ADMIRAL TURNER S SPEECH FILES REMARKS BY STANSFIELD TURNER ON INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003600130001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 97
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1973
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release
NAVY review(s) completed.
ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH FILES
12 OCTOBER 1973
REMARKS by STANSFIELD TURN
ER on
INT IVERSITY SEMINAR ON ARMED FORCES
AND SOCIETY , Chicago, ILLINOIS
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.REMARKS BY VICE ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY
Chicago, Illinois
11 October 1973
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 concerning the future use'of organized force, both in the
world as a whole and as it relates to our own country.
Three topics which. seem pertinent to me'include: First,
Tonight I would like to share some thoughts with you
the general historical trend in the use of organized force
and where we stand today relative. to the long term trends.
Second, the present state of world political order and what
this portends for the employment of United States military
power for the decade or two ahead. And, Third, the status
of-the United States military today and some of the problems
it must overcome if it is to serve the national purpose
successfully in the immediate future.
Turning to an assessment of the evolution of force and
where we stand today, I would agree with Mr. Robert Osgood's
perspective. He characterized the development of military
technology from the pre-nation state era through the pre-
Napoleonic era as being a relatively limited force which
was gradually harnessed and made somewhat useful to the
embryonic nation states of that day. From the Napoleonic
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CHICAGO
Wars until the end of World War I, he traced the tremendous
expansion of military power coincident with the industrial
revolution in Europe and the United States, an expansion
so great and so swift that political institutions of the
period were unable to exercise adequate controls.
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There were attempts by governments to reduce the'. causes
of \,war before Woxld War I,. the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907 being prominent examples.
Between World Wars T and II we had even more efforts
to control military force. The Kellogg-Briand pact re-
nounced war as an instrument of. statecraft. The widely
heralded Washington and London Naval Disarmament Treaties
reduced naval strength among all signatories and
maintained a freeze on battleship tonnage for 15 years.
These efforts failed to prevent World War II. Which
brings us to the epoch commencing in 1945 in which we live,
a period characterized by Robert Osgood as the regulatory
phase in the evolution of force. The advent of nuclear
weapons resulted simultaneously in a tremendous increase in
available destructive power and ever increasing efforts by
political institutions to achieve (control-over the new force.
World War II seems in retrospect to have been a con-
.flict relatively free of excessive political control. The
trend since has been to ever greater political restrictions
on the use of force. To name but a few outstanding examples
one can cite: (1) the Truman-MacArthur showdown over Korea,
(2) the establishment of centralized control in the Depart-
ment of Defense, (3) the lessened reliance on the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in the decision making process, (4) the j
designation of individual bombing targets in North Vietnam
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from the White House on a day to day basis, C5.) and, the
elaborate fail safe devices and procedures devised to
control release of nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union also has demor.strated continuing
concern with centralized political command and control:
Cl) the manner in which they manipulated their forces in
the Cuban missile crisis, (2) the system by which political
officers are assigned to parallel regular military command
down to the unit level, (3) the way in which they maintained-
simultaneous tactical control over all theirinaval units
deployed around the world during Exercise OKEAN, (4) Soviet
willingness to limit naval incidents at sea and sign the
SALT agreements, all are symptomatic of a trend which is
accelerating, at least in the developed countries and
especially in the superpowers.
I do not contend that this trend is anything but healthy
because it may well help to prevent accidental disaster
in the future. To be sure we have a long way to go in
improving our command and control organization and equip-
ment. The system has not always worked as intended in the
past. One might cite the Lavelle incident, the Arnheiter
affair, or My Lai as evidence that it hasn't worked well.
But I would contend that these are exceptions rather than
the rule. Furthermore, the r:ere fact that they came to
light at all is evidence of tremendous change in the scope
of control which is now exercised by the United States body
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politic over its military organizations. Such incidents
would most likely not have come to light at all 30 years
ago, first because military commanders had much greater
freedom of action in the field,,and second because sub-
ordinates would not so readily have taken the initiative to
expose what they observed to the nation at large.
In short, civil government at least in the developed
nations is beginning to react to the tremendous growth in
military power which has characterized the past century and
a half and is taking steps to place effective controls on
organized force by both unilateral and multilateral means.
Which brings me to the second point which I should
li_kp I-n discuss with you, that is, the present world order
and what demands this may generate for-United States
military force. General recognition by the superpowers that
there is rough nuclear parity, and that this condition is
likely to continue for some time in the future, coupled
with competing domestic requirements, have led to the current
atmosphere of detente.
Some observers look into the future and wishfully see
no, end to detente, hence no-need for forces. Some look
ahead and see the existence of forces as a temptation that
will undo detente. Others look ahead and theorize'that the
foundations of peace must rest on more enduring principles
than the fear of physical punishment, hence seek the elimi-
nation of force and the threat of force today.
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Still others view :detente as: just a tactical ploy by
.In order to have.detente, each side must perceive a
sense of security. In the present atmosphere, security
will continue to consist of a series of recognized
(although muted) threats that both sides feel willing
and able to counter. It would be mere wishful think-
ing to conclude that. threats no longer exist because
sabers are not rattled, but merely carried at the.
ready.
Although I share the concern of many that.the
the 'Russians. to gain time 'and access to Uestern technology.
Even some Russians are convinced-of this. We read. just this
month of nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov `,warning that
fundamental Soviet attitudes may not change. And, there are
disturbing reports that Chairman Breshnev has told his com-
rades that detente is a tactic to beemployed for a decade
or so, at which time the Soviets will be strong enough to
abandon a policy of conciliation. .
Speaking from the viewpoint of military professionals
who will have to be responsible for national security if
detente fails, it seems to me that:
`' :uetente is a fragile thing which we all hope wall
continue to grow'.
I
? If the existence of military force imperils detente,
an imbalance`; of force would be particularly dangerous.
Soviets may be. using detente only as a short term
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 military professioril s must be to- advise the President,
the 'Congress, and the general public of the risks
inherent in each' 'agreeine-Ht which 'is proposed.. We must
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-tactic, we must give_ detente "a chance. The task of
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also be alert to the' 'fact that security is not neces-
sarily synonymous' with more weaponry. I I would hope
that in time we may also convince our Soviet colleagues
that this is true.
? Detente will only be preserved if all parties come
to trust the word and intert'of the others through a
series of gradual mutual adjustments in armaments.
For the near term this may mean retaining what is
obviously enouqh power to devastate each side several
times over,. because one or both sides may feel more
secure with a large margin of retaliatory capability.
We must understand that whereas the United States has
a tradition of geographic security, the Russian perception
of security is profoundly influenced by a long history of
being invaded from both the East and the West. The Soviets
will perceive a requirement for a large military force for
the. foreseeable future-in order to:
? Police the East European satellites
? Insure !domestic security in a nation composed of
many different nationalities
? Further the cause of their P4arxist-Leninist ideology
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We must also realize that there is not the same
tradition of dislike for a large standing army as in our
country. Nor is there any possibility of meaningful public
dissent which would inhibit Soviet l'tdership from retaining
a sizeable military establishment.
Thus,-I foresee United States military power as being
necessary in the next decade or two to provide strategic
balance in three areas.
'First, we must, by a careful combination of treaties,
protocols, and strategic nuclear' forces, maintain a rough
balance among all the nuclear powers. Contrary to the
hopes of many, this is not likeiv to lead to general and
.complete disarmament; rather it will be a continuing effort,
hopefully multilateral, to exercise control over a fluc-
tuating level of strategic armaments. This effort will be
complicated by the continuing development of new weapons
technology, possibly addition of new members to the nuclear
club, and continuing shifts in relative economic power and
political alignment among all nation states.
Rather than accepting agreement limiting one or two
types of armament as a-rationale for drastic cutbacks in
all types of military forces, we must continue to proceed
carefully toward arms limitations covering all -types-of
weapons. Simultaneously, we must maintain the forces we do
have at a high state of combat readiness and pursue a steady
program of research and development, and modernization of
weapons systems to counter potential threats.
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Our goal should be to achieve as many freezes as we
.--tea gotiate on expensive.new systems such- as -ABM. I
strongly believe that it Is impossible to prevent new
technological discoveries br legislation,, but we can control
the. application of new technology to weapons systems by
mutual agreement among nations. This makes it imperative
that wehave a well managed ongoing Research and Development
program and demonstrate 'a willingness to proceed with new
weapons programs until we. can reach specific agreements with
other nations. We must learn from-the mistakes of the
1930-'s and refiolve not only to seek agreement on as many
political and military issues as we'can, but also to com-
pete effectively in those areas where there is yet no arms
limitation agreement. This is in essaice the "bargaining-
chip" strategy which we are currently trying to implement.
I see no immediate alternative to the strategy of
mutual assured destruction which is the present basis for
strategic deterrence. I should like to emphasize that
?nutual assured destruction need, not necessarily be a
strategy aimed at civilian populations.
In order. to supplant mutual assured destruction, a
successor strategy must contain built in positive incentives
to dissuade any party from attacking the territory of the
others. One solution to our current dilemma might be to so
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-thoroughly intermingle the economic interests- of each
nation state. within the:'< erri_tory of the others that there
troying the others
would be -a mutual self interest in not de
l
property. This raises questions -of relations between multi-
national economic institutions and national sovereignity.
Such a plan would also require juxtaposition of strategic
weapons systems and economic complexes, at least in.the
initial stages, in order to preclude either side from opting
for a counter-force strategy. Perhaps someday a melding of
economic interests will provide ?a strong incentive for
nation states to desist from threatening one another. However,
I am not optimistic that it will occur in the next decade.
Therefore, our first concern must be to maintain nuclear
parity.
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The 's'econd use for. United States. military forces must
be to contribute to the strategic balance in Western Europe.iThis
does not necessarily mean that the present force levels and the
nature'of weapons deployed must remain fixed in their. cur-
rent status.
Since the early 1960'.s.,. the United States has sub-
scribed,to a strategy of flexible response to possible Soviet
incursions against NATO European territory. We have
advocated that sufficient conventional forces be deployed by
all the NATO allies to provide for a breathing spell between
the first incursion by Warsaw Pact forces and the time when
it might become necessary to escalate to nuclear war. Our
allies have reluctantly agreed to this strategy and have
contributed s-,-,.bstantially to conventional ft ues iii Eutvuc.
We in turn have attempted to provide a capability for our
military to fight a sustained campaign in Central Europe
by building a force with a heavy emphasis on logistic
support.
There are several reasons why this strategy needs to
be carefully reevaluated:
struggle. Rather, they have emphasized the capability
for a short massive blow which could not be sustained
very long because their logistics train is inadequate.
for the task.
? The Soviets have not designed a force for prolonged
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o 'Our allies have designed forces with a potential
for perhaps more sustained combat than the Warsaw Pact
but certainly not for a prolonged conventional war.
If we attempt to afford the dollars to support a.
sustained conventional war fighting capability in
Central Europe there will be little else in our inventory
of military capability.
o The Soviets are unlikely to attempt such a war
because of the danger of escalation; because of the threat
of China and because of their trouble retaining tight
controls on. their current East European satellites. They
are more interested in exercising a larger measure of
political.infiuence over. western Europe than in conquering
it and having to control it like the eastern satellites.
For these reasons we may find it advantageous to:
? Bargain together with our Allies for Mutual Balanced
Force Reduction (MBFR); perhaps difficult to achieve
because of Soviet requirements for internal security.
? Restructure our forces in Europe with greater emphasis
on defensive weapons, smaller more mobile units, and
redeployment within Europe based on the realities of the
terrain rather than artificial constraints such as
national boundaries and historical accident resulting
from World War II.
? Reduce the logistic tail necessary for a long con-
ventional war and increase the ratio of combat troops
vis-a-vis support troops in Europe. We should also
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consider frequent unit -rotation between Europe and
the: United States as a substitute for the lengthy
individual tours with the large number of dependents
which characterize present deployments
? Plan on rapid small unit replacement and reinforcemeiff
from the United States in the event of hostilities or
increased tension, rather than individual replacement
as is presently contemplated.
The mission of United States forces committed to Europe'
will most likely evolve from one of fighting a sustained
conflict to that of supporting Western Europe against poli-
tical pressure from the Soviets and maintaining a capability
to fight a short, perhaps unexpected defensive war against
powerful but short-legged offensive forces.
-A third use of United States military force will be to
deter major power dominance in the Third World. Only the
United States can perform this function. Thus there is some
rationalization of effort here with our European allies carry-
ing a larger share of the central front load, and we tending to
the free world's interests around the globe. Note that I did
not say that we should police the Third World. United States
interests will best be served for the foreseeable future if
Third World nations are permitted the freedom to work
.out their own destinies. Unfortunately, they may not be
left alone simply because the United States may choose to
withdraw forces. The Soviet Union's naval building program,
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coupled with its radical change in deployment patterns over
the past decade, the many statements by their CNO, Admiral
Gorshkov, and their interest in obtaining basing and logistics
support facilities in strategic locations, all point to new
Soviet awareness of the persuasive power of military presence.
Even though the United States will be less likely to
use overt force in Third World areas, the capability for a
counter presence will be necessary. Without a reasonable
countervailing capability on our part, we can expect Third
World nations to succumb to military pressures. For
example, one might. reasonably speculate as to whether or
not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask
the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces
from Egyptian-territory if the United Stat(-_~ 6;h Fleet
had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. -Even though
the United States is not a formal ally of Egypt our visible
military force. on the scene might well have been the latent
potential support which permitted-him to take the action he
did. No matter what. some people say, our interests overseas are
growing not declining. We are increasingly dependent
on imports. That in turn means that we must export more.
in addition, despite what some of our eastern press
would have us believe, I am confident that the people
of this country will. not turn their backs on the
contribution that our example and support can give to those
struggling for what we accept as our heritage.
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I foresee an evolution in the nature of United States
of United States forces-from areas where they have-maintained
presence overseas. This does ?not 'imply complete withdrawal
a presence since World War ZI. Over a prolonged period it
may mean replacing presence in force with token \,,presence
backed by the capability to rapidly deploy reinforcements
from the United States if circumstances reauire'it. Nor does
it imply that overt -use of United States forces must be'the
rule. Presence may be sufficient to the task if our'nterests
are manifestly apparent to all concerned and our will to
persevere is 'credible. Hopefully such a .strategy will in-
duce abstension on the part of the major powers and dis-
courage adventurism on the part of Third World nations
themselves, either of which ro>1a be dangerously esoal at-nry.
-- 1
To review, then, I foresee three uses for United States
military forces in the next two decades.''First, strategic
nuclear forces must` balance'potenti-al enemies in order to
deter nuclear war. ''Second, conventional general purpose
forces must be sufficient to provide that type and size of
contribution to NATO defenses which will buttress our allies
from acceding to pressures from the Soviet Unionjincluding
any.efforts to -use their new'naval power as a wedge against
nations on the NATO flanks, or for that matter against ~A.e
Japanese in the Pacific
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-Third, we need sufficient general purpose forces to deter
major power dominance'~In the Third ~,Torld and protect United
States interests abroad. We need not match potential
opponents measure for measure but we must demonstrate a
continual willingness to maintain a sufficiently broad
spectrum of capabilities so as.to make overt use of force
seem very risky to an adversary. Once force is actually
employed in the future it will lose much of its persuasive
power. Furthermore, despite the trend /I mentioned earlier
there is always a danger that forces in war will.be less
susceptable to political control. This makes it even more
important that our military organization and our diplomatic
pronouncements are-credible so that we need resort t
combat only rarely. Latent force will be the-most useful
weapon in he decade ahead.
This brings me to the third topic I-should like to
touch upon this evening. That is some of the problems which
the United States military must deal with in the next few
years. As I indicated earlier the principal task of United
States military forces should be.-deterrence. This demands
that the military profession.relook at how we shape and
employ our military in light of the changing perils of force
and aspirations of many people to avoid its use. We must
be more concerned with perceptions of the opponent than we
have in the past, while at the same time being careful not
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to ineglect the. force requirements. which would be necessary
should hostilities actually occur.. In the past.:few- years,
we have used a set of possible war scenarios 'as justifi-
cation for structuring our'.forces. We have tended to pick
the worst case as criteria for.force and individual weapons
design and assumed that preparing for a worst case automati-
cally gave -us the capability to handle less demanding wars
elsewhere in the world. 'Vietnam taught us the danger of
this approach. The Navy is consciously endeavoring to
achieve a more balanced force consisting of a few-very capa-
ble and relatively expensive units together with a somewhat
larger number of units which are less costly yet still
capable of performing a spectrum of tasks, particularly in
dj_ed5 where the threat is not as large as ~ -c is in the worst
case'scenario. Absence of a clearly defined threat scenario
such as we have had for the Cold War period will make it
much more difficult to predict future force level require-
ments.
Assuming that we can learn to cope with this more
difficult task of identifying and explaining requirements
for latent military force we face an increasingly difficult
task in convincing the Congress and the public of our long
term requirements. The general public would like to forget
Unfortunately, it requires 7 to 10 years to*produce sophisti-
cated weapons, so the military must procure in tine of peace
what it may need in war.
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Vietnam and the military and concentrate on domestic problems.
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In .addition to problems involving hardware modernization
I think it is safe 'to sav that there will have to be a
.series of adjustments, some dramatic, over the next several
years to tailor the compensation programs, terms of enlist-
ment, and recruiting programs to meet the special needs of
each service. For example, the Army has had diffi-
culty meeting its recruiting goals for the past six months.
On the other hand the Air Force more than met its goal in
July and the Navy was very close to its goal. Each service
may evolve radically different programs to correct such
imbalances.
We in the military will be challenged tb retain our
most talented men and women. Perhaps one answer might be to
offer young people the opportunity to contract before they
commence military service for a decade of military service
in exchange for graduate level education. This medium term of
service would provide educational advantage to our youth and
provide the services with highly trained individuals without
committing either party to a long term contract. The service
would not be burdened with an excess.of people who must be
place for talented people.
which.:ten.d to receive 'the 'greatest publicity, all :the services
face unprecedented personnel problems. Vietnam brought us
the'opportunities of a stable well paid all volunteer force,
but the disadvantages' of having to compete in the market-
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_--retained until sta.tutgry retirement. - The individual would
N,be assured of a marketable skill to provide him with job
security when
his service contract expired.
A similar program
to obtain the technical skills needed in the
enlisted ranks.
There are many other,-manpower ranagement cruestions
-which will require some in depth study.-accompanied by much
trial and error experimentation. Many of our current
operating procedures and equipment designs need reevaluation
in view of the fact that men are-now much less a free good
than they were only three'vears ago. The military can
learn a great deal from civilian industry and the academic,
world, I am sure. In order to facilitate transfer of ideas
we might want to develop programs to accept civilians into
the military at their mid-career points for limited periods
of service or even-for the remainder of their productive
years. I do not rule out the possibility of accepting
individuals into the services at the flag and general officer
level if they have specific skills that are required.
Naturally, there will be some problems with job security
and retirement benefits, but these questions are of concern
to the nation at large. We are all going to have to come to
.grips with the problem of providing vested retirement credits
to a mobile work force.
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 I would like to pxovide ample opportunity for questions
will close my foal remarks: by quickly reviewing three
major points which I hope you will consider carefully:
First -- military force must be and will be subjected tc
much more comprehensive political control in the future.
This control to be effective grill demand a more enlightened,
continuous, less emotional public interest in the problems
of military security than we have experienced in this century.
Second - the level of military forces will not revert to
what we knew in the 1930's because geography is no longer
our defensive shield. We will be required to maintain forces
which complement those of other nations and supplement a
system of arms agreements which may grow more and more
comprehensive. Many forces will be aesigned and deployed
primarily to deter war rather than primarily to engage in
actual sustained combat. Latent force will be amuch more`,
powerful influence than overt force.
Third - sociallchange, coupled with the requirement for
substantial active duty military forces and a ready reserve
will place.unprecedent demands for talented military personnel
at a time when military service is less popular than ever.
We who now hold the top management positions in the uniformed
services are continually exploring new ways to attract and
keep good people working with us.
19.
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Purpose --keep young men/women military career feeling married
to a curse.
Have; challenges - makes stimulating
Grateful IUS exists and grateful participate
Serious discussion way solve problems
Discuss consider principal problem
Define purpose - mission
Start recognizing utility diminished for political purpose
1. Most Obvious nuclear parity
Super power confrontation too dangerous
Same for major allies of super power
2. Major power, operating under US type ground rules,
could not achieve political advantage in small
3. Greater interest in economic welfare than political
conquest
Politicians concerned witmproving
domestic standard. of living over
yesterday - not being better than Japanese,
British, etc. Leads to commonality of interests.
country with large military force,
Vietnam
Because - limited war vs, total war
- Tech supplied to minor power sufficient
To seriously complicate fighting
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because economic game not zero - sum
4. Western world acceptability down
Communications - sense of world community
Communications - humanitarianism juices up -
Popularity word detente
Not' overdo
3rd World
Lesser developed
Focus - underdeveloped
Dangers
1) Super power involvement
2) Major power
dominance - surrogate or direct power
Raw materials
3 missions
1. Strategic nuclear deterrence
2. Military balance W. Europe
Non-mil deter Soviets
` Reassure allies - linkage
3. Military balance 3rd World
Deter adventurism major power
Contain conflicts
Common characteristic
Deterrence emphasis -
Vice defense or war fighting.
If this is a new thrust - cause problems
Mention 3
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1. Design military forces for deterrence
Define
(Deterrence- Discourage enemy by
Technology has pushed costs weapons so high,
we have only two choices if we plan against enemy
capabilities - a defense force:
1) Limit the areas. which we are prepared to defend
probably to Europe
confronting with
1.x.0
unacceptable risks,, work on enemy
intentions)
(Defense Reducing our cost and risk-in event deterrence
fails, i.e., reduce enemy capability)
.Proverbial to say that because intentions can change
quickly, we must-.plan based on enemy capabilities,
That is rapidly becoming unhelpful response,
2) Only be partially prepared for worldwide defense
requirements.
Whichever choice we make, we are in effect estimating
intentions - that is we estimate either that Europe is
The primary threat area or we estimate that we can take
a chance by having inadequate air defense forces, sea
control forces, anti-tank forces or something else that
we require to be prepared on all fronts
In essence this is part of the difficult time we are
having in acknowledging that the power of the United
States is indeed limited.
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Really we are hoping that our force structure.will
somehow be adequate if we must defend, even if define
threat downward
Should we not give more attention to the requirements of
deterring conflict?A Our 44sil primary force
sizing technique is the:.analysis of tactical warfighting
in specific scenarios, deterrence is less amenable to
scenario definition or to analysis.
This is because infpart deter is perceptions -number
1. Soviets Y
2. 3rd expect Sov help
3. 3rd
4.' Combo
We don't know much of impact mil force on perceptions
Need study operative factors mil presence.
2. If deterrence more difficult define more difficult sell
Congress - public
If talk - deterrence as balance - stabilizing vice defense-
superiority - need less - get less
Euphoria of detente
FragiA - careful not appear want it to fail.
Navy - gunboat
Nearest - Largest
Credible - applicable
Supersonic vs Airborne
Mil - Intell
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Study detente
Particularly fragile if let imbalance develop -
Could not risk
Would not forsake advantage
Containment
Recognize asymmetries in U.S. Soviet approach to detent
1. Double detente
2. Soviet Force needs China, E Europe - Domestic
Forces Soviets maintain will be perceived as
threat
For moment, no reason believe won't exercise
threat e.g., Naval build upj9erceived threat
not perceived by intellectuals
Touch lightly
Japan
Norway
Still stuck on scenarios and analyses
Need study relationship mil threat and pol/econ
3. Less Utility - More difficult explain purpose -
Attract young men and women
Issue: How f~ sacrifice standards, procedures to accomodate to
society
Make more attractive?
Must look at fundamentals
Superficial proposal require M.A. for LCOL
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By #'s - flower/roots
Instead - look.what separates us - exclusiveness
Housing
PX
Commissaries
Hospitals
Sense of dedicated career vs job
Lateral movement Flag
Job Coding for transferability
Less indentured servitude
Greater intellectual contact with civilian academics
don't add layer
Abolish Academies, PG, WC, PDP
Rather scoff domestic action contaminating
society - increase-contaminate military
Need study what essential - descipline , auth
Flogging
McMahon
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I'd like to discuss what I'consider to be the principle
problem facing the military today; how to define our purpose
or mission. I believe we should start by recognizing the diminish-
ing utility of military force as a means of furthering political
purpose. There are four reasons for this. The first and most
obvious is the advent of nuclear weapons, and in particular
the' Soviet achievement of nuclear parity with the U.S.
It is simply,;out of the question for the super powers to
consider resolving their differences with military force. Nor
should any of the major allies of the super powers consider
using either conventional or nuclear force to solve their
problems.
Secondly, both Korea and Vietnam have taught us the very
real limitations on the ability of a major military power to
exercise its will over a minor power through use of military
force. In part this is because the major power is almost
always fighting a limited war for limited objectives, whereas
the minor power is fighting a total war for survival. Further
with the dispersal of technology a small power can obtain
enough sophisticated equipment and learn enough about its
operation to give a major power a very difficult time.
Thirdly, today the powers of the world are becoming more
concerned with improvement of their economic position rather
of their political position. Politicians are concerned with
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a steady improvement of the country's standard of living, not
with comparison to the standards of country X or country Y.
Thus military force is less applicable to furthering economic
issues in what is a non-zero sum game.
Fourthly, within the Western world at least, the accepta-
bility of the use of military force has declined. With instant
world wide communications, there is a greater sense of
world community today. There is also a greater appreciation
of the horrors of war and a professed humanitarianism. Out of
this, in part, comes the popularity of the word detente.
We do not want to overdo this concept of diminishing
utility of military force. Many countries in the world still
feel that they can benefit from the use of force. Many others
feel insecure under the threat of force. They have only to
look at the Middle East situation, the continuing strife in
Cambodia, theIndia-Pakistan conflict, and many other small
conflicts in recent years. These conflicts seem to focus on
the lesser developed countries of the Third World, Israel,
Pakistan, India and Indonesia, etc., rather than the very
underdeveloped countries. The major powers have considerable
interest in these potential conflicts. On the one hand, there
is always the danger that they will lead to super power
involvement. The Middle East situation is a classic example.
On the other hand the United States does not want another
major power obtaining dominance in some area of the third
world through the use of either direct or surrogate military
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power. The major powers are becoming increasingly dependent
upon the import of raw materials from these areas and all
would be concerned at such a development.
From this there seem to me to be three missions which
are likely to dominate military force planning in the decade
ahead. The first is obviously the maintenance of strategic
nuclear deterrence. It appears to me that we must consider
alternatives to mutual assured destruction. In many ways this
concept is responsible for the apathy or sense of opposition
on the part of the citizenry toward military forces.
A second mission is the maintenance of a military balance
in Western Europe. The political and economic factors are now
of greater importance than military in deterring an actual
Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The use of our military
forces, however, is of considerable importance in reassuring
our Western European allies that there is a linkage between
our nuclear power and their vulnerability to invade.
Thirdly, we need to maintain some form of military balance
in the Third World. We want to be able to deter adventurism
by major powers and to contain conflicts which may develop
between Third World powers themselves.
The common characteristic in these three missions is an
emphasis on deterrence vice defense or warfighting. If this
is in fact a new thrust in United States military force planning
there are at least three substantial problems which we must
be prepared to face.
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First, it is difficult for the uniformed military to
design its forces for deterrence rather than defense. By
deterrence, I mean forces which will discourage an enemy by
confronting him with unacceptable risks. Here, we are working
with the enemy's intentions. By defense, I mean reducing
our cost and risk in the event deterrence fails. Now we
are working against the enemy's capability. The proverbial
response that because enemy intentions can change quickly we
must base our plans on enemy capabilities is in my view rapidly
becoming unhelpful. Technology has pushed the costs of
weapons so high that we have only two choices if we plan
against enemy capability by developing a defense force. The
first is to limit the areas in which we are prepared to
defend, problably in Western Europe. The second, is to be
only partially prepared for world wide defense requirements.
Whichever choice we make we are, in effect, estimating intentions.
We are estimating either that Europe is a primary threat area
or that we can take a chance with ;inadequate air defense forces,
sea control forces, anti-tank forces, or something else that
we do require to be prepared on all fronts. In essence this
is part of the difficulty we are having in acknowledging the
limited power of the United States. Really we are hoping
that our force structure will somehow be adequate if we must
defend. Sometimes, however, we find we have to redefine the
thread downward in order to be reassured. Should we not give
more attention to the requirements of deterring conflict?
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For those of us in uniform this is difficult because our
primary force sizing technique is the analysis of tactical
warfighting in specific scenarios. Deterrence is less amenable
to scenario definition or to analysis. This is true in part
because deterrence relies on perceptions, and there are a
number of perceptions we must consider.
One of these is the perceptions of the Soviets. Second,
we must consider perceptions of a Third World power which
hopes to be given assistance by the Soviets. In this case,
the perception by the Third World country of the relative
balance between us and the Soviets and our relative ability
to bring force to bear on the situation is important. This
perception may, in fact, be quite different from the Soviet
or U.S. perception of the same situation. A Third situation
is when third world countries simply must look at what we can
do to them without any Soviet interference. Of course, it's
possible that several of these perceptions may be working at
the same time. Unfortunately, we do not know much about
the impact of military force on perceptions like this. In
the Navy for instance there is always a tendency when called
upon for gunboat diplomacy to send the nearest ship. If there
is a choice it is-always in favor of^the largest and most
powerful ship. Yet there are times when the largest and most
powerful is not the most credible or the most applicable to
that particular situation. Supersonic airplanes are likely
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to be a small threat to a very underdeveloped nation whereas
a marine helicopter assualt on the capital of a country may
be very meaningful indeed. Overall, we need considerably
more study on the operative factors of military presence or
deterrence.
Second if deterrence is more difficult to define or
difficult to understand than warfighting and defense we
are going to have a greater problem selling this program to
the Congress and the public. If we talk of deterrence in terms
of balance or in Morris' words "stabilizing," rather than
in terms of defense and superiority, the obvious conclusion
will be that we need less. If we ask for less we will
probably get'much less. The best bureaucratic strategy may
well be to continue to play up the threat and ask for forces
for warfighting capability in the hope that we will have
enough for a deterrent strategy.
There is great danger today in the euphoria of detente
which pervades in the Congress. After sitting though three days
of Pacem in Terris with Congressmen, intellectuals, businessmen
and others of stature in the communities, I can assure you
that there is a lot of sloppy euphoric thinking about the
term "detente." Detente is, in face, a fragile thing.
Coming down here on the airplane yesterday I was reading
a column in the Washington Post, which states "detente is finished"
On September 27th the Soviet Union knew what day and the fact
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that the Arabs were going to attack Israel. They did not
tell us and therefore they have betrayed detente. I believe
the author of that column to be taking an over simplistic
view of idealized detente. He is making no allowance for the
constantly changing nature of detente. It is a progression
forward and sometimes backward in time into a state of trust
and confidence. Our present stage of detente is nowhere near
the kind of trust and confidence which permits us to reveal
that sort of information.
We need to study and probe into the meaning of detente.
If an imbalance in military force (conventional and strategic)
develops between us and the Soviet Union in particular, we will
not have detente. If.either of our countries felt vulnerable
to attack by the other, we could not risk detente. Similarly,
if either of us felt we had.a marked military advantage over
the other, I suggest that we would not be likely to forsake
it. History has not shown many cases of countries forsaking
an advantage over a rival. I believe this though I consider
the U.S. the most magnanimous country in the history of the
world, one that when it possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons
for five years or so pressed for a policy of containment not
detente.
We must now recognize the assymmetries that exist in the
U.S. and Soviet approaches to detente. I believe that one
of the reasons the Soviet Union, Red China, and the U.S. have
agreed to detente was that all three of us did-not want to have
7
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opponents on two fronts. But instead of us each dropping one
opponent and keeping one in a trianglar situation we now have
double detente. I think that is going to have an impact on
the attitudes in our country and in the Soviet Union towards
detente.
Further the Soviets have different needs for military forces.
If I were a Soviet military leader I would be very genuinely
reluctant to reduce my forces when I considered my responsibilities
on the eastern front. If I were a Svoiet military leader I
would be equally reluctant when I thought of my responsibilities
in the eastern European nations. If I were aSoviet political
leader I would be reluctant to have military forces reduced
too much, due to a tradition in history of using force to
preserve domestic order and security. After all, the Soviet
have not the tradition,--of anti-militarism we inherited from
our founding fathers.
As an aside, I also see no reason to believe that the
Soviets will not excerise the force they have to threaten
other people. They are clearly building up their Navy to a
far greater extent than their legimate requirement. Even if
they do not purposely exercise force their possession of
forces for these three legimate purposes will be perceived as
a threat by many other nations. I suggest here again that we
in our community need to do more thinking about perceived
threats.
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A few days ago I was talking with an academic civilian
involved in a study on Japanese security requirements. In-
evitably and very quickly we were in conversation about the
very long jugular from the Persian Gulf to Japan. I said,
"what would you have the Japanese do." And he said that it
was so long, so difficult to defend, that there is no point
in their building naval forces to protect it. I suggest
this is a misunderstanding of perceptions of military power.
There is a major difference between a zero degree threshold
at which another power can exercise threat with military
force against one of your vitals and a 10, 20, or 30 percent
capability. I may be wrong but I think we need to be sure that
we understand more about the perceptions of threat, how they
affect political and economic decisions of countries.
While in Europe a few weeks ago, I read in the British
newspapers that the Norwegians have discovered oil in their
coastal waters, their own territorial waters. But the
Norwegians have come to feel that the Norwegian Sea is a
Soviet lake; so they have elected to develop those oil fields
only in the very southern part of their coast line.
Lastly, I would like to touch very briefly (because I have
run overtime and also because there are many of you here who
are far more expert in this field than I) on the problem we
will have explaining the purpose of a military force which has
less utility today. Recruiting and retaining the young men
and women necessary to man our forces will be more difficult.
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I think the most interesting issue is; how much do we need
to sacrifice our standards,. our procedures, our traditions,
our practices in order to accommodate to our society. How
much do we need to do to make military life more compatible
with that which young people enjoy in civilian society. Here
we must really examine fundamentals.
Today, I was disappointed in what I consider a very super-
ficial proposal for bringing the military into harmony with
civilian society; to ensure that every Lieutenant Colonel has
a civilian master's degree. To me this is a by-the-numbers-
approach. We will succeed only in watering the buds, and
would not feed the roots. Instead I think we must look at
what separateSus in the military from the civilian society.
The principal thing is the sense of exclusiveness, which has
been and still is very important. Although it is one of those
morale items which builds esprit can we afford it? Can we
afford housing on the bases or should we give it to the
civilians? Can we afford PX's, commissaries, and hospitals
for our dependents? Can we give young people the sense of
coming into a dedicated career when they join the military
rather than taking another job 7 All of us who made it a career
and love the military are proud of our profession. We like
feeling that we are an elite and distinct profession. But if
we want to be closer to the civilian society can we afford the
elitism?
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Must we provide for greater lateral movement, out and in.
Two weeks ago I talked to a group of civilian businessmen and
suggested we permit lateral entry even at flag and general
rank. A lot of hands went up and volunteered. I told how
much I got paid and most of them carne down.
In this same connection, should we consider coding our
jobs in the military to bring them into line with those in
civilian life. If we provide a greater transferability, a young
man need not hasten out of the military to ensure that he is
going to be able to establish and qualify himself for a job
in civilian life. Should we have less indentured servitude?
Perhaps we should require only 18 months of military service,
as I understand the British do.
If we need greater intellectual contact between military
officers and civilian academics, we need not add another layer
of unnecessary education. We should consider abolishing the
service academies, post graduate schools, and even the war
colleges and putting that education into civilian institutions.
Perhaps we should also look for a mandatory program for officers
being promoted to LCOL and perhaps enlisted men to Gunnery
Sergeant in which they would take a year off from the military
service to work in civilian industry in some corresponding job.
Finally rather than scoffing at domestic action as did some
people who fear we may contaminate society, perhaps we should
increase domestic action programs and contaminate the military
with civilian. mores.
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Overall I believe. we need to study what is essential, to
maintaining order and discipline in the military to achiee
a better understanding of which of our traditions and practices
can be abandoned and which must be preserved.
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 02840
27 SEP 1973
FROM: President, Naval War College
TO: Office of CNO (OP 921E)
SUBJ: Speech clearance; request for
REF: (a) Paragraph B-3007, U.S. Navy Public Affairs
Regulations,
ENCL: (1) Seven copies of speech to Inter-University
Seminar on Armed Forces and Society in Chicago.
1. In accordance with reference.(a), it is requested
that the enclosed speech be cleared for presentation
to the Chicago Seminar on 11 October 1973.
DAVID G. CLARK
by direction
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 9/27/73
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CHICAGO
Tonight I would like to share some thoughts with you
concerning the future -use of organized force, both in the
world as a whole and as it relates to our own country.
Three topics which seem pertinent to me include: First,
the general historical trend in the use of organized force
and where we stand today relative. to the long term trends.
Second, the present state of world political order and what
this portends for the employment of United States military
power for the decade or two ahead. And, Third, the status
of the United States military today and some of the problems
it must overcome if it is to serve the national purpose
successfully in the immediate future.
Turning to an assessment of the evolution of force and
where we stand today, I would agree with Mr. Robert Osgood's
perspective. He characterized the development of military
technology from the pre-nation state era through the pre-
Napoleonic era as being a relatively limited force which
was gradually harnessed and made somewhat useful to the
embryonic nation states of that day. From the Napoleonic
Wars until the end of World War I, he traced the tremendous
expansion of military power coincident with the industrial
revolution in Europe and the United States, an expansion
0
so great and so swift that political institutions of the
`period were unable to exercise adequate controls.
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There were attempts by governments to reduce the causes
of war before world Wa.r I,. the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907 being prominent examples.
Between World Wars T and II we had even more efforts
to control military force. The Kellogg-Briand Pact re-
nounced war as an instrument of statecraft. The widely
heralded Washington and London Naval Disarmament Treaties
reduced naval strength among all signatories and
maintained a freeze'on battleship tonnage for 15 years.
These efforts failed to prevent World War II. Which
brings us to the epoch commencing in 1945 in which we live,
a period characterized by Robert Osgood as the regulatory
phase in the evolution of force. The advent of nuclear
weapons resulted simultaneously in a tremendous increase in
available destructive power and ever increasing efforts by
political institutions to achieve control over the new force.
World War II seems in retrospect to have been a con-
flict relatively free of excessive political control. The
trend since has been to ever greater political restrictions
on the use of force. To name but a few outstanding examples
one can cite: (1) the Truman-MacArthur showdown over Korea,
(2) the establishment of centralized control in the Depart-
ment of Defense, (3) the lessened reliance on the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in the decision making process, (4) the,
designation of individual bombing targets in North Vietnam
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from the White House on a day. to day basis, C5) and, the
elaborate fail safe devices and procedures devised to
control release of nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union also has demonstrated continuing
concern with centralized political command and control:
Cl) the manner in which they-manipulated their forces in
the Cuban missile crisis, (2) the system by which political
officers are assigned to parallel regular military command
down to the unit level, (3) the way in which they maintained
simultaneous tactical control over all their naval units
deployed around the world during Exercise OKEAN, C4) Soviet
willingness to limit naval incidents at sea and sign the
SALT agreements, all are symptomatic of a trend which is
accelerating, at least in the developed countries and
especially in the superpowers.
I do not contend that this trend is anything but healthy
because it may well help to prevent accidental disaster
in the future. To be sure we have a long way to go in
improving our command and control organization and equip-
ment. The system has not always worked as intended in the
past. One might cite the Lavelle incident, the Arnheiter
affair, or My Lai as evidence that it hasn't worked well.
But I would contend that these are exceptions rather than
the rule,. Furthermore, the mere fact that they came to
light at all is evidence of tremendous change in the scope
of control which is now exercised by the United States body
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politic over its military organizations. Such incidents
would most likely not have cometo light at all 30 years
ago, first because military commanders had much greater
freedom of action in the field, and second because sub-
ordinates would not so readily have taken the initiative to
expose what they observed to the nation at large.
In short, civil government at least in the developed
nations is beginning to react to the tremendous growth in
military power which has characterized the past century and
a half and is taking steps to place effective controls on
organized force by both unilateral and multilateral means.
Which brings me to the second point which I should
like to discuss with you, that is, the present world order
and what demands this may generate for-United States
military force. General recognition by the superpowers that
there is rough nuclear parity, and that this condition is
likely to continue for some time in the future, coupled
with competing domestic requirements, have led to the current
atmosphere of detente.
Some observers look into the future and wishfully see
no end to detente, hence no need for forces. Some look
ahead and see the existence of forces as a temptation that
will undo detente. Others look ahead and theorize that the
foundations of peace must rest on more enduring principles
than the fear of physical punishment, hence seek the elimi-
nation of force and the threat of force today.
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.Still others view detente as Just a tactical ploy by
the Russians;to gain time. and access to Western technology.
Even some Russians are convinced of this. We read just this
month of nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov 'warning that
fundamental Soviet attitudes may not change. And, there are
disturbing reports that Chairman Breshnev has told his com-
rades that detente is a tactic to be employed for a decade
or so, at which time the Soviets will be strong enough to
abandon a policy of conciliation.
Speaking from the viewpoint of military professionals
who will have to be responsible for national security if
detente fails, it seems to me that:
? Detente is a fragile thing which we all hope will
continue to grow.
? If the existence of military force imperils detente,
an imbalance of force would be particularly dangerous.
In order to have detente, each side must perceive a
sense of security. In the present atmosphere, security
will continue to consist of a series of recognized
(although muted) threats that both sides feel willing
and able to counter. It would be mere wishful think-
ing to conclude that threats no longer exist because
sabers are not rattled, but merely carried at the
ready.
Although I share the concern of many that the
Soviets may be using detente only as a short term
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tactic, we must give: detente. a chance. The task of
military professionals-must be to, advise the President,
the Congress, and the general public of the-risks
inherent in each agreement which is proposed. We must
also be alert to the fact that security is not neces-
sarily synonymous with more weaponry. I would hope
that in time we may- also convince our Soviet colleagues
that this is true.
? Detente will only be preserved if all parties come
to trust the word and intent of the others through a
series of gradual mutual adjustments in armaments.
For the near term this may mean retaining what is
obviously enough power to devastate each side several
times over, because one or both sides may feel more
secure with a large margin of retaliatory capability.
We must understand that whereas the United States has
a tradition of geographic security,,the Russian perception
of security is profoundly influenced by a long history of
being invaded from both the East and the West. The Soviets
will perceive a.. requirement for a large military force for
the foreseeable future in order to:
? Deter China
? Police the East European satellites
Insure domestic security in a nation composed of
many different nationalities
Further the cause of their Marxist-Leninist ideology
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We must also realize that there is not the same
tradition of dislike for a large standing army as in our
country. Nor is there any possibility of meaningful public
dissent which would inhibit Soviet leadership from retaining
a sizeable military establishment.
Thus, I foresee United States military power as being
necessary in the next decade or two to provide strategic
balance in three areas.
'First, we must, by a careful combination of treaties,
protocols, and strategic nuclear forces, maintain a rough
balance among all the nuclear powers. Contrary to the
hopes of many, this is not likely to lead to general and
complete disarmament; rather it will be a continuing effort,
hopefully-multilateral, to exercise control over a fluc-
tuating level of strategic armaments. This effort will be
complicated by the continuing development of new weapons
technology, possibly addition of new members to the nuclear
club, and continuing shifts in relative economic power and
political alignment among all nation states.
Rather than accepting agreement limiting one or two
types of armament as a rationale for drastic cutbacks in
all types of military forces, we must continue to proceed
carefully toward arms limitations covering all types of
weapons. Simultaneously, we must maintain the forces we do
have at a high state of combat readiness and pursue a steady
program of research and development, and modernization of
weapons systems to counter potential threats.
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Our.goal should be to achieve as many freezes as we
can negotiate on expensive:: new systems. such as AB".M. T_
strongly believe that it'is impossible to prevent new
technological discoveries bar legislation, but we can control
the application of new technology to weapons systems by
mutual agreement among nations. This makes it imperative
that we have a well managed ongoing Research and Development
program and demonstrate a willingness to proceed with new
weapons programs until we can reach specific agreements with
other nations. We must learn from the mistakes of the
1930's and resolve not only to seek agreement on as many
political and military issues as we can, but also to com-
pete effectively in those areas where there is yet no arms
limitation agreement. This is in essence the "bargaining-
chip" strategy which we are currently trying to implement.
I see no immediate alternative to the strategy of
mutual assured destruction which is the present basis for
strategic deterrence. I should like to emphasize that
mutual assured destruction need not necessarily be a
strategy aimed at civilian populations.
In order. to supplant mutual assured destruction, a
successor strategy must contain built in positive incentives
to dissuade any party from attacking the territory of the
others. One solution to our current dilemma might be to so
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thoroughly intermingle the economic interests. of each
nation state within the territory of the others that there
would be a mutual self i.nterest in not destroying:. the others
property. This raises questions of relations between multi-
national economic institutions and national sovereignity.
Such a plan would also require juxtaposition of strategic
weapons systems and economic complexes, at least in the
initial stages, in order to preclude either side from opting
for a counter-force strategy. Perhaps someday a melding of
economic interests will provide a strong incentive for
nation states to desist from threatening one another. However,
I am not optimistic that it will'occur in the next decade.
Therefore, our first concern must be to maintain nuclear
parity.
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The 's'econd use for: United. States military forces must
be to contribute to the strategic balance in Western Europe. This
does not necessarily mean that the present force levels and the
nature of weapons deployed must remain fixed in their. cur-
rent status.
Since the early 1960's.,. the United States has sub-
scribed to a'strategy of flexible response to possible Soviet
incursions against NATO European territory. We have
advocated that sufficient conventional forces be deployed by
all the NATO allies to provide for a breathing spell between
the first incursion by Warsaw Pact forces and the time when
it might become necessary to escalate to nuclear war. Our
allies have reluctantly agreed to this strategy and have
contributed substantially to conventional forces in Europe.
We in turn have attempted to provide a capability for our
military to fight a sustained campaign in Central Europe
by building a force with a heavy emphasis on logistic
support.
There are several reasons why this strategy needs to
be carefully reevaluated:
? The Soviets have not designed a force for prolonged
struggle. Rather, they have emphasized the capability
for a short massive blow which could not be sustained
very long because their logistics train is inadequate
for the task.
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o Our allies have designed forces with a potential
for perhaps more sustained combat than the Warsaw Pact
but certainly not for a prolonged conventional war.
o If we attempt to afford the dollars to support a.
sustained conventional war fighting capability in
Central Europe there will be little else in our inventory
of military capability.
o The Soviets are unlikely to attempt such a war
because of the danger of escalation; because of the threat
of China and because of their trouble retaining tight
controls on. their current'East European satellites. They
are more interested in exercising a larger measure of
political. influence over. Western. Europe than in conquering
it and having to control it like the eastern satellites.
For these reasons we may find it advantageous to:
? Bargain together with our Allies for Mutual Balanced
Force Reduction (MBFR); perhaps difficult to achieve
because of Soviet requirements for internal security.
? Restructure our forces in Europe with greater emphasis
on defensive weapons, smaller more mobile units, and
redeployment within Europe based on the realities of the
terrain rather than artificial constraints such as
national boundaries and historical accident resulting
from World War II.
? Reduce the logistic tail necessary for a long con-
ventional war and increase the ratio of combat troops
vis-a-vis support troops in Europe. We should also
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.consider: frequent ;unit xotat ..;on between Europe and
the" United States :as.,a substitute. for the 'lengthy
individual tours with the large number of dependents
which characterize 'present deployments.
? Plan on rapid small unit replacement and reinforcement
from the United States in the event of hostilities or
increased tension, rather than individual replacement
as is presently contemplated.
The mission of-United States forces committed to Europe
will most likely evolve from one of fighting a sustained
conflict to that of supporting Western Europe against poli-
tical pressure from the Soviets and maintaining a capability
to fight a short, perhaps unexpected defensive war against
powerful but short-legged offensive forces.
A third use of United States military force will be to
deter major power dominance in the Third World. Only the
United States can perform this function. Thus there is some
rationalization of effort here with our European allies carry-
ing a larger share of the central front load, and we tending to
the free world's interests around the globe. Note that I did
not say that we should police the Third World. United States
interests will best be served for the foreseeable future if
Third World nations are permitted the freedom to work
out their own destinies. Unfortunately, they may not be
left alone simply because the United States may choose to
withdraw forces. The Soviet Union's naval building program,
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coupled with its radical change in deployment patterns over
the past decade, the-many statements by their CNO, Admiral
Gorshkov, and their interest in obtaining basing and logistics
support facilities in strategic locations, all point to new
Soviet awareness of the persuasive power of military presence.
Even though the United States will be less likely to
use overt force in Third World areas, the capability for a
counter presence will be necessary. Without a reasonable
countervailing capability on our part, we can expect Third
World nations to succumb to military pressures. For
example, one might. reasonably speculate as to whether or
not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask
the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces
from Egyptian. territory if. the United States 6th Fleet
had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. -Even though
the United States is not a formal ally of Egypt our visible
military force. on the scene might well have been the latent
potential-support which permitted him to take the action he
did. No matter what some people say, our interests overseas are
growing not declining. We are increadingly dependent
on imports. That in turn means that we must export more.
In addition, despite what some of our eastern press
would have us believe, I am confident that the people
of this country will not turn their backs on the
contribution that our example and support can give to those
struggling for what we accept as our heritage.
13
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I foresee an evolution in the nature of United States
presence overseas. This does not imply complete withdrawal
of United States forces from areas where they have maintained
a presence since World War lz. Over a prolonged period it
may mean replacing presence in force with token presence
backed by the capability to rapidly deploy reinforcements
from the United States if circumstances require it. Nor does
it imply that overt use of United States forces must be the
rule. Presence may be sufficient to the task if our interests
are manifestly apparent to all concerned and our will to
persevere is 'credible. Hopefully such a strategy will in-
duce abstension on the part of the major powers and dis-
courage adventurism on the part of Third World nations
themselves, either of which could be dangerously escalatory.
To review, then, T foresee three uses for United States
military forces in the next two decades. 'First, strategic
nuclear forces must balance potential enemies in order to
deter nuclear war. Second, conventional general purpose
forces must be sufficient to provide that type and size of
contribution to NATO defenses which will buttress our allies
from acceding to pressures from the Soviet Unionyincluding
any efforts to use their new naval power as a wedge against
nations on the NATO flanks, or for that matter against t/,6
Japanese in the Pacific
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This d, we need sufficient general purpose forces to deter
major power dominance in the Third World and protect United
States interests abroad. We need not match potential
opponents measure for measure b-ut we must demonstrate a
continual willingness to maintain a sufficiently broad
spectrum of capabilities so as to make overt use of force
seem very risky to an adversary. Once force is actually
employed in the future it will lose much of its persuasive
power. Furthermore, despite the trend I mentioned earlier
there is always a danger that forces in war will be less
susceptable to political control. This makes it even more
important that our military organization and our diplomatic
pronouncements are-credible so that we need resort to
combat only rarely. Latent force will be the most useful
weapon in the decade ahead.
This brings me to the third topic I should like to
touch upon this evening. That is some of the problems which
the United States military must deal with in the next few
years. As I indicated earlier the principal task of United
States military forces should be deterrence. This demands
that the military profession relook at how we shape and
employ our military in light of the changing perils of force
and aspirations of many people to avoid its use. We must
be more concerned with perceptions of the opponent than we
have in the past, while at the same time being careful not
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to neglect the force requirements. which. would be, necessary
should hostilities :actually- occur.: In the past.fev years,
we have. used a set of possible war scenarios as justifi-
cation for structuring our.forces. We have tended to pick
the worst case as criteria for force and individual weapons
design and assumed that preparing for a worst case automati-
cally gave us the capability to handle less demanding wars
elsewhere in the world. 'Vietnam taught us the danger of
this approach.. The Navy is consciously endeavoring to
achieve a more balanced force consisting of a fewvery capa-
ble and relatively expensive units together with a somewhat
larger number of units which are less costly yet still
capable of performing a spectrum of tasks, particularly in
areas where the threat is not as large as it is in the worst
case'scenario. Absence of a clearly defined threat scenario
such as we have had for the Cold War period will make it
much more difficult to predict future force level require-
ments.
Assuming that we can learn to cope with this more
difficult task of identifying and explaining requirements
for latent military force we face an increasingly difficult
task in convincing the Congress and the public of our long
term requirements. The general public would like to forget
Vietnam and the military and concentrate on domestic problems.
Unfortunately, it requires 7 to 10 years to produce sophisti-
cated weapons, so the military must procure in time of peace
what it may need in war.
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In addition to problems involving hardware modernization
which tend to receive the greatest publicity, all. the services
face unprecedented personnel problems. Vietnam brought us
the opportunities of a stable well paid all volunteer force,
but the disadvantages of having.to'compete in the market-
place for talented people.
I think it is safe to sav that there will have to be a
series of adjustments, some dramatic, over the next several
years to tailor the compensation programs, terms of enlist-
ment, and recruiting programs to meet the special needs of
each service. For example, the Army has had diffi-
culty meeting its recruiting goals for the past six months.
On the other hand the Air Force more than met its goal in
July and the Navy was very close to its goal. Each service
may evolve radically different programs to correct such
imbalances.
We in the military will be challenged to retain our
most talented men and women. Perhaps one answer might be to
offer young people the opportunity to contract before they
commence military service for a decade of military service
in exchange for graduate level education. This medium term of
service would provide educational advantage to our youth and
provide the services with highly trained individuals without
committing either party to a long term contract. The service
would not be burdened with an excess of people who must be
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retained. -until statutory retirement. . The -individual would
be assured of a. marketable skill to provide him with job
security when his service contract expired. A similar program
could be instituted to obtain the technical skills needed in the
enlisted ranks.
There are many other manpower management questions
which will require some in depth study accompanied by much
trial and error experimentation. Many of our current
operating procedures and equipment designs need reevaluation
in view of the fact that men are now much less a free good
than they were only three years ago. The military can
learn a great deal from civilian industry and the academic
world, I am sure. In order to facilitate transfer of ideas
we might want to develop programs to accept civilians into
the military at their mid-career points for limited periods
of service or even for the remainder of their productive
years. I do not rule out the possibility of accepting
individuals into the services at the flag and general officer
level if they have specific skills that are required.
Naturally, there will be some problems with job security
and retirement benefits, but these questions are of concern
to the nation at large. We are all going to have to come to
grips with the problem of providing vested retirement credits
to a mobile work force.
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I would like to provide ample opportunity .,#or questions
so i will 'close my forma-1 remarks. by a'uickly reviewing three
major points which I hope you will consider carefully:
First - military force must be and will be subjected to
much more comprehensive political control in the future.
This control to be effective will demand a more enlightened,
continuous, less emotional public interest in the problems
of military security than we have experienced in this century.
Second - the level of-military forces will not revert to
what we knew in the 1930's because geography is no longer
our defensive shield. We will be required to maintain forces
which complement those of other nations and supplement a
system of arms agreements which may grow more and more
comprehensive. Many forces will be designed and deployed
primarily to deter war rather than primarily to engage in
actual sustained combat. Latent force will be a much more.
powerful influence than overt force.
Third - social change, coupled with the requirement for
substantial active duty military forces and a ready reserve
will place unprecedent demands for talented military personnel
at a time when military service is less popular than ever.
We who now hold the top management positions in the uniformed
services'are continually exploring new ways to attract and
keep good people working with us.
:1%
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 9/27/73
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CHICAGO
Tonight I would like to share some thoughts with you
concerning the future use"of organized force, both in the
world as a whole and as it relates to our own country.
Three topics which seem pertinent to me include: First,
the general historical trend in the use of organized force
and where we stand today relative to the long term trends.
Second, the present state of world political order and what
this portends for the employment of United States military
power for the decade or two ahead. And, Third, the status
of the United States military today and some of the problems
it must overcome if it is to serve the national purpose
successfully in the immediate future.
Turning to an assessment of the evolution of force and
where we stand today, I would agree with Mr. Robert Osgood's
perspective. He characterized the development of military
technology from the pre-nation state era through the pre-
Napoleonic era as being a relatively limited force which
was gradually harnessed and made somewhat useful to the
embryonic nation states of that day. From the Napoleonic
Wars until the end of World War I, he traced the tremendous
expansion of military power-coincident with the industrial
revolution in Europe and the United States, an expansion
so great and so swift that political institutions of the
period were unable to exercise adequate controls.
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There were attempts by governments to reduce the causes
war before world War I,. the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907 being prominent examples.
Between World Wars I and II we had even more efforts
to control military force. The Kellogg-Briand Pact re-
nounced war as an instrument of statecraft. The widely
heralded Washington and London Naval Disarmament Treaties
reduced naval strength among all signatories and
maintained a freeze on battleship tonnage for 15 years.
These efforts failed to prevent World War II. Which
brings us to the epoch commencing in 1945 in which we live,
a period characterized by Robert Osgood as the regulatory
phase in the evolution of force. The advent of nuclear
weapons resulted simultaneously in a tremendous increase in
available destructive power and ever increasing efforts by
political institutions to achieve control over the new force.
World War II seems in retrospect to have been a con-
flict relatively free of excessive political control. The
trend since has been to ever greater political restrictions
on the use of force. To name but a few outstanding examples
one can cite: (1) the Truman-MacArthur showdown over Korea,
(2) the establishment of centralized control in the Depart-
ment of Defense, (3) the lessened reliance on the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in the decision making process, (4) the
designation of individual bombing targets in North Vietnam
2
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from the White House on a day. to day basis, (5) and, the
elaborate fail safe devices and procedures devised to
control release of nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union also has demonstrated continuing
concern with centralized political command and control:
Cl), the manner in which they manipulated their\,forces in
the Cuban missile crisis, (2) the system by which political
officers are assigned to parallel regular military command
down to the unit level, (3) the way in which they maintained
simultaneous tactical control over all their naval units
deployed around the world during Exercise OKEAN, (4) Soviet
willingness to limit naval incidents at sea and sign the
SALT agreements, all are symptomatic of a trend which is
accelerating, at least in the developed countries and
especially in the superpowers.
I do not contend that this trend is anything but healthy
because it may well help to prevent accidental disaster
in the future. To be sure we have a long way to go in
improving our command and control organization and equip-
ment. The system has not always worked as intended in the
past. One might cite the Lavelle incident, the Arnheiter
affair, or My Lai as evidence that it hasn't worked well.
But I would contend that these are exceptions rather than
the rule Furthermore, the mere fact that they came to
light at all is evidence of tremendous change in the scope
of control which is now exercised by the United States body
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politic over its military organizations. Such incidents
would most likely not have come to light at all 30 years
ago, first because military commanders had much greater
freedom of action in the field, and second because sub-
ordinates would not so readily have taken the initiative to*
expose what they observed to the nation at large.
In short, civil government at least in the developed
nations is beginning to react to the tremendous growth in
military power which has characterized the past century and
a half and is taking steps to place effective controls on
organized force by both unilateral and multilateral means.
Which brings me to the second point which I should
like to discuss with you, that is, the present world order-
and what demands this may generate for United States
military force. General recognition by the superpowers that
there is rough nuclear parity, and that this condition is
likely to continue for some time in the future, coupled
with competing domestic requirements, have led to the current
atmosphere of detente.
Some observers look into the future and wishfully see
no end to detente, hence no need for forces. Some look.
ahead and see the existence of forces as a temptation. that
will undo detente. Others look ahead and theorize that the
foundations of peace must rest on more enduring principles
than the fear of physical punishment, hence seek the elimi-
nation of force and the threat of force today.
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still others view detente- as ''just a tactical ploy by
the Russians, to gain time: and access to Western technology.
Even some`Russians are convinced of this. We read rust this
month of nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov \warning that
fundamental Soviet attitudes may not change. And, there are
disturbing. reports that Chairman Breshnev has told his com-
rades that detente is a tactic to be employed for a decade
or so, at which time the Soviets will be strong enough to
abandon a policy of conciliation.
Speaking from the viewpoint of military professionals
who will have to be responsible for national security if
detente fails, it seems to me that:
? Detente is a fragile thing which we all hope will
continue to grow.
? If the existence of military force imperils detente,
an imbalance\Of force would be particularly dangerous.
In order to have detente, each side must perceive a
sense of security. In the present atmosphere, security
will continue to consist of a series of recognized
i
(although muted) !threats that both sides feel willing
and able to counter. It would be mere wishful think-
ing to conclude that threats no longer exist because
sabers are not rattled, but merely carried at the
ready.
? Although I share the concern of many that the
Soviets may be using detente only as a short term
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tactic, we must give -.detente a chance. The task of
military professionals just be to' advise the President,
the Congress, and the general public of the risks
inherent in each 'agreement which is proposed. We must
also be alert to the fact that security is not neces-
sarily synonymous with more weaponry.
I would hope
that in time we may also convince our Soviet colleagues
that this is true.
? Detente will only be preserved if all parties come
to trust the word and intent of the others through a
series of gradual mutual adjustments in armaments.
For the near term this may mean retaining what is
obviously enough power to devastate each side several
-times over, because one or both sides may feel more
secure with a large margin of retaliatory capability.
We must understand that whereas the United States has
a tradition of geographic security, the Russian perception
of security is profoundly influenced by a long history of
being invaded from both the East and the West. The Soviets
will perceive a requirement for a large military force for
the foreseeable future in order to:
? Police the East European satellites
? Insure domestic security in a nation composed of
many different nationalities
0 Further the cause of their Marxist-Leninist ideology
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We must also realize that there is not the same
tradition of dislike for a large standing army as in our
country. Nor is there any possibility of meaningful public
dissent which would inhibit Soviet leadership from retaining
a sizeable military establishment.
Thus, I foresee United States military power as being
necessary in the next decade or two to provide strategic
balance in three areas.
~F~, we must, by a careful combination of treaties,
protocols, and strategic nuclear forces, maintain a rough
balance among all the nuclear powers. Contrary to the
hopes of many, this is not likely to lead to general and
complete disarmament; rather it will be a continuing effort,
hopefully multilateral, to exercise control over a fluc-
tuating level of strategic armaments. This effort will be
complicated by the continuing development of new weapons
technology, possibly addition of new members to the nuclear
club, and continuing shifts in relative economic power and
political alignment among all nation states.
Rather than accepting agreement limiting one or two
types of armament as a rationale for drastic cutbacks in
all types of military forces, we must continue to proceed
carefully toward arms limitations covering all types of
weapons. Simultaneously, we must maintain the forces we do
have at a high state of combat readiness and pursue a steady
program of research and development, and modernization of
weapons systems to counter potential threats.
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Our goal should be to achieve- as many freezes as we
can negotiate. *on expensive. new sy.stems such- as AB'M. I
strongly believe that it is impossible to prevent new
technological discoveries b legislation, but we can control
the application of new technology to weapons systems by
mutual agreement among nations. This makes it imperative
that we have a well managed ongoing Research and Development
program and demonstrate a willingness to proceed with new
weapons programs until we can reach specific agreements with
other nations. We must learn from the mistakes of the
1930's and resolve not only to seek agreement on as many
political and military issues as we can, but also to com-
pete effectively in those areas where there is yet no arms
limitation agreement. This is in essence the "bargaining-
chip" strategy which we are currently trying to implement.
I see no immediate alternative to the strategy of
mutual assured destruction which is the present basis for
strategic deterrence. I should like to emphasize that
mutual assured destruction need not necessarily be a
strategy aimed at civilian populations.
In order to supplant mutual assured destruction,
successor strategy must contain built in positive incentives
to dissuade any party from attacking the territory of the
others. One solution to our current dilemma might be to so
8
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thoroughly intermingle the economic interests. of each
nation state within the territory of the others that there
would be a mutual self interest in not destroying.the others
property. This raises aruestIons of relations between multi-
national economic institutions and national sovereignity.
Such a plan would also require juxtaposition of strategic
weapons systems and economic complexes, at least in the
initial stages, in order to preclude either side from opting
for a counter-force strategy. Perhaps someday a melding of
economic interests will provide a strong incentive for
nation states to desist from threatening one another. However,
I am not optimistic that it will occur in the next decade.
Therefore, our first concern must be to maintain nuclear
parity.
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The 's'econd use for United States. military forces must
be to contribute to the strategic balance in Western Europe.iThis:
does not necessarily mean that the present force levels and the
nature of weapons deployed must remain fixed in their cur-
rent status.
Since the early 1960'.s.,. the United States has sub-
scribed to a strategy of flexible response: to possible Soviet
incursions against NATO European territory. We have
advocated that sufficient. conventional forces be deployed by
all the NATO allies to provide for a breathing spell between
the first incursion by Warsaw Pact forces and the time when
it might become necessary to escalate ~to nuclear war. Our
allies have reluctantly agreed to this strategy and have
contributed substantially to conventional forces in Europe.
We in turn have attempted to provide a capability for our
military to fight a sustained campaign in. Central Europe
by building a force with a heavy emphasis on logistic
support.
There are several reasons why this strategy needs to
be carefully reevaluated:
? The Soviets have not designed a force for prolonged
struggle. Rather, they have emphasized the capability
for a short massive blow which could not be sustained
very long because their logistics train is inadequate
for the task.
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o Our allies have designed forces with a potential
for perhaps more sustained combat than the Warsaw Pact
but certainly not for ,..a prolonged conventional war.
o If we attempt to afford the dollars to support a..
sustained conventional war fighting capability in
Central.Europe.there will be little else in our inventory
of military capability.
o The Soviets are unlikely to attempt such a war
because of the danger of escalation; because of the threat
of China and because of their trouble retaining tight
controls on-their current East.European'satellites. They
are more interested in exercising a larger measure of
political. influence over. Western Europe than in conquering
it and having to control it like the eastern satellites.-
Fox these reasons we may find it advantageous to:.
Bargain together with our Allies for Mutual Balanced
Force Reduction (MBFR); perhaps difficult_,to achieve
because of Soviet requirements for internal security.
? Restructure our forces in Europe with greater emphasis
on defensive weapons, smaller more mobile units, and
redeployment within Europe based on the realities of the
terrain rather than artificial constraints such as
national boundaries and historical accident resulting
from World War II.
? Reduce the logistic tail necessary for a long con-
ventional war and increase the ratio of combat troops
vis-a-vis support troops in Europe. We should also
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consider: frequent :unit xotat_. ,on between Europe and
the :'United States :as a substitute for the lengthy
individual tours with the large number of dependents
which characterize present:deployments.
? Plan on rapid small unit replacement and reinforcement
from the United States in the event of hostilities or
increased tension, rather than individual replacement
as is presently contemplated.
The mission of United States forces committed to Europe
will most likely evolve from one of fighting a sustained
conflict to that of supporting Western Europe against poli-
tical pressure from the Soviets and maintaining a capability
to fight a short, perhaps unexpected defensive war against
powerful but short-legged offensive forces.
A third use of United States military force will be to
deter major power dominance in the Third World. Only the
United States can. perform this function. Thus there. is some
rationalization of effort here with our European allies. carry-
ing a larger share of the central front load, and we tending to
the free world's interests around the globe. Note that I did
not say that we should police the Third World. United States
interests will best be served for the foreseeable future if
Third World nations are permitted the freedom to work.
out their own destinies. Unfortunately, they may not be
left alone simply because the United States may choose to
withdraw forces. The Soviet Union's naval building program,
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coupled with its radical change in deployment patterns Over
the past decade, the many statements by their CNO, Admiral
c:orshkov, and their interest in obtaining basing and logistics
support facilities in strategic locations, all point to new
Soviet awareness of the persuasive power of military presence.
Even though the United States will be less likely to .
use overt force in Third World areas, the capability for a
counter presence will be necessary. Without a reasonable.
countervailing capability on our'part, we can expect Third
World nations to succumb to military pressures. For
example, one might. reasonably speculate as to whether or
not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask
the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces
from Egyptian territory if. the United States 6th Fleet
had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. Even though
the United States. is not a formal ally of Egypt our visible
military force on. the scene might well have been the latent
potential support which permitted him to take the action.he
did. No matter what some people say, our interests overseas are.
growing not declining. We are increasingly dependent
on imports. That in turn means that we must export more.
In addition, despite what some of our eastern press
would have us believe, I am--confident that the people
of this country will-not turn their backs on the.
contribution that our example and support can give to those
struggling for what we accept as our heritage.
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I foresee an evolution in the nature of United States
presence overseas. This does not imply complete withdrawal
of United States forces from areas where they have-maintained
a presence since World War II. Over a prolonged period it
may mean replacing presence in force with token presence
backed by the capability to rapidly deploy reinforcements
from the United States if circumstances require it. Nor does
it imply that overt use of United States forces must be the
are manifestly apparent to all concerned and our will t
rule. Presence may be sufficient to the task if our interests
persevere is credible. Hopefully such a strategy will in-
duce abstension.on the part of the major powers and dis-
courage adventurism on the part of Third World nations.
themselves, either of which could be dangerously escalatory.
To review, then, I foresee three uses for-United States
military forces in the next two decades. First, strategic
nuclear forces must balance potential enemies in order to
deter nuclear war. -Second, conventional general purpose
forces must be sufficient to provide that type and size of
contribution to NATO defenses which will buttress our allies
from acceding to pressures from the Soviet Unionyincluding
any efforts to use their new naval power as a wedge against
nations on the NATO flanks ,.__or for that matter against tl,e
Japanese in the Pacific
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Third, d, we need sufficient general-purpose forces .to deter
major power dominance'in the Third world and protect United
States interests abroad. We need notmatch potential
opponents measure for measure but we must demonstrate a
continual willingness to maintain a sufficiently broad
spectrum of capabilities so as to make overt use of force
seem very-risky to an adversary. Once force is actually
employed in the future it will lose much of its persuasive-
power. Furthermore, despite the trend /I mentioned earlier
there is always a danger that forces in war will be less
susceptable to political control. This makes it. even more
important that our military organization and our diplomatic
pronouncements are-credible so that we need resort. to
combat only rarely. Latent force will be the-most -useful
weapon in the decade ahead.
This brings me to the third topic I should like to
touch upon this evening. That is some of the problems which
the United States military must deal with in the next few
years. As I indicated earlier the principal task of United
States military forces should be deterrence. This demands
that the military profession relook at how we shape. and
employ our military in light of the changing perils of force
and aspirations of many people to avoid its use. We must
be more concerned with perceptions of the opponent than we.
have in the past, while at the same time being careful not
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to neglect the force xecruirezents. which, would be necessary
should hostilities actually occur. In the past.?ew-Vears,
we have. used a set of possible war scenarios as justifi-
cation for structuring our forces.