INTRODUCTION TO TACTICS SROC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 22, 1973
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
Good afternoon, gentlemen. This marks your entry into the
final trimester of your 8 da:y exposure to the Naval Warfare
curriculum. Z hope you are getting an understanding ref what
our senior students have covered this year and that this has
whetted your appetite for thE~ new correspondence courses we
will be offering this fall.
When you hear of Naval Tactics, you normally think of the
doctrine associated with operating today`s ships .and aircraft.
There are so many sorts of platforms and systems today that
we couldn`t possibly cover each of them. Furthermore, if we
took the time here to brief the students in detail on how each
platform versus platform interaction takes place today, what
would they do ten years from now when today's platforms, both
ours and theirs, may be obsolete? What we have done is to
continue the principle used in Strategy. We force the student-
to look behind the status quo and determine verities that
transcend contemporary system:> and procedures.
Why study tactics at a11? Where does this course fit in?
First of a11, this is still the Naval War College. Other
schools may teach Strategy, from an international relations
if not from a naval paint of view. Many colleges specialize
9,n Management of one brand or anothers. We could as our
critics point out, obtain some training for our officers
elsewhere. No other institute for higher learning, however,
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
even ~.p~roaches military I'act:ics at a graduate level. If naval
officers are to be inspired t:o be tacticians in the future,
they must comprehend the basic principles of weapons systems
and the interactions of encoL~nter, detection and target pros-
ecution. This can only be done here. Otherwise, we must go
on relying upon civilian think-tanks to do-all our tactical
development.
WHY TACTICS IMPORTANT
SIX REASONS
Slide 1 1. Obvious to you many management decisions based
on tactical assumptions.
e.g. SCS study
e.g. I~fARAC-G-ATLANTIS
'Fight vs open convoys
DD's vs SES/helos/bouys
Most management decisions presume new future
tactics.
Disasters from extrapolating current tactics.
Again 'Why our emphasis not on tactics of
today
deriving future tactics
More later
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2. Standard procedures/doctrine less useful guides
two reasons
zmpact of technology and pola.ti,-cal restrictions
Flip 1 A. Technology first:
Slide 2 1. Changes in own and enemy capabilities
e.g. Foxbat
Proliferation
2. More alternatives
Slade 3 Nelson - Tay alongside
F.G. DD's vs long range contact
e.g. Task Group mix
Slide 4 B. Poli,ti,cal restrictions - rules of
engagement superimposed .
e.g. Bombing 19th parallel
Flip 2 3. Fascination with technology
Hardware solutions
D.C,
Only tactics will heop today
Superior tactics only hope of offsetting
quantitative and qualitative superiority
Slide 5 New York Times
Flip 3 4. Navy lacks capability to develop tactics
My experience as TG CDR/as systems Analyst
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No one working on it .
Fleets itoo busy.
OPNAV/N14VMAT - hardware/$
Peacetirne training can be misleading
e.g. I)D - slow speed SHO$OM
Recent reorganization
Fine ~- but will require people capable of
developing tactics.
.......................
tot just fol'loty"irig' book
Our task - provide input
~'eaah hcaw to derive tactics
Not to da it
Flip 4 5. Complexity of naval missions
Missile shin
Mini-ABNI
ASW
C&C for A~C
Communications complex
Flip 5 6. Navy blackshoe - brownshae syndrome
Lack understanding driving management decisions
Lack understanding hurts tactics
e.g. Vinh incident ,
Not a Navy man in room including myself here
that does not have a lot to learn
How approach tactics?
Slide 6 Divide into two worlds
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Flip 1
Flip 2
Derivation similar management -Execution
Definitions
This course treats execution only peripherally
Now MEAT
How derive tactical alternatives and compare
for decision
Two steps:
1. Understand fundamentals
Sensors
Weapons
Platforms
2. Lay out logic process
See alternatives
Fundamentals ?- ]_ist
Slide 7 Not MK/Nods
Slide 8 Principles -? sonar
Flip Laws physics
Weapons
Flip ], e.g. Guns vs ~r~issile
Slide 9 Platforms - characteristics affect performance
weapons/sensors
F~,ip 2 e.g. Difference in a radar in satellite and ships
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Sensor/Weapons capabilities absolutely
dominate tactics
My experience operational people do not
understand
e.g. Rowan
How apply funda~tentals in logic flow
Slide 10 Study components of tactical engagement
~' X P X P
D FC' A
. ... ....................... ......
~offe'ris~e` `or~ ~d'e'fein'se
x'11 show few examples of logic displays
No standard way
Logic display means taking theoretical
knowledge of fundamentals and displaying
so can apply to a decision process
Alternatives
Factors driving problem
Slide 11 1. Driving factors ~ sub search plan
2. Sub attack procedures alternative cor~~equences
flip See consequences of results of search plan
zf detect -
Slide 12 Classify
Position
Attack
FIiX> 1 Zf counterdetected
Note: Tf ignore due improper classifica-
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Different if no detection
Alternative consequences
Show - mus't'be' dapable of all steps
Understand fundamentals - sensors
weapons & platform
Chain -weakest link
Slide 13 4. ASM
Geometry display
Recognize fundamental limits of detection
Note radar - alert operator 30-23 miles
F1,a-p l E-2
2 3 scopes
3 Still no way to connect to Terrier
Could
Slide 14 Or.~e benefit ~ feedback of good tactical
analysis is R&D and hardware suggestions
Flap ~, Graf Spree
Could use other displays
Time line
Graph
Not right/wrong tactics - probabilities
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Slide 15 Probabilities
How derive?'
Look at. all components
Estimate probabilities with ops analysis
Insert estimates
Tdentif`y sensitivities (radar warning)
Tdentif`y interferences (speed)
zdentif`y conditions that different
alternatives become preferred
Forces
Pol constraints
Enemy
Decision
Art of Science
Both
5yst:ematic approach
Tntution - guess - estimates
on non-quantifiable only
Educated
You're receiving a very meaty portion of this course. You'll
have a chance to discuss the DE vs SSN interaction in some
detail. This, combined with the ASMD study which you have on
Monday reflects one of the toughest problems facing our tactical
innovators today: the Soviets' extensive nuclear submarine
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
fleet armed with anti-ship m:Lssiles which can be fired while
submerged. Then, on Monday ~~.fternoon you'll have a chance to
see the result of some of this innovation. The UPTZDE series
of exercises which address protecting of our surface forces
from submarines. We're always looking for ideas. There may
be analogous problems in your various backgrounds which you
have seen solved and which m~Lght very well flood this whole
tactical area in a new light? Donut be shy. Thirty years
ago, when a physicist first convinced our planners that
torpedo shooting and area search both could be modeled as
Brownian motion from gas theory, it opened up a whole-new
world.
Good luck.
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 INTRODUCTION TO TACTICS
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SROC - 22 JUNE 1973
Good afternoon, gentiemen.~ This marks your entry into the
~r~..,
~:inal trimester- of your ena--.w~~k exposure to .;the Naval Warfare
~~ ~~
~ ~ s
curriculum I hope %.~a-_?:as both given you~an un erstar~ ding ~
what our senior students have covered this yearjand;
whetted
~
your appetitej'for the new correspondence courses we will be
c>ffering this fall
SVhen you hear of Naval Tactics, you normally think of the
doctrine associated with operating today`s ships and aircraft.
' r.m r/ '.
~~aw do you take on a "Charlie-Class with a~DEM ~or with a P-3,
S 3 , _ obr...._with an SSN?~ What i f the target is an
ship? An a.raft? -The permutations aid combinations go on
,~~....on:?~ We couldn't possibly cover each of them. Furthermore,
i.f we took
the time here to brief the students~on haw each of
these platform versus platform interactions take place today,
wn.at would they do ten years from now when today's platforms,
both ours and theirs,~may be obsolete? What we have done is
continue the princip e used in Strategyr ~ force the student
t:o loak behind the status quo,~and determine verities that
transcend contemporary systems and procedures./ mho=~ ~rA
JJ .
#;a~ail~~ari ~F+_ri ~~_~~day `s h.ardwar~s,~only .to the extend:`.: that
we must to acquaintour "-throttle jockeys" with~the black
shoe world and t._o get t~.;.submari:nars eyes above keel. depth
Why study tactics at all?~ T1' ~~? ara ~~"___~~ ~s-trvng :Ecr the
~eq>~ va7ent-_9f _.a graduate school- F~dudati.oh.,~ere does this
First of all, this is still the Naval W~~
College. Other schools may teacYz Strategy, from an international
relations if-not from a naval point of view. Mang colleges
specializ in Management of one. brand or another We could
as our critics paint out, obtain some training for our officers
,elsewhere. No other ins =itute for higher learning, however,
1
even approaches military Tactics at a gradua~~ If naval
officers are to be inspir
e
they must comprehend the basic pa;-inciples of weapons systems
diid i.hC lntei"aCti.OnS of encounter,/ de4sc~lJn :nd target praS-
i
scul~ve~ ~~iri_I~ele 2QQ~/~081f~ :cTd~i~0~5~QOQ~~ must: ga
,E
be tacticians in the future
on relying;'on civilian thing-tank~`to do all our tactical development.
 ~Ie~~~~~OBTI~'d~~P80B01554R003500450001-8
Most management decisions presume new future tactics..
Disasters from extrapolating current tactics.
I ,
Again Why our emphasis-.,not on tactics of today
deriving future tactics
More later
REAS~1'pN~
1. Oyybvious to you many management decisions based on tactical
assumptions.
e. g. SCS study
e.g. NARAC-G - Atlantis
- Tight 'vs open convoys
DD`s vs SES/halos/buoys
,~ S
2. Standard procedures/doctrine less useful guides - two reaso
Impact of technology and political restrictions
A. Technology first:
1. Changea in own and enemy capabilities
e.g. Foxbat
Proliferation
2. More alternatives
Nelson - lay alongside
E.G. DD's vs long range contact
e.g. Task Group mix
B. Political restrictions - rules of engagement
superimposed.
e. g. Bombing 19th parallel
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
3. Fascination with technology
Hardware solution,a
D. C.
Only tactics will help today
Superior tactics only hope of offsetting quantitative
and qualitative superiority
New York Times
4. Navy lacks capability to develop tactics
My experience as Tt~ CDR/as Systems Analyst
No one working on it.
Fleets too busy.
OPNAV/NAVMAT - hardware/$
Peacetime training can be misleading
e. g. DD - slow speed SHOBOM
Recent reorganization
Fine - but will require people capable of
developing tactics.
Not just following book
Our task - provide input
Teach how to derive tactics
Not to do it
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1~ ~ 5. Complexity of naval missions
Missile ship
Mini-ABM
ASW
C&C-for A/C
Communications complex
n - ,?.
6. Navy black shoe - brownhoe syndrome
V
Lack understanding driving management decisions
Lack understandin~~ hurts tactics
e. g. Vinh incident
riot a Navy man in room/myself here that does not
have a lot to leaa~n.
How approach tactics?
Divide into two worlds
Derivation similar management -.Execution
Definitions
This course treats execution only peripherally
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 Flip 2
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Now MEAT '
-How derive tactical alternatives and compare for decision
Two steps: ,
1. Understand fundamentals
Sensors `
Weapons
.,
Platforms ~ .
2. Lay out, logic process
See alternatives
Slide $
~~ ~.
Not MF~'`Mods
~ ~ `,
Principals -? '~~~~'~~
Laws physics
Weapons
Flip i e. g. Gun ~c~s missile
Slide 9 Platforms - characteristics affect performance weapons/sensors
Flip 2 e.g. Difference in a radar in satellite and ships.
Sensorj.Weapons capabilities absolutely dominate tactics
My experience .operational people do not understand
e. g. Rowan
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 Approved FI~bO~l'9~8~1~~~#1,~88BORA050001-8
Slide 1C7 Study components of tactical engagement -
PD x AFC x PA
offense or de~Eense
I`11 show few example: of `logic displays
No standard way -
Logic display means taking theoretical. knowledge of
fundamentz~ls and displaying so can apply to a
decision process
Alternatives
Factors driving problem
Slide 11 1, Driving factors - sub search plan
Flip
2. Sub attack procedures alternative consequences
See consequences of results of search
If detect -
Classify
Position.
Attack
n
If counter detected
plan
Note: If ignore due improper classification
may be subjected counter detection
Different if no detection
Alternative consequences
Show - must be capable of all steps
Understand fundamentals -
& p1at;Eorm
Chain - weakest link
sensors - weapons
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 Flip 1
Flip 1
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4. ASM
Geometry display
Recognize fundamental limits of detection
Note radar - alert operator 30-23 miles
E-2
3 scopes _a
Still no way?to connect to Terrier
Could
One benefit - feedback of good tactical
analys:i.s is R&D and hardware suggestions
Graf Spee
Could .use other displays
Time line
Graph
End result is a decision
Not right/wrong tactics - probabilities
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SlidE~ 15 Probabilities'
How derive?
.Look at all components.
Estimate probabilities with ops analysis
Insert estimates
Identify sensitivities (radar warning)
Identify interferences (speed)
Identify conditions that different alternatives
become preferred
Forces
P?1 P(~l contstraints
enemy
Decision
Art or Science
Both
Systematic approach
Intuition - guess - estimates
on non-quantifiable only
Educated
-Summary
2. :Emphasis o~ detailed step-by-step analysis
Not coa 'e cutter
~~``
3. Emphasis on cl rivatioz~-"vs execution
4. Emphasis on to 'c pYocess not hardware/doctrine
S. Graduate program
Derive formulae
Start fundamentals.
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
You're receiving a very meaty portion of this course. /'You'll have a
chance to discuss the DE vs SjSAf interaction in some detail.-This,
combined with the ASMD study which you have on Monday reflects one
of the toughest problems facing our tactical incsvat today:
the Soviets extensive~~uclear submarine fleet armed with anti-ship
missiles which can be fired while submerged ~ Then, on Monday
afternoo ~ you'll have a chance to see the result .of some of this
innovation'. The UPTIDE series of exercises/which address protectioir~
of our surface forces from the~'r submarines. We're always looking
.for ideas. /Ther~knay be analogous prob_1ems~in your various backgrou
which you have seen solved and which might very well flood this
whole tactical area in a ew light Don`t be shy. Thirty years agoJ
when a physicist first convinced our planners that torpedo shooting
."'
~~~
\ 111
and area search could bot be modeled as Brownian motion from~gas
theory, it opened
~ whole new world.
~
Good luck.
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Also playing for long run
No intent send you away - abreast current Navy tactics
and equipment.
/`..~;~
prep school next tour duty - would want to know
gi get, capabilities - u w th
,s man n f ~.~..: ,~~ ~, ~ .~_~a~k .
At same time can't-get away from current.
capabilities altogether.
BLit - make one point clear side benefit only -
No intent provide detailed descriptions
Current procedures/equipment
Your warp course all out shape - if insist drive discussion
into details - capabilities - characteristics - new versions,
If Course any value must stand test of time.
Good for students 2-3 years from now.
So concerned - seriously considered freezing
US and enemy data 1970
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Why Tactics Important? - Why Included?
assumptions.
e.g. SCS study
e. g. NARAC-G - Atlantis
Tight vs open convoys`
Z. Obvious to you many management decisions based on tactical
r
DD's vs SES/helos/buoys
Mast management decisions presume new future tactics.
Disasters from extrapolating current tactics.
Why our emphasis not on tactics
deriving future tactics
More later
~~~
~.
-2. Standard procedures/doctrine less useful two reasons:
Impact of technology-and political restrictions
A. Technology: ~,~
4 'r
1. Changes in own and enemy capabilities
e. g. Foxb
2. ~ v Niore alternatives
Nelson - lay alongside
e.g. DD's vs long range contact
e.g. Task. Group mix
B. Political restrictions - rules of engagement
superimposed.
e.g. Bombing 19th parallel
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
3., Fascination with technology
Hardware solutions
D.C.
Only tactics will help today-~?'
Superior tactics only hope of offsetting quantitative
and qualitative superiority
New York Times
4: Navy lacks capability to develop tactics
My experience as TG CDR/as Systems Analyst
No one working on it.
Fleets too busy.
OPNAV/NAVMAT - hardware/$
Peacetime training can be misleading-
- e.g. DD - slow speed shobom
Recent reorganization
Fine - but will requaire people capable of
developing tactics..
Not just following book
Our task - provide input
Teach how to derive tactics
Not to do it
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5.. Complexity of naval missions
Missile ship
Mini-ABM
ASW
C&C for A/C
Communications complex ,~~
Amphib assault
CAS
Troop maneuver
Helo - Boat landings
ASW/AAW defense
More problems bringing together tactical capabilities
one time.
6. Navy black shoe - brown shoe syr,~drome
Lack understanding driving management decisions
Lack understanding hints tactics
e.g. Vinh incident
e.g. CVA-ASW
,~ ~~r~r ti-? i
Not a Navy man here that does not have a lot to learn.
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Hc~w approach tactics?
Divide into two wo -ds
How derive tactical alternatives and compare for decision
Two steps: '
1. Understand fundamentals
Sensors
Weapons
Plat forms
2. Lay out logic process
See alternatives
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
Fundamentals - List
Sensors
e. g. CZ __
P3.atforms - characteristics affect performance weapons~'sensors
e.g. Difference in a radar in satellite and ships
Sensor/Weapons capabilities absolutely dominate
tactics
Weapons
e.g, Gun vs missile
i'jiy experience operational people do not understand
e. g. Rowan
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
Study components of tactical engagement
PD x PFC x PA
~~__..`~f
~
??~""E~;am les of to is dis la s
P g p Y
..'
No standard way -
Logic display means taking theoretical knowlecta~of
rr
r..-~~.
fundamentals and displaying so can apply to a
2. Sub attack procedures
See consequences of results of search. plan
.Classify `
Position
Attack
Tf counter detected _ ___
Note: If ignore due improper classification
/ l f~
_1
may be subjected counter detection
Alternative consequences
Show - must be capable of all steps
Understand fundamentals - sensors - weapons & platform
Chain - weakest link
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
~. ASM
Geometry display
Recognize fundamental limi.ts,of detection
Note radar - alert operat?r 3L}-23 miles
3 scopes
Still no way to connect to Terrier
Could
.One benefit - feedback of good tactical.
analysis is R&D and hardware_su~t.iosas
Platf
Could use other displays
Time line
Graph
Hope you'll invent some
Po=rr~ =-~~fake~~s~u~~-eIem~irt~---~-a~i~a1,4_process
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Not right/wrong tactics - probabilities
Px-obabilities
HoFCr- deride;
Look at all components.
Estimate probabilities with ops analysis
Insert estimates
Identify sensitivities
Identify interferences
Identify conditions that d:i.fferent alternatives
become preferred
Decision.
Art of Science
Systematic approach
Intuition - guess -- estimates
on non-quantifiable only
Educated- -
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.summary
Emphasis on detailed step-by-step analysis
Not cookie cutter ,
r'
Emphasis~on derivation vs Execution
Emphasis on logic process not hardware./doctrine
Graduate program
Derive formulas
Start fundamentals
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IIvTRODUCTION TO TACTICS
SRDC - 22 JUNE 1973
Good afternoon, gentlemen. This marks your entry into the
final trimester of your 8 day. exposure to the Naval Warfare
curriculum. I hope you are getting an understanding of what
Gu ~ i
r., , ,.- ...-. r. , ~ ~ .-. 1 ...A ~ - 1 ~. L _ - - - - - - - ~ . , - -
whetted your appetite for the :new correspondence courses we
will be offering this fall.
When you hear of Naval Tactics, you normally think of the
doctrine associated with operating today's ships and aircraft.~a
There are so many sorts of platforms and systems today that
we couldn`t possibly cover each of them. P'ur~hermore, if we
took the time here to brief the students in detail on how each
platform versus platform interaction takes place today,. what
caould they do ten years from now when today's platforms, both
ours and theirs, may be obsolete? What we have done is to
continue. the principle used in Strategy. We force the student
to look behind the status quo and determine verities that
transcend contemporary systems and procedures.
Why study tactics at all? Where does this course-fit in?
First of a11, this is still the Naval War College. Other
schools may teach Strategy, from an international relations
if not from a naval paint of view: Many colleges specialize
in ~iarzagement of one brand or anothers. We. could as our
critics point out, obtain some training for our offiee:rs
elsewhere. No other institute for higher learning, however,
Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/08/01: CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
even approaches military Tactics at a graduate level. zf naval
officers are to be inspired to be tacticians in the future,
.they must comprehend the basic principles of weapons systems
and the interactions of encourzter,~detection and target pros-
ecution. This can only be done here.- OthE~rwise, we must go
on relying upon civilian think:-tanks to do all our tactical
development.
WHY TACTICS XMPOR.TANT
SIX REASONS
Slide 1 1. Obvious to you many management decisions based
~.
on tactical assumptions.
e.g. SCS study
e.g. NARAC-G-ATLANTIS
Tight vs open convoys
DD's vs SES/helos/bouys
Most management decisions presume new future
tactics.
Disasters from extrapolating current tactics.
Again Why our emphasis not on tactics of
today
d~sriving future tactics
More later
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
Flip 1
2. Standard procedures doctrine less. useful guides
- two reasons:
zmpact of technology and politi-cal restrictions
A. Technology .first:
_ 1. Changes in own and enemy capabilities
e.g. Foxbat
Proliferation
2. More alternatives
NTe~asori - lad ~alorigside
E.G. DD's. vs long range contact
e.g. Task Group mix
Slide 4 B, Political-restrictions - rules of
engagement superimposed .
e.g. Bombing 19th parallel
Flip 2 3, Fascination with technology
Hardware solutions
D.C.
Only tactics wall heap today
Superior tactics only hope of offsetting
r~7antitat:ive a~ d qualitatzvQ superiorit1T
Slide 5 .New Xork Times
Flip 3 4. Navy lacks capability to develop tactics
My experience as TG CDR/as Systems. Analyst
Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003500450001-8
Na one working on it.
Fleets too busy.
OPNAV/NAVMAT - hardware/$
Peacetime training can be misleading
~~t
e . g . DD - slow speed SHOBOM ,~ guV ~ ` j
-' c