ADDRESS BY HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003500170001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 21, 1973
• Content Type: SPEECH

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ADDRESS
By
Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Presented at
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Washington, D. C.
Host: The National War College
21 August 1973
NAVY and OSD review(s) completed.
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JOINT LECTURE
ADDRESS
By
Honorable James R. Schlesinger
(21 August 1973)
ADMIRAL BAYNE: /Introduced the speaker
DR. SCHLESINGER: Thank you, Admiral Bayne, for that
kind introduction. I am not sure I would say the same things
14 years later than I said 14 years earlier. I think that
somewhere in that book, if I recall correctly, there is a
reference to Napoleon's dictum that in war the moral factors
outweigh the economic factors by three to one, or something
of that magnitude. I think I would place far more emphasis
on morale than I would on pure economics or pure resource
constraints.
I do not think you want from me this morning any
pontifical remarks on the fact that you are commencing a new
phase of your life as officers. I presume that all of you
know why you are here, and if there is any question in your
minds, I probably could not help very bell to straighten it
out.
I broke into this business by serving at the Naval War-y''''am
College many years ago. Admiral Kidd lived next door to me.
Those of you in the Navy will be delighted to know that Admiral
Kidd prof ed ( I will put this delicately) to complain that
'he really preferred driving destroyers around the Atlantic
than being up at e ar o ege and he did not see much
purpose in being there.
I ran into Dennis Wilkinson some time ago. He had
forgotten that he had been a student at the Naval War College
while I was an instructor there. The impact of those lectures
seemed to have evaporated completely. /Laughter/ I had to
remind him of the fact. Anyway, I am sure that you will be
far superior students and that you will recall all of the
lectures that you have during the course of your year here. No
one can ever predict what might turn up in the future.
I will not spend the time reading a speech. I am sure
you did not come here to see how well I read a speech. I
think there is a prepared speech, which you are all welcome
to read at your pleasure. What I will try to do is spend as
much time as possible answering your questions and start with
some introductory comments.
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Unite tates maintains military forces; secondly, why we
maintain the military forces that we do or we should; and,
third, what are the problems that we face as a society today
in the maintenance of an appropriate force structure.
J
-1/
Let me start with the first one: Why does the United
States maintain military farces in an era of detente?
I submit that there are a large number of people who
believe that defense is now obsolescent or obsolete in the
atmosphere in which we live, since there is cooling between
the two major parties on the international scene that we can
substantially reduce or further reduce defense expenditures
and devote these resources to various types of domestic
goodies.
-D..//suggests that they would be disappointed. The Soviets have shown
!V no such proclivity, and we must keep in mind that we maintain
/our forces primarily because of the power of the Soviet Union and
its associates in the Warsaw Pact. We cannot afford to rely
upon the sense of self-restraint, good will, forebearance, or
generosity of the Warsaw Pact. It is true that the climate of
international relations has improved dramatically in recent
years, but the reason for that dramatic improvement may well
be associated with the policies cf strength that the United States
has adhered to in the years at least since the Korean War.
Those who would further disarm tend to point to this
improved climate, but the Soviets still possess a mail fist, even
though it is more obviously encased in a velvet glove than
previously.
reduce its forces that the Soviets would emulate this moral
posture of the United States, zElere e is a long history which
The Soviets apparently see no conflict between detente
and defense. The Soviet defense budgets have been incrdasing
Y?,,v approximately _centa- year-. Military forces have grown
from three million men to approximately 3.6 million men since
1960 despite the fact that the United States has redt~d---i-t-s
force structure by approximately 30 percent. since Fy 1969. The
growth of Soviet forces has proceeded apace 5 percent per year in
terms of resources, and you are familiar with the build-up of
those forces.
For those who believe that if the United States were to
We maintain our forces in order to achieve deterrence and,
if. deterrence fails, to prosecute a war, a war which, if
we maintain the right array of forces, will permit us in some
sense to come out ahead.
Let me turn to the second problem, which is why we maintain
the specific set of forces that we maintain.
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we o no maintain these forces to protect pri M~a
rily
the North American continent or the U.S. ZI. If our sole
concern were protection of the North American-continent, we
could reduce our defense budgets probably by 30 or $40 billion
easily. The reason that our forces are as large as they are
is because of our overseas commitments and our desire to
continue to live in a world in which there is free exchange
among states that have by and large a set of values and a
degree of openness in which the values that have characterized
the United States can continue to flourish on the world scene
not merely in terms of the North American continent.
The overall setting is provided by strategic forces, and
since roughly the Second World War, American strategic forces
which have been paramount until the mid-sixties provided the
crutch on which all of the Western nations could rest. And
sometimes they could rest sufficiently so that they could'go
to sleep with regard to the need.for complementary forces.
We need, as the primacy of the U.S. strategic posture has waned,
a set of complementary forces which maintains an overall balance
V so that in the types of wars that we may, if deterrence fails,
be forced to fight we can indeed come out ahead.
Nobody is likely to start deliberately a nuclear war.
The probabilities of that are extremely low. The way nuclear
war will get started will be escalation from a lower level conflict
in which miscalculations occurred. And of particular concern
continues to-be-the posture along the NATO frontiers in which the
Soviets, if they believe that we do not have the will to resist
or the conventional forces to resist, may believe that a
conventional grab will not in fact be resisted by our Alliance
and consequently that they will be tempted through the weaknesses
of our American posture and Alliance posture to make such a grab.
For this reason NATO must remain strong. We talk in terms
of a NATO triad, consisting of conventional, tactical nuclear
and strategic forces just as in a different context we talk about
a triad of strategic forces. But the United States cannot in
NATO do the job alone. It must do it in collaboration with its
allies, who will be obligated to provide at least, say, 50 percent
of the ready forces and the reserve forces for NATO. If our allies
are unprepared to make those kinds of sacrifices in order to
provide those kinds of forces, the American forces alone cannot
protect in a conventional war the NATO boundaries. Consequently,
we are thrust back on the use of either tactical nuclear or
strategic. nuclear weapons,'in the hope that they may deter a foe
that we presume under those circumstances to be unaggressive. We
leave .a gap in our overall deterrent posture, and the reason that
we wish to maintain a conventional capability which is formidable
for the NATO war is to avoid leaving that kind of gap that would
tempt our opponents.
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 addi to the strate forces and the conventi
forces Ajpv,~l3;oaraIai29a"YEq~~i~a016Yc~`g0R41 iithosome
contingencies which are difficult to specify in regard to involve-
ments on the ground.
As you know, the formal statements of American strategic
policy are that we now maintain forces for one and a half wars
One of the wars is quite clear: the NATO context. The half-a-war
is difficult to specify, particularly as the American proclivity
to fight a ground war on Asia, at least for the time being, seems
to be attenuated.
In addition to these capabilities, we must maintain naval
forces, and as Soviet power on the sea builds up, we maintain
naval forces increasingly to protect the sea lanes. And there is
some small shift emphasis away from the r ection of power
ashore to the pr ec ion of the sea lanes.
In each of these contexts -- strategic forces, NATO forces
and naval forces -- it is clear that we must maintain a balance
that in the event of challenge hopefully will be superior to the
forces that an opponent can bring against us and will be perceived
continually to be superior by the opponent so
will not be challenged.
that those
forces
/CHART S-1 - Force Characteristics Providing Challenge
Under the Interim Agreement/
Let me start with some comments on strategic forces.
This is the position in which we emerged from the SALT I
discussion. There was a rough parity that was perceived between
the forces on both sides. The United States had some major
advantages with regard to technology and'MIRVs and RVs, guidance
and the technology of nuclear warheads which permits us to main-
tain despite the lower number of launchers and throw weight for
the United States, forces which were markedly stronger than those
of the Soviets in terms of the numbers of RVs, which compensated
for the Soviet advantage in terms of gross megatonnage, numbers
,of launchers and throw weight. These, of course, are the Soviet
advantages. I point to the ones that were recognized at the time
and the very impressive potential advantage, which was a very
aggressive Soviet program to develop new missile systems which
incorporated U.S. technologies or their equivalent.
The Overall balance and the U.S. position is based upon
waning Advantages, in a relative sense
Our purpose at SALT I was to limit the then Soviet ad-
vantages in terms of the development of large numbers of
launchers and to break the momentum of their deployment
program of ICBMs and SLBMs. The problem we face is that the/
Interim Agreement
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cannot be acceptable to the United States over the lo ger period
of time. With improved technologies represented by w at the
United States already has and the exploitation of its_ throw weight,
the Soviet forces can potentially in the 1980s clearl outclass
the forces of the United States. We cannot, I think,-!allow such
a set of circumstances to develop.
/CIIART S-2 - U.S. Strategic Objectives
J
I think these are the principal objectives for which the
United States maintains its strategic forces.
Let me stress this objective: We must maintain an--image
of olitico-mil_itary equality with the Soviet Union because we
are eating not only with a bipolar world in which many people
have made their analyses and in which arms controllers tend to
think for the reason they tend to think in these terms Es when
you add third parties, it becomes so complicated that you cannot
analyze the issue properly.
It is evident, for example, that if the United States
intends to maintain forces which are as large as those of the
Soviet Union and China, and the Russians wish to maintain forces
as large as those of the U.S. and China, and the Chinses insist
-__.on going ahead with missile development, you have an explosive
~situation in an arms control sense. The conclusion, if you happen
to be an analyst, is do not think about the problem; just look
at it in the bipolar context. Laughter
We must remember the United States has provided over the
years strategic forces which defend not only the North American
continent, the U.S. ZI, but extended deterrence for the NATO
Alliance as well as commitments made during the Johnson Admini-
stration to provide guarantees against nuclear attack virtually
around the world.
We certainly desire to develop a strategic edge in terms
of_hypothetical war-ighting capabilities against a slowly reacting
Sovie union. It is no longer the case that the United States is
in a position to threaten to bust up Soviet cities simply as a
result of' Soviet incursion against Western Europe. The set of
circumstances, the range of circumstances in which the United
States will choose the cit -busting strategic o tion are narrower
than they were years ago before the Soviets had an effective
counter deterrent. This is one of our objectives that tends to
be stressed to quite an extent.
/CHART S-5 without overlay - Reciprocal Counterforce
Capabilities, Soviet Union and the United
States?
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Ries that
the Americans presently possess, given the fact that heir throw
weight and ICBMs-,outclass the U.S. in terms of four t one, even
if we continue to assign to the Soviets a lower CEP i the early
1980s than the United States possesses, with that throw weight,
the fact that they can put about 7,000 on_e.-megaton RVd on board
their ICBM forces with approximately 20 percent of fhrlir fnrrA
0.11 1.C:UUI:C uS .L1L L11.LS nypozneticai case to about 100 missiles'.
By contrast, the United States usin 30
t
_J i
early eighties be facing a situation in which the Soviet Union
has the o t` f
io
y e s in the U.S. missile force as opposed to the perspectively
large yields in the Soviet MIRV force, any degradation of CEP
works dramatically against the United States.
The effect of this is that the United States mi ht in the
One of our problems, however, is that with the very small
IA
- g percen
of C11 force,
would leave the Soviets with something on the order of 350 or
400 missiles given the assumption about CEP.
OVERLAY ADDED?
aroun e world as in some sense balanced.
/CHART C-1 - Center Region, The Conventional Balance --
Europe7
rs
strike, but, in addition, to have a set of strategic forces which
are perceived d 4-11
mportance not only of the ability to bust up Soviet cities and
to have an assured destruction capability despite Soviet fi
t
n o using counterforce against the United States
while the U 1 ed_Sta_ter_does not possess that option. Circum-
stances in which the Soviets have 7,000 one-megaton RVs on their
ICBMs and the U.S. has 3,000 170-k.t. RVs are not circumstances
which are likely to fortify the will of any President of the
United States in the early 1980s. That is why I stress the
Similarly in the NATO context, we must continue to have
what are perceived to be a rough balance of forces, in my judgment.
That, once again, depends on the collaboration of our allies.
At the present time, despite a good deal of pessimism
about the overall balance in the center region of NATO, just in
purely quantitative terms there is not so obvious a discrepency
that the Soviets feel confident. As a matter of fact, Soviet
intelligence shows pretty much the same picture as I have illustrated
here: the Forces numerically are roughly balanced
NATO ha
.
s a
major weakness in terms of tanks, but they have advantages in
terms of antitank weapons, There is some discrepancy with regard
to ground forces in numerical terms, and that discrepancy in
numerical terms probably understates the real discrepancy and the
fact that the forces of the NATO Alliance are more poorly trained,
subject to greater turmoil, that there are serious command contro
roblems that exist amongst a set of more or less equal allies,
I maintains independent sovereignty. The cohesion of
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 the N ? ejc gl~ a JO939 9c~tC A P80BOf1ormance0 a1f Othe9 forces on
the ground is particularly of concern, but that is a qualitative
aspect, and we should pay attention to-those qualitative aspects.
But we should recognize that in simple quantitative measures
that there isn't that great a discrepancy.
The air power represented by the United States in par-
ticular and the Alliance in general should be the great equalizer
in terms of obtaining a conventional balance in NATO This measure
understates the qualitative advantages that are possessed by the
United States and by the Alliance in terms of aircraft. Our air-
craft are more costly, for one thing. They have far greater range,
far greater payload. They are designed for the attack mission
as opposed to most Soviet aircraft, which were designed for the
intercept mission. There is no doubt that if we were to utilize
the air assets properly that they could serve the role of off-
setting the disadvantages to some extent of NATO forces on the
ground.
n
p o you the picture with regard
L~ to the naval forces, t once again it is clear that the United
States, which is isolated, far away from the world island, must
as a maritime power, maintain sufficient naval strength so it can
control the sea lanes. The entire Western Alliance, in fact the
set of American alliances, including Japan, depend upon free com-
munications by sea. If the Soviets are in a position permanently
to interdict these channels of communication, the Alliance col-
lapses in and of itself.
There is some proclivity to take a very pessimistic view
of the NATO balance. In Napoleon's dictum on moral factors that
may be advisable, but in terms of the pure resources going in and
the assets available, there is, at least in the center region of
NATO, a balance.which is not unimpressive and, more important than
that, can be further strengthened.
-io I have no slide to rese
t t
What are our problems?
The first problem that we face is the problem of public
opinion, public opinion in a democracy in a period of time in
which thel~.~ evisibly is tired of our involvements,
tired of the burdens that it has carried for 25 years.
/CIIART A-1 - De Tocqueville's Challenge
Democracies historically have not always stood the test
of challenge. i think this was recognized by an early student of
the American democracy, Alexis de Tocquevillq in his study of
the U.S. in the mid-nineteenth century. Especially in the conduct
of their foreign relations democracies appear to me decidedly in-
ferior to other governments. A democracy can only with great
difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking,
persevere in a fixed design and work out its execution inspite
of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with
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secrecy (that has a certain poignancy these days /Lau4hter7)
or await their consequences with patience.
I think that represents the challenge for the United
States. It represents a challenge for all of the Western
democracies. Forces move today much more rapidly than they did
in the 1920s or 1930s, and the democracies in Europe did not
stand up very well against the challenge of that period of time.
They preferred to comfort themselves with self-deception, that
there was really no risk, that their opponents never would attack.
We cannot be in a position
in which,
as I
said at the
outset, we are depending upon the forbearance and generosity of
potential opponents. We must have a set of forces which balances
their capabilities so that they are not tempted to attack.
The next problem we have in maintaining these forces is
credibility.
I would be remiss if I did not point out that the credi-
bility of the military establishment and the Department of Defense
is not at its high-water mark at the present time. Part of this
is the fault of the Services themselves. There is a kind of "gung-
ho" attitude; we are going to sweep away all difficulties. After
a period of five, six, or seven years of listening to intelligence
briefings which perceived each and every day of the week light at
the end of the tunnel, the credibility on the Hill, at least, for
the military establishment is quite low.
I think this is part of an admirable characteristic of
the military "goddam, it-can-do" outfit--"We're going to win
next week, if you'll just give us the resources"--and a disin-
clination, incidentally, to list all of the assumptions which are
necessary to achieving victory. I think it is plain that the
military, at least, were not resp ales of
y for the c ivi i.an
to burrow dowTY behind the military. This is not a new tendency.
It has gone on for at least 25 years, to my knowledge, and probably
a lot longer than that. I think the civilians had the primary
responsibility for organizing the way that we fought in Vietnam,
what the objectives were and what the constraints were. As long
as there is civilian control of the military, I think it is
necessary to recognize the corollary of that, which is civilian
responsibility, but that corollary is not always recognized. So
part of the credibility problem comes, not from the performance
of the U.S. Services but from the circumstances in which the
Services found themselves by following legitimate civilian orders
and for which they are improperly blamed. That does not necessarily
lessen the credibility problem.
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A third difficulty that we have is with regard to
the costs of the military establishment.
We shall have to face the fact that we, are going
to have steady budgets, at best, in real terms.
/CHART B-5 - Outlook to 1980, $ Billions Fiscal
Years? We are going to have steady budgets in real terms
until and unless there is a shift in public opinion.
V
As you will note, in these out-years, GNP is
increasing at the rate of about a hundred billion dollars a
year, which is not an insignificant rate of expansion. Defense
will be increasing by about four or five billion dollars a yeE,.r,
about 4 percent. As a result of this, the defense share of
the federal budget, which is now down to about 29 percent, will
fall during the rest of the decade to about 23 percent. The
defense share of GNP will continue downward from about 5.3 percent,
where it will be in FY 74, to about 5 percentE- f to,
I do not think we need worry too much about our share of
GNP as long as the absolute level of resources is adequate. There
is some question of whether it will be adequate. That depends in
part upon the performance of our potential foes. If Soviet
budgets continue to grow at 5 percent per annum, it s not
obvious that the United States can remain stable in terms of real
resources and still maintain the balance that I spoke of earlier.
We shall have to do a better job with regard to bringing
in weapons systems at appropriate costs. In recent years the
building in of high technology, high-cost weapons systems, has
resulted in a set of circumstances that if you replace the exist-
ing U.S. force structure with the equipments now available as a
result of high-cost, high-technology designs, it would cost us on
the order of $45 billion a year ir~_ ocurement dollar , and
reg ttably, or understandably (depen ing on your point of view),
that kind of money just is not available. We shall,therefore,
have to look at reduction of the average unit costs.
As you know, since World War II, the cost of an aircraft
has increased by a factor of 100. There is some skepticism
whether performance of aircraft has increased by a factor of
a hundred. The cost of a tank has increased about tenfold. The
Army has got into the game of high technology about a decade
later than the Air Force and the Navy, but they are now attempting
to make up for lost time!
I think part of the fault lies with the Services once
I again, but the fault also lies with Senator Proxmire and myself,
by which I mean the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Congress. The Services have not been given any incentive to hold
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down the cost of individual weapons systems. Their very
incentive has been to run up thecost.
LAI(LV a
During the sixties the Services were given a fixed
21
force structure -- 15 CVAs, 9 CVSs, 16-1/3 divisions,
air groups, tactical air wings or whatever it was. They
were given a force structure and told the budgets were open-
ended. Under those circumstances they had every incentive
to run up the per-unit cost. They had no incentive whatsoever
to hold down per-unit costs because the force structure was
frozen. They.-were not given a budget and told, "Here's the
amount of money that you're getting. If you can squeeze 17
divisions or 16 carriers out of that amount of money, go to
it! We want a force structure that will further reduce the
level of risk, if you can bring it in at that budget level."
And, of course, Congress is doing the same thing at the present
time.
I think, we have to get out of that habit. We should be
pXoviding budget guidance which provides an incentive to the
Services to reduce the unit cost for new weapons systems. What
has happened is that in the sixties the Services were encouraged,
not explicitly but de facto, to run up the per-unit cost of
weapons systems, so that you ran into the billion-dollar
carrier and the $15-million aircraft and the $1-million tank.
In the seventies it turned out that the budgets were not open-
ended. As a result, one has either an obsolescence or a
shrinkage of the general,purpose force structure.
I do not think that we can tolerate that since the
resources available will not be growing rapidly. The only
alternative that we have is to reduce the unit cost of weapons
systems.
We talk these days about a high-low weapons mix. That
sounds very good. It is probably rationalization. First we
are buying the high side and pr,ectively at some future point
4 is n .rationalization
ide
l
o,~ s
in time he
of the fact that the only weapons systems we have available at
the present time are the high-cost ones. We recognize that if
we continue to attempt to buy those high -cost systems, the
force structure is going to shrink unduly. So, instead of
attempting at the outset to obtain a set of equipments which are
purchasable within some reasonable aggregate level of resources
and to buy and equip the forces with these equipments, we are
producing a set of forces which are less than optimally balanced.
But given the circumstances in which we find ourselves today,
I do not think there is any alternative.
An additional problem that we have is the problem of
articulation.
The days of ex cathedra pronouncements from the Department
That is associated with
of Defense on what we need are gone.
the bfty American public
@p~IF~t'te6~iQ01/$ -
 and tcA I @v Fn- J%asiecy2A0 a~29P. 1~ s~0. ~5V.F Q?3ne0eci00 t"o9 ce s ,
why the forces cost what they do, why explicitly in each
area of the world we maintain the level of forces that we do.
Unless we are able to articulate those arguments, we will
be swept aside by what is the current nostalgia for the pre-World
War II years.
In doing so, we face our final problem, which is candor.
Let me encourage all of you to be as candid as you possibly can
be in your analyses, in your discussions within the Service or
within these institutions. One of the advantages of these
institutions should be and has been that they encourage candor
within the building.
Our Services, of course, are large organizations. There
is a good deal of emphasis on team play and going along with the
current-Party line and the rest of i . That, in the present
climate of opinion, is not a profitable course to 0 ow. s I
have indicated, we must articulate why we need equipments, forces,
and sometimes the party line tends to slide over some of the weak
points in the argument. There is a whole set of people on the
Hill, in places like Brookings, and so forth, who are searching
out
the
weak points of the arguments. Therefore, the arguments
for
the
maintenance of our forces must be very effective. Other-
wise
we
will be continuing to face the pressures from the Hill
for
the
reduction of budgets.
I do not think the present level of resources is immutable.
There are circumstances in which the level of resources might
be lower than it is at the present time. The only set of
circumstances that I can see is a major reduction of capabilities
in the Soviet Union. I do not think that it is immutable in the
sense that it has to stay at the present level. If there is
a change in the international climate, it is quite possible that
there will be a change in public opinion in the United States which
will bring a greater flow of resources to the Department of
Defense. ..
But that flow 6f resources should not reinstitute a set of
bad habits with regard to running up the cost of equipments and
the rest. The better job that we can do in terms of articulating
the desirability of the maintenance of our force levels or
improvement of those forces as circumstances require, resisting
the impulse to reach for more simply because it is there like
Everest, the greater will be the contribution toward the long-run
credibility o the Department and the abilility of the Department
to maintain balanced forces in a stable condition as opposed to
going rouge the cycle of east and famine that has characterized
the force posture over many years.
Gentlemen, I am ready for your questions.
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SM MARY
Compensatory force restructuring may be the only viable way for NATO
to maintain a credible deterrent/defense posture in event of sizable MBFR
cuts. Otherwise, such cuts would probably further accentuate NATO's exist-
ing Center Region military deficiencies vis-A-vis the Warsaw Pact.
Indeed the need for restructuring to optimize. NATO's conventional
defense posture is driven by other factors too. The advent of nuclear
parity is making adequate conventional defense even, more essential, at
the very time when escalating weapons and manpower costs are making it
more expensive. And this is occurring at a time when lessened tensions
and competitive demands for funds to meet domestic needs are-simultane-
ously exerting pressure on defense budgets. Something will have to give --
even in the absence of NBFR. In all likelihood, NATO will have to do more
Fortunately, NATO is already within reach of a higher confidence
conventional posture, even within likely manpower and budget constraints.
Af?tex all, NATO spends comparably to the- Warsaw Pact- ac-fields as much
active manpower, even in the Center Region. How-,-then, does the WP man-
age to produce such a high order of conventional threat to NATO, while
NATO produces from comparable inputs a posture which, by its own esti-
mate, is at best marginally capable of effective defense?
chosen to allocate their defense budgets and posture their forces
THE SOURCES OF NATO CONVENTIONAL INFERIORITY
Some reasons for this striking paradox (such as sheer geographic
differences, the likely WP advantage of the initiative, or that NATO is
a loose 14-nation coalition compared to the USSR-dominated WP) are more
or less inherent in the differing nature of the WP and NATO situations,
thus difficult to change. But to a great extent NATO's inferiority
vis-a-vis the WP springs from the different ways in which the two sides
In brief, the Pact (led by the USSR) has gone a long way toward
optimizing a conventional force posture aimed at precluding NATO's
development of its greater war potential by an armored and air blitzkrieg
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offensive. It has maximized its short-run combat power'by: (1) struc-
turing deliberately to overwhelm NATO's thin ready forces in the crucial
Center Region; (2) finding ways to minimize logistical support so that
more resources can be channeled into armor-heavy combat units; (3) inte-
grating much training and schooling into its operational structure; ~4)
organizing into smaller, leaner units than its NATO counterparts; (5) us-
ing a quick mobilization system, based on large numbers,of active but under-
strength or cadre divisions which can be rapidly fleshed out and readied
for combat; and (6) using a unit replacement system to sustain offensive
momentum by replacing whole divisions as they are used up in the offensive.
Via these techniques, the USSR and its allies have produced a force which
our own generals tell us could quickly swamp NATO unlegs it went nuclear.
(U) In strong contrast, the NATO defenders have chosen-to dispose
their comparable resource inputs across a much wider spectrum of capa-
bilities than would seem optimum in terms of this WP threat. The resul-
tant agymmetrieEr between the WP and NATO postures go far to explain why
NATO is so conventionally inferior in the crucial Center Region. They
feed the myth that an effective conventional defense is impossible, at-
le withput massive added defense outlays. `-'
(U) While 'the WP invests the bulk of its GF*'"buaget and active man-
power in creating an armor-heavy threat-to the NATO center, no major NATO
power except the FRG invests a comparable portion of its conventional
force budget in meeting this blitzkrieg threat.'-Indeed, it is notable
how modest a proportion is devoted primarily to initial defense of the
NATO center. Even granting the many reasons for the diversion of NATO
military resources to other purposes (the perceived low likelihood of WP
attack, confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the need to posture
against other contingencies, national desires to maintain balanced forces,
the need to hedge against a longer conflict), we nonetheless argue that
NATO has never optimized its defense posture to meet what it claims to
regard as the most serious threat.
(S) Many of NATO's military deficiencies are brought out in the
AD-70 and NSDM-95 studies. These essentially call only for modest incre-
mental improvements across the whole range of NATO forces and capabilities.
They do not question NATO's force structure or basic pattern of resource
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allocation. But we would argue that NATO's deficiencies are much more
structural in nature than suggested by AD-70 or NSDM-95. Moreover,
neither takes adequately into account the even greater constraints on
budgetary and manpower levels that are now emerging -- as a result of
which it may prove impossible in the Seventies to simVly maintain NATO's
existing force structure and modernize it.
(S) Nor did AD-70 or NSDM-95 deal with, one of NATO's most serious
conventional deficiencies -- insufficient ground comb at'forces which
thus have to be too thinly stretched along the many feasible routes of
WP advance to permit defense in depth. Also lacking are sufficient mobile
reserves to seal off penetrations and counterattack. hence, NATO must
trade space for time, and cannot even implement its so-called forward
strategy.
(U) Why does NATO generate so few divisions from comparable manpgwer
to the Pact? Besides allocating its resources to many other purposes, it
structures its forces in fewer larger divisions, and has a much higher
ratio of support to domb at troops. This structure is designed to be
indefinitely sustainable in extended conflict. The U.S. contribution in
particular is organized on a manpower-expensive "expeditionary force"
basis largely because the United States still has to provide most of its
own logistic support. Nor, because of its excessive fear of surprise
attack, does NATO stress quickly mobilizable reserve divisions or quickly
deployable reinforcements to counter the WP's rapid estimated buildup
from 61 divisions (many at reduced strength) on M-day to an estimated 86
at full strength by M+30. Ironically, NATO plans to mobilize far more
personnel than the WP, but even after mobilization NATO ground forces at
any rate remain people-rich and combat-unit poor.
(S) Another glaring anomaly in NATO's posture is the different wars
for which the United States and its allies seem to be preparing, and
the resultant poor fit between their force postures. The European NATO
countries seem to be posturing primarily only for a short conventional
phase, as indicated by their WRM goal of only 30 days, and lack of reserve
divisions. Yet the U.S. goal is 90 days WRM in Europe, and it maintains
an extensive reserve structure suitable only for extended conflict. The
various U.S. services also seem to be preparing for different kinds of war.
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While the USAF is posturing for an early peaking of the air war, the
Army is planning on gradually sending massive reinforcements to Europe
peaking well after D+30 days, and the U.S. Navy is planning on at least
a 90-day ASW campaign at sea. In sum, NATO's posture does not seem very
consistent with its strategy; it does not seem to have sorted out its
priorities very well.
(U) Given all these weaknesses and anomalies, it is easy to see
how roughly equal MBFR cuts as posited in this study would further ac-
centuate NATO inferiority. Of course NATO could rely even more heavily
on nuclear deterrence, but this alternative is much less credible than
before in an era of nuclear parity. Yet likely political pressures to
reduce defense budgets, despite rising manpower and weapons costs, will
also make achieving a credible conventional capability harder than before.
Should MBFR withdrawals of U.S. forces add to this dilemma, it also
would become-imperative to reassure our allies that the United States
was not in effect giving up on NATO conventional defense.
(U) Hence we believe that a viable post-MFR NATO posture must meet
""-three key criteria: (1) militarily, it must be..a.degyate for conventional
defense-and deterrence; (2) economically, it must-be fundable within
likely budget and manpower ceilings;-and (3) politically, it must suffice
to reassure our allies that NATO is not being undermined. How can NATO
cope with these largely conflicting imperatives?
THE CASE FOR NATO FORCE RESTRUCTURING (U)
(U) There is an answer to this dilemma, through restructuring NATO's
force posture to actually implement the NSDM-95 concept of doing first
things first. This may be the only viable way to achieve a credible NATO
conventional defense despite sizable MBFR cuts, combined with likely budget
and manpower constraints. Indeed, the latter constraints will probably
dictate much force restructuring even without MBFR. In this event, the
NATO powers will be compelled to take a harder look at what existing
defense missions, outlays, and capabilities can be modified or sacrificed
to free up resources for higher priority needs.
(S) On the other hand, if NATO will only face up to these hard
choices, it is well within reach of a hi 1 confiidence initial defense.
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Fortunately, there is ample room for tradeoffs within the mas
the NATO powers would still be spending. But in our view, this would
entail such new departures as:
(S) 1._ Accepting the calculated risk of posturing on the assumption
that NATO could prudently count on more mobilization/'8eployrment time,
since (among other reasons) MBFR cuts would also slow down VTP ability to
mount a quick, overwhelming attack.
(S) 2. Giving higher priority to initial defense against the short,
blitzkrieg offensive for which the WP is postured, if necessary at the
expense of capabilities for more sustained conflict. Until NATO achieves
a higher confidence initial defensive capability, can it-afford to divert
so many resources to hedging against a longer conflict or other lower,
priority needs? It seems fruitless for the United States in-particular
to continue posturing for a sustained effort if our allies are not doing
the same.
(p) 3. Fte-lding additional ground combat forces to provide defense
in depth against an armor-heavy WP attack, via the measures cited below.
(U) 4. Designing smaller, leaner divisions tailored more for
initial _combat power than for staying power, and with slowerrratio of
combat to ' support troops, as probably the onl Vay to generate such
forces within likely resource and MBFR constraints.
(U) 5. Going much further than currently planned toward strengthen-
ing NATO anti-tank capabilities.
(U) 6. Greatly speeding up U.S. capabilities to reinforce the NATO
Center with both ground and air forces, as perhaps the best single means
of offsetting U.S. troop withdrawals under MBFR. .
_(U) 7. Generating more quickly mobilizable allied reserve divisions
and territorial forces, as a means of thickening up the NATO shield while
still absorbing MBFR cuts and reducing manpower costs.
(S) 8. Revamping NATO's Center Region air posture, to increase
survivability and flexibility at low cost.
(U) 9. Making fuller use of low cost technology and other compensa-
tory measures (e.g. civilianization and greater U.S. use of allied
wartime assets) to offset manpower cuts.
(U) 10. Rationalizii NATO's defense posture, via such means as
point to ~iatcFsor-Relegal2/~pc i6e-FP~~Sf~59g~A~93 This
App'ove
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would also facilitate more equitable burden-sharing frdm the U.S.
standpoint.
This study argues that by such means NATO can attain a credible
defense capability vis-a-vis the WP, even after MBFR cuts, at no added
cost in resource inputs. It attacks the myth that ari' effective conven-
tional defense is unattainable without massive budget and manpower in-
creases; hence that NATO must resign itself to an inferiority that fore-
ordains defeat or nuclear escalatio;i in event of Pact attack. Nor would
any change in NATO's existing "flexible response" strategy be required.
What is needed instead is to revamp its force posture to make the exis t
ing strategy more realizable than before. _
The rest of this study applies the above concepts tQ (1) ways
of absorbing 10-30 percent NBFR personnel cuts with least impact on
residual NATO capabilities; and (2) low cost compensatory measures to
reassure our allies and enhance NATO deterrence/initial defense. We
focus mostly on-U.S. forces, particularly ground forces, which. comprise
80 percent of U.S. manpower in the NGA. While our detailed proposals may
be flawed in some respects, we are convinced they point generally in the
di-reetion NATO will have to travel if it-is to achitve.adequate conven-
tional deterrence and defense within likely resoVrce-constraints.
ABSORBING MBFR CUtS IN U.S. ARMY FORCES IN EUROPE
The "school solution" would be to absorb 1:0-30 percent NBFR cuts
in U.S. Army personnel in Europe by withdrawing essentially a proportional
slice of the present force -- combat as well as support troops. This
would leave a balanced residual force and do minimum violence to USAREUR's
existing structure. In this event, we recommend that such cuts be made
by brigade orbattalionslices, -rather than division slices. Keeping even
understrength division and corps structures in Europe would: (1) help
reassure our allies; (2) permit us to keep manning our sector of the NATO
front; (3) facilitate the rapid reinforcement on which our post-MBFR
posture would be critically dependent; and (4) permit leaving the
An Annex to this Summary (pp. xx-x};x) outlines the 158 specific
proposals made to this end in the study.
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equipment of troops withdrawn with the parent units, thus providing low
cost prepositioning. All these advantages far outweigh the complica-
tions of withdrawing by less than division slices. However, we believe
that such balanced cuts are far from optimum.
Instead, we recommend taking MBFR cuts in an unbalanced manner,
mostly from USAREUR's large "expeditionary force" support structure. We
suggest ways in which up to 52,750 spaces could be cut from Army support
personnel in lieu of withdrawing maneuver units. The rationale would
be to cut logistic and sustaining instead of initial combat capabilities,
and to rely more on local civilian or mobilized wartime European support.
The largest cuts would be in engineers (7,150) signal personnel (8,100),
maintenance (13,000), transport (3,800), and food services (3,200). We
also propose cutting 9,350 air defense spaces by shifting high altitude
Nike battalions to the FRG or relying on interceptors, reduction of vul-
nerability by dispersal of stocks, etc. Merging TASCOM, USAREUR, and
EUCOM headquarters (in event-of major cuts, pruning some headquarters
would"be politically essential), plus reducing special mission forces
like the Berlin garrison, would yield an additional 4,400 spaces.
Taking all the savings proposed would permit over a 23 percent MBFR cut
in US.-militaiy personnel in: the NGA, while still retaining 4-1/3 divi-
sions, the two ACRs, all artillery, and the like.
To help meet. NATO's crucial need for enough ready divisions for
initial defense in depth (with sufficient resexves to counter Pact pene-
trations), we also propose restructuring USAREUR division forces. A
modest option would be to eliminate such marginalia as infantry company
81-mm mortar platoons, maneuver battalion radar sections, and three
assault helicopter companies better suited for Vietnam than Europe, for
a net saving of 3,250 spaces. If these are not needed to help fill out
MBFR cuts, we suggest converting them (and 1,750 engineer spaces saved
earlier) into: (1) four more mechanized battalions; (2) five more tank
battalions; and (3) either three AT helicopter companies or (together
with other existing USAREUR aviation assets) a highly flexible AT heli-
copter brigade designed to help blunt major Soviet armor penetrations.
These tradeoffs would substantially augment USAREUR's present thin
combat strength
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A more far-reaching alternative would be to convert USAREUR's
present 4-1/3 divisions into one-third smaller lean divisions specifi-
cally tailored to meet the WP threat. These divisions would still retain
comparable firepower and have much larger anti-tank weapon strength.
Their structure would facilitate rapid fleshing out by adding fourtli
companies to maneuver battalions. Going to a 9,600 instead of 15,400-
man peacetime armored division and a 9,300-man instead of 15,426-man
mechanized division would permit either saving 26,000 more spaces or
?
converting to seven new-style USAREUR divisions while still absorbing
a 20 percent MBFR cut from non-divisional units. Granted that such a
force would be very lean., thin in sustaining power, and much more depen-
dent upon European logistic support. But it might be the best way to
absorb large MBFR cuts, yet still preserve a major U.S. defense contri-
bution to NATO Center Region defense and reassure our allies -- all
within likely budget constraints.
ABSORBING MBFR CUTS TN USAFE
While current U.S. thinking is not to make any MBFR cuts in our
air''forees in Europe, we show how USAFE -too could - so b-"10-30 percent
cuts if necessary, mostly from support personnel witfiout reducing much
initial combat strength. Since USAFE is structured to rapidly absorb
large reinforcements soon after M-day, however, cuts much over 10 per-
cent or so would seriously degrade this capability -- even if its peacetime
combat aircraft strength were kept up for political reassurance purposes.
In fact, planning to deploy U.S. air reinforcements more quickly than
presently contemplated would help greatly to compensate for MBFR cuts
in general. But to this end the United States must insist on pre-
planned or if possible peacetime collocation on up to 20 allied air bases
desired by USAFE, this would at low cost greatly enhance USAFE ability
to absorb massive, quick reinforcements and increase their survivability,
while providing the best'means of absorbing any MBFR cuts in U.S. air
forces as well.
CIVILIANIZATION AND GREATER RELIANCE ON EUROPEAN SUPPORT
Another way to compensate for MF;FR cuts in U.S. forces would be
greater subs Fttb qua' AWMMs C dRb"( OCplZ9more
pprove
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reliance on mobilized European forces, to replace U.S. Person el in
less sensitive functions. ,The range of possible savings woul be from
at least 17,000 to over 20,000 spaces. Such substitutions w uld involve
a calculated risk in terms of: (1) less U.S. control over its own
logistic support; (2) reduced flexibility to meet non'-'NATO contingencies;
and (3) possibly less wartime reliability. But these must be weighed
against the alternative of withdrawing combat forces under MBFR, and the
need to rationdlize NATO's defense posture. NATO can no longer afford
the outdated concept that logistics are a national responsibility, if it
is still to field an adequate defense in the Seventies while absorbing
MBFR cuts.
(U) Indeed, the United States could use MBFR as a potent lever to
get our allies to assume many support functions we have had-fo perform
up to now ourselves. The prospect that U.S. combat troops would have to
be withdrawn unless our allies took over such functions might provide
these allies a powerful incentive. This would permit sizable U.S. cost
savings without parallel increases in allied peacetime costs, since much
of the allied costs would be incurred only in wartime. In effect, MBFR
anZI`cons.equent restructuring could be used to secure' mare- equitable
NATO burden sharing via a new formula of shared ?'r"'Lspdhsibility which
might be more palatable to our allies than the increasingly painful
haggles over offsets.
?
QUICKER REINFORCEMENT AND RICHER ACTIVE/RESERVE FORCE MIXES (U)
(S) Since NATO badly needs more divisions for defense in depth
against a WP blitzkrieg, speeding up planned U.S. ground reinforcements
would help greatly, as well as compensate for MBFR cuts. We suggest
several low-cost measures, such as: (1) sending smaller reinforcement
packages than divisions; (2) posturing to reduce readiness,, equipment
marryupj and deployment times; and (3) using existing prepositioned attri-
tion stocks to equip instead those U.S. reinforcing divisions whose
(U) These are only partly add-ons, since many were also included
in the USAREUR and USAFE cuts mentioned earlier.
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s
equipment must presently go by sea. Even in the absence of FR, such
measures would better attune the U.S. force posture to NATO' current
strategy and to current U.S. national guidance. So long as structure
in Europe to absorb them was retained, it should be possible to return
the 45,400-man equivalent of a 20 percent cut within two weeks. Indeed,
airlift makes it feasible to design procedures which could both bring U.S.
post-MBFR forces back -up to strength and greatly reinforce them within
the 23 days between M-day and D-day assumed in current U.S. national strategy.
(U) We also see major opportunities for enhancing NATO's early de-
fense capabilities via richer active/reserve mixes.. Posturing to generate
more well-trained ready reserves to flesh out or reinforce active forces
might be the most sensible European NATO and U.S. repsonse to NBFR cuts,
or to cuts in active force levels because of budget pressures even in the
absence of MBFR. It would be a low-cost way for our European allies in
particular to enhance their initial conventional defense contribution
(as suggested by the fact the the FRG Defense Commission has* proposed
just this solution for the Bundeswehr).
RES'TRUCT.UP,ING EUROPEAN NATO FORCES (U)
(U) In getteral, it would he more difficult' tb absorb MBFR cuts in
allied than in U.S. forces, because they, are already thinner in peacetime
support structure 'and there are fewer possibilities for substitutions.
Probably the most difficult to cut without severe risk would be the FRG
forces, which make the largest single allied contribution to Center
Region defense. From a military viewpoint, withdrawal only of "stationed"
forces would least diminish. residual allied capabilities, since they
could' be postured for quick return.
(U) However, we suggest a variety of means by which allied ground
forces could absorb 5 percent to 10 percent MBFR cuts with least loss of
residual capability by (1) judicious pruning of marginal personnel and
units; (2) greater reliance on cadre/reserve units; (3) reduction of
overhead structure and training base, plus civilian substitutions;
and (4) various compensatory measures. Deeper MBFR cuts and/or budget
pressures would almost dictate extensive restructuring by such means
as streamlining division slices, going to a richer active/reserve mix,
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and placing more reliance on territorial forces. Assuming reasonable
time for mobilization, this would permit them to field forces compar-
able in initial capability to before.
The very lean allied air forces would be even more difficult to cut
than ground forces,. Nonetheless we suggest severalways of absorbing
up to 20 percent MB FR cuts if imposed, such as converting air defense
missile units to reserve/civilian status, joint training, and cutting
marginal units. On the other hand, the allied air forces are so poorly
organized in toto to take full advantage of airpower's inherent flexibil-
ity that such compensatory measures as an improved, Center Region command
and control structure, a tactical air control system, more aircraft shel-
ters, rationalization of missions, and cross-servicing arrangements
would greatly improve their net capabilities even after, say, 10 percent
cuts.
COMPENSATORY TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS
In our view, a wide range of low-cost technological options could
also be used to help compensate for manpower cuts by strengthening
reeidual capabilities, especially against the WP ax-mo ,--and, air threats.
We suggest-a' whole menu of such possibilities; -r example, light pro-
liferation AT weapons, improved mines and minelaying, and mini-fortifica-
tions to enhance ,the utility of territorial forces in harassing WP armor.
We also suggest a range of improved air and ground munitions, and command/
control/communications improvements. But achieving such modernization on
the requisite scale within likely reseu=ce constraints will demand much
greater rationalization of NATO efforts than yet achieved.
COST IMPLICATIONS.
We have looked sufficiently into the major cost elements of our
restructuring proposals to be able to say with confidence that they
could be financed essentially from MBFR savings and related tradeoffs.
Over a reasonable period like five years, the estimated $3 billion
savings from a 20 percent MBFR cut -- assuming equivalent personnel
reductions in active U.S. force levels -- would more than offset such
restructuring costs as added equipment for more units, increased use of
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LNs and reserves, and the like. The chief added needs Mould be for more
equipment for the added combat units, but we suggest numerous ways in
which these could be met from existing stocks or normal modernization
without true add-oncost. For example, we suggest ways to avoid large
buys of duplicate equipment for prepositioning. There would also b&
sizable annual BOP savings -- an estimated $280-$337 million a year in
event of a 20 percent MBFR cut. Our proposals for using MBFR as a lever
to get greater-allied support would produce further BOP savings.
CONCLUSIONS
In sum, we propose a more efficient use of NATO resources to produce
a high confidence initial defense posture which could be.sustained within
likely resource constraints, and after MBFR cuts. Though this entails
adopting a new set of priorities and different resource allocations,
we contend that only in this way could NATO field adequate forces to
implement its flexible response strategy during the Seventies. Naturally
a price would have to be paid in such terms as less support and sustain-
ing power, and the calculated risk inherent in posturing on the assump-
tion of more mobilization/deployment t1he. But we' beUeve- that these
add up to a prudent level of risk, especially when weighed against the
gains described. In any case, such. risks seem far more acceptable than
those entailed if NATO's current inadequate conventional posture were
further degraded by MBFR cuts and other constraints.
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Annex
158 SPECIFIC WAYS TO STRENGTHEN NATO CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE
WHILE 'STILL ABSORBING MBFR CUTS*
s
I. GUIDELINES FOR MBFR
1. Keep flexibility for force restructuring, even'at expense of
verification (p. 2).
2. Regard MBFR And force restructuring as two sides of same
coin (p. 44).
3. To this end, confine cuts to overall personnel levels, rather
than cutting units and/or equipment.
II. GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR NATO FORCE RESTRUCTURING
4. Posture to do first things first, instead of allocating resources
all across the spectrum (pp. 34, 39-41).
5. Posture more explicitly to meet WP blitzkrieg threat (pp. 41-44).
M.,._ 6..- Accept calculated risk of posturing on asaumpx.:,Qn,.th.at NATO
could'easonably count on more mobilization-time (pp. 13, 18, 41).
7. Give higher priority to meeting Center Region initial defense
needs at expense 9f capabilities for more sustained conflict (pp. 42,
8. Generate more quickly available ground combat forces to provide
defense in depth against armor-heavy Soviet.assault (p. 41, Chapters V,
VI, IX, X).
9. To this end, design smaller leaner divisions tailored more for
initial combat power than staying power and with a lower tail-to-teeth.
ratie (p. 42, Chapters V and IX).
10. Generate more quickly-mobilizable European NATO reserve divi-
sions, similarly configured (p. 43, Chapters V, VIII, and IX).
11. The United States in particular should greatly speed up planned
reinforcement of NATO center with ground and air forces (p. 43, Chapters
III, V, VI, VIII).
12. Economize on NATO resources by realistic ways of rationalizing
1* its defense posture (p. 44 and Chapters VII, VIII, IX, X).
*
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III. BALANCED MBFR.CUTS IN U.S. ARMY IN EUROPE
13. To enhance deterrence and reassure allies, do not withdraw any
divisions as such (p. 52).
14. Leave equipment in Europe to facilitate quick return (p. 53).
15. Thin out peacetime manning levels on unbaZaneed basis (p. 55).
16. Take proportional cuts by brigade slices (pp. 56-57).
17. Alternatively, take them by battalion slices (pp. 57-58).
18. Posture forces withdrawn for quick return as specified (pp. 58-59).
19. Go to different active/reserve force mix to-replace such forces
and economize on equipment (p. 62).
IV. UNBALANCED CUTS BY RESTRUCTURING U.S. ARMY SUPPORT FORCES
20. Engineers: (a) Substitute four Labor Service /Civilian Labor
Group (LS/CLG construction companies for four military construction bat-
talions to save some 2,950 spaces; (b) simplify divisional engineer func-
tions to save 1,750 spaces; (c) substitute German territorial units for
m8 _corps combat engineer and bridging-functions-to save '3,800 spaces;
(d) reduce.mairLtenance and depot personnel'prop.o,xionately to save 250
spaces; (e) reduce engineer topo battalion to save 150 spaces. Total:
7,150 military space' savings (pp. 70-80).
21. Signal.: (a) Merge or collocate several higher administrative
headquarters to save 1,400 spaces; (b) simplify communication procedures
for nuclear warhead custodial units to save 426 spaces; and (c) either
integrate the present military peacetime grid into the Bundespost system
to save about 4,000 STRATCOM and 2,300 signal brigade spaces plus about
1,500 civilian spaces, go to civilian contracting to save around 4,000
STRATCOM spaces plus 300 signal brigade spaces, or double up the peace-
timelwartime structure by using STRATCOM personnel as wartime fillers for
cadred field signal units to save around 2,500 field signal spaces.
Total savings from 2,900 military to 8,100 military plus 1,500 civilian
TOE spaces (pp. 80-89).
22. Alternatively, substitute civilian contracting to save 4,000
plus STRATCOM personnel (p. 90).
23. Or cadre field signal units and use STRATCOM personnel as fast
fillers to save 2,800 spaces (p. 90).
24. Maintenance: Change replacement and training practices, con-
struct covered garages, go to greater civilianization in maintenance,
and place all maintenance directly under 1':15C0.1. Savings: 13,100 mili-
tary pvgpms*dalge4fftteaze
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25. Go to a multi-year training cycle (pp. 94-96).
26. Further civili'anize CGEE and missile maintenance to save 1,800
spaces (p. 101).
27. Keep equipment near mint condition (p. 102).
28. Use "contact teams" to strengthen DS capabilities (p. 103).
29. Food Services: Centralize food processing and messing and
develop substitutes for field messing to save 4,400 spaces (pp. 104-107).
30. Assign all.in-theater medical assets to Medical Command; elim-
inate 7th Brigade Headquarters; integrate 7th Brigade field units into
the peacetime hospital structure; go to Type B manning for ambulance com-
panies. Saving: 450 military and 2,000 civilian spaces (pp. 107-112).
31. Consolidate Army and Air Force medical services (p. 112).
32. Transportation: Position more ammunition stocks forward, plan
to drain forward German commercial fuel stocks, dampen peacetime training
activity, and substitute wartime German units for peacetime U.S. truck
assets to save-3,600 authorized spaces. Assign cars to staff sections
minus drivers to save 200 spaces (pp. 112-115).
33. Reduce POL transport (pp. 119-122).
_34.~ Phase out Bremerhaven and other Army activfefe's'in the North
Sea area. ? Savings : 350 Army and 700 civilian? aces (pp. 123-124).
35. EUCOM Headquarters: Divest MUCOM of MAAG and other non-NATO
planning tasks; verge EUCOM's essential functions into other headquarters.
Savings: 1,200 authorized (Army) spaces and 250 civilian spaces (p. 125).
36. Reduce Berlin garrison by 1,000 spaces (p. 126).
37. Merge USAREUR and TASCOM Hqs or assign TASCOM G-4 planning re-
sponsibility and collocate TASCOM Headquarters with USAREUR Headquarters.
Savings: 600 staff and Hqs support spaces and 200 signal support spaces,
for a total of about 800 military spaces (and 400 civilian) (p. 127).
38. SETAF: Retain warhead support detachments but reduce other
elements by assignment to the Italians or relocate warhead custodial
detachments to the FRG. Savings: 1,150 military and 400 civilian
authorized spaces (pp. 129-131).
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39. Reduce air vulnerability by dispersing stocks forward, rede-
signing units, more shelters, etc. (pp. 134-135).
40. Redesign two rear area Vulcan/Chaparral battalions' to save 450
spaces (p. 136).
Y
41. Cut three Hawk battalions because of Improved Hawk to save
2,250 spaces while still increasing AD capability (pp. 137-138).
42. Eliminate Nike/Hercules or turn it over to FRG to save 3,714
spaces (pp. 138-140).
43. Eliminate three AD group Hqs to.same 775 spaces (p. 140).
44, Reduce AD signal battalion by 300 spaces (p. 141).
45. Cut corps and lower intelligence staffs by 100-200 spaces (p. 142).
46. Consolidate intelligence data handling systems to save 100-200
spaces (p. 143).
47. Civilianize finance disbursing detachments to save 5.47 spaces
(p. 143)..
48. Further civilianize four ordnance ammo companies to save 400
spaces (p. 143).
`49'.? Prune Support and Engineer Utility Districts Zpp. 143-145).
50. Take proportional cuts in indirect support (above districts,
postal, AG, Finance, Health Services, DS maintenance) to save up to 4,208
military and 6,512 civilians (pp.-145-146).
51. By combination of above, absorb MBFR cuts of up to 23 percent
of total U.S. forces in NGA, while still not touching 4-1/3 divisions and
other USAREUR maneuver units. Or convert any cuts not required by MBFR
into more combat units along lines suggested below (p. 149).
V. CUTTING AND RESTRUCTURING USAREUR DIVISION FORCES
52. Replace nine 81-mm mortars in each infantry company with en-
larged heavy mortar platoon to save 2,050 spaces (pp. 151-153).
53. Alternatively, convert to four added mechanized battalions
(p. 153).
54. Eliminate infantry and tank battalion ground surveillance sec-
tions to save 500 spaces (pp. 151-154).
55. Or convert these (and 1,750 division engineer spaces saved in par.
above) into five more tank battalions.
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56. Allot 2,400 MP spaces to four wartime motorized infantry bat-
talions (pp. 156-158).
57. Eliminate three helicopter assault
(pp. 158-159). -
companies to save 600 spaces
58. Merge Aviation Group and two battalion headquarters to save
100 plus spaces (p. 159).
59. Alternatively, convert above into AT helicopter companies
(pp. 159-160)._
60. Or form an AT helo brigade from existing USAREUR assets (p. 160).
61. Restructure H-series armored division, cutting it from 15,400
to 9,600 men in peacetime; with 17 percent fewer tanks and 11 percent
fewer men in maneuver platoons but 67 percent more major AT weapons (in
wartime it would have 29 percent more men in maneuver platoons, 11 per-
cent more tanks and 121 percent more major AT weapons (pp. 161-168).
62. Restructure H-series mechanized division to reduce its peace-
time strength from 15,400 to 9,300 men, with 40 percent fewer tanks but
80 percent more major AT weapons. In wartime, it would have.47 percent
fewer tanks, but'60 percent more infantry and 144 percent more major AT
weapons (pp. 161-168).
63. Create battalion packages based in CONUS to bring above divi-
sions rapidly to war strength of 13,000 and 12,600-respectively (pp. 166-168).
64. Provide added equipment for above without add-on investment
cost by (a) redistributing equipment freed up by restructuring; (b) util-
izing some POMCUS.stocks; (c) freeing up equipment by also restructuring
CONUS backup divisions (pp. 165 and 168-171).
65. By a combination of pars. 20-48 and 54-61 above, take MBFR cut
of up to 32 percent from total U.S. forces in NGA, while still. fielding
4-1/3 new style divisions, 2 ACRs, Berlin brigade, and AT helo brigade
(p. 172).
-66. Alternatively, take a 20 percent MBFR cut, while still fielding
restructured force of 7 new style divisions plus AT helo brigade (p. 172).
VI. ABSORBING MBFR CUTS IN U.S. AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
A. For Unbalanced 10-percent Cut (3,440 men)
67. Cut 620 from base and transient aircraft maintenance (p. 181).
68. Cut 680 from headquarters staff, support to SHAPE, etc.,
organic support to Hqs. (p. 181).
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69. Use LNs to replace 955 base support, hospita]:,,etc. spaces
(p. 183).
70. Transfer two 412L radar sites to FRG to save 445 spaces (p. 178).
71. Cut 305 liaison, management engineering Audit (pp. 178, 180).
72. Cut 435 Other Hqs, etc.
B. For Unbalanced 20-percent Cut
73. Cut 600 more from real property maintenance activities by using
LNs (p. 189).
74. Cut 525 more from base support, hospital, etc. -by using LNs (p. 189).
75. Transfer air weather service to FRG to save 300 spaces (p. 189) .
76. Transfer 870 from RF-4 and F-4 squadrons, tacti.cal air support,
airlift support (p. 189).
77. Trans 'er 235 from USAF security service (p. 189).
78. Transfer 710 more from Other Hqs, etc.
For Unbalanced 30-percent Cut
79. Cut 300 more from real property maintenance activities (p. 203).
80. Substitute LNs in base support, hospital, etc. to save 930 more
spaces (p. 204) .
81. Cut RF-4 squadrons to save 835 spaces (pp. 198, 201-203).
82. Use LNs in base communications facilities to save 315 more spaces
(pp. 204-205).
83. Cut 1,060 other spaces from Hqs, etc. (pp. 206-207).
Compensatory Air Measures to Offset MBFR Cuts
84. Revise planning to facilitate quick return of all withdrawn
personnel (pp. 209-211).
85. Accelerate and augment U.S. air reinforcements (pp. 212-214).
86. Increase dispersal by collocating on 20 allied bases, which
would also permit up to a 20-percent MBFR cut in USAFE from RPMA and
BOS alone (p. 214).
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87. Also disperse munitions along above lines (p. 214).
88. Also reduce vulnerability by building enough added shelters for
entire planned Mf30 force (p. 215).
89. Posture USAFE more for initial defensive capability, including
close support, by buying more MAVERICKS, stationing'A-7 and ultimately
A-10 squadrons, etc. (pp. 215-216).
VII. CIVILIANIZATION AND GREATER USE OF EUROPEAN SUPPORT
90. Employ more civilians in U.S. installations, in addition to
cases cited preceding pars., e.g. in corps areas (pp. 223-224).
91. As was done in Vietnam, make more use of civilian contractors
or facilities in peace and war; e.g. telecommunications, POL storage and
distribution, medical facilities, wartime rail and truck service, ship-
ping, etc. (pp. 224-226).
92. Plan on more wartime use of mobilized allied assets, e.g. to
replace LOCPORT package. In connection with NBFR, insist on principle
that allies will operate ports of entry and LOCs for forces sent to
their defense (pp. 226-228).
93. Also plan on more use of German territorial commands for
specified rear area functions (p. 228).
94. -Explore quietly reopening civilianized.-U.-S. LOC across France
(p. 229).
95. Collocate U.S. ground as well as air units on allied bases to
save personnel and costs (p. 229).
96. Expand NATO common logistic support systems, not just NAMSA
but in such common services as (a) port operations; (b) shipping; (c) base
utilities and maintenance; (d) non-tactical communications, etc. (p. 230).
97. Seek more equitable burden sharing by getting costs of above
paid largely by allies, on principle that logistics can no longer b e.?a
national responsibility in case of MBFR (pp. 231-232).
98. By same token, don't allow MBFR provisions to preclude such
civilian or European military substitutions or burden sharing (p. 233).
VIII.. GO FOR QUICKER REINFORCEMENT AND RICHER ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX
99. Design smaller than division-size U.S. reinforcement packages
to accelerate deployability (pp. 243-244).
100. Reduce vulnerability via dispersal of smaller reinforcement
packages to more European ai feldd and- . 244).
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groups by
102. Preplan for several levels of U.S. alert to reduce', political
sensitivity (pp. 245-246).
101. In early stages of alert, send individuals or smal
commercial airline (pp. 244-245).
103. Retain an expandable structure in Europe to absorb quick rein-
forcement (p. 246).
104. Create a USAREUR and USAFE rear Hq in CONUS (p. 247).
105. Consider using Marine divisions in Center Region (p. 247).
106. Modify commercial 747s to make them bulk cargo-capable (p. 248).
107. Revamp Army readiness procedures (pp. 248-249).
108. Limit attrition at sea by staggering reinforcements (pp. 249-250).
109. Use prepo stocks to equip more reinforcement divisions instead
of reserving for attrition replacement (pp. 250-251).
110. Revamp Army reserves and use them to flesh out active divisions
which-have in turn released units to reinforce NATO, thus permitting Army
to (a) absorb sizable MBFR cuts; (b) absorb cutbacks in overall personnel
ceiling; yet (c) still retain present 13 division force at almost as high
a state of readiness as before (pp. 255-257).
111. Flesh} out support units with raserves., on FRG model (p. 257).
IX. ABSORBING M13FR CUTS BY RESTRUCTURING ALLIED GROUND FORCES
112. Cut support first before cutting" combat forces; reduce over-
head (pp. 264-268).
113. Streamline NATO division slice from present 25,000-30,000 to
more. like 20,000 (p. 267).
114.
O
Strengthen AT capabilities (pp. 267-268).
115. Put greater stress on ready reserves, with peacetime active
duty cadres (pp. 268-269).
116. Expand role of territorial forces for combat as'well as rear
area functions (pp. 272-273).
117. Cut Bundeswehr as proposed by FRG Commission to help absorb
MBFR cuts (pp. 272-273).
118. Expand role of Territorial Army (p. 274).
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119. Reduce or eliminate specific marginal FRG units, e.g. airborne
divisions (p. 275).
120. Absorb up- to ltl percent Dutch MBFR cuts out of large support,
overhead, and training base (p. 277).
121. To absorb 20 percent cuts, also restructure RNA divisions to
one active and three 25 percent cadre strength (p. 277).
122. Absorb up to 10 percent Belgian MBFR cuts by reducing overhead,
cadred support units, and eliminating marginal non-NATO.-committed units
(p. 278).
123. To absorb 20 percent cuts, also restructure Belgian Army into
one active and two cadre divisions (p. 278).
124. Absorb 10 percent cut in BAOR by withdrawing to UK one battalion
slice out of each brigade (p. 279).
125. Absorb deeper cuts by restructuring division slice to permit
retaining three two-brigade divisions in BAOR (p. 279).
126. Deal with special French problem by urging France to partici-
pate in MBFR by.. (a) moving forces cut by MBFR back a few kilometers
49 across Rhine; or (b) moving back whole corps, since it doesn't have
initial role anyway (p. 280).
127. Shift allied AD battalions to Improved Hawk on less than
to-one basis (p. 281). -.~
one-
128. Take allied manpower savings from shift from Honest John to
Lance, for a savings potential around 3,000 men (pp. 281-282).
129. Try to confine MBFR cuts to "stationed" rather than indigenous
forces (p. 283).
130. Posture any allied "stationed" forces cut for quickest possible
return on alert (p. 283).
X. ABSORBING MBFR CUTS IN ALLIED AIR FORCES
131. Cut other allied SAM units through going to cadre system and
civilianization, for savings potential up to 5,570 men (pp. 289-290).
Explore joint training to reduce overlap (pp. 290-291).
Increase civilianization of support functions (p. 291).
134. Redeploy forces outside NGA if disbandment not required
(pp. 292-293).
135. Reduce active Canadian air strength at Lc11r to absorb up to
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136. Take 10 percent cut in "stationed" RAF by reducing support
and relying on UK base structure (p. 295).
137. To absorb-20 percent cut, also reduce squadron UE to save
970 more men (or place on FRG base on standby (p. 295).
138.
Cut or redeploy Belgian recce and transport aircraft first
(p. 297).
139.
Cut or redeploy Dutch recce and/or training squadrons (p. 297).
140.
Further civilianization, or redeployment, seems only viable FRG
option without cutting combat strength (pp. 297-298).
141. Reorganize 2 and 4 ATAFs into single AIRCENT (p. 299).
142. Create NATO Tactical Air Control System, perhaps using existing
U.S. BUIC equipment (pp. 298-300).
143. Absorb U.S. squadrons on allied bases (p. 300).
144. Build more aircraft shelters (p. 301).
145. Rationalize air force missions (pp. 302-303).
146. Expand cross-servicing arrangements (pp. 303-304).
XI. -COMPENSATORY TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS
rocket (pp. 311-315).
147. Make more extensive use of AT mines and demolition; develop
better automatic minelayer; mate artillery-delivered mine to tactical
(pp
148. Proliferate light AT weapons like Improved LAW (pp. 315-316).
149. Use mini-fortifications (p..317).
150. Specific approaches to improving counterbattery capabilities
.-318-319).
151. Improve artillery aubmunitions (pp. 319-320).
152. Explore potential of cheap one-man jet engine (p. 320).
153. Specific approaches to better airfield interdiction (pp. 322-323).
154. Use strategic bombers for tactical missions (p. 323).
155. Fill gaps in tactical air capabilities, e.g., recce/strike in
high threat areas, .clear night delivery, anti-radar, LOC interdiction
(pp. 325-3219).
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156. Improve C3 (pp. 329-332).
157. Improve -real time battlefield reconnaissance (pp. 332-333).
158. Improve camouflage, simulation, etc. at low cost (pp. 333-335).
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 W
rel.
~I4'T 14. 6Pg0350017000 9
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V
OFFICE OF THE ,
A
CNO EXECUTIVE PANEL
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350
SECRET (TJNCLAS upon removal of enclosures)
OP-OQK/bjf
Ser 773
10 S~P 1973
I am enclosing several recent items which may be of interest
.to you.
The first is the transcript of an.extemporaneous address
by Secretary Schlesinger at the National War College last month.
It's a good summary of his philosophy as it has evolved over
the past several months. It also provides a preview of the
concepts contained in the new DPPG which is in final draft
form now, and on which you will be briefed at the next meeting.
The second item is a summary of the Komer study on-
restructuring of U.S. forces in Central Europe. Ambassador
Komer will discuss the study with the Panel on the 20th of
September.
One further item of news: plans now call for-the November
.meeting of the CEP to be held in London, hosted by Admiral
Worth Bagley, the new CINCUSNAVEUR. NATO Strategy and the
Middle East will be prominent agenda topics. We are shooting f
for a -gate, early in the month in order- to increase_.be? '
prospects of good weather, arid will be -ir* touch with you
shortly to ascertain_dates compatible with your schedules.
The meeting with SECDEF, which had been scheduled for the
November session, has been deferred to the January meeting.
Sincerely, yy/~~,~, vG4
W.(. COCKELL
Ca tain, U.S. Navy
Enclosures:
(1) Schlesinger address of 21 AUG 73 (Secret)
.(2) Summary of Komer Study CSecret)
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aiks---
O
Red Ensign
In one of Britain's most successful naval
exercises for many years, no less than 27
vessels gathered outside the Firth of
Forth last week.
"They were warships of every kind,"
said a naval spokesman later. "Some, for
instance, were Russian trawlers. Others
were Russian electronic spyships and yet
others were Soviet observation vessels.
There were also a few Russian cruisers.
We learnt a great deal from the exercise."
The British ship taking part was a small
frigate, HMS Anonymous, a completely
new type of fighting ship.
"We have streamlined it utterly by re-
moving all the weaponry and armament,"
commented the spokesman. "Its main
function, after all, is to attract Soviet
observation so that we can study it, and
excess weight of guns would-only slow it
down. Also, the apparent absence of any
weaponry puzzles the Russians extremely.
You must remember that the role of the
modern'British navy is not so much to
protect our isles, though we could swap a
good punch or two if it came to the
crunch, but to keep the Russian navy
busy. Am I talking too fast?"
"No," we said.
"Not you," he said irritably. "There's a
Soviet trawler off Denmark taking all this
down. There's nothing the British Navy
resents more than being misquoted in
Moscow."-Toss
af,44 4,9~/w
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