and their Chinese associates seemed
resolved to make the political situation and the economic development of every
nation in the world, no matter how small or how obscure, a testing ground for
the confrontation of the most ultimate issues of how society and life were to
be organized. We responded in kind.
Faced with that situation an aggressive USSR, Soviet-Chinese
solidarity, and a communist effort to be involved in every significant conflict
over the future of any nation -- those responsible for our nation's policies,
including the state of our military forces, felt that the United States had to
plan its mil ik3riirrofgcfg ilietlielatshee26$10
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moment, be called upon to resist militarily, and directly, large-scale
IPaggression in Asia or Europe, and perhaps in both simultaneously.
On the nuclear side, as our atomic monopoly evaporated, the
need for constantly increasing stock of even more sophisticated nuclear
weapons seemed to grow greater, not less. The first priority was to build
a deterrent, proof against the most effective conceivable surprise Soviet attack.
The result was the construction of a strategic deterrent force composed of
three basic elements -- land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles,
and bombers -- each independently capable of surviving an all-out Soviet
attack with sufficient strength for a retaliation that would destroy the Soviet
Union as an organized society. In addition, in an effort to extend our nuclear
strength to protect our allies, we deployed literally thousands of nuclear
? weapons throughout the world. These weapons were supposed to compensate
for inadequacies in ours and our allies' non-nuclear forces.
This image of the world on which our military forces were premised
is scarcely recognizable from the perspective of late 1973.
First, while the profound differences between the social and
political systems of the United States and the Soviet Union remain, and while
there persist genuine areas of serious international conflict between the U.S.
and the USSR, the relationship of the two superpowers simply can no longer
be described as one of general and unrelenting confrontation. The past two
years have seen two United States-Soviet summits marked by effusive cordiality,
by the conclusion of the strategic arms limitation agreement which, whatever
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its ,limitations, marks an acceptance by both sides that there is no real
defense against nuclear war except mutual vulnerability, and by intense
discussion of immensely expanded economic links between the United States
and the Soviet Union.
Nor, of course, is this phenomenon of detente with the USSR
only a bilateral one. The Ostpolitik has brought with it, if not permanent
settlement of the conflicts which divide Europe, at least a renunciation of
the use of force. The European security conference and the negotiations on
force reductions in Europe are signs of a change in the relationship between
the Soviet Union and the nations of Western Europe and may portend more
basic settlements in the long run. Such a sign of change and an end to con-
frontation is the very rapidly expanding Soviet trade with Western Europe and
Japan.
Even more dramatic is the change in the relationship between the
United States andChina. Rigid antagonism on each side has given way to a
reopening of communication based on a cautious but, in all probability,
irreversible recognition that there are simply not that many profound conflicts
between the vital interests of the United States and those of China. As we
come to take a more realistic view of China, and, perhaps, also a less
omnipo-
tent view of ourselves, we find less and less to fear from that immense nation,
faced as it is with profound challenges in its own internal development.
At the same time, relations between China and the USSR have so
deteriorated as to make the phrase "Sino-Soviet Bloc" but a memory.
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And, of course, in planning defense policy, there is the fact
that we are involved no longer in the war in Indo-China.
Finally, in a world in which economic issues on the international
scene are growing in relative importance, we must recognize that the United
States has lost its economic domination of the international scene, even while
retaining its vast military strength.
From these profound changes in the international setting, one would
expect profound changes in American military policy and military forces. For
it is, of course, to serve our international policy that we create military forces,
however often it may seem that the relationship is reversed.
To be sure, there has been a certain amount of verbal change in
our declaratory policy. But if we turn from declaratory policy to the hard facts
of budgets and forces, we find incredibly little change. Measured by its own
sound maxim -- watch what we do, not what we say -- the present Administra-
tion's defense policies seem all but oblivious to the great changes taking
place in the world around us.
Despite these changes and the much-advertised winding down of
74-71
American involvement in Viet Nam, we are being asked to spend more, not less,
on military force. The Department of Defense budget requested by the President
.mr.,,memmremem????o?wasoa?
for Fiscal 1974 -- that is the year we are now in -- is $4.1 billion more than
we spent in 1973 and that expenditure was, in turn, $3.2 billion more than in
1972. Even taking price changes fully into account, spending on non-Viet Nam
military forces will increase by $3.4 billion from 1973 through 1974, if the
Administration's proposals are approved by Congress.
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?ko
0
This is in sharp contrast to past post-war budgets. Following
the second World War, by the year 1947, the defense budget was less than
10 per cent of its wartime high. After Korea, defense spending fell in two
years to just 45 percent of its Korean peak in 1952. In the present post-
Viet Nam case, there were, to be sure, small reductions from the years of
very high levels of combat activity in Viet Nam. But the basic pattern, fixed
?
early in the process of reducing direct combat expenses in Viet Nam, has been
to maintain real defense spending at a relatively constant level. ?
Even this "level budget" policy cannot long continue, unless we
41/t
? change the policies on force size, manpower, and procurement which underlie
the present budget. The current budget includes plans to buy weapons and
maintain forces whose increase in costs in the rest of this decade can be
fairly readily measured.
The estimates of the cost of staying on our present course are
staggering. The 1974 budget projects a further'$.4.6 billion increase in the
tfl
national defense budget for next year.
The Brookings Institution in its analysis of the 1974 budget offers
a longer-term projection. It estimates that maintaining current defense policies
will require that we increase the defense budget from the $85 billion requested
for Fiscal 1974 to almost $100 billion in Fiscal 1980. And that is without
making any allowance for increses in price, which, according to the same
analysis, would mean the $100 billion mark would be passed in 1977 and we
would have a $114 billion budget in 1980.
Thus, we face a paradox of an increasing budget for military
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?
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purposes in a world in which all the political signs point to conti,ngencies
calling for U. S. military action being less rather than more. This
paradox cannot be explained by any restructuring in our forces to meet the
new situation. Instead, the $85 billion request of the Administration is to
support forces of essentially the same size and type as (though in most
cases far more powerful than) those maintained by the United States in the
early to middle 1960's, when political conditions were radically different.
To be specific:
--Our strategic forces in 1974 will be essentially identical in
numbers of vehicles to those of 1964, except for the retirement of some older
bombers and the completion of some missiles and submarines under construction
illin 1964. The effective striking power of those forces has, of course, been
multiplied several times in the interim by the introduction of multiple warheads.
--Our tactical air forces have remained at only slightly below
the 1964 levels, with 2,800 aircraft in all services as against 3,000 in that
year. But simply counting aircraft or squadrons ignores the fact that the
improvements in the new aircraft which have come into service in the interval
have greatly increased the capability of the force as a whole.
--Our naval forces continue to be centered around aircraft carriers.
Again, although there is a reduction from the 15 attack carriers maintained in
z
1964 toeyow, the newer units are more capable than those they replaced.
The number of ships in the fleet is substantiallyuced, but the force as a
ofr
whole is much newer and more capable.
/,'//`-
)
Y
--Similarly, with ground forces, there has been but a modest
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reduction from the 1964 figure of 19 1/3 divisions to the present 16
divisions with a considerable build-up of firepower and mobility.
Moreover, the missions assigned these forces are essentially
the same as those assigned to forces in 1964. The Air Force is designed to
conduct deep interdiction of enemy supply routes as part of a prolonged war
in Europe or on the Asian continent. The Navy is planned on the assumption
it must be ready to fight a sustained antisubmarine effort in the North Atlantic
and, with its carrier aircraft, to provide interdiction, air superiority, and
ground upport for sustained combat ashore. The Army and Marines are to-
-
be prepared to sustain a long war in Europe, and, to judge from their deploy-
ment and numbers, also to be prepared to fight directly on the Asian continent.
Is it not clear that today we simply go not need all the military
forces which we now maintain? As I have suggested, we are maintaining
in 1973, in the face of substantially reduced international tensions and sub-
stantially consolidated U. S. international objectives, practically as large a
force as we did in 1964 when the global confrontation seemed to be much
sharper and America's goals much more ambitious. It should be noted that 1964,
the last pre-Viet Nam year, marked a post-Korea high.
What kind of forces would the Administration be asking the American
people and the economy to support if international relations had remained
essentially the same? And what would we be told we re. uired if relations with
\.
China and the Soviet Union had worsened?"' 1.)
It must be recognized that, to a degree, our forces and our defense
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11, policies are functions of tradition and bureaucratic pressures as well as
products of analysis of our interests and the forces we need to protect them.
To the degree that this is true, it makes it all the clearer that something is
gravely wrong.
For, if we consider our international policy and not bureaucratic
politics, our present situation is truly inexplicable.
Why, in the changed world situation which President Nixon has
called an era of negotiation, do we still need -- and why should the American
people be asked to support -- the military establishmnt which was created
? e?
for an era of confrontation?
After Viet Nam, do we really want the military forces we now
? maintain to fight a land war in Asia?
With the profound changes in relationships between the two parts
of Europe, do we really need an Army, Navy and Air Force structured around
a mission of sustaining a long conventional land war in Europe? Incidentally,
this question is made all the more pointed by the fact that neither the Soviets
nor their allies, nor our own NATO allies, appear to believe sufficiently in the
likelihood of such a contingency to design their forces for it. All other forces
in Europe appear quite clearly to expect a short, intense conflict, if there is one.
?
Why, given our recognition of the inadvisability of military inter-
vention in marginal conflicts, do we need a military force with the capability
of intervening on a' massiv, scale anywhere in the world with carrier air, land-
based tactical air, and ground troops?
We need a fundamental re-examination of our defense policies and
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the missions for our forces.
There are, of course, substantial savings that can be made
simply from greater efficiences, especially in the use of manpower, in cur-
tailing our military establishment's propensity for overly complex multi-aupose
weapons systems, and in avoiding procurement of strategic nuclear weapons
which actually diminish our security_Loy_damze.a.aixag_m_utual stability. However,
to bring our defense budgets into line with our foreign policies and our natiOnal
interests, we cannot avoid a fundamental re-examination of the missions of
our military forces.
What military missions make sense in this decade of the twentieth
century?
--First, of course, the defense of the United States itself. Indeed,
it is a striking measure of how large our defense establishment has become to
consider what would be necessary if this were the only mission we now assigned
our military forces -- as, of course, it was for all hut about the last 30 ears
of our nation's
history. Adequate for that mission would be an invulnerable
nuclear deterrent and minimum conventional forces, all of which would cost
perhaps one-third of our current defense budget.
--However, we must recognize that, while there have been important
changes in the world, there are still many elements of tension and potential
conflicts between the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China on the one
hand and, on the other, nations whose independence is a direct and vital
national interest of the United States. For this reason, we do indeed need the
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military forces necessary to support international commitments jointly agreed
-
upon by the Congress and the President as genuinely serving our vital
interests.
In strategic forces, we need a secure and stable nuclear deterrent,
that is, a force such that any potential attacker would recognize that enough
U. S. forces would survive and be used after an all-out surprise attack utterly
to destroy the society of the attacker.
In planning a new national defense policy that takes account of our
national interests as they now exist, we must also recognize that there are
limits to what we can afford to spend on defense even in this rich, though
currently troubled, economy. A dramatic example of how heavy a burden our
? people have had to bear for arms is the following. In the last ten years,
individual income taxes on all Americans have totaled $790 billion. During
that same ten years, spending on defense has totaled $760 billion. That is,
virtually the entire revenue of the individual income tax has been devoted to
defense spending. As we continue a chronic inflation at home, and as inter-
national confidence in the American economy declines, these economic factors
assume increased relevance.
Particularly in these days when "national security" is being used
to justify things far worse than inflated defense budgets, we must give new
thought to what real national security means.
Finally, it seems to me appropriate to establish certain negative
? goals as well as affirmative ones, that is, to say what we do not need our
military forces to be able to do. We do not need to exceed our potential
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opponents in every possicgy merely to avoid the supposed stigma
of not being "number one" in everything. We do not need the capability for
general intervention everywhere in the world. We do not need to buy forces
necessary only for contingencies which are not only remote -- such as the
.1110.011111,010100.10.
so-called war at sea or a long conventional war in Europe -- but which would
never occur without advance warning; far in advance, by a radical change in
the political setting.
With respect to strategic forces as well, negative goals may be
as important as affirmative missions. We need, as the President has said,
sufficiency; we need not be concerned about disparities i_n_crikde force levels
or destructive power which in Churchill's haunting phrase would only "make
the rubble bounce." We, must not construct systems which, sometimes in the
name of accumulating "bargaining chips," make negotiations on arms control
more difficult by creating powerful vested constituencies for the preservation
of weapons. Also, we must recognize that for all their terrible destructiveness,
the political and military use of nuclear weapons is quite limited, namely,
the deterrence of their use by others.
The recent Pentagon announcement that the Soviets have now tested
MIRVs, the Multiple Independently-targettable Reentry Vehicle, does not
change the basic facts of the nuclear stalemate. The only surprise about the
Soviet development is that it has taken so long in coming. When I was in the
Pentagon, five years ago, it was anticipated that the Soviets would develop,
within a couple of years, the capacity to deploy on its missiles multiple
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warheads that were capable of being aimed separately at different targets.
We had, at that time, already tested MITZVs of our own, and we have now
deployed them on hundreds of our land-based and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles.
We continue to retain a large lead in numbers of warheads.
But the Soviet Union has the capability today of destroying our society, without
its new MIRVs, even if the United States were to attempt a first strike. No
matter how many or how large the missiles that the Soviet Union might equip with
multiple warheads, we would still have the ability to retaliate and destroy
Soviet society even after an all-out attack.
Accordingly, all that the Soviet MIRV development should mean
is that both sides should pursue as a matter of priority the efforts at SALT II
? to place effective controls on further accumulation of unnecessary, immensely
expensive and desperately dangerous nuclear weapons.
These principles, presenting the reasons for our military forces,
demonstrate vividly that substantial cuts can be made in the defense budget
and in the forces it sustains. Such changes will make our military posture
reflect the changes in the world and the changes in our national policies. The
changes will leave us with a military force fully adequate for our own defense
and for carrying out commitments to our allies, but they will permit us to do so
at a cost that our economy and our health, as a society, can far better sustain.
I believe it is a mistake to plan our military expenditures for one
year only, on a year to year basis. An area of expense that constitutes over
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fifty per cent of our total budget deserves better planning than that.
If the Administration's requests for new vieapons and for its
building and manpower programs were to be granted, it is estimated that the
defense budget would continue to increase yearly, to a figure of over $100
billion. I consider this an outrageous burden for our country to carry. Instead
of defense expenditures going up each year, they should be coming down.
I do not favor a large cut in one year in the defense budget. I
believe it would be better to make smaller reductions but to continue such
cuts over a period of years. This plan would have less impact on our domestic
-economy, upon employment in defense industries and upon the attitude of other
countries.
I would like to cut the defense budget in Fiscal 1974 from the
proposed figure of $85 billion to $81 billion. Next year, I would favor a
further cut to $77 billion. Then, in the following year, Fiscal 1976, cut to
$73 billion. From then on, starting with Fiscal 1977, I would stabilize the
budget at $69 billion.
This approach would contrast with budgets which could otherwise
be expected, under present policies, to be $85 billion for 1974, and to reach
more than $93 billion for 1978.
In this period of time, therefore, under the plan I recommend, we
would, in round numbers, go from a current budget of $85 billion to $70 billion
a year in 1978, instead of going from $85 billion to $95 billion in the same period.
Thus, the total savings over the five fiscal years would be an impressive figure
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of $80 billion. The saving thus effected is computed in current dollars.
If one anticipates continuing inflation, the saving would be substantially
greater.
There is not sufficient time on an occasion such as this to present
in detail each specific cut which I believe ought to be made to accomplish this
objective. There has been developed in recent years a number of extremely
well-informed critiques of the official proposals, with comprehensive
suggestions for bringing specific items in our military forces in line with
current realities and policies. However, it is appropriate to indicate some
general areas in which changes should be made.
The substantial ground and air forces earmarked for operations in
Asia can be greatly .cutback or eliminated, since we clearly do not need or
want, as a nation, to pursue political policies which would make it necessary
to use military force in that way. As a first step, they. S. division still in
Korea should be withdrawn and demobilized.
We should start bringing troops back from Europe now. We can do
this without destroying the NATO alliance and, indeed, without compromising
the principle, which I fully support, that the highest priority for our conventional
forces is the contribution they make to presenting a credible conventional defense
in Europe. Indeed, by abandoning the "long war" premise, and configuring our
NATO force recognizing that in the unlikely event of a conventional war inEurope,
it will be a short one, we could actually have a stronger NATO conventional
capability at lower costs and troop levels.
Making the changes to bring our NATO force up to date will not,
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as is so often claimed, foredoom the negotiations on mutual and balanced
force reductions in Europe which are now beginning. Those talks are certain
to be long and not unlikely to be ultimately unproductive. Therefore, we must
not delay the steps we need to take in our own national interests to preserve
"bargaining chips" for them. But, I believe, carefully planned U. S, with-
drawals and restructuring of our NATO forces could actually increase the
favorable prospects for those negotiations. International arms control negotia-
tions are not fully understood by drawing analogies to poker tables. In fact,
unilateral signs of restraint, far from vitiating the prospects of negotiated
restraint on the other side may, by indicating seriousness of purpose, actually
make the agreements easier to reach.
Similarly, we must not be deluded, in the cause of gathering
"bargaining chips" for further rounds of the SALT talks, into buying strategic
weapons we do not need and which could actually jeopardize our security by
contributing to nuclear instability. If such programs are truly "throw-aways"
for bargaining purposes, the Soviet negotiators can be expected to understand
that. If, as it seems more likely, they have powerful bureaucratic backers,
taking the first step now is likely simply to create a constituency for insisting
that the right to build these systems be protected in any future negotiation.
Many of our current weapons programs not only are inordinately
complex and expensive,but they represent little, if any, real advance over
existing systems which will be adequate for years to come.
I am by no means calling for across-the-board cuts in every
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category of our military program. Precisely because I believe that forces
in being should be sharply cut, I urge the importance of keeping up an active
and imaginative research and development program to provide us with the
technological base we would need for adjustment to future changes in ttig
international situation. Similarly, if we adopt a military policy which takes
better account of the international political situation and which accepts the
fact that we cannot afford to hedge heavily against all possible contingencies,
it becomes all the more important to have an efficient -- and honest --
intelligence-gathering system.
,
In any discussion of American defense policy for the future, it is
impossible to ignore problems of more efficient use of manpower. Manpower
has been a steadily increasing element in the defense budget. Some 58
? percent of the defense dollar now goes for pay and allowances for military
personnel.
?
Consider the following facts: There are more three and four star
generals today than at the end of World War II, when the military establishment
was four times as large; twenty-five years ago, the Army had seven recruits
for each sergeant, today there are more sergeants than recruits; twenty-five
years ago, more than half of our officers were below the grade of captain,
today two-thirds of our officers are captains or higher. With a total defense
establishment of 315,000 men less than in 1948, we now have 26,000 more
captains, 21,000 more majors, 15,000 more lieutentant colonels, and 4,000
more colonels.
The most fundamental decision on military manpower made in recent
years has been the adoption of the all-volunteer force conc,ept _
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alternative to the inequities and irrationalities of the old draft was needed,
few would dispute.
But that the volunteer army is an equitable or a workable solution
seems equally. doubtful. It is proving extremely expensive, not merely in
pay but in accumulated pension obligations for the future. Further, as enlist-
ments fall short of goals in both numbers and quality, one may fairly ask
whether a volunteer system is likely to produce the large number of technically
talented personnel needed in the increasingly technological military establishment.
Finally, the volunteer army concept rests upon negation of a
principle 'which I believe remains valid even under today's changed conditions
that a free society can properly call on its citizens to perform military service
and to have military training. Indeed, an all-volunteer army appears to be a
way of institutionalizing the worst feature of the old military draft, that is,
concentrating military service and its burdens and risks among citizens with
lower incomes.
As we adjust our defense policy to new conditions, I believe we
must start now to explore what we will put in the place of the volunteer army
system if, as I believe, that system proves itself to be unworkable and
unacceptable. In that consideration, the concept of u_4-liversal national
service whereby all young men and women would give a year of service to
their country, either in the military or in assigned civilian jobs in the areas
of their background and competence; ought, I believe, to receive the highest
attention.
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In sum, I believe that the changed world calls for a changed
defense policy and a changed defense budget. Of course, it will always be
said that the uncertainties of any change are so great that only the most
trivial adjustments can safely be made. But with the profound changes on
the international scene, if we cannot begin now to reduce our defense budget,
rather than continuing to increase it, when will we ever be able to do so?
Will we have to wait until we really reach a $100 billion defense budget, and
even higher, before we take a serious look at where we are and where we
are going?
It is argued in many circles that the defense budget must be cut
in order to free funds for domestic programs. I would not cast the argument
in those terms. For the reasons I have stated, I believe the defense budget
?
should be cut to bring our military policy in line with our foreign policy and
international reality. I do not necessarily propose that the funds thus saved
would automatically be expended in other parts of the federal budget. Indeed,
I suggest that a high national priority now is to get our own house in order
financially. This requires, given the heavy inflationary pressures in this
country, putting a stop to the budget deficits to which defense spending makes
so large a contribution. In the years since 1969, the total United States deficit
has been $74 billion. Is it any wonder that with these deficits, combined
with a serious inflation, there has been a decline in international confidence
in the dollar and in the American economy in general? Unnecessary, profligate
illdefense spending and maintenance of unnecessary overseas military establishments
has contributed importantly to this loss of confidence in America's financial
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integrity, both directly and through its contributions to the unacceptable
budget deficits of recent years.
Our true national security resides in something more than over-
blown military forces and hardware. It rests, more basically, on the ability
of our society to maintain a sound, productive and growing economy. Today
we are deeply troubled by a damaging and unabated inflation, a deterioration
in our balance of trade and our balance of payments which, in turn, lead to
an increasing lack of confidence in the dollar.
We have the undoubted power to destroy all the countries of the
world. But our present inability to control our own economic destiny threatens
to deprive us of any genuine influence in world affairs. If we allow this to
occur, we will indeed have become, in President Nixon's imagery, a "pitiful,
stumbling giant."
In sum, for a defense posture for an era of negotiation, not con-
frontation, I offer a different concept of the policies and missions our military
forces are to perform. The premises on which these proposals are based would
maintain fully adequate forces to defend our country and to carry out our basic
international commitments.
A study of the rise and fall of great nations discloses that their
decline was not due to a reduction in their military strength, but to a loss of
confidence of their own people in their government and in their economy. Our
most important problems today are internal ones.
We must place the issue of defense policy in its proper perspective,
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and let us get on with the task of developing once again that moral fibre
and economic strength and opportunity that made the United States the hope
of the world.
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PACEM IN TERRIS
A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
III
Circulated: September 25, 1973
Critique:
by Dr. Jeremy Stone
Director, Federation of American Scientists; former
Consultant, RAND Corporation
FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY
Scheduled:
Session V-VI, beginning at 8 p.m., Tuesday, October 9, 1973
Also Scheduled:
Addresses by Clark Clifford and Herbert York
Critique:
kr
Albert Wohistetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque, Jeremy
Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner
A Paper prepared for, delivery at a national convocation sponsored by the
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to convene at the Sheraton-Park
Hotel, Washington, Oct. 8 - 11, 1973. Press inquiries should be directed to
Frank K. Kelly, The Center, PO Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103.
Telephone: Area Code 805 969-3281.
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Panel Response of Jeremy J. Stone
Racem in Terris III
October 9, 1973 8-10 P.M.
RE: THE PAPER BY CLARK CLIFFORD
Secretary Clifford's paper notes that the world has changed.
These changes have finally validated arguments long used by critics of
defense spending.
Twenty years ago one of these critics, President Eisenhower, was
already complaining that defense costs would "bankrupt" America; he
was widely advised to study Keynes. But today the dollar is badly
devalued, and fears are still expressed about the "overhang" of dollars
extant around the world -- dollars for which we sometimes even have
to refuse payment; for example, when we have only enough soybeans for
ourselves.
Ten years ago, seizing upon domestic disorder, other critics of
defense spending argued that "security" ought to be interpreted to
include "domestic security"; were we not running greater risks of losing
Chicago through insurrection than through nuclear war? But today it is
not necessary to expand the notion of security to complain about the
defense budget. Even the Armed Services Committee wonders whether man-
power, and rising weapons costs, have priced the military out of the
market.
America is now in a position in which most world countries have
been for most of their existence -- one in which we must consider_
seriously civilian-military priorities. Heretofore, these were often
only a slogan -- a slogan of opposition to military expenditure.
In the words of Madison Avenue, those who voiced the criticism
have got "attention". The time has come to deliver the message. Now
we need much more serious analyses of the costs to Americans of slightin
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2
non-military expenditures in favor of military ones. The depletion of
_
the civilian sector, the withdrawal from the civilian economy of resources
that might have increased productivity, the inflationary effect of run-
ning constant deficits because of a swollen defense budget, and the costs
to society of failing to heal social ills. In this age, American scholars
must become adept at the calculus of priorities.
Secretary Clifford's second observation that the defense establish-
ment has not changed despite world changes should be a final warning
to all who take geopolitical and military planning too seriously. The
record of strategic plans of the Cold War is not a happy one. Both the
Korean and the Vietnamese wars were mishandled. Between wars, bomber
gaps, missile gaps, anti-missile gaps, and big-missile gaps revealed our
compulsive response to strategically motivated misinformation. Wisdom
was found in such gems as "more bang for the buck". Thousands of nuclear
weapons were placed in Europe with no visible doctrine for their use.
In strategic weapons, a tradition was developed of cost overruns, waste,
and overbuilding in numbers. Ad hoc explanations for strategic decisions;
weapons systems in search of missions; and scare stories timed to the
"spring became perennial phenomena. Finally, to top it off, we switched
from a 2-1/2 war strategic requirement to a 1-1/2 war strategic require-
ment and nothing much happened to our force structure.
Whether the strategic planning is done by civilians, the Joint
Chiefs, or Joseph Alsop, the history of the last 25 years suggests that
their plans and reasoning ought to be taken with a very large grain of
salt. Our job, in the next 25 years, is to avoid making again the same
mistakes.
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3
RE: The paper by Herbert York
The paper by Herbert F. York, "Nuclear Deterrence and the Forces
Needed for It", observes that superpower strategic forces are much larger
than necessary and could be greatly reduced without affecting the strat-
egy of mutual deterrence. It concludes that our "highest priority short-
term objective" should he to do just that.
It is true that enormous reductions of strategic forces could
be achieved without affecting the capability of the United States and
the Soviet Union to destroy high percentages of the population of the
other side. But, if so, do these reductions make enough difference to
deserve the highest priority, albeit in the short run?
Could it not be argued as follows, from the same datum: If
disarmament is irrelevant to the vast majority of the lives that would
be destroyed with nuclear weapons, then perhaps the highest immediate
priority should be placed on making sure that nuclear weapons are not
used. This includes such ideas as:
discouraging the initial use of nuclear weapons: by requiring
that no one man (even the President) can make the decision; by
shaping the options provided in military planning; by controlling
the authority of nuclear commanders, especially_atse_a; by en-
couraging public attitudes to consider the use of nuclear weapons
a criminal act; by shaping the reciprocal expectations of leaders
in favor of non-use rather than use of nuclear weapons through
public statements, quiet discussions, and so on.
discouraging the escalation to nuclear war of any isolated use
of nuclear weapons: by indoctrination of battlefield commanders,
locks and physical restraints on unauthorized use, methods of
high-level explanatory communication (hot lines), and so on.
encouraging methods for terminating nuclear war if it occurs: by
avoiding doctrines that encourage spasm war, embodying recognition
of the fruitlessness of trying to disarm the other side in the
plans and expectations of the highest military leadership;
avoidance of attacks upon command centers rather than empha-
sizing such attack; preparing to maintain command and control
of nuclear weapons throughout any war whatsoever.
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If, for example, planning in Europe in one or both camps is for
prompt and easy escalation to nuclear weapons; if the sudden outbreak of
violence will not realistically permit other possibilities, then what
is needed is a world-wide campaign against these plans and attitudes and
against nuclear weapons themselves, rather than a campaign only to reduce
their numbers. Would we, for example, prefer to have: (a) 50% of the
nuclear weapons destroyed (and national planning as it is), or (b)
everyonelinking that the first use of nuclear weapons anywhere was a
criminal act comparable to the use of biological warfare (and national
planning based on that latter assumption). Neither of these outcomes
provides perfect protection but there is a lot to be said for the second.
It may, of course, be harder to achieve -- I'm not sure. But, in any
case, it strikes me as irresponsible to continue to ignore the dynamics
of nuclear war in conferences of this kind. The world in general, and
Europe in particular, is a nuclear tinderbox which disarmament is not going
to cure.
Of course, nuclear reductions, if explained properly, can play
an important role in discouraging the use of nuclear weapons. How can
these reductions best be motivated? Dr. York has argued persuasively
for destroying the largest nuclear weapons on the grounds that they
create that much more collateral damage through fallout. Happily for his
excellent proposal, these same large nuclear weapons are probably also
to be found among the most vulnerable, destabilizing and/or provocative
nuclear weapons. Thus, the argument for his conclusion is greatly
strengthened.
However, I would argue that, in general, the most persuasive
argument for reductions may lie elsewhere -- in the realm of economics.
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5
While it is not, by great power standards, overwhelmingly expensive to
maintain a large strategic force, it is extremely expensive to keep
modernizing such a force. And neither great power seems to be able to
resist the impulse to modernize all that it has built -- no matter how
much. it says about part of the force being "backup", "secondary",
"insurance only" or whatever. Thus the slogan, "One does not modernize
what one does not have" mig!lt be of more significance to political leaders
than the fallout produced by the weapons they have already paid for and
built.
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PACEM IN TERRIS
A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
III
Circulated: September 6, 1973
Address
DETERRENCE BY MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
by Herbert York
Professor of Physics, University of California at San Diego;
former Science Advisor to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy;
former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Depart-
ment of Defense
FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY
Scheduled:
Session V-VI, beginning at 8 p.m., Tuesday, October 9, 1973
Also Scheduled:
Address by Clark Clifford
Critique: Albert Wohlstetter (Chairman); Gloria Emerson,
William Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque, Jeremy
Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner
kr
A Paper prepared for delivery at a national convocation sponsored by the
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to convene at the Sheraton-Park
Hotel, Washington, Oct. 8 - 11, 1973. Press inquiries should be directed to
Frank K. Kelly, The Center, PO Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103.
Telephone: Area Code 805 969-3281.
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? ?,
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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE FORCES NEEDED FOR IT
by Herbert F. York
In this paper I shall try to make two main points and one
specific proposal based on them.
The first point is that, while Deterrence through the
Threat of Mutual Assured Destruction may be the best strategy
available to us at the present time, we should not delude our-
selves into believing that it is a good strategy. It is a
terrible strategy, and our highest-priority, long-run objec-
tive should be to get rid of it altogether.
The second point is that, even if we accept the strategy
of deterrence as the best currently available to us, the stock-
pile of weapons we now rely on to produce it is from ten to
one hundred times as murderous and destructive as it needs to
be to satisfy that purpose. Therefore, our highest-priority
objective for the immediate future should be to reduce greatly
the current level of "overkill" even while we still maintain
the strategy of deterrence.
The specific proposal describes a way to make a very
large reduction in overkill without requiring or producing any
change in the strategy of nuclear deterrence.
Basically, a strategy of nuclear deterrence is one in
which we seek to prevent certain political or military actions
by others by threatening to use our nuclear weapons rather than
by actually using them. Maintaining such a strategy, therefore,
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is more a matter of political psychology than of nuclear
technology. Someone will be deterred if he believes that the
nuclear punishment he will receive will be more severe than
the achievement of some particular objective merits. Thus,
the actual physical properties of the weapons only enter the
deterrence equation insofar as the physical properties affect
the beliefs of the various parties. However, if and when
deterrence fails, the matter changes radically. Then it is
no longer what people believe about the weapons that counts
but the real physical facts about their properties.
Twenty years ago, the general strategy of nuclear deterrence
was particularlized in John Foster Dulles' doctrine of Massive
Retaliation. The Korean War was fresh in peoples' minds, and
those who advocated massive retaliation were in effect saying,
"The next time we are seriously challenged, we will not allow
the enemy to choose the place and style of warfare most favor-
able to him." Instead, they said, "If there is another attack
anywhere on one of our allies, we will immediately retaliate
with a massive nuclear strike on the real source of the new
aggression." At that time, the idea was to deter conventional
war anywhere in the world, but especially in Europe, through
the threat of massive nuclear retaliation. The United States
was able to make such a threat because we had an overwhelming
superiority in nuclear weapons. We had, perhaps, a few hundred
atomic bombs, each somewhat bigger than the one that had killed
about 100,000 people in Hiroshima eight years earlier. We also
had many long-range aircraft and we had many air bases from
which even short-range aircraft could reach the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, the Soviets had only just begun to accumulate
atomic bombs, their aircraft were less capable, and they had
no air bases close to our heartland. The situation was so
unsymmetrical that it made perfectly good sense from our point
of view to deter conventional attack by a threat of massive
retaliation.
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Since then, the situation has changed radically. In the
meantime, the hydrogen bomb has been perfected, resulting in
a thousandfold increase in the power of individual weapons.
Now nuclear bombs number in the tens of thousands rather than
in the hundreds, intercontinental bombers and rockets have
replaced short-range aircraft, and forward bases are no longer
essential. Most important, there are now two nuclear super-
powers possessing these extreme capabilities, and there are
three other nuclear powers each of which has a nuclear
capability that is small compared to what the superpowers have
today, but enormous compared to that which the USA had when
it first put forth its policy of massive retaliation. In
recognition of the fact that for some time now there has been
a rough balance of terror between the two superpowers, we now
speak of deterrence as being based on the threat of Mutual
Assured Destruction. Under such circumstances, one set of
strategic nuclear forces does little more than deter a direct
attack by another. To be sure, there are those who would like
to believe these terribly murderous and destructive forces
achieve other, broader objectives, but it is doubtful that
they any longer do so. The best that is usually claimed for
nuclear deterrence is that it "works," and that it is stable.
The first of these claims is speculative -- and in any event,
unprovable. The fact that there has been no invasion of
Western Europe is consistent with the notion that the threat
of massive retaliation "worked," but does not prove that it
did. Similarly, the fact that there has been no strategic
nuclear bombardment by anybody since 1945 is also consistent
with the idea that nuclear deterrence works, but again it
simply is not possible to prove there is any causal connection.
Along with most others, I believe the current nuclear
balance has been stable for some time, and that the SALT I
agreements go a long way toward assuring that it will remain
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stable for the foreseeable future. Moreover, I believe the
present balance is stable in two different ways. First, it
possesses what is called "crisis stability." That is, in a
military crisis, one side cannot add much to its chances of
survival by striking first, and so there is no strong induce-
ment to do so. The current nuclear balance is also reasonably
stable in the "arms race" sense. That is, there does not
appear
bo:::-ayt
\ h7Yotlfloerr one.
byto achieve an overwhelming
y quiCkly acquiring any reason-
able quantity of some new weapon, and so again there exists
no really strong inducement to do so.
So much for what might be called "the good side" of
deterrence; what is wrong with it? Simply this: If for any
political or psychological or technical reason deterrence
should fail, the physical, biological and social consequences
would be completely out of line with any reasonable view of
the national objectives of the USA or the Soviet Union. What
would these consequences be? I believe the following is as
accurate and detailed as is necessary and useful for any
general but serious discussion of the subject. In the event
of an exchange of blows by the strategic nuclear forces of
the USA and the USSR, most of the urban populations of the
Soviet Union and the United States could be killed, and most
of the industry and commerce could be destroyed by the direct
and immediate effects of the nuclear explosions. The towns
and rural areas of the two countries would at the same time
be subjected to varying amounts of radioactive fallout. The
details of what would happen to the people living in such
areas depend importantly on the weather conditions prevailing
at the time and on the details of the attack pattern, but well
over one-half of the town and country populations could be
killed by the fallout. In addition, the living standards and
the life expectancy of the survivors would be substantially
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reduced by secondary effects, including both the effect of
less-than-lethal levels of fallout and the general breakdown
of civilized services. The balance between the damage to
the urban population of one side and the damage to the urban
population of the other side depends somewhat, but not
materially, on who strikes first. However, there is a real
possibility that the rural population of the side that strikes
first will end up somewhat better off.
In addition, the lives of many millions of people living
in the immediate neighborhood of the superpowers would be
imperiled by so-called local fallout, and long-range or
world-wide fallout would endanger those living in even remote
countries. It is very difficult to make precise estimates,
but it seems that a full nuclear exchange between the USA and
the USSR would result in the order of 10,000,000 casualties
from cancer and leukemia in countries situated well away from
the two main protagonists. In addition, genetic problems,
that are even more difficult to calculate, would affect many,
many millions of others, not only in this generation, but for
centuries to come. Civilization would survive somewhere,
but probably not in the United States or the Soviet Union,
and perhaps not elsewhere in North America or Europe.
Some authorities have proposed that we confront these
awful possibilities by undertaking huge, complex programs
designed to cope directly with a massive nuclear atGack.
Such programs usually include the installation of a so-called
thick system of antiballistic missiles combined with very
extensive civil defense and post-attack recovery programs.
In detailed examinations, however, the main elements of
such proposals have always been judged to be either technically
unsound, or economically unfeasible, or socially and politically
unacceptable, and so no such programs are currently underway
or even being seriously considered.
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In brief, for now and the foreseeable future, a nuclear
exchange would result in the destruction of the two principles
as nations regardless of who strikes first. This is what is
usually meant by the phrase "Mutual Assured Destruction."
It is most important in any discussion about international
affairs or the current military balance to have clearly in
mind what the current technical situation means: the survival
of the combined populations of the superpowers depends on the
good will and the good sense of the separate leaderships of
the superpowers. If the Soviet leadership, for whatever
reason, or as a result of whatever mistaken information, chose
to destroy America as a nation, it is unquestionably capable
of doing so in less than half an hour, and there is literally
nothing we could now do to prevent it. The only thing we could
do is to wreak on them an equally terrible revenge. And,
of course, the situation is the same the other way around.
No onecan sayA deterrence will break down, or even
why it--14111). Indeed, if the leadership of all the nuclear
powers always behave in a rational and humane way, it never
will. But there are now five nuclear powers, and there will
be more someday, and if any of them ever makes a technical,
political or military nuclear mistake for any reason, real
or imagined, then there will be a substantial chance that the
whole civilized world could go up in nuclear smoke. This is
simply too frightful and too dangerous a way to live indefinitely;
we must find some better form of international relationship
than the current dependency on a strategy of mutual assured
destruction.
Let me now turn to the matter of the size of the force
currently devoted to mutual assured destruction, and to the
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matter of "overkill." Informed opinions about how many weapons
are really needed vary over an extremely wide range. For
example, shortly after leaving the post of Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge
Bundy wrote, "In the real world of real political leaders --
whether here or in the Soviet Union -- a decision that would
bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country
would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten
bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and
a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable."
For a very much higher estimate, we turn to some
calculations made in the early 1960ts. In order to quantify
the question, it was assumed that "assured destruction" meant
guaranteeing the deaths of 25% of the population and the
destruction of a majority of its industrial capacity. From
that, it was calculated that as many as 400 bombs on target
might be needed.
As an intermediate estimate, we may turn to what the
French and British have actually done to produce what they
evidently think is a deterrent force. In each case the number
of large bombs devoted to that purpose seems to be something
less than one hundred.
There is, thus, a wide range of views about what is
needed for deterrence. My personal view is that Bundy is
right: that from one to ten are enough whenever the course
of the events is being rationally determined. In the case of
irrational behavior, there is no way of calculating what it
would take. The case of irrational behavior is, therefore,
of little interest in connection with the question of how
big the deterrent force should be; rather, the matter of
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irrational behavior only enters into questions about when and
how deterrence will fail, and about whether a policy based
on deterrence is of any political value at all.
How do these estimates of need, running from a low of
one to a high of 400, compare with what we actually have?
When current plans are completed, just one component of
the U.S. strategic force will consist of 31 Poseidon sub-
marines. Each submarine has 16 missiles, each missile can
deliver 10 or so warheads, each to a different target.
That makes 5000 warheads altogether, and each of them is about
three times as big as the one which killed about 100,000
people in Hiroshima in 1945.
In addition, we plan to retain 10 missile submarines of
an older type, which deliver bigger warheads, but not so many
of them. In addition to the submarine missiles are the land-
based Minuteman and Titan forces, capable of delivering about
2000 warheads, ranging in size from those which are "only" ten
times the size of the Hiroshima bomb up to warheads hundreds
of times as big.
The third component of the "Triad" of strategic force
consists of long-range bombers, mostly B-52's. The details
of their capability are less well known publicly than those
of the missile forces. It is known, however, that each bomber
can deliver many individual weapons, including both air-to-
surface missiles and free-fall bombs. The actual number and
megatonnage depends more on administrative decisions than on
technological limitations. It is, however, clear that the
bombers can carry many more megatons than the combined sea-
based and land-based missile force. All told, the total
number of individual warheads in the force I have described
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is in excess of 10,000 and their total explosive power is
about one half million times as great as the nuclear explosive
power used to put the finishing touches on World War II.
By the time the Soviets complete their current round of
missile deployments, they will possess a force which is in
a general way comparable to ours, though differing in its
details. Specifically, in the mid- and late-seventies they
will end up with substantially fewer individual warheads, but
with substantially more total megatonnage.
If one, or ten, or maybe a few hundred bombs on target
are all that are needed to deter, how did it happen that we
came to possess more than 10,000? And why so much total
explosive power?
These numbers are not the result of a careful calculation
of the need in some specific strategic or tactical situation.
They are the result of a series of historical accidents which
have been rationalized after the fact.
In the late forties and early fifties, before the
--,invention of the H-bomb, it was determined that we needed on
the order of 1000 delivery vehicles (then land-based and sea-
based bombers) in our strategic forces. This was determined
by several factors: World War II and the Korean experience;
the need for a relatively large number of vehicles in order
to develop the tactics needed to penetrate defenses with high
assurance; and, probably most important of all, purely fiscal
considerations during the late Truman and early Eisenhower
administrations. Then suddenly when the H-bomb was perfected
in 1954, the explosive power of the bombs multiplied 1000-fold.
When the effectiveness of each nuclear weapon was thus so
enormously increased, one might have supposed it would have
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resulted in a reduction in the number of delivery vehicles
needed, but no such adjustment was made. . fact, since the
perfection of the H74Omb_waa one-af?tA Orazo.IaGiaaa-a4Var
that made lonE=Laage--mts,sil-as pract.&e.a.T the H-bomb actually
4?
resulted in a proliferation of types of delivery systems, and
that in turn resulted in a small increase in their total
numbers. In the late sixties, further technological advances
made it possible to provide each individual missile with more
than ten individually targetable warheads. Again, one might
have expected some adjustment in the number of delivery vehicles,
but there was none; the number of land-based missiles and the
number of sea-based missiles have both remained exactly the
same as they were before this latest innovation was introduced.
In sum, very great changes, even order-of-magnitude changes,
in the technological capability of the strategic forces have
resulted in no change whatsoever in their numbers.
As I remarked before, all of this has been rationalized
after the fact. One method for doing so is called "worst
case analysis.:." In such an analysis, the analyst starts with
the assumption that his forces have just been subjected to a
massive preemptive attack. He then makes a calculation in
which he makes a series of very favorable assumptions about
the attacker's equipment, knowledge and behavior, and-a -s-i-mflar
series of very unfavorable assumptions about his own forces.
Such a calculation can result in an arithmetic justification
for a very large force indeed, provided that we really
believe there is a chance that all the many deviations from
the most probable situation will go in one way for them and
in the other way for us.
An additional argument for possessing many more weapons
than are needed for deterrence involves a notion called
"Damage Limitation." The idea is that a part of our force
should be reserved for attacking and destroying those enemy
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weapons that for some reason were not ?used in his first,
preemptive strike. Besides the obvious technical difficulties
with such a scheme, it is counterproductive for political
reasons. In today's world, the internal politics of each of
the two superpowers requires them to maintain strategic forces
that are roughly equal in size. That in turn means that if
one side builds a large force for "damage limiting" purposes,
the other side will build a roughly equal force which will
inevitably be "damage producing." Such a chain of events
obviously leads from bad to worse. Furthermore, the kind of
forces needed for this so-called "damaging limiting" role are
technologic,ally-identical to those needed for a first .strike,
and so such a strategy is obviously. dangerous for that reason
also.
In brief then, even if we accept for the time being the
need for a policy of deterrence through mutual assured destruc-
tion, the forces now in being are enormously greater than are
needed for that purpose. And again, if we recognize that
deterrence can fail, and if we admit to ourselves the con-
sequences of such a failure, then we see that greatly reducing
the current degree of overkill is both possible and essential.
Before making some specific recommendations about what
should be done, I shall first discuss one particular alternative
proposal sometimes put forth as a means for improving the
current dreadful situation. In that proposal the current
deterrence policy, in which populations and industries are
the key targets, would be replaced by a policy in which .only__
weapons and military centers are targets. At first glance,
it seems that such a policy would be more humane in some
useful sense. As a result, such proposals have frequently
arisen; the best known being the "counterforce" proposal made
by Secretary McNamara at a NATO meeting in 1962. However,
the idea has several flaws. First of all, such counterforce
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strategies, as they are called, always turn out to require,
or at least justify, many more and generally larger weapons
than are needed for the so-called counter-value, or deterrence
strategy. In such a case, a failure in deterrence would
generally result in many_more deaths, especially in third
countries, than would be the case for a force sized for
deterrence only. This comes about partly due to an increase
in collateral damage through fallout, and also because of the
colocation of so many military targets with urban targets
such as the military command posts in Washington, Omaha, and
Moscow; the transportation centers in St. Louis, Chicago,
Kharkov and Kiev; the naval bases at New York, Boston, San
Diego, Los Angeles, Leningrad, Sevastopol and Vladivostock,
and so on.
Moreover, a policy to target only military installations
would only be an administrative arrangement; it would not rely
on anything intrinsic in the equipment. Hence such a policy,
agreed to internationally or not, could be abandoned or
abrogated on short notice, after first being used to justify
a substantial increase in force levels. For these reasons,
I believe the proposals for improving the present situation
by going to a counterforce strategy are among the most
dangerous proposals I know.
How might we, then, go about reducing the great overkill
inherent in the present Soviet and U.S. forces without at the
same time affecting the style and stability of the nuclear
deterrence strategy? Recalling that the local fallout from
a nuclear exchange can cause the death of more than half of
the town and rural populations of the two superpowers, and
that the world-wide fallout from nuclear exchange will result
in the death of many millions of people in third countries,
and noting that fallout is essentially proportional to
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megatonnage, we see we ought to start by getting rid of those
elements of the force that deliver the most megatons. In
each case, roughly 20% of the forg,e_s_parry_roughly 80% of_the
megatons. In the U.S. case, these are the several hundred
long-range bombers and the 54 Titan missiles. In the Soviet
case, these are the 300 very large La:_-9_missiles plus a
relatively small intercontinental bomber force. Ridding the
world of all these weapons and, of course, prohibiting their
replacement by newer versions, would decrease substantially
the threat to the rural populations of the two protagonists.
It would also reduce the danger to residents of innocent
countries five-fold. At the same time, their simultaneous
elimination of these weapons through negotiation or, I would
venture to say, even their unilateral elimination by one or
both sides, would have little effect on the deterrent posture
of either side.
There is another area where it should be easy to achieve
a further two-fold reduction in potential fallout. Only
one-half of our Minutemen are being converted to the new
Minuteman III, and only 31 of our 41 Polaris boats are being
converted to Poseidons. Simply abandoning the not-to-be
converted residuals of these forces would eliminate about
one-half the fallout potential of our missile forces. And
precisely because these older weapons are less capable,
their complete elimination would have only a marginal effect
on our ability to deter. Similarly, we may be confident
the Soviets also have some obsolescent _weapons they could
get rid of at the same time in order to keep things in formal
balance. And beyond the elimination of these excessively
murderous and obsolescent vehicles, we might also consider
placing an upper_limit on the explosive,pow_er, of those kVY
remaining. For instance, we might set an upper limit in
power equal to that of the Hiroshima bomb. The many thousands
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of bombs that Would still remain the strategic forces even
after the reductions I have suggested, would still seem to
be many more than enough for deterrence through mutual assured
destruction, even if each bomb were so limited in power.
The overkill capacity in the present forces is so large
that even the rather substantial reductions I have suggested
would not o much to the threat a ging ovez-LLe, lahab-itants,
of the larger cities; most of them would still be killed in
the event of a breakdown of deterrence. But, since there
would be big decreases in death and destruction in rural
areas and small towns, the prospects for so e sort of aatianal--
survival
would be much improved. Perhaps most
important,
the number of deaths and the amount of genetic damage in
innocent countries would be reduced more than ten-fold. And
whether or not one believes the leadership of a nation has
the right to place all of its own citizens at risk, it surely
does not have that right with regard to third parties.
In the real world, admittedly these specific arms
reduction suggestions are clearly too much for the short term
and too little for the long term.
The short-term objectives, as embodied in the SALT
negotiations, are largely devoted to stun.= the tubnalagiaal
0
arms race, and real reductions in arms have been relegated
to the future.
The long-term objective, as attested to on several solemn
occasions by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, and by
Chairmen Khrushchev and Brezhnev, are general and complete
disarmament. Leaving aside the question of the feasibility
of their ultimate objectives, we must even so note that my
suggestions are very modest by comparison.
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These particular suggestions, then, are meant for the
intermediate term, say the next five or ten years. They are
for the period after we finally succeed in fully arresting
the forward momentum of arms development and deployment but
before the final arrival of the conditions necessary for
"General and Complete Disarmament."
So far, after almost thirty years of attempts to achieve
some kind of serious disarmament, not one single nuclear
weapon has ever been destroyed or even moved as a result of
an agreement to do so. That record could lead to a feeling
of utter hopelessness, or it could lead to a renewed determina-
tion to accomplish something at long last. Let us try to
make it the latter.
4e
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44.
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9 .?
.2
a?te ez-01 ?11 t'.7i1'1:/a;,
gel), /4,014a '?,,-...
? Wash)._ said.theresohation
"really: does.nnp.'adequately.,
cover, - this, "pro*nt..li", What;
: he fears.,:mosthe
*. that the Arahi inight:seekto? ,
get the-KU.Ntei---order3::.A;.:',
standstill Cease-fire in 'Place? :::
which could7leave _Arabs:
, . control of some portintis_o_t
the area helithylsrael Priorq
? to the .itart "Of.. fighting on-,
Saturday..-:,,..; Thus, ?although':
? '"the first moves Were made,:
by them," the natione-,
might seek to obtain a JU.N.,
sanctioned benefit. from
their aggressinin:;'?.-ii,?:,-.."4--?,:i.
'rliere *as:46111e huit4*-r;
? terday that Scott-Matu4
fielth:- 'language had'4.lipest
drafted am:Frit...shed throngk.1
Beziate-F.A.tjtea
strong pro-lrae1 senators'
might ';to'force through?'
a -ieso
YrIac,an44-"?gpt which.
"'-'? caul& hil;setits.-.peaeekiniti4
atrves. IacltS'OFt._::'derded;
' ever, thatatlilliad: intended'
ciesnt ge.:a0
(11A
Ystidruipu*O4
:!;10faet!'-ieihr
.what11a4aSsed. '
ikAKi"sfikaieesyi:i
, ? vi,?.ff ?
a .,.n
`?
.14r
)161:&:6074i)'W. dVitif;414,'
.,:w.4:?WvorkagairisrlsraerW,!..
? Tstaek:shOtildeldri.vacrosi.,,i,
theSCaiialr.TheyonJ
-.theGoIariHeights,. and bc.-;_
cupy tert t$"didnt so
cupy
, ?break of
c.,:z,qtte**44,
4;r*oil?
-e4
???
At the Statez.:/feurinfenV2.'
IVIcClosker'reiteratel
- The UnitedStates had no?
, fixed proposela th-presentat
? the Securityconricil
"We have? not- yet :produced.
a piece ofpaper,lhative' 'are.:
prepared to introduce,?'-he
said. Then,: in-an attempt to
? dampen spectilation that the:.
United ?States.:,--had,' :hot,
moved with di sp at ch. in-the
crisis, permitting .,..the
elis time to :retake territory;,
McCloskey- volunteered that a
the United ::,-.States,-.had
sought to get Security Coun-
? cil action frOrn, the start but
only when it whuld-not-
to useless- 'rhetOrie",':and
"endless debate!. Such: spee.,?;:
ulation, he
unworthy, of -the :-spirit in
which the United States has
? approached:the- entire- situa&tio
::
After: hiSmorninr:',
ing with 'the:President
singer spent the ?.'"day . in
State ' Departmentoffice,?!..5
contacting foreign, diplomatsf;-:
by telephone .and
with senior aides in the 'Mici-4
die.- Bast; crisis;;MeCloskei7'
_ In addition to the in:tined.'"
ate crisis vosvingout of the,
hostilities along the fron-
tiers of the occupied-territo;:'
ries U. S. officials, are faced:
with. the potentiar'probleriI
that the oil-rich Arab states.
could try to72ihflifence-: the-
conffict by Tarrying out ear-7.-.
her threats tti, withhold:, oiln
or refuse-s to -increase proA
duetion in step with-Wester
requir_ementa.--officials
however, resPonsei:;tiii;
question, said-theY:.tact seen:
? no "inobiliiatieittitude:
toward "that...kindcif.,?"deci4-,'
sion."-TheY7addeitthat
a contingencyrtliSt,..hits;;.
been s consideredlierejl
WashingtoitIobv,iouilY4,iNgi,.4
hope that- hothingilike: :the'
:7
O LI 4
t-
TS.;!'.',' -.74 ?!:.?.,
-Sake&
`hatt.';'
raised, tbe::energy:questicifiq
? in ? talkaiwitifitlien.ii Said: that4
nor.:Ainericank,offiCiat
brthight_hp.:.thei-Wprobleni,+
In.thepesrth.israerii:hiv#5'
_statedtliat.t;tlifretiergyAues:,'';
'
there "*ere"
problem
? .4lso ? contrihutinvin
report-ton.v Washiagtirre-Posi!%
Staff Writer Spincpr.Rich,f.:,.
- ?
?
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77
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Secretary of StateHenrY
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riuittP;;IFT?;P=
en;scanI^ eaf
letk41,4d.ekcl.ceiTIF?,.
:;1{,pftirairjapeircla:
:sing&--rep!cesentetlik,
-rnakers71-t and; hi*.i?Cliaice4
first& speaker Wei ra4.haar:
adeOne of the demo
.?.tOi-iilWati(ineherD'hir aisisial
' bee ether= audierieCazior*
curity inen ? pushertAhai:461? ,
onstratorout4
Kissinger?i-esuniecripe
after a delay of.' about:''Ave!
minutes, with the: -
4
I, IP,IZW-t.,t's ?
overwif
to continue,: , _
.?
thgeerafer-
-
hriet
,ences:teither.esent?hiUddle:.
;. niounted:A:hy4thei.:.kineriCaa:.
? Soviet polio: it
cannoSursIve
irrespan.sihilitr iiituarJarea;,,
including:the Middle-East,'-."
said-Kissinger. B.iti -,..salci;.;
_...'"!"HoweVerT"?"!weil-ffsWeinittain,
-"?ti crisisi? as-we : hiveicott-.".
4;tained,:,Others;t:Weninst..=stilP
ask ourselves What*
beyond...the, management of
conflict'
faiian "
" audience composed ?"Of many:
? inteliectnar Critics; Including !'
.former!.icademie. olleagues
The: cptiCe.suppart,the-zna--.
jority opposition .-raiseci., in
the 'Senate and Hauie.itO;
giantingtheS?vietUiion
most-fa yared-fiationWtraife
13eiiefitsgwithout:COnclitions,
. Canditicink
demaricinCongressiWer._e:-
"guarantees of ertligtattope
h-olts,..*faeCiallY?401:-.RuSF,
?"'min Tenter4tP
led'?=-?b"TJPWO-It?''Ajick.e. i?e?D?4
7; Glichtlit.JviA-Pciii74uth.9.Vile*
.-anderl.AolzhenitsY4
eivgriat: ainbrimit* thi0
63tintryl5tinion-
itotd*eoplous?trati,*tfi*
-e:Nniow.0,341-*I1p37/01337,Wit;
faddiesa4,*Sejsz.:ii:=3:11P.i?rruP
. laright
WX1.10:-.K Faihright100.004
"Xissinge.c.'inAefendin
S'4?40iv&."4-11n104#44,1#04,4j,*0
slitsne?k'.."-f*Att?00**,..4W1.
"Of.
'1T704140#04iina -
_
; powaAiOliticax.apPtci,
_
'
,ahout--*Ttfattarp.OpaSen:43a.?
? neveltib.eenoretilige4r::
Kfisingataire4-'1.7. -
"Let fofresh
consetist*Itit.iikreSibie-7a:,
spirit,- ofZnnelerStiEclink4be;:":"
tweentlie?-leMs"
executive,. b?ee1th&qV-
ermnent:andt]ie* liaressle-??-.
I tweeTtAk. PeoPla,?-ar4- -t4eir;
;
But- -!`thej)rle*Uisita-ftie
; a ? fruitfu nationahAebate;T.
! said :,11.5singerg
t Policrmalcerncfa*,
! preciate.-eacirt.lothisrli..,:parg,
spectnd
othet's:!?purposeenv.*:-,:,4
e, That..?"1/20asthet
touChed' *idea -out'
fram. ?the demonstra-!';
:lors
order :iwass.-_?restoreel4n;, the.,
: fciam:Hissinger?-:repeated
. -burst. Of;applause,?",
. Iiissinger..,saicif. the ipoliC?41.'"
makeraustc"st4kee..?..bali:.;',
? anCe:hetweeng whatiis....???d '
? ancir;::"the ,butiiderr.
'.?tv .
inct:?:3eritic.:-rnistt.acknowP;
. _
ecige:-.1he -complexgy, of; t,14,
choices. -
hair Ceinttiri,l.' a
Kisiinger," .!`....we.?chaiii,' object-
ed to,Cominumst4effortsjo..
alter the?? domestic struc
tur4.kl-kiaf.\
'For
...War, We sought :tc1Tfease?the;
risks..breducedc-i.;fr"i'competz-,1
? .ineitteOlogies-.--:Are we 'tow:,
=to come full circle" and7-in,,
ity Conctitfcni.7of progki;
ress .toirard, iaeaCerr.s.." Fi-
.:'*1.01IgheOft;:hW7ad es?
-
Kissinger pub questions to .
the r..ratics;, :Aretwe.ready
to: qiCiAlie..::?Ctides,"-Inci ml
.1?lOgq" ?
? =it! detenteTthat ,has
. pialopted.TepreSsiOni(inside!
the SovetUjnon)-or is it F
:OetAnteLtil.44:.W-:::gPerat.0111
:the ferment Oct the. demand
f oiotienne*whielt.iike ret'a
ncivP:witnesalfigrJR?01?
.i0TheF.S...,goV.ernMgit !max!
underestimatki,tWmak-giii-,
;ofi...conees.sionS4v"axlahlea?-tn,
?Lis;.!;;."? 1C-4- s s
edgeCtn"Ant,e4a1:r:Acl'ehater:;:,
.they: gennAtiestions
""-the.?'?ansViers "A;wiiielajconldi-
. affeet_flheanteAtir.-ot get
"?`
ittainalientliePeaCee-
. ,
?
:alsota,:profiannolaorat con
cern, samd Kissi?i and
. questiOn..441ave
? It ms-'Inisleading he Salcf;':
to imply.:,:that.%tliee. term; :
"meit:MaVorecr.inatitin," im-
plipiiareferentiat..."-' treat;-
-
Instead es?ft.nieans.
onailettansTito-t=:-resumei.
...hYliblilishtiediscrfnainatory
trndek7!"?iestrictiOii..m.posed:,'
1954
resterightiiew shared',)
by oveik-41f10-ziatheaations.1,1
?
a^ -nnotfeonctii. jitjhe -appo
Of .1V117.T.,Sakharar, the Soiicti
physicjt who says.;?-?that
there-- can bev.".126-A, datentei:
7v0P11,0.1.:ktf,;d0n6c-rYii.?.?17;741.-.:k
novelist Solzhent$ri
says that-t 'mankinds sole'
salvation.. hes dn eyeryone
niakiitg.?*.erjthing.1iia
, "If 'ive.:Wishttd;applylirei4:
'sUrre Jon' democracy and hu-
man 'fights,'.! said: Fulliright;f;
"Would' it:'not make ;Sense-to.
start BrazilK'Or'
Greeee,ffill cll.:Whom:Ate
nerab1e.4O4Anierica- pre'
: sures, , none'iof whom. are
? Selitial.pertiers,forhemain
? tenance?-of?Fworid: peager.,
???Fulbrfght saidis'asAi&Ki-
? singer, " that the &Viet' Unintr.
, already has yielded consider?
ably U.S demands on
Jewish- emigration. To adopt".
the demands-. hat Sen; Hen-
ry
?=??? -
N.? ;.,,,4ack:sod,,ID,347ash4" ?-15Y
le the":"..seriate,...? said.
?
destrOyL;lhe detente' netw.een''':?'-',1:::
."-the.,2"Sc.i14"6PATPiOrtv44d.;i.the!:'
' United ??,', StateSbitt.'it'plativ?z,.
WeltriderailSen Jackson, in a4 state:
riientqaitiiiklit;coinaUenting,-:41',"
'hothri:',theilCissijigeki.:...and-;:?:-:i-.
? - Fulbright r rki;
thingp'"."-.`,.;?aw*.-around :the--->s
world "divie dikthitli Our 3
whein,4and!fcalrit,alOieign
-
Fulbrighti.-faiiectl fiajlinentien;;:::P
, the:: prOposeck7.,.igranting.;--Pf'4,:.--
? ereditk ?lei.,!,:Russikt;!birt-Ahatf.z'7"'?
is ??,tv.hat....;thear.e=
. . ?
billions of dollars
C eat -;...interest.;:',-Xliateri;:iii.:;.
csan getredit-,fora*:.:--1
: hontek-FOt"...a.i.;::Oace-45:;,3.per."51-?.:`?
a b o trt'Ahe
saida ; ?
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : miaz. '-n17:r1, /36001 60001 -9
'ace
7
Li art :$
,
Good
? :77, =????
4 .7'
Approved POn.,
By Judith'M.
The ca-ck1esOf two
, novelty store ? ? laugh.- boxes. ,
briefly disrupted- a speech.?-?
by Secretary of State. Henry ?
? Kissinger last night, sound-?
? ing an eerie note at an eve- ?,
rang session ???? of Pacem in
- Terris, a four-day seminar
on peace. at the. ? Sheraton
Park Hotel. -
The crowd of 3,5.00, gath-
? ered to hear .Kissinger and :-
Sen. J. William ,? Fulbright ?,
(D-Ark) talk about peace as ????
war raged in the ? Middle ,
East, already appeared grim t
and tense. ?
When Theodore Glick, 23,
?one of the Harrisburg ?
Eight charged in 1971 with
conspiracy to kidnap Kissin-
ger but later cleared?and
his companion, Christophere.:
. Thomas, interrupted Kis-
singer to shout slogans and'-
hold their laugh-boxes aloft;
the tension boiled over into
a scuffle.
' An unidentified man seat-
' ? ed in -front of Glick and
. ,Thomas jumped. to his ,feet _
and hit Thomas. The mans
wife grabbed his arm and
tried to pull him away. ? ?
As police hustled the two..?
out and Kissinger- ?
lent at the podium, a few ?
people screamed "Let them.'
stay" while most shouted,
"Out!" The police attempted
to make. arrests, but this-
was a peace conference and -
executive director Peter
Tagger refused to press -
charges.
Livid, Tagger screamed at
Glick and Thomas instead
and waved a crumpled. $10
'bill under their noses de-?? ??
mending that they accept a...
refund for their admissions...,
. They refused. ?Thomas had
? tears in his eyes. ?
The two protesters were
among five young people
from the Community for
Creative Nonviolence,. a.,
Washington group that
-maintains free: food, medi--
cal and' legal services for
the poor. The other three,
Edward Guinan, Rachelle,
Linner and K.atheline Thors- ?
by, also used lan,?,h-boxes at
the beginning of Kissinger's
speech, but their protests
brought only nervous laugh--
ter from the audience. ? ?
Kissinger joked later that -..
the outburst sounded -like
one of his own. staff meet.--'
ings. Asked how he felt
about the fact that there had:.1
in arrests following 1
the disruption of the peace ;
seminar, Kiseineer said, -"I
was very touched by it."
The speech was Rissinger's?:#4
frst since assuming his new ?1
? post. Last week he hosted
slimier at New York'.3. _
politen Museum of Art for
,, .,..,:,.. ,,,F.,h4,-..,t...,,,,t,- -:
. . ?
P.:ACti:bi.:4".4iii;iitH''1?-14/ . 4... ' ' ....::;: ' 4
: ' , 1 , '-' .''-'' :N..ata' 0::df' 0 :?}'-';'4-,:lSPQral;egigiii,..;*f.0-r7;21: :i.1::::V4::.:' l'.91:1;?.''l :
..
"about ?Ici- Unite ' ' ' :. Itg.:9?e-awaYs;11-a;:tm:
s' Iprnat .- and irisctibefii, ' --gtriATup '1.:, ;1-... : : ,...,.,,,, ---.'",
' '':..:4Mili. l'ihatdre:: :be:::n."???:.e'j 'eCte:l.qreralitcr;::'' ''''''''''''.:':'''''''s ''*4 "-.'. 4.' ' " ' d
Tti'sittindina iiiitel-1;:- '4*-t..t'Lli---,;''''In:'.4u-br'...;:ikefi-4v.4.:':,:he'e,3411`uct.ti,:lsli.'!ilAti-tii:e0i::
,..e,-.7z... 7 ?,?-?;.::??,?*-,.1..,,- ,17,;_.'7, ,,? .r.... ? ,,,....7, ,?,,.-.. :Rai ............,2 .z.- ,? ? itz-,--t-,,,
,t?-?-? - a' "'''''St i -to - - Center ' is
tiiii:.' session ,-: ..Glick.:-.=gOiththi'-'2;:,'"-ftie9r11,11{-er'2.civil*as.:1;:ofiti6-41:,'..,?,?oth,d';,......'the.g.itt.'7ei.._
-.:Protett was no
: ' t corinecte d:._,k
.-.e...,Who't tried. 16 :S?Tieep a
?Atp:2,.ii.,...
with the Middle East :Situa?
???????;;;:tinn.-:- but.. was directed at .,.v...;c0opntinlist?ti,c '''''',oliel; ':?110111eu'
iiissingeif, because le4iwas, gni
:',`i.,?';','''''''''4-. '. ?''?"?`..,` ?;,,,.*.. :.-a7r.',i :-?'u.12e he.
"an
ran arehitect;ofeAieribarieIZiY2 - -;,
?policy ineIndochina -anc e just have. to, eupIm'`?:.i
Whie4 imi:tiC'esaid?'Iranan' Am.-'
corpanonirind 4141asadoi,Ardeoir,:zhecx'.
,
_19it leaflets entitled.."Belliktrr?-'.;:,.,' Paul_ Newman' ;.;:t11._:______Elict6r';?r
lii- 'Terrier (`,11Taite'.on Earth7)::::z-.7'uldrsatt?eWnatinyt. toinoSaoky:*!nytepnhis..liefagt.;
' `'i;.:Eyerkr,through .the earlier:;;?:;lie* ...,
sepait''.`?OCthe:-.evening-mhen-,=;;;',..and`ii.achect:thel'ioinis-ty4';
-.4there:,..was:?.partyingther.ei::-._i-61`ETOw-eilit ailythingo.ame
5iims.little,JIaiighter;.ironit ot'.-.`":4...0f,lthi'!,. ?aid)-.Toiiit7i4htin;.-72
'?-?43therwise::.r-, iI..;..-,..i..-,; ,.;-?,: ,;?:-1-?,..-'''' studeAt :fruit ,..,'?,TowsoirciStatel'
S.;`,17-;;?."rin? very:- iad;',I'm- College:, who'3:wandere&i:Ari,-
discoura,ged, said Ellsworth," -?011,".a :break.!?frone takingzhis-
Hunker,--formenli.S. ambas. -.
f ,,..Law-:-..Aptitu,de6.-t
st':;i-:?1'- an-
'jsador to South- Vietnam.-"-- 'ohe1-roon0f:.hehotel
;--
But asked if he meant that: -,f`Groups of-:people'.-get7to-
-*Ole :was 'discouraged about ,,..,--.`gether all, over., the- country.:
p?s.,'?,:the -possibility of there ever,E:.,_isTe said
othin,2;:e,yerfconi.e;:_.7.,,..i-n.Ci,Iti,:?.' .?
,..
eing the peace discussed at h
'??:?.,f,the. conference, lie.said slow-:?.h.:isT,bee7cani4lie:;=1:If ?Iftto, e?lrveeturtfwat -to '
.t.ly; -tf.We.hive to, keep ?trying,-
-,,;-ifi reavy ;',A like
.4to,F;bring,:. it about in .-.:some -:--fi) become-G a,7:
', wayiio,,I'.n, .n.-ot. dis.co.u,r.ag,e_d_:.
lim7:.h e:-Itt!71rhi!abonfaclvinepeaein tberheaC.tnirdfssrger
world. _
'Tye. got to peasZ' ?, ,. ?. ?...,- ..
:i _Asked,:if.:?her..-expeeted;to.....*- ' ' - ? -
4.,, , ._ ,, see .it in. his :lifetime, .E..iiinkere--"I
...,??
- ????- .., , ..'..4.4,,, . , shor_4-ehis-heati_ sadly!Timill
: -,Ilettrxes,,iv. gier?, 4,elit;e-;...i.:4.-4,:pretti old,7:11,e',ik'cl:"Vire-'74 7:
rit6-*Wife,:.?Caripl'Laise; alSo'c'
."...-- -*-4,1??? !,c,-,?fi ?'e`?".1' ',re.. ----.a?-? U.S diplomat,: '???-"lf -7
- ? '''-',..f :;74-: -1.:'.g -i-1,1,2-?,, -,..-,- ,,,,, _71, , _ : , -: said. s
,?
Olied For Release 2002/01/10: CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
,..?
Six days ago, the outbreak of the
new Arab-Israeli war raised a hypo-
thetical challenge- to the soaring goals--
of American-Soviet detente:. In the in-
tervening week, that possibility -,has.
escalated into a tangible danger.,
That, at least, evidently is the
sage that the . Nixon administration
wishes to convey :to the Soviet-Union-
in a- -Carefully-orchestrated patternr,ofz
rising - American: concern during the-
last. 48 hours. over-Russian Werds and,.
actions in the volatile; crtst
On Tuesday Sogiet COmmunist?Party)
. leader Leonid L . Brezhnev was :re-
-.?__
ported- to have urged all Arab statevto-
supply "the greatest possible support'-
to Egypt and ,Syria- in. their conflict'
with IsraeL According to the-Algerian
news agency,-'one Brezhnev message;j.
received by Algerian President Houarii
Boumediene, exhorted, "Syria: and,
Egypt must not remain alone in their
, struggle against a perfidious enemy;"..'
- When that ? report reached. .-the
United Nations, where Soviet thetoriel
_
- The writer is,- on. the- national
? staff of The:. Washington.
aboutthe warnoticeably hardened be-
tween -Monday and Tuesday, one,
. source is reported- to have ..exclaimed--.
privately, "So much for detente!!! ' .
? _.The, U.S.. government officially" has,
said nothing remotely resembling.: such
a grim, dire conclusion, nor'does it apt.
i _..Pe d
ar likely to do so. It probablFwoul_require a- complete- unraveling of all
prospects for containing the -new- Mid-'
east :conflict before,. the,Nbton
istration even _would conceive of aban-
doning the high hopes, of detente on
whicn its-- entire foreign is
?.? Nevertheless, by yesterday it was an
. parent that international squeeze.
? play was underwayien the :premise
that detente could becidamagedif not 4
jeopardized, z by the .repercussions of
Mideast warfare.
The Nixon. administration let rithe
known, selectively, Wednesday mnin-
ing, that it was very disturbed that .the--k.
Soviet. government was encouraging
Arab- nations to:,-supply support'-. for
Fygpt and Syria.,--The Pentagon:next
sounded open warnings, Without attrib-
ution to named -officials;? of -. serious:
U.S. concern about" the Magnitude of .
the airlifting -of Soviet supplies-'to' the
warring Arab nation's:
? In language. that was more guarded,
diplomatically,',-but at least- equally I
pointed, State Department spokesman
Robert J. McCloskey, who is- a-veteran
in calibrated phrasing, expressed an.
official warning: "If this (the report
out of the Pentagon) turns. out to be a
massive airlift, it would tend to put a
new face on the situation. But I am not
in position to confirm that any of this
is taking place at this time."' -
That formulation coupled. a.. serious.:
admonition with a major qualification
?wherher a massivi:? airiift Soviet,
military supplies into Egypt and Syria
is indeed underway.
' - Accordinefo'aVailable information,'
Soviet air traffic into, Egypt and Syria.
increased considerably over the Oct.-,4,
6 period immediately : before- the new
?:: Arab-Israeli warfare erupted, then su
,: sided, and now the, air trafficis;ba
'. to the high volume of the immediate
,_. pre-fighting-days. What is still unclear-
is' juit ,,twhat war material the Soviet
transports areearrying:?,'-:,?,4f; '?
?,, In any event,-Tta underscore-the -a --
,
ministration's position .that more - is at;
stake than simply, the-level : , of war -stip-
'
plies,\MOCloakeyreadily recalled whatl
Secretary?of1StateHeiary,,A.,;Kissingeri4
said..1,--..inthliclyilist*Moriday4',-,nightl:,
"Petente,,cariniitiSurViVe, irrespOnsibit-
ity in any1,-aria .,Iiinaludiric the Middle
East!'; '''' ' ' ---:-
Arming'.-46ersarienir:' in7?,the:'-_,Mide
however, ii-ziO.Pa.;etie-wa4?Streettl,f I-
The questionWhiell?waStniniediatelil
raised- yesterWi!andleft fiofficially uri.4--,
answeretei; was', -whether: United:, '?
States was;Pointitig:an*cilsing finger
at the Soviet dittatcliref war--supplies?
in order tnjuitify? replenishing .the--I..
, _
raeli army's. stocic.ef War equipment
,-
which has been severely -hit in the
lighting: :4: ; ..,''--?-?)- - ' -
IneVitably;r?:the?alarni raised by7the'-
administration about . Soviet ' replenish.
merit Of:Arab.supplies ,produced a,-"fre '
bound' On" Capiti4?Hill;'inurgent de=-
mandifor the-,linited States to resup,,,,
ply thelitaellt-, ..
Thedangerfeidetente is thatinter-
? . ,
actiorpiCare-tiletieleri .n. life Wits' ?oWn;,
whicligitheA-Nixon administration- and
the Kremlin, 'even if they: 'do -: gettback,
on a.:.ccitifierativetraeidannoti.neceS-1
sarilr iiilly.-,,'control F or - err stageifen;
Capitol -1/11V ,there remains the al:-
challenge_, yri.,.'4.44,-geals-i,i of ,;summitrn
This .;*?the .tearing.i'contrOverst.-ove*
whether!': or 7,.not.,1 the United---,'State-
shouledemandtteancessiorie,.from - the-
- .SovietViiion-liciillie?ttreatinent of-,Its
own dissidentsandits-'enifgrantsW a
the price for-non-discriminatory tariffs':i
and credits' for Rus-lian exPints tethel.
United' States:-,` -.. ' ! T%...??,
-The Nixon -administration-.
will progressively - undermine its own -
case for resisting these congressional
demands by Cemplaintsef. its ownthat.
the . Soviet Union is defaulting on' the
multiple-sunithif-pledged pattern of--cd-
operative detente. : -'.-:',-,',- '? ? -
? Long beforellie aeclainiedfera'of ne-
gotiation- baciOn-the days-of - blatint
confrOntation;:thelate Secretary' of
State Fester Dillies, whose strat-
egy flourished in, thecold war, made a
memorable remark about the ability of
small,weak nations: to confound the
strategy of the most powerful nations.
Dulles deplored what he described. as
- "the tyrannY of the ?weak.":::";:":
The Arab-Israeli, ,war carries the
threat.* revalidating that'. maxim,, - by
confounding-the, .goals of supernower
. . ..
? United gtates?...anc1*.the..4oviepi,Union-
nledged:.not.4inly.tn;?aveldtly
....tar4cenfraiitationar-between therrig:hut
?. to. act",j..Orlitli...09PiTiMe4iii.:0*.41e---..:.
velopment.: of 'situatIons.c?ble' __of
causing" a dangerous': ?rbation of
7 ?
? edteSfthit4tWaS;',Canght.h.Y.,-..,SurpAseiby-.4
? theiitithreal?Er-efthe--:_current:e.war,7?ex;'-
cept7.3fori*fleW,4;. t?inalleqwarning When did the , itate
f rst knaw, or' sense, that was' was
' Union
atte-adVavA...-fsii?44&
Was it.asearly, perhaps as: Se
when.SYtiatwaS
have?-.-iestrictedf.the
Soviet; advisers" toughthO-Syrian-
That.
tioxv::acebtici.Mk467.:press,.:account.aolvasky
'seetirS:yrianr*aliationt',f044..e.,SW:let'
iefiSai4k.flactivitel.'Anagiantstirat4i_
? ..air.`-'-miS'Sfle'f!lainifiii'er* during thO:
"
which; larag; elalmaele?
? Syriarr:Mig;Is
. in late::.September, have cah.' oned the.
-
..,Knited-State4?-under,the.-
sumini-Oecord,"J.haethere,',Was
minentittgeif4dt:Wnr?
ceiyable,;11.Ven?thefeettliat,
Statesiandthe."StryletiLininn; _ elkir
? ----moreraglothe-,:',7.-WirriztigtitiationaKthat4.
one ,nkthe;:itipegtnivez.s.vwOUlcIWO
? the other;31iat lts-tlientatite*firifigi
to inake'..Wair
? validity of the: detente pledger: Does-it,
apply ouly' to selective-threats4f-ftlie
"exacerbation of relations"?
- HoNieVeithese? questions may
.-; swereCtheST- -illustrate 'how the world,
is noVikpiabing the depth or theLalial;;.,
4owness.. of: the, summit commitments..
At the same time; the: record shOWSit
that .,-,.ven-s,prolonged--.Nian -between
client states neednot automaticalry'de-i-.,.;
stroy,`or, cripple superpower- -detente;
For ? the; structure-- for East-West".?-dec?,
tente',4wai!.?' erected. at thez?-.'cliinectiC,..
height of the Indochinawar; in in the,
di-
rect, ..-American.:challenge"stn -Soviet-"
prestige bY-5 the :mining of.?Natth?,YE'
etnam's. harbors,- immediately -. efor?
the -first.':-.Nixon-Brezhnev
? .!-',"t7.?:.1..?;.
But thatli?the?kirict-oft-Crisii?.-aeilie,'
rep eat--nor bet that -detente' Can'-ngafri.,it
brink that neither- nation, Ls. ailXitlyaitir:1
? ? .
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Tuesday , 0.41973,-:; 'THE WiSBINGTPNPOET-,;:. ?-?
? -?44
a Big Powers
? ,_ ?
Hope to
Area of
, By. Marilyn Ber
.
.7. Vasttarrtan Post Staff yrlter -
' High U.S alit; Mid.
yesterday that Auae' United:11.
States, the et I.7nienand7.
China apn/ared , to,.be.
.. , . .
agreement . that they,. .woiddl
not permit- the4ightingt4i,,
the- Midcile, East icy -spread.:
beyond the region. ? .-
The disclosure followed
announcement that Presi-
dent Nixon had .sent a. mes-
sage to Soviet Communist
Party chief , Leonid. I. l3rezh...'
nev. White House spokes-
man Ronald L. Ziegler said.
the two leaders exchanged
written . messages throughi
' normal diplomatic channels.
- State Department spokes-
man Robert .7. lieCloskeY-2??
said later. that the . United!,
States had heerr approach-
ing its ' diploniatie: disetia-:-.=
.sions with the major pow
. in the "spirit-of the- content,.:.
and substance!. a communi-
ques issued . with 'both- the,:
Soviet Union. and 'Chinn-41:i
- the 1917 summit IneetIngrior,
Moscow and Peking. v?I,-
In both the Difostiowd
Shanghai- eommuniqueel oft,
1912 ? the United States,
?
agreed with each VE..theantp
jor powers to Matt ?
done' tensions -through: een=T
sultations. U.& -officiaLstaict
that while the United, States ..
had not attempted tovirevtikeil
. the letter -ot:the.., communik
ques in the current..discure.k.,
noes. on the Mideast. erts1C
"We , have attenustedi.
speak in the spirtVef"thd
communique:" ?,1!'?-t-,...,.?,-_-,-.-.._,..i.
Secretary State Hearn.
-
A. Kissinger. meVwith . the:
bead of the -Chinese- lialimi-1::
office in Washington; Hyaag ..
Chen, Saturdaf night 'The
Nixon?Brezhnev - exchange--
came the next day, on Sue:-
. day. _ __..... .,. .,..._, - . ?
Any decision..by.the.major":
powers to limit, the &maids',
by remaining outside ...is .
likely to be.-severely'.tested,-
however,- M. the -.-ilitys . to:
come_ Israeli ,. Offidialt- said _
they have thretA objectives
in the current ; crisiaz.. to .
eject the Egyptians;. tejact,
the Syrians, and to dea"r1 a-...i
devzstating blow to the milt-T. I
tary machine-7ot both ''Arirb;
SEr2T.aS 30-: that - it will he im-
possiblefor"theqo latukh
her aggression. for-,:, a -
7.,r7 lone time-'!Aporcive4:1
aiienevea
.
ccor on imffingt? Fighting
Art.1?
Isititeli Sourees. Said they'
have mad' theier isbjeciives
: known tatint-Antericans. Is-it
? raeli Anthassador;1. Simcha '?,
Dinitz: saw ' Kissinger. Sun-
day. evening shortly ? _ after 7
. lrinitit returned from Israel..
: ;Diplomatic sources said that i
IL: S. Officials,. informed 'of
.?1.srael's?three , objectives, did::'
not demand ;.. that Israel re-,,
: .? /rein from, whatitarhaS un- t
.clirt?keri?P1.''A'''''t-'-;?L'''''
,%-!-.-21:17,1thr7regtiler-hriefing .
- -
yesterday', ..McCloskey . said.:.
. the Unit-ed.:SW:ea wal not ,i,
arging7Istgtek:Aot to; go be,T-:.
yond , the 1967 tease-fire,
? ,' lines in, repulsing Egyptian.
' iiid-SYrieri?ferCia.- "We have
. not wanted to prejudice our;.?
own case : by levying de-
mands .or specific require- ?
, nients during the battle on.
" anyone," McCloskey said.
While.fslatkls',,ww.stdi re-.
, ,occtipieggaiiien,? '4196T.six-.;''
t
portedly* _ ,to repulse :
. the Syrians lklie..Egyp-
tians frOni. . ?futIS it haat
day?,wae.,A,40eXipte,-. with
:
only haLa Orkledemendiers-
,7presentAsasial?fisolution-
,Ilihg for .. withdrawal of .
...lb, P1lrtiegt*t2149.67 ge4.40-''
? ' fire +1Inev.;.;,'7Kisliiiiger ',Was
.
quo - 4, ..,,,.,by,Sexiate lgue.
%cott?:.
,? Pe ? 'ne:-.':?.."1"
- ? ....1181, ,.?,..t.A -.'s ?;'. Aid low
" 1,.- '".'
'the, ', u - ' - hatitneniab.";
.J.-.
; ..Th - resolutOr wawappar-.4,
' f'? :?antlyi-,directect.:.-to the prob.:
.. ': ? ' lens i", Off Arab ',..:-withdrawal. ;.
however could'shortIF. be ,
- . . ?
, superseded.- by events, ---and:
1, the qiiistione:\will.:'then,...be?
' ;whether...;Israek will :hold to...
the cease-fire lines ' or go.
hayonclii; I sre el t ...iourcesil,
. ? made clear that they would
- - not ston', 'fighting until the
Stated. objectives, Vier
, achieved.. But. the-p? would.;
not elaborate_ on -thekititY. ?
_ ..!."devastating t blOW"tibef.ii.V.r.
tendedjto , inflict/ pa neigh-.
boring.!,,,ArabStates-Thek:
said; lioweverAthiik it wa
the military 0 machine thati;:
was thetarget-andnetpopW.
lationser eitie-Sq?-7.tyy. 1, -,......,
. Presidetit:',-/sTiine4spek
briefly with reporters yes-
terday- and Sifillhe Milted'
"for a - position -,Vihich ' we
hope and believe will be ef-
fective in stooling the fight;
ing." The President was ref-
erring to consultations lead-
ing to Security ..Catineil ac?
tion to: deaf:, witls,...:0e, Mi.;:c
desist situation....:, - -
- : "It is very easydrAtte 'Pres-
ident sairl,...39-4higr# this.
particularkindel.,??a;:crisis:
sin.ply-in- tenni of ziti.E.7and?:??1
- stand -.::-:,play,. . ? where_ the I
United StateSflr.gtin.'and. r
'inflate-ally , =ike','"4"..!;:2 '`,cv...i;
which thenfaille.24?Rivi :.".
[.ori
.1 Kissinger; Ivyitt 749
the: ,President;.' _"We'
have-been in atygii--,d,intacc.
with, ill, the4Permartent4'..
members of thee Security'
Council,, with the-Part. ies' to
? ? the conflict and.evire ? have,
been doing?thistsceSittar.4,
, day afternoon in ;Order ..toi?.
bring an-end to.theiffghting.l?
Our intentiopas,toontiaer
forward with - tiae, larbadest''.,
? Possible support that;ea4
? effected.",
1 Altliou?gh-"
? would: not %digclosp, 'ant;
? ture
message to Brne-aver thet-
- Soviet' reply,:?it .'.appeared: .1
that the:Unitea'States -waif
. in-part seeklitgiZtascow!s. :
support-for a Seenritv?,Coun--.
eilnieeting.
that, however, .
It-
was underst.crod he was act-
States was seelting'--support-
ing in _accordance with the-
, "basic principles" signed in
Moscow on-May- 29,- 1872, in
which ? the,- two '.*iuntries?
agreed- to- -"aioid.;'.:itilliterY
confrontations.- and": prevent
nuclear . and - to.
? "exercise. restraint In theiry
mutualielatione.:-They fut.;
-.ther :
? thingie:theirpower,so that -
_conflicti''oe eittuitioiswill
-
tiotaiisewhieti.vionhit. serv ,
to increase:',:internaffonal!
tensioner,f47,1-,-:;;;;A,t;,
In-: thei..7Une:.:22;fv
.agreementoon-the,?preVew
tiod otPnnclearfivarthe
countries -agreed toip!en
into Urgent coesultatienn*,
avert the .-:risk't?td.:-..!-*iiiiclean;
war arising: kens: any. eon4
ng to-thett;?aCein;KT '
conference;Kii'linger-?, ari
plied elrIndoffrationale
the 'high-level' Contacts:
the Russians.=-"Detente,": he:
said, "cannoe_.survive-,'
; sponsibilitr4vaht Area,:
- chiding the Michilst?Bast.".
At a 'luncheon, for:: Japit;,
-nese Prime Tillnitter Rakuef
Tanaka, tBrezhneiel..?. stated,
that -the Soviet Union IS
'prepared as-before to
contribution.toward
peace."-Se said,
Soviet sympathies lie with,
the Arabs, whom -be termed::
"the victims, of aggression'',
but he was re1attyelynzild-
giving no support to Arab
claims on the territory of lig.
rael itself saying only that.
the Soviet ',Alnion would?,
"support a fair-and-lasting-
pe ace ..
teed seeurityitoaa-colui-',
:tries and peopreatif the. lit*
which it:so Oise to clir fratO
- 7-7i
For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
ail
st,/ried- -"Commentator" in ? '
rot. officIW.People'S DailY,f;
more strongly.labeled ImeL:il,
the aggressor: But while
iterating support ior....the-.
-just struggle of Egypt andi_
Syria'the- Chinese: mar*:
clear ;in:. accordance _witir
? their, doctrine of:: the _ peo.:
? pies war, that it was the Ar-i;
abs alone who Woad have tk
fight the battle.,. '?With thr:
: support of, .the ? peopl '
throughout "theworld; the's,'
? Arab countries and their:
people will certainly, be ablei
to dverebme haidshipi:ori:
deseriptiorir on,the,-_,,road=or
advanCe, and
?ter .4:,... . ?- as roneia tit
strengthen their unity- a
persist in fighting," -the pin
Per said. ' .'? ., '",r. " '
. The Senate ." resoluti
_calling on both sides to
-? serve the 1987 cease-fire
was approved by voice
shortly after noon.. ir
. day, with only 'about" ei
or nine - senators ,?, on ,
. floor.. Wit. withinl'
hours,. 38 ' :senato
joined as costsonaorsolli ad
tion to _Majoritea
Mike ManAeldi (1/11
' and Minority Leader-
the' original sponsere,r
" The resolutien-''' Call
on the Mideast eombatan
to stop fighting and:. to :
turn to the ceasefirei in
: they- occupiedvhefore- th
fighting broke out Saturd
-it read: -:.',tC64!;???:=4-...i?
:.?! "It is-the sense& Vie Se
ate that we deplort?the- out
break of tragic hostilities'. -
. the?Middlelastd?:that .
;?support_the use,,n1; gtelci ..
'-'.officesiof the. I7ritiStater4
President andthic-
" fetaiy OrStaik416,-; ? .
'rtheA..Participantap:incb
about a cease-Ercr,andla .
- turn of. thepartfes.Invo _'
to lilies and pOsitiOnat ,
'pied by themi4piipift 'i,
- Outbreak. of,-4nirrentiltr*
. ties,, and, further:40# ---
,. Senate.'" expresses5t
,for:.a-more .stahker,?Rontii
leading- to -pea,Cia,
gion." -???:.0'
: :Scott told :re
-
about:40 rninutea,-,liffet0
Senate approved'4/10
tip's,.1Cissingicf i,a1;iiitt,_ _::
and asked tam vicf:', Tour Vi
resolution Amrtatireizef- -
no ? fault whatetteind
felt7it,?pro
US:
dtring-rvin= .
back:', where-.
Sean- said of bin ecoiReraav,
\
tion With Kissinger.'
Scott said the resohniano,
'.'i mplicitly- recognizesnitiafi.
aggression has,. taken ,:iglie.er:
and the lines occopietP:bi;-
the- Israelis have e tisieili4:.
breached." He thus inter-
preted the resolution- as--110;:ir
ing generally - pro4iraeli
-without being-so:-,Marked*
'to endangertf:S:ciliicimatie.:4;
? - if-4 ;dives with-the,Ataba. -.---,
--
However,...aeiverak? strong:I!
ssupporters of Iirsel
spedifl-
eally declined to. endorse
the resolution, hinting that
they considered its
.tion that Israel had been On!
the receiving end of aggres-
sion too weak a statement of
the pro-Israel sentiment, of
the Senate. ? ,
"I haven't joined in spoil-,
aoring it and- I won't". said '
Sen., Abraham A. Ribicoff
(D-Conn.).. "I don't think it's ?
a very good' resolution?the
Arabs started- the war, they
started Invading and now.
the resolution says ? go' back
to where-you were.:" 73'.4',.
Sen. Henry M:iickeo*(D;;;t
Wash.) said - the resolution,
"really does not adequately,,
cover this problem."- What
he fears ? most,: _ he said, isr:
that the Arabs Might seek to,.
get ? the U.N. to order
standstill cease-fire in place.'
which could leaveArabs: in.
, control of- some : portions of
the area held by Israel prior-
to the start Of fighting on
Saturday.:_ Thus,: although.-:
the first moves were made.
by them," the Arab nations
might seek to obtain a U.N.-
sanctioned benefit from
their aggressigihr:
There was inine'ltiniiYesi-
terday that :the Scott4ManS4.4
belcb- language had" beer*
drafted and rushed tbinugh:;.?
'..thestro:iienak
'might .tr*-4:#0 for* througho
ar...-?.4..;.,"Cfanierraiing441
f-:0g4lckuimetigIS-Pe,acit lidW3
attires. Jackshir.deniedi'hoWil.i.
- ever, that; 'bad intend
,top "e:
this.' 4.
en
Vtriaid,ilihre?Were indica- -
lei Zieio o
- Offered.',.
what ha:4*nd wit not u
detir,Klasingees)i* "
Maw.
PaSf-4inirA. *11*
.oltwork againstgiraer
riraeh shottickdrivenacrosr
the Stieeicanat: or. -.13eyonati
the-delete Heights and. oc-,
cupi:.tersitnindirinMOc.":
cups priott:.ttkehaVne*, out-'-
break of , ?
At the ? State'DePartrient. g
? McCloskey- -eiterated _that.
She United -states had no ?
fixed proposals to present at ?
the Security Council session,
We have not- yet producen ?
a piece of'paperthat we are
prepared to introduce," he
said. Then, in an attempt to
dampen speculation that the'
United ? States ? had-- not
moved with dispatch-in the
crisis, permitting _the Isra,
elis time to -retake territory,,.
McCloskey volunteered that .4
the United ? -States , had
sought to get Security Coun-
cil action from the start, but
only when it would-not- lead..
to useless- rhetoric'' and',
"endless debate!. Such Spec-,
ulation, he -Said,
unworthy- ? of 'the- spirit- in,
whic.h the United States has,
approached the- eptire:
tion,"
. .
After his.. morning". meet-
ing with : the- President, Kis-
singer spent the7day in
State Department,. office,-'
contacting foreign diplomats':
by telephone .and' meeting.;-
with senior aides in the
Mid.-
die East crisis,".-MeCloskek7
said-
In addition to the. innnedi:
ate crisis growing-out of the,.
hostilities along the fron-
tiers of the occupied' territo-,
ries U. S. officials are faced
with, the potential' -probleth'
that the oil-rich Arab states:.
could try te-iiifhience,' the '
conflict by carrying out ear-
lier threats tO-- withhold: oil',
or refuse. to 'increase
dation in step with Western'
req uirementa-UrS.: officials;
however, in response-, to .
question, said- they: had seen:.
no "mobiliiiitioii-of.attitudes:.
toward that-Lkinc4of-?deci ? '
sion." They7addedfthat "It ie.
a contingency"..c:Aliat.has
been-consideredhere.,...1
Washiagton0hviMialY.Wce,
hope that .notbing,ilike -their
? -
Israeli7,,..i.)ffickawt# tsiced'
whether. HiSsinger'-'.' had;
raised- .the.: energyiinuesticin,;:
in talkawith therm -Said thatC
brought_upL,the oil/problem
In the- past?:' th.Israeife have
-
stated that,tbet?erterkzque
tliere,-irer;? niviArab-Israel,
problem. ?
Also contributing-to thi i -
?
report was Washington Post'
StaffWriter Spencur- Reek- , ?
. ._ . , - -
'
,
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP80601554R003600160001-9
r TI-M-VPASHINGTON. POST '
_ ? ? ?
Approved Fo-t Refe--aii:---?2002/0 /10 : u1A-RDP80B015 0036001613Q01-,a, -
Kissinger Sees3hreat to Detente
By Murrey Marder
waddlingson Post wan writer>
Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger said last night:'
that the United States
recognize the risks for East7,1,
West detente in levying de;.,
mends. upon . the Sov4t,'
Union: to liberalize its.: o *tif
society.' - ?
The "intense debate:
wader :way in this ..coantry,-,
over -imposing conditions .0
Soviet trade with-the United
States is emajor policy Is-
sue;as well as "a ...?
moral dilemnia,'7. Sin.'
singer:. ; ? :P.
"How hard can we press
without provoking the Soviett
leadership into returning: td.
_ praCtices:4:-hr its foreign
policiv_thatfhicreaslantinf
tionif*ision?"-404,
.
Ksiger wasibe.0
'
speaker hist nigtdk before
font 41inatiatftniaViont
on foreignI'Tpolicy;;eni.2.
(peace a earth) iponsoredit
-
by The 'Center for the Stud* -
offe,DemotratietInstitutf
at the. SheratorkPark.Hofe
Demonstrators briefly' di
',ranted this first", appearance'
bfKissingerf?asiSecsctary. ,
ence-Toeabhut 3,000 -
With .500 ether! Matching
televiefeit. hi :rair -adjoMin-
? -ii?efit'**eigthKalie
'?..W.:::battery-prOvieree.-
,
sing. fthoutedqiiitZ! :*
singer rept esented, "thi.
and: hisp,choice,
fuse speaker wal'- 1
ade,',' One of the demo
torrwitininched bY a -
her. oftheT audfericeiant---
curity men pushed-the:-
onstrators out. ofa the;
Kissingeriesumecripe,,
after a delay of about:11
minutes, with the audiencei
Approved
-
overwhetingiy urging him
to continue, ? "
Kissinger, in :brief refer-
ences to the present?Pdiddle;
_ East - crisis, .,treated, it as a-
,challenge that mould be sur- ?
mounted., by the American- :
Soviet policy of detente.-
"Detente. cannot ,..survive-
- irresponsibility im any :?area,
including heMiddle East:
said Kissinger. But he said,
?: "However" well we.'-contain
this crisie,,7 as we
have cob-
tamed ntheis;!*e Must still ?
ask ourselves what .we !Seek;
beyond the management of
conflict2gvf -5: -4 ?
.-,?Kissinger was 'facing an
audience composed Of many,
Intellectual critics, including ,
former academic eolleagues.
The critics support the ma-
jority . opposition raised: in
the 'Senate and House ,to
granting the Soviet Union
most-favored-nation i.z.* trade ?
benefits, without condition/L.:
The ? t. Original conditions,
demanded in Congressiwere?,
guarantees of emigrationA
rights, especially '' for
'ken .Tewit.; Soviet disren
led ?-bilPhysicist Andrei:
- Sakhainw.-
? ander
ed greater eentiment in this
country bY *Acing-the-
,?,_StatesAtailinsishi ontlitlemet;
gratizationT in.. the4Sovi4-,
prcede '
7ftente+41,41-14.-
fensi aft adinArdstratiiin-pol-
icsifer4i.artf_4agv,,: thei, trade'lieefitk43tcq, the 4f-Soitet.:'
addiests:'firl.-Senz ...1.4.11.; PPR
brighti(D,Ark.):IwAiiklitD4i(4'
7Kissinget In..44efendinti
Tsla,422eV,t* }alit eall3tailto.'itw.,
? tins =1'7. ?oVfee
u-adr*V?.7stnanfitaxi':i
- vkiat ? ,
power; vOlitiii*.,caPigiiael0;of
"The' need.
,aliout? tibb#,Parneieee,,has-
never.,,-,hrn more urgent."
Kissinger-?:'. agreed. :OW
"Let wesear,c1,- t?.:ft