DEFINITION OF NATIONAL AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE; NOTE TO COLUMBIA ON MKULTRA; DRAFT DOWNSIZING NOTICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003400030015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 11, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: National Tactical Interface Study Committee
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Definition of National and Tactical Intelligence
1. I hear a good bit of what I believe is inaccurate utiliza-
tion of the terms "national" and "tactical" intelligence. Inaccuracies
develop from the fact of the very complex and difficult subject with
which you are wrestling. I would like to share with you my views
on how we define the national and tactical intelligence, because
unless there is full agreement on this, your study can only end
in controversy.
2. I believe that there are four bases on which you could
divide intelligence into national and tactical categories:
a.
By the quality or nature of the intelligence
itself;
b.
By who produces the intelligence;
c.
By who utilizes the intelligence;
d.
By who collects the intelligence.
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3. Subdivision by nature and quality: I find it difficult
to find any examples of intelligence which are uniquely national
or uniquely tactical in all circumstances. For instance, the most
detailed tactical intelligence might be a lookout with binoculars
sighting four tanks coming across the East German/West German border.
Clearly, this is primarily a matter of concern to the tactical
commander. Yet, there are many circumstances in which it would
be brought immediately to the attention of the President of the
United States, e.g., it was the initiation of hostilities, e.c:..
it was the appearance of an armored division in an area where had never noted or expected one before and during a war. Si -il:-'.
during the Mayaguez crisis, the President was intimately invo' :
in details of the movement of boats with personnel in thti-',
a very tactical matter. At the other end of the spectrum.
hardly think of a piece of intelligence primarily intended
at the national level which is not of some concern to r,a oy'
commanders. In short, what is national and what is tactic
nature varies with the circumstances and with the level of
Most frequently, one man's tactics is another man's strate,;v.
4. Subdivision by producer: If the previous
correct, it's almost axiomatic that no matter who ~irc~ds~C?"
intelligence it is going to be difficult to label
or tactical. In addition, the way we are organi.-,-d ">)r
intelligence there certainly is no clear line h'r'
'
on this particular grounds.
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5. Subdivision by consumer: Again, no matter who the intended
consumer is, there may well be other consumers who are equally involved
in the question and it would be impossible to subdivide on this
grounds.
6. Subdivision by collector of intelligence: There is available
to us a clear line of demarcation here, e.g., is the collecting unit
funded in the National Foreign Intelligence budget or is it not?
7. I therefore believe that what we mean by national intel-
ligence is that which is collected by units funded in the National
Foreign Intelligence Program; what we mean by tactical intelligence
is that which is collected by elements that are funded in the Defense
Department's budget.
8. It therefore seems to me that what we are talking about in
your study is how we task national and tactical collection units to
best satisfy the total needs of both; and, how to disseminate the
intelligence received by both national and tactical collectors so as
to insure the best utilization of it.
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 The Director
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Dr. William J. McGill, President
Columbia University in the City
of New York
New York, , New York 10027
I certainly appreciate the description in your letter of 12 October of the
difficult position in which you have been placed by our disclosures on MKULTRA.
I only wish that this bit of history had not been forced back to the surface again
since we really uncovered very little that was new in substance. Still, as you
would appreciate, I had no option once the materials were discovered than to
present them to Congress which had previously been told that such materials
had been destroyed.
I would like to assure you that as of this time we have located no additional
evidence of the involvement of Columbia University, or anyone affiliated with
Columbia, in drug testing or human behavioral research of the type associated
with Project MKULTRA. Except to the extent that certain information was deleted
from the documents which have been supplied to you, I can assure you there is
no basis for concern on your part that we have made only a "partial disclosure"
of our involvement with Columbia. We have honestly attempted to be as forth-
coming as possible within the legal constraints which made those deletions
necessary. I do believe that our actions have been faithful to the spirit of
sharing with you everything that we possibly can.
I would like also to add,. contrary somewhat to the statement in your letter
that Mr. Lapham's 12 August letter to you was written
at my direction and initiative rather than at the insistence of the counsel of a
congressional committee. T had discussed the question in the public hearing
with some members of the Senate, but I made my decision to notify the universi-
ties involved with MKULTRA after consulting several of your eminent colleagues
whose universities were not so involved. I simply asked them whether if they
had been involved they would have preferred to hear from me directly with the
attendant additional risk of leakage of this information, or whether they would
prefer to have not been informed at all. The response that I received was unani-
mously and imperatively in favor of hearing all the news that we could transmit.
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Hence, I asked my General Counsel to communicate with you and the presidents
of the other universities involved. I sincerely hoped that this action would have
resulted in a less painful experience for Columbia than if we had not so informed
you.
With regard to your concern that there may be more research grants to
Columbia funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, I can only say that if
that is the case it is entirely possible that the materials available to us at this
time do not accurately or completely record the full extent of the MKUL.TRA
program. Unfortunately, as you know, the project records themselves were
destroyed in 1973. Our knowledge of MKULTRA is now limited to what may be
deduced from the surviving financial records which were uncovered. last August
and which are fragmentary at best. To the extent you have been able to supple-
ment those records with recollections and records of the individual involved at
Columbia, a source not available to us, your knowledge of the events may well
in fact exceed ours. There is no evidence in our records of other research
grants made to Columbia without the knowledge of the University. However,
since retrieval of information regarding activities long past is sometimes difficult,
I would be grateful if you would identify suspected incidents which continue to
trouble you in order that: we might investigate them.
Let me only assure you that the Agency has long since terminated support
of drug-testing research of the type that was funded under the MKULTRA umbrella.
Such research is no longer regarded as a proper activity for the Agency to under-
take. Moreover, any research involving experimentation on individuals is coordi-
nated with and cleared through the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
at this time. With respect to any Central Intelligence Agency activity on an
academic campus, our present policy requires that the appropriate senior manage-
ment officials of the academic institution be made aware of all Agency contracts
or Agency-sponsored research projects that are performed at academic institu-
tions.
I apologize for the confusion over the additional project file which we sent
to you and which it appears did not contain any information indicating that the
research in question was connected with Columbia. University.
Passing to another matter for the moment, while it remains our intention to
protect individual and institutional identities to the fullest extent possible, the
Agency has come under increasing pressure through congressional inquiries
and Freedom of Information Act requests to release the names of institutions
notified of involvement in these activities. Where a university has itself made
public these relationships, there would seem to be little point in our continued
refusal to confirm these facts. Your letter indicated that you have advised the
University Senate of this matter and that it was your desire to furnish a full
accounting to the faculty and student body. In order for us to be able to assess
our position properly in this regard, it would be most helpful if you would con--
firm whether you have publicly disclosed our previous correspondence or the
matters to which it related and, if not, whether you believe the identity of your
University should continue to be protected against disclosure by this Agency.
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Again, may I express my appreciation for the helpful tone of your letter.
I am sorry that we had to bring you into sharing this unpleasant experience
with us in any way. If there is anything more I can do to be helpful to you in
explaining this situation to your constituencies, I would be most pleased to do
so.
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TAPE 33
SIDE A
O-?/3
Dear
Last week Bill Wells sent you a notification that we were
forced to ask you to terminate your employment with the Agency.
He did this with my full approval. I want you to know, however,
that this was not a decision taken lightly or easily. With an
agency that has as many dedicated and highly competent people. as
this one, it is not easy to pare down in size. One cannot take
lightly the danger of cutting into capabilities that are essential
for our country. One also cannot take lightly the danger of
selecting the wrong i=ndividuals to-ask toleave.
I do want you to know that I believe most sincerely that
this reduction will strengthen, not weaken, the Agency and, in
particular, the Directorate of Operations. We cannot maintain
our pride, morale and efficiency if we are overstaffed. While it
is never easy to reduce an organization, there are times when it
simply must be done in the national interest.
I also want You to know that we made every effort to be as
fair as possible in selecting the individuals concerned. We followed
the guidelines laid down in DDO's
as closely as possible
with due regard to the many human factors involved. There is simply
no way to assure that we have not made mistakes. I can only tell you
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NOW
2
twe have attempted to balance what appears, to be
that genuinely best and necessary for the Agency and fair and appropriate for the
individuals.
Please know that we are all very grateful for your
years of service to our Agency and our country. You have every
reason to be more than proud of the record that you have made.
I wish you well as you move along. We will, if it interests you,
make every effort to see if there is a position for you in another
Directorate, (this phrase not to go in the supergrade notices)
and to help you in any way we can With locating other employment.
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