CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003300310056-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: December 5, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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5 December 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Chemical Warfare Capability
From time to time, we've published some materials on the Soviets'
chemical warfare capability. It also keeps bubbling up in policy
arenas with respect to whether we should be putting more emphasis on
it or not. Attached is an article from International Security by two
of the leading proponents of stronger U.S. chemical warfare capability.
I'd appreciate your having someone look at it and let me know whether
we agree with its factual assessment of the Soviets' capability in this
area.
STANSFIELD TURMER --
Attachment
as stated
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The Neglected Threat
of Chemical Warfare
Amoretta M. Hoeber
and Joseph D.
Douglass, Jr.
I Beginning in the late
sixties, and triggered at least in part by the Dugway sheep incident of 1968,' the
chemical warfare (CW) capability of the United States underwent a rapid and al-
most complete decline. By the mid-seventies, the Army Chemical Corps was almost
disbanded, and the ability of U.S. forces to conduct operations in a chemical envi-
ronment has now decreased to the point where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff says the U.S. is "not prepared" (Ref. 3, p. 90). Coincident with this unmistak-
able decline in U.S. interest and capability, the Soviets moved in the opposite
direction, not only improving their capability, as they have done in all fields of
military activity, but significantly upgrading the relative importance as well.
These trends have reached a point where now, among all of the comparisons of
U.S./Soviet military capabilities, one of the most lopsided is that for chemical war-
fare and operations in resulting toxic environments. There, the Soviet superiority
over the United States is assessed not by mere factors of two or three, but more of-
ten than not, by two or three orders of magnitude. This differential is believed to ap-
ply almost uniformly to munitions stockpiles, testing facilities, training activities,
equipment, personnel and force structure. While the U.S. attitude about this facet
1. The "Dugway sheep incident" was an accident in 1968 when the nozzle of an aerial spray
tank carrying the toxic chemical VX malfunctioned during an open-air test at the Dugway
Proving Ground, an Army chemical warfare test site. Within the next several days, 6,000-6,400
sheep grazing some 27 miles away were found dead. While the cause and effect has never been
proven conclusively, minute quantities of VX were said to have been found in the sheep tissues,
and the connection of the sheep deaths to the chemical test is usually presumed. (Ref. 1, p. 6
and Ref. 2, p. 26)
This paper was prepared for the New York Arms Control Seminar, sponsored by the Institute of
War and Peace Studies of Columbia University. While cleared for open publication, neither the
review nor the publication of the paper implies any endorsement of the factual accuracy or opin-
ions by any agency of the United States Government.
Amoretta M. Hoeber and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., are associated with the Strategic Planning Divi-
sion of System Planning Corporation, Arlington, Virginia.
Ms. Hoeber has analyzed strategic, tactical nuclear and chemical warfare aspects of the U.S.
military policy and posture for many years. Before her current position she was Director of the
Department of Military Policy Analysis of General Research Corporation and before that was
employed at the Rand Corporation.
Dr. Douglass has been engaged in European defense studies-nuclear, conventional, chemical,
command/control-for the past decade. Before his current position he was the Deputy Direc-
tor of the Tactical Technology Office of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Depart-
ment of Defense.
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International Security 156
of preparedness is characterized by widespread apathy and repugnance,2 the Soviet
approach , as in other military endeavors, is one of serious warfighting capability
and readiness.
Whether the mounting Soviet interest and capability derive from the develop-
ment of more tolerable protective clothing and equipment, from the development of
an antidote that enables them to better exploit the use of their own chemical weap-
ons, or merely reflects their seizing upon the opportunity to capitalize on the U.S.
decline is not known. What is clear, however, is that the Soviets have an impressive
capability and appear well trained and ready; that the United States and the rest
of NATO are neither equipped nor trained to any extent comparably to the Soviet
Union for this type of warfare a and that the main and significant advantage of
chemical warfare emerges in exactly such a condition of asymmetry.
While this state of affairs is now recognized at some of the highest levels in the
armed services, and while some actions have been initiated to improve U.S. pre-
paredness (Ref. 4), the program still suffers. The efforts which have been initiated
to ameliorate the situation in which we now find ourselves are still definitely of
subcritical mass and will probably remain so unless nurtured and guided by
unequivocal and widespread high-level support. The trends of improvement are
marred by a severe sense of paranoia, continued lack of attention, coordination,
and direction, and a fairly common belief that the only politically practicable
"solution" is an arms control or disarmament agreement aimed at erasing the
problem. The dangers inherent in such an approach and the potential for error in
the underlying assumptions are, the present authors believe, of such a, magnitude
as to warrant a critical review of the subject.
Hence, this article will summarize the state of Soviet chemical warfare capabili-
ties, both offensive and defensive; rationales from the Soviet point of view on the
utility of chemical employment in both nuclear and non-nuclear conflict; the state
of the U.S. posture to cope with such a threat; and the basic problems associated
with resolving chemical warfare issues within the U.S. defense establishment. As
the article will show, this assessment leads the authors to the conclusion that there
is a significant vulnerability in a critical aspect of U.S. and NATO military capa-
bility and that the actions currently under way to reduce the vulnerability in no
2. It is a mark of the U.S. attitude that the author of "Close Encounters of the Third Kind"
selected a nerve-gas "accident" as the circumstance that would most assure complete evacuation
of an areal
3. In the Chairman's Posture Statement (Ref. 3) the adjectives used to describe these aspects of
the U.S./NATO capability range from "not prepared," to "marginal" and "extremely limited,"
while those used to describe Soviet capabilities are "extensive," "superior," "formidable," and
the like (pp. 15, 90, 91).
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The Threat of Chemical Warfare 157
to
n
le
d?
on
of
f?
ad
way match the seriousness of the threat. U.S./NATO forces should expect to have
a toxic environment forced on them, and if, as today, they are "not prepared" (Ref..
3, p. 90) to operate in such an environment and to impose comparable problems
on the Warsaw Pact forces in response, Soviet use would clearly have disastrous--
and potentially decisive-consequences for NATO. And the U.S. /NATO lack of
capability may well invite exactly that which might be avoided, that is, Soviet use
of their chemical warfare superiority.
Chemical Warfare
Chemical weapons are unique among modern weapons in that they impact only
on living things-that is, they attack people without destroying physical facilities
or equipment.4 There are several types of chemical warfare agents, with widely
differing properties. Some are colorless, some odorless; others can be seen, as, for
example, in an approaching cloud, and some can be detected by their characteristic
smell. Some are quickly dissipated and lose their effectiveness in as short a time as
a few minutes; others persist-or can be made to persist-for a day or so; and
the more persistent agents, either by nature or by the addition of thickeners, can
last for a week, a month, or more, depending on the atmospheric conditions.
The chemical agents of greatest concern today are the nerve agents Sarin, soman
and VX, which attack the human nervous system, although older agents, such as
mustard and hydrogen cyanide, have important military advantages and hence are
serious threats in particular circumstances, some of which will be discussed below.
Nerve agents can be absorbed as vapor through the respiratory system or directly
through exposed skin that comes in contact with liquid agent droplets or concen-
trated vapor clouds. Even very small doses are sufficient to have an effect. Symp-
toms of nerve agent poisoning are a running nose, tightness in the chest, dimmed
vision, difficult breathing, drooling, sweating, nausea, vomiting, cramps, twitch-
ing, jerking, headache, confusion, drowsiness, convulsions and, if a lethal dose has
been absorbed, death. (Ref. 5, p. D-7) While the after-effects of the older, mustard-
type agents are serious and usually permanent-and, in fact, the horror of these
lasting effects may well be one of the major causes for the general repugnance
about this type of warfare5-full recovery from less-than-lethal doses of today's
4. While biological weapons likewise attack only people, they are generally not viewed as
battlefield weapons due to the time delay required before onset of effect.
5. Such an explanation, however, would hold in reverse as a factor in the Soviet emphasis on
this type of warfare-in World War I the Soviets suffered almost as many chemical warfare
fatalities and casualties as all other countries combined.
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International Security 158
nerve agents is entirely possible. Such doses can put personnel out 'of action for
days to weeks, however, depending on the amount of the dose and the medical
treatment available, and thus would increase the military impact, both through pre-
venting performance of military functions and, in addition, tying up many person-
nel in the administration of medical care for the incapacitated.
Chemical weapons are primarily tactical and can be delivered in a variety of
munitions, such as land mines, artillery rounds, multiple-rocket launchers, tactical
rockets such as the Soviet FROG, longer-range operational-tactical missiles such
as the Soviet SCUD, cruise missiles, air-delivered short-range attack missiles, and
bombs. In addition, agents can be sprayed by both land vehicles and airplanes and
helicopters.
Chemical weapons are basically area munitions; they affect anyone who is not
properly protected both at the time of agent delivery to the area or, in the case of
areas attacked with the more persistent -agents, anyone who subsequently enters
the area without proper protection. The lethal areas associated with the employ-
ment of these munitions depend on the agent, on the number of munitions em-
ployed, with several munitions normally used to "blanket" the area of interest,
and on a number of outside factors, such as weather, terrain, local vegetation, etc.
Areas that one can efficiently attack with a single salvo of a few rounds of the
larger weapons, i.e., bombs and missiles, may be roughly the size of a major
logistics area, depot, or an airbase, and areas which might be attacked with a few
battalion volleys of artillery might be the size of an anti-tank defense position.
Chemical weapons are particularly appropriate for use against facilities just prior
to overrunning them, or when it would be desirable to capture and use particular
assets, or in circumstances when continued offensive progress would be hampered
by the rubble created by conventional or nuclear explosives. Not only different
types of chemical agents but also specific agent/ munition combinations are more
or less useful for different purposes. A non-persistent agent attack would be
logical in advance of an assault, for example, in a concentrated, surprise mode to
cause heavy casualities at the position to be attacked. Multiple rockets, artillery, or
tactical air might be the best mode of delivery for this purpose. A persistent
agent, on the other hand, would most logically be employed to secure flanks or to
block off routes of counter-attack, to "put out of action" bypassed urban areas,
or to prevent the opponent's access to favorable ground or vital facilities-again,
particularly those whose preservation for one's own use appeared necessary or
desirable, such as rail or road networks or airfields. (Refs. 6 and 7, passim)
Atmospheric conditions are very important in determining the method of
employment of chemical weapons and in predicting effects. Chemical agents drift
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The Threat of Chemical Warfare 159
for
filar
red
ent
pore
be
e to
or
tent
or to
as,
ain,
or
with the wind, and lower temperatures lower their. evaporation rates; these sensi-
tivities vary, depending upon the agent. According to the relevant Army Field
Manual (Ref. 8), the meteorological conditions of interest are wind speed and di-
rection, temperature, and atmospheric stability. Predictability of agent dissemina-
tion patterns and of the potential persistence of effects is an issue in determining the
different agent/munition/target combinations of choice and the effects of use.
While uncertainties exist, except for very high winds the weather conditions can
be accounted for, and the type of agent selected and the weapons employed in
such a manner as to take into account those conditions. This should not be con-
sidered as major an issue as it often is. Other factors, such as target location
uncertainty, may well introduce more severe problems and apply to all weapons
effects calculations. Minimizing the uncertainties associated with the behavior of
chemical agents is largely a function of the attention paid to this matter..
Effectiveness of CW munitions can also be quite sensitive to the readiness of the
unit under attack. Here, readiness includes the type of uniform, the capabilities of
other individual and group protective equipment, decontamination capabilities,
and, of exceptionally great importance, training in the use of available equipment.
Chemical warfare is rather special in that considerable protection and readiness to
cope with the resulting environment, while technically and physically demanding,
can be achieved at relatively low cost. However, the measures that need to be under-
taken are often extremely cumbersome and inconvenient. No one likes the idea of
having to remain inside special clothing and to wear gas masks while fighting a
war. The incentives and capabilities to do so require special emphasis on under-
standing the threat and on regular training in operating in a CW environment.
Even with serious attention paid to these factors, a unit might well expect 5 to 15
percent casualties just from errors, oversights, or faulty equipment, e.g., a leaky
overgarment or gas mask; however, that is much better than the heavy casualty
level which might result from the only-marginally effective protective posture of
both the current U.S. forces and most of the rest of the NATO forces' (Ref. 3,
p. 90).
Considering the effects of chemical weapons throughout a target area, the ability
of such agents to penetrate into trenches and buildings, and the "lasting" nature
of their effects (if desired), chemical weapons should be recognized as very effective
on a pound-for-pound basis. While they do different things, and hence are not
directly comparable with conventional munitions, a rough estimate might well con-
6. Great variation in protection exists; according to Ref. 3, capabilities range from adequate to
essentially none (p. 90).
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International Security 160
sider them close to an order of magnitude more effective. During World War I,
when chemical weapons were used extensively, they were judged to be between
four and eight times as effective as high-explosive weapons (Ref. 9, p. 11-1 and
Ref. 2, p. 30). Current chemical weapons should be considered significantly more
effective in producing fatalities than World War I mustard and lewisite against
similar levels of protection. In a sense they might more accurately be compared to
nuclear weapons of a few kilotons yield, except without the attendant blast, thermal
and atomic radiation effects. However, comparative effects calculations for chemi-
cal weapons which consider them in isolation are of limited utility because such
weapons are often used in combination with others to achieve complementary
benefits. Thus one should expect the use of different agents at the same time
against one target and also expect the use of agents coupled with explosive and
fragmentation weapons, thus enhancing the impact of both. This latter combination
would be particularly synergistic in attacking most NATO operations complexes,
considering the nature of the facilities and the lack of readiness of the personnel to
deal with such combinations. For example, many buildings are relatively soft,
that is, easy to puncture, and contaminated portions that would result from a
combined conventional and chemical attack would be difficult to seal off. Another
example: while NATO may be prepared to repair damage, e.g., craters in runways,
it is not prepared if the area to be repaired is also contaminated.
The Current Soviet CW Posture
Chemical warfare clearly is a major contingency for which the Soviet Union plans.
Capabilities for chemical warfare are serious and specialized, and are integrated
throughout ground, air, and naval forces. The seriousness is demonstrated in force
structure and personnel, equipment, training and testing, and agents and muni-
tions. The -overall Soviet capability to conduct chemical warfare has been termed
"awesome" (Ref. 10, p. 22), and it is reportedly the "official Army position" today
that there is a "considerable" chemical threat to NATO forces and that the Soviets
are continuing to add to their CW capabilities (Ref. 6, p. 17).
Chemical defense units are organic to every Soviet command from front to
regiment. Smaller units, even down to company size, have special Chemical
Troops (Ref. 7, p. 3). There are "scores of Soviet generals and some 70,000-
100,000 full-time chemical warfare officers and men" (Ref. 10, p. 22). (The United
States has at most 2,000 officers and men engaged fulltime in some form of
chemical chores, and, of these, probably no more than a small percentage could be
regarded as equivalent.)
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The Threat of Chemical Warfare 1 61
Chemical warfare preparedness is also integral to the Soviet main fighting
equipment. All modern tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) are designed
to offer protection in both nuclear and chemical contaminated areas (Ref. 7, p. 3).
The tank and armored personnel carrier protection includes integral "protective
sealant liners," and air filters are provided which protect against chemical and
biological contamination. The remainder of the new Soviet generation of fighting
vehicles, including support vehicles, missile transporters, command vehicles, etc.,
are provided with supplies of individual protective equipment for the crews (Ref.
11 and Ref. 12).
There is also a considerable amount of issued individual protective equipment
and equipment for decontamination. The soldiers all have personal masks, protec-
tive clothing, chemical detectors and "effective" atropine-based compound syringe
antidotes (Ref. 7, p. 3, and Ref. 12).' Each Soviet division has decontamination
companies which are to decontaminate and return to combat men and equip-
ment. The specialized chemical decontamination equipment includes a unique
type of vehicle called "TMS-65," a truck-mounted turbojet spraying apparatus
for rapid decontamination of large vehicles (Ref. 7, p. 3). These capabilities do not
appear to be merely defensive but appear designed and deployed for use as part
of the Soviet offensive capability, i.e., to enable Soviet troops to exploit the results
of the employment of their chemical weapons. While the Soviet protective clothing
for the troops imposes considerable operating stress, as does the U.S. clothing, the
current asymmetry in CW offensive capability means that the Soviets need have
almost no fear of being subjected to contamination not of their own making.
Hence, rather than being continuously on the alert and in their protective gear,
they, unlike the U.S., would know when, where, and what agents are planned for
employment. Thus, they would need to don the cumbersome gear only at essential
times and places. Training in the use of the equipment for the purpose of fighting
during chemical attack is standard and is emphasized in all individual and unit
training (Ref. 7, p. 3), which, as a further indication of their seriousness, includes
training in live agent environments (Ref. 3, p. 90).
The magnitude of Soviet attention to CW in the design of their forces was not
clear to the U.S. defense community, despite the available intelligence material,
until analysis of the Soviet actions during the 1973 Middle East War and analysis
of the Warsaw Pact equipment captured during that war made many begin to
question the appropriateness of the U.S. lack of attention. As indicated in Ref. 13,
7. Prompt use of antidotes can protect personnel against several times the nerve gas exposure
that would otherwise be required for lethal effect.
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information gathered from [that] Middle East War has emphasized that foremost
among the potential adversaries of the United States in CW is the Soviet Union.
Although the CW equipment they furnished in the October War was defensive,
their forces are considered to be well-equipped for offensive and defensive CW
operations. Evidence of CW delivery systems and weapons development, chemical,
biological and radiological protective systems (CBR), realistic CBR training and
civil CBR training support the fact that the Soviets can operate in a toxic environ-
ment.
The large amounts of Russian CBR equipment captured in the Middle East ...
reflect this capability and emphasize Soviet CW preparedness. As the Army's
[then] Chief of Staff, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, testified before Congress on
14 February [1974], the U.S. Army was surprised by the [CW preparedness of the]
Arab forces, and is determined to improve its own CBR defenses. (pp. 21-22)
Analysis of captured assault equipment indicated that it had been designed to
operate in a CW environment and that personnel had been provided with individ-
ual CW protective gear and antidote inoculants. From the universality of protective
aspects of the captured weapons it was inferred that such protection on Soviet
equipment was standard (Refs. 11 and 14). General Abrams, for example, said
that he concluded that
chemical, biological and radiological defenses were now standard on all Soviet
weapons and thus had been included on the equipment sent to Egypt and Syria.
(Ref. 14, emphasis added.)
As to offensive capability, actual evidence is scarce-Knowledgeable persons,
however, including Professo o rn -Erickson of the University of Edinburgh (as
quoted in Ref. 7, p. 3), have stated that Soviet chemical warfare agents include
both World War I agents and more modern ones:
-mustard gases
-phosgene
-hydrogen cyanide
--roman
-other nerve gases
-an agent that "the Soviets label VR-55"
According to Erickson, chemical rounds exist for the 122-mm and 152-mm
artillery, the FROG surface-to-surface short-range rocket, the longer-range SCUD
surface-to-surface missile, and the BM-21 multiple rocket launcher (as quoted in
Ref. 7, p. 4).
Chemical artillery, mortars, mines, air-delivered bombs and spray tanks were
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The Threat of Chemical Warfare 163
in the Soviet inventory in World War II. There is no evidence that those munitions
have been destroyed, and a similar pattern of weaponization can therefore logically
be assumed for the post-World War II agents. A relatively more recent system,
the BM-21 multiple rocket launcher, may well., as Erickson says, also have such
rounds. It would be an ideal weapon system for delivery of a non-persistent agent,
such as hydrogen cyanide. Because of the short lifetime of delivered toxic concen-
tration, such an agent would be most useful against enemy forces immediately in
front of forward-moving troops; occupation or assault of facilities attacked with.
such an agent can be carried out in a very short time after that attack with minimal
danger to the assault troops. However, in the case of hydrogen cyanide in particu-
lar, this would not be very effective unless a lot of it were delivered to the target
in a short time. Hence, the value of a multiple rocket launcher:
The BM-21 . . . provides a multiple container for the agent, it insures effective
and rapid distribution of the agent over a target area, and the round can release the
agent in active form. A battalion volley can impact 720 rounds on a target. (Ref.
7, p. 3)
Soviet Rationale for Use
The potential Soviet use of chemicals in a major theater conflict which includes
the use of nuclear weapons seems certain: there would be many advantages to
the Soviets in hitting some targets without physically destroying them. And the
impact of the use of chemicals on the likelihood of coupling to a strategic nuclear
exchange might be viewed as minimal in that scenario: if escalation did not result
from the use of theater nuclear weapons, it would be unlikely to result from the
additional use of chemical weapons.
It is possible, however, that, should such a major theater war begin, the Soviets
might favor keeping it conventional, at least for some period of time, if they be-
lieved that they could do so while still accomplishing their objectives. These ob-
jectives, relative to NATO in such a context, could be, first, to improve the position
of the Soviet Union if the conflict should come to the point of a nuclear exchange
(by reducing or eliminating the NATO nuclear capability), and, second, to quickly
overrun NATO defense positions and seize critical territory. The primary problem
in achieving the first objective would be the destruction or "putting out of action"
of NATO nuclear forces-air capabilities, surface-to-surface missiles, artillery-
and their associated command/control. The primary problems in achieving the sec-
ond objective would be overrunning NATO anti-tank defenses, disabling NATO
ground-attack tactical air, and inhibiting NATO force movements.
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An important question here, particularly since the answer determines a great
deal of the impetus or lack thereof in the U.S. programs to cope with a potential
chemical threat, is whether chemical warfare agents would be employed by the
Soviets in such a non-nuclear phase of conflict in Europe. The U.S. perception-
both -official and unofficial-for many years has been, and, for the most part, still
is, that, given the Soviet definition of chemical weapons as "weapons of mass de-
struction," chhemic~~`".ter{arP woiid only occur as part of a nuclear attack, whether
that nuclear attack initiated a conflict or occurred at some later point. The present
authors disagree. While it is clear that an important thread of the Soviet view of
chemica an nuclear weapons is that the two are considered much alike, this
thread by itself is a gross oversimplification and cannot and should not be relied
upon to limit the type of conflict in which chemicals would be employed.
For the major Soviet concerns or targets in the event of either a conventional or
a nuclear start to a war in Europe-NATO anti-tank defense; NATO nuclear capa-
bility, including command and control; NATO reserves; and NATO tactical air-
chemical weapons in all cases offer important advantages that complement rather
than duplicate the effectiveness of both conventional weapons and nuclear weap-
ons, and recommend their use in both contexts. Without a good protective posture
on the part of NATO, fast-acting chemical weapons could paralyze NATO anti-
tank defenses without inhibiting Pact armor operations. Non-persistent agents,
such as hydrogen cyanide, delivered by multiple rocket launchers, coupled with
normal artillery preparation and smoke delivery, can effectively neutralize such
defenses within a few minutes and be safe for Pact overrun some minutes later.
Should nuclear weapons not be used, chemical weapons with persistent agents
would likely be very important and effective for disabling NATO nuclear capabili-
ties that are dispersed over areas, such as airbases and nuclear supply depots. With-
out a considerable protective posture on the NATO side, including decontamination
capability, Soviet use of chemical weapons could put such bases out of action for
extended periods of time with only a few repeated strikes with persistent chemical
munitions. Many command/control targets, such as radars, ground control sta-
tions, navigation transmitters, and so forth, are neither large enough to warrant a
nuclear strike nor vulnerable enough to be reliably destroyed with one sortie of
conventional munitions. For such targets, generally unprotected against chemical
agents, chemical weapons are the most efficient means of putting them out of
action in a context of nuclear or conventional conflict.
Further, in both conventional and nuclear scenarios, it would be preferable from
the Soviet point of view, to seize, rather than destroy, many targets including
airbases, petroleum-oil-and-lubricant storage depots, and transport centers (har-
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The Threat of Chemical Warfare 165
ith-
n for
1 sta-
mical
bors and airports). The objective is not to destroy these targets but merely prevent
their use by U.S./NATO forces until the Soviets can seize them and put them to
their own use-perhaps immediately, perhaps within a week or so (Ref. 15). In
these cases, again, chemical weapons offer important and unique advantages; with,
selection of the proper agent, under conditions where the U.S. and other NATO
forces have almost no decontamination capability, as today, such targets can, be
rendered unfit for NATO use but available for Soviet occupation and use at the
planned time.
roblem
re
d
p
y a seve
Finally, the movement of NATO reserves, which is alrea
given their deployment (Ref. 16, p. 19), could be seriously impeded by the applica-
tion of the more persistent chemical weapons to important nodes.
The effectiveness of CW weapons can be especially high in exactly these mission
areas because the desired results-disabling of the particular forces and contamina-
tion of particular areas-would not depend upon lethal doses of chemicals being
delivered over the entire target. Sublethal dose areas that extend well beyond the
lethal-dose areas will impose physically disabling effects on personnel who are
not protected. These effects, in particular the optical pain and miosis$ caused
by small doses of nerve agent, will prevent or seriously degrade the performance
of missions such as aiming, sighting, instrument reading, and flying, thus signi-
ficantly increasing the effectiveness of these weapons beyond the usual estimates
of effectiveness that are based only on the lethal areas.
All in all, chemical weapons offer very significant advantages to the Soviets in
any kind of war, nuclear or conventional. Considering their advantages, many of
which the Soviets obtain because of the "marginal" (Ref. 3, p. 91) U.S./NATO
preparedness either to cope with such employments or to subject the Soviets to the
same environment throughout the depth of their offensive deployment, it is in-
conceivable to the present authors that the Soviets would not capitalize on their
capabilities. The benefits to be derived-disabling NATO tank defenses, paralyzing
NATO nuclear capabilities, rendering inaccessible logistics areas and equipment
depots, and hence greatly shortening the war-are far greater than any additional
incremental risk or political cost associated with their employment over that of the
war itself.
This conclusion is gradually gaining acceptance. The current Army Manual
100-5, the basic Army document on tactics, published in 1976, notes that the So-
viets clearly have a capability to use chemicals in any level of conflict:
S. Miosis is contraction of the pupil of the eye, resulting in dimmed vision.
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International Security 166
... Soviet or Soviet-equipped and trained forces could initiate and sustain large-
scale CW operations in either a conventional or conventional-nuclear conflict.
Their doctrine emphasizes the employment of chemical weapons in close coordina-
tion with conventional and nuclear weapons to capitalize on the attributes of each.
(Ref. 9, p. 11-5, emphasis added.)
And this year's Department of Defense Annual Report (the Secretary's Posture
Statement) goes a bit further and says that this capability is likely to be considered
for use:
It is likely that the Soviets would consider using a combination of chemical and
conventional weapons, as well as a combination of chemical, nuclear and conven-
tional weapons-and they have the capability to do either-if they believed a sig-
nificant tactical advantage could be gained. (Ref. 17, p. 157, emphasis added.)
The old Penkovskiy Papers book includes the statement: "let there be no
doubt: if hostilities should erupt, the Soviet Army would use chemical weapons
against its opponents" (Ref. 18, p. 249). Further, the Papers state that "the U.S.S.R.
has already given political release for chemical weapons" (Ref. 18, p. 249). John
'f Erickson has stated more explicitly that "Soviet division commanders have chemi-
cal weapons planning, release, and employment authority" (as quoted in Ref. 7,
p. 3)., It is the conclusion of the authors of this paper that if such delegation is
assumed, use of chemicals should be considered a certainty early in any conflict.
Further, even if such authority has not devolved, the Soviet use of chemical war-
fare during a conflict or a phase of a conflict limited otherwise to "conventional"
weapons, should not be discounted. We agree with the statement that:
The Soviets are so immersed in chemical weaponry, tactics, doctrine, equipment
and personnel, and so much of their training centers around the use of lethal
agents, that it would be odd, from a military standpoint, if they did not employ
them. (Ref. 10, p. 22)
Protective .Aspects of the Current U.S. Posture
The U.S. posture to cope with a chemical attack was evaluated by the Army in
1975, by the Air Force in 1974, and by the Navy in 1977, in response to the
concern over the threat which was generated as a result of the 1973 Mid-East War.
These analyses showed that there was a great deal to be desired. The Soviet superi-
ority over the United States in chemical warfare capabilities was assessed as con-
siderable. However, not only was the imbalance serious at that time, but it has
continued to grow.
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The Threat of Chemical Warfare 167
rge-
iflict.
ina-
ach.
ture
erect
and
ven-
sig-
e no
!pons
,.S.R.
John
hemi-
:ef. 7,
ion is
nflict.
war- oral"
7ment
lethal
nploy
Improvement programs in the Army and Air Force are now, belatedly, under
way to ameliorate some of the deficiencies in their protective postures. The Navy
appears less concerned. The "ultimate" goal of the Army and Air Force programs,
toward which currently funded improvements are a first step, is for units to be
protected sufficiently to continue sustained operations in a chemically contami-
nated environment, a capability for which, according to Ref. 3, the forces are "not
prepared" today (p. 90). To first survive and then operate, the units as a whole,
and the individuals separately, must be thoroughly trained in:
-Interpretation of intelligence and detection and warning data indicating. chemi-
cal attack.
-Immediate actions necessary to protect against the agent.
-Reporting procedures to insure warning/ notification of adjacent and higher
elements.
-Operations in the appropriate protective posture.
-Recovery from the protective posture and resumption of normal operations.
In addition to the education and training implied by the above requirements,
improving the defensive posture means provision for individual protective equip-
ment, collective protection equipment for facilities, decontamination and evacua-
tion equipment, and development of the proper procedures and the proper train-
ing for the use of these. Specialized units are needed to support operations in
the contaminated environment and, therefore, some force structure changes will
be required; regular and extensive training for all individuals and units in per-
forming their normal mission operations in a contaminated environment is neces-
sary; and equipment for the forces not only for both operational use but also
for training use must be provided. Fortunately, such training can and, in fact,
should, be primarily integrated training; the desired proficiency in operating in
contamined environments must and can be achieved while performing other
mission-related training tasks. And, further, while resources are required to accom-
plish all the above-listed tasks, a chemical warfare defense program does not in-
volve large amounts of money. Much can be gained at relatively low cost.
Concurrent with initiating development of comprehensive doctrine and equip-
ment procurement, the Army is also beginning to establish a chemical defense
capability as part of an overall NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) defense im-
provement at division level. The major effort here will be the provision of recon-
naissance and decontamination support in the form of an NBC defense company
which is to support the brigades of the division. This improvement is scheduled to
provide support for forward Army units within the next year or two. As the Army
my in
to the
t War.
uperi-
s con-
it has
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 International Security 168
doctrinal work is completed, efforts will be expanded to include the necessary rein
area support. In a related force-structure effort, the Army has reviewed staffing
and recommends an addition of several thousand spaces to the total force for NBC
defense. Procurement efforts are expanding to begin supplying the forward-base
personnel with equipment.
The Air Force is also moving to establish some chemical warfare defens
preparedness. Procurement of protective equipment is being accomplished. Priori-
ties for equipment distribution for the Air Force are for in-place units in the high-
threat areas; however, equipment is also being provided to CONUS Air Force
bases for training purposes, and an Air Force-wide effort has been initiated to
ensure that personnel receive adequate CW training. Additional manpower has
been judged necessary to support the training and management of the additional
equipment in the Air Force as well as in the Army The Air Force gained 300
all areas:
-Attention
-Awareness of the threat
-Personnel
---Material
-Doctrine
-Training
-Facilities
additional personnel authorizations for thq disaster preparedness mission, which!
includes CW defense, in FY 77, and identified several hundred additional man-i
power authorizations believed necessary for the FY 79/83 period. (In the opinion
of the present authors, the size of the immediate Army and Air Force manpower
needs for CW defense are an indication of how bad the situation currently is.)
Both the Army and the Air Force have special problems in regard to the special
protection requirements for pilots and crews. It is not likely that aircraft in-;
teriors can be kept free from agent contamination. Absorption of even very small
quantities of nerve agent will cause miosis, thereby rendering the crew member
virtually unable to fly his aircraft. For this reason, the Air Force has adopted a
"dirty cockpit" concept, which requires that whole-body and eye/respiratory
protection for air crews be provided in addition to normal flight gear. An ensemble
has been developed for this purpose by the Air Force and when procured will be
the first tactical-fighter qualified CW protective ensemble in the free world.
As all the armed services will admit, the task is by no means finished, and, in
fact, is only barely getting under way. There is a great deal still to accomplish in;
%wor NW
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The Threat of Chemical Warfare 169
And progress seems interminably slow: procurement rates are such that equip-
ment sufficient for more than a very limited survival time, and only limited opera-
tions during that time, will not be available until sometime in the mid-1980s;
training depends on both equipment with which to train and qualified personnel
to do the training and evaluation, and all progress in beginning training programs
is being handicapped by the "insufficient issue of equipment" (Ref. 3, p. 90), by
the personnel deficiencies, and by the general attitude of repugnance about CW
that permeates the miiltary forces. Current training is described as "limited" and
"usually rudimentary" (Ref. 3, p. 90).
Clearly, considerable integration and coordination is required in moving toward
a uniform protective posture for our forces as a whole. Unfortunately for the
coordination of both policy and program aspects of solving the problem, there are
almost no focal points at significant levels in the services for force development,
training, coordination, direction, or plans, and none in the Office 'of the Secretary
of Defense. Responsibilities for CW defense generally are fragmented, left up to
individuals at different levels to respond as they see fit, or at best, assigned as sec-
ondary responsibilities. The store is, in effect, left largely untended. Although the
recent Army action to reestablish a CW focal point at the Departmental level is a
significant step, it should be recognized that this was done by adding the CW
responsibility to the existing position of nuclear responsibility. As recognized by
the Marine Corps, "the defense against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
attacks requires special consideration and training" (Ref. 19, p. 153). While such
defense should not be vibwed as "special," but rather should be considered an in-
tegral part of the standard posture, perhaps special coordination and integration
of efforts to improve are temporarily warranted until considerably further progress
is made in developing a momentum toward an integrated and adequate capability.
There is another aspect that must be considered as well. In warfare some of the
personnel, no matter what the protective efforts, will suffer physical trauma. Medi-
cal evidence indicates that even a small, nonlethal dose of some agents can severely
complicate other medical problems likely to occur. Agent effects can possibly inhib-
it necessary life-sustaining and recuperative mechanisms. Medical treatment, fur-
ther, requires not only a biologically clean environment, but chemically safe sur-
roundings as well. Even if a medical treatment facility were to remain initially
uncontaminated, there is the problem of preventing secondary contamination, for
example, from contaminated clothing that the victim is wearing at the time of
entry into the treatment space. The limited number of medical personnel must be
Protected and yet still permitted to perform their mission. Many such issues are
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 International Security 1 7
still without solutions. Equipment and training can go a long way toward over.
coming inherent design and use deficiencies, but further research, analysis, and
development is clearly necessary to provide more answers and solutions.
We must meet the requirement' of providing adequate protection, when feasible,
to the officers and men of our armed forces. The complex systems used today,
and those likely for the future, require skilled manpower that must spend a
long time in the training pipeline. No matter how sophisticated the equipment,
no matter what degree of automation it entails, we must continue to rely on
people. They are an integral link in the systems of modern defense. The current
and continuing climate of austerity points toward military forces of reduced size
with reduced manning levels; hence, the importance of each individual, very spe-
cialized individuals with only minimal crosstrained backup, is growing. It is for
the integrity of our forces that we must consider whether or not we are moving
fast enough on defense against ON, as well as defense against the myriad other
threats.
The value of each man is difficult to quantify. It may well be possible to place
a dollar value on his salary, even, perhaps, on the expense of his long period of
training. But it is beyond our capability to place a price tag on his services if, as a
result of relatively simple and unopposed enemy action, he cannot continue effec-
tively-and the result is a defeat.
Problems in Improving the U.S./NATO Posture
Despite the beginning of programs to improve the CW protection of the U.S.
forces, the overall effort is limited and suffers from a serious sense of insecurity,
and from concern over anything that might draw adverse publicity from the press,
Congress, the arms control community, or academia. As explained to the authors
by several senior U.S. officials, while the character and magnitude of the problem a
were clear, because of the political sensitivities associated with the topic, as one
phrased it, he "could not stick his neck out." Furthermore, because of the low state
of interest in and efforts focused on this area for a number of years, there have been
relatively few persons thinking about the contributions that such protection could
make to either deterrence or warfighting. Consequently, the value for deterrence
and warfighting of improvements in the U.S. CW posture has not been convincing-
l
i
l
d
Thi
bl
y art
cu
ate
.
s pro
em is demonstrated in the following passages:
There are statements in testimony, in field manuals, in CW studies and in war
games which purport to show that CW has a high utility and that it could be a
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The Threat of Chemical Warfare 171
cer-
and
ible,
day,
itd a
Bent,
on
Arent
1 size
see-
s for
ving
ther
place
lod of
t,asa
effec-
U.S.
urity,
press,
s one
v state
rence
ncing-
d be a
decisive factor in future battles. But the long-standing low state of both defensive
and offensive CW capabilities in U.S. forces belies that conclusion, The lown rior?t is
assigned to CW would be inexplicable if that were true. (Ref. 20, p. p
added.)
And,
In summary it can be said that the U.S. chemical warfare policy is stable, con-
sistent with tradition and in general accord with the basic attitude of Americans
towards chemical warfare ... it can be said that a lingering ambiguity persists .
with respect to CW policy, as to whether a major chemical warfighting capability
is required for an adequate U.S. national security posture. Because it has long
been technologically feasible and financially possible to have such a capability,
ietCW offensive
S
ov
if deemed essential to cope with the threat of known major
and defensive capabilities and in view of the apparent absence of such a U.S.
capability (as acknowledged in testimony before Congress), it may reasonably
be inferred that chemical warfighting is not an essential military requirement. (Ref.
20, p. 41, emphasis added.)
Further, to be politically viable, any improvement program has to be strictly
defense or protection oriented. At this time "efforts to improve the CW retaliatory
capability have been halted" (Ref. 3, p. 91), despite the fact that U.S. policy allows
for continued offensive capability for deterrence and to permit a reasonable degree
of retaliation (Ref. 3, p. 90), and despite the fact that the current stockpile is
"inadequate ... becoming obsolete." (Ref. 3, p. 90)
The current policy of the United States regarding chemical and biological
warfare was promulgated by the President on 25 November 1969. The policy ob-
jective was stated to be to deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and
to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails. First use of chemical weapons
and all use of biological weapons were renounced. In January, 1975 the U.S. rati-
fied the 1925 Geneva Protocol which essentially contains the same chemical/
biological policies as those unilaterally stated in 1969. Additionally, in April 1975,
Executive Order 11850 extended the no-first-use policy to riot control agents and.
herbicides in war except for defensive purposes.
In May of 1977, a review of the chemical warfare policy and posture of the
United States was directed by the President. This review resulted in a presidential
decision which stipulated no immediate policy changes but called for another re-
view of both the policy and posture in 1978, pending the outcome of another year's
effort at the ongoing CW treaty negotiations in the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva. This decision appears to move the United States
more seriously than ever toward negotiating a, treaty banning chemical weapons,
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International Security 1 72
if possible, despite the fact that there are still major points to be worked out in the
on-going negotiations, involving both verifications measures' (Ref. 6, p. 20) and
the sorts of items to be banned or limited (Ref. 2, p. 6). Meanwhile, the "halt" in
any improvements in U.S. forces for CW retaliation-in-kind is, in the present
authors' opinion, the result of a mistaken impression that such restraint might be
reciprocated or is necessary to demonstrate to the Soviets the good U.S. intentions
with respect to the on-going treaty negotiations.
Given the results of the 1977 review, it is not surprising that the few improve-
ment programs are progressing so slowly. Chemical warfare preparedness, in
general, has only recently benefitted from any attention at all; for most of the ten
years since the Dugway test accident, as has been noted, it has been a neglected
area, even compared to other neglected areas of security needs. While the Dugway
accident served as a trigger, however, it was, the authors believe, only that; the
reasons for neglect of this facet of warfare go much deeper. There are a number of
causes, and they should be understood in detail, because they continue to affect
the fragile impetus for improvement.
First, the neglect has occurred partly because the predominant U.S. assumption,
given the Soviet definition of chemical weapons as "weapons of mass destruc-
tion," is that CW would be used by the U.S.S.R. only as an adjunct or supplement
in a large scale theater nuclear conflict. In that case, the nuclear use is seen as domi-
nant in terms of war conduct and outcome; chemical weapons are discounted as of
relatively minor importance in that nuclear environment. Hence, the relative lack
of preparedness in the chemical posture is not considered to seriously compound
other preparatory oversights, such as maldeployment. Further, because the United
States focus has been on deterring nuclear war, not on evolving a capability to
fight it, U.S. nuclear capabilities are, according to this logic, not only the primary
but also a sufficient deterrent by themselves. Chemical warfare preparedness is
viewed as, at best, an unessential component of deterrence, and, at worst, a poten-
tial source of disaster. One example of the latter logic is:
... Since nuclear weaponry, tactical or otherwise, is a built-in deterrent to war,
it would make sense to reduce the number of other dangerous alternative weapons
such as chemicals, lasers, and electromagnetic weaponry. With them out of the
way, nuclear war conceivably could be less likely because fewer types of weapons
9. There is widespread agreement that a ban on chemical weapons is not fully verifiable without
inspection measures so intrusive as probably to be both politically and commercially unacceptable.
Among other reasons, this is because production facilities for chemical agents cannot be distin-
guished either from the air or from external ground inspection. (Ref. 21, pp. 323-326)
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The Threat of Chemical Warfare 17'3
ption,
omi-
as of
lack
nited
ty to
ss is
would be around for starting trouble with, thus risking escalation with nuclear
weapons. (Ref. 6, p. 19.)
It is believed by the present authors that this approach only works if both sides
concur. And, in contrast to the United States, the Soviets appear to view warfight-
ing capabilities not only as a feasible but also as a principal objective of military
preparation and, further, to view chemical offensive capabilities as a unique and
extremely important aspect of that preparation for all modem warfare, be it
nuclear or non-nuclear. As noted above, considering the potential benefits for the
Soviets in using chemical agents in attack of air bases, in assaulting critical facili-
ties and features of the terrain, in denying NATO use of nuclear weapons, and in
disabling NATO anti-tank defenses in conjunction with conventional artillery and
smoke, and the facts that all aspects of Soviet training-conventional as well as
nuclear-emphasize operations in toxic environments and that chemical capabili-
ties are integrated throughout their force structure, it appears entirely plausible
that the Soviets intend far more than just retaining chemical weapons as an
adjunct to nuclear weapons in a major war. Where is clear evidence to suggest
that the Soviets do distinguish be vein chPmrcat r~ ii ide r, tt, t they 6VP
separated the two, and that chemical weapons are considered to have an effective
and important role both in a nuclear conflict and in a conventional conflict. Fur-
ther, because the use of such weapons in a conventional conflict, or in a conven-
tional phase of a conflict, might satisfy multiple Soviet political and military objec-
tives, such use must be considered plausible. Under this assumption, lack of U.S.
preparedness for such an environment looks considerably more dangerous.
Second, U.S. repugnance and fear associated with the topic of chemical warfare
and the mirror-imaging assumption that the Soviet Union shares this repugnance,
permeates the political and defense establishment. Chemical warfare, curiously
much more so than nuclear warfare, is termed "not chivalrous" and "bordering
more on murder than on the killing according to the rules of warfare" (Ref. 6, p.
17). This fear and repugnance can be said to describe the traditional overall U.S.
approach to CW, in contrast to an approach based on understanding.
At least part of this perspective appears to result from the strong memories of
the World War I use of chemicals and the panics associated with those uses. Con-
cern over such panics extended into World War II and provided an enlightening
glimpse of the impact of this fear on actual combat capabilities. Although chemi-
als were officially not used, there was one cry of "gas" during the Omaha Beach
invasion. This led to the loss of discipline and the complete disruption of command
throughout an entire division, which subsequently was not reconstituted as an
(tective fighting force for three hours.
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Part of the repugnance and fear may well have originated from a moral
basis, and part of it has also probably derived from the simple pragmatic problem
of fighting while wearing protective clothing and gas masks. The latter is viewed
as a real ordeal that poses a major hindrance and presents severe training incen-
tive problems, particularly in peacetime and when chemical weapons have not been
used extensively for fifty years.
Additionally, there is considerable skepticism in the U.S. defense community
as to the effectiveness ofc1t=ieft4-~ons, and this, in turn, feeds the fear and
repugnance. In arguing against the effectiveness of CW weapons, many people
cite the problem of predicting coverage areas. As discussed above, this involves
the effect of local meteorological conditions on the dispersal, settling, and
evaporation of the chemicals. And, while it is true that there are uncertainties
associated with planning CW employment, and some potential that such use might
impact on the user's troops, the issues of "uniformity of effect" and "prediction of
effect" should not be confused. The state of the art of prediction could be much
further advanced in the United States than it is today. It is not, not because
of limitations in the currently available U.S. analytical models and quantita-
tive methodology to calculate effects areas, but rather because of lack of knowl-
edge about the models and methods and lack of people to apply them (partially
a result of the lack of priority and apathy about this subject and the resulting lack
of effort). Such limitations need not be continued, however, nor do they imply
that the weapon itself is any less effective. Other problems, which apply to all
weapons, as noted above, may introduce more severe uncertainties than errors in
estimating precise coverage or dose concentration contours. Also, the problem of
the potential for variations in coverage that might impose a danger on friendly
troops can be compensated for by selecting the proper delivery system and agent
combination and by preparing the protective posture of one's own side, both to
guard against unknown wind currents and drafts that may carry the agent back
over the troops using it and to permit rapid movement through those areas over
which the contamination has been disseminated. In general, the use of. CW need
not end up introducing any more unknowns than are already associated with
normal conventional warfare and certainly far less than are associated with
theater nuclear warfare."
10. Among the more illuminating findings on the analysis and uncertainty problems associated
with normally "well-understood" conventional war, are the results that HERO has obtained in
analyzing more than 100 engagements and campaigns of World War II and the Arab-Israeli Wars
of 1967 and 3.973. That study concludes, among other things, that there is "no apparent rela-
tionship between force ratios and rates of advance" (Ref. 22, p. 12).
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The Threat of Chemical Warfare 175
oral
lem
wed
cen-
nity
and
ople
Ives
and
ties
ight
n of
such
use
tita-
wl-
ally
lack
ply
all
s in
of
dly
ent
to
ack
ver
eed
fated
d in
Nars
rela-
The problem of skepticism about utility again has exacerbated the U.S. rejec-
tion of chemical warfare because of the U.S. propensity to mirror-image: because
the United States does not believe CW weapons have military utility, the Soviets
are viewed by some as rejecting an effective role for such weapons. Thus, accord-
ing to this rationale, attention need not be paid to either offense or defense pre-
paredness.
Again, it is believed by the authors that, while the repugnance and fear may be
a perfectly reasonable view of the "immorality" of chemical warfare, the evidence
is that the repugnance is not shared by the Soviet Union. The authors believe the
evidence supports the interpretation that:
Chemical warfare, to the Soviet leadership, is just another means of winning. This
form of warfare holds for them none of the disgust and fear with which it is justly
regarded in the West. (Ref. 2, p. 22)
Third, and closely related to the preceding problems, communicating the extent
and significance of the Soviet CW threat and its import for the U.S./NATO posture
has been and remains a significant problem. The basic problem here has not been
one of lack of intelligence analyses. The fundamental problem has been that of
communicating to an audience that basically has not wanted to "believe" or to
address the problem in earnest, for the reasons cited in this section. In effect, it
required the "hard" evidence of the actual, physical materiel captured during the
Middle East War of 1973 to get some command attention. To a lesser extent,
however, the problem is also generated by the limitations of scope and breadth
of the analyses available on the threat and its impact as follows:
(1) Most of the threat analysis that has been available within the defense com-
munity has been, and is, largely technically oriented. The reporting of available
data on stockpile of agents., systems for offense and protection, and order-of-battle
tend to receive the emphasis. To develop a credible story, however, interpretation
of the data, rationale for use, doctrine, potential employment plans, and most im-
portantly, impact on U.S./NATO survival and operations is critical, and, generally
speaking, has been least available.
(2) This is a result, in part, of the lack of priority assigned to this subject and,
therefore, the number of experienced people that are charged with CW threat anal-
ysis. There are very few such people, only a handful, and the majority of these are
technical specialists. It is no wonder, when these numbers are compared with the
numbers of analysts devoted to other tasks, that the chemical warfare problem
has not received the attention which it has deserved. The base for advocacy has
been extremely limited.
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 International Security 1 76
(3) A further reason for limited communication of the threat has been the lim-
ited extent to which analyses are distributed, not only within the Department of
Defense itself, and to' other government agencies, but also to contractors, who play
a major role in the U.S. national security decisionmaking process. While detailed
information in its original form should rightly be restricted to a very small com-
munity, even the derivative analyses have had an extremely limited audience be-
cause of what have been, in the present authors' opinion, unnecessarily constrain-
ing levels of classification.
(4) An additional, and very important, part of the problem has been that the
intelligence analysts concerned are, generally speaking, restricted by charter from
looking at the U.S./NATO capabilities to cope with the imposition of the toxic
environments which the threat could present. Hence, either they have not under-
stood or they have been prohibited from including in their analyses consideration
of the impact of threat use. It is only generation of and communication of that
impact which could have and can now lead to further attention being paid to the
available analyses and further efforts being allocated to generating other needed
analyses.
(5) To the extent information on Soviet CW activities has been examined at
all, moreover, the primary focus has been on CBR (chemical, biological, radio-
logical) protection, and its "defensive" nature. And, given the common assump-
tion that such weapons would only be used in nuclear conflict, the common view of
a large-scale, highly destructive, nuclear war in Europe leading to "radioactive
deserts" (Ref. 23, p. 40) had led to an interpretation that the large Warsaw Pact
CW protective capabilities, training, etc., could well be primarily for anti-radiation
and anti-fallout purposes. Again, the CW role has been largely dismissed."
Fourth, the inherent U.S. belief in arms control and/or disarmament as a solu-
tion to military problems, and the resulting widespread assumption that the terms
of the Geneva Protocol forbidding the first use of chemical weapons will be ob-
served by the Soviet Union, has contributed to the paralysis in CW preparatory
efforts by making preparations to cope with such use appear unnecessary, particu-
larly in a time in which resources are severely limited. Likewise, the hopes for a new
arms control treaty banning chemical weapons altogether have minimized incen-
tives to solve the imbalance, as noted above, by halting improvements in the re-
taliatory posture, and have also reduced incentives to improve protection. How-
11. The authors believe that a widespread better understanding of the Soviet approach to war in
Europe in a broad sense, as well as a better understanding of the resulting potential role for CW
would help clarify the situation. For some ideas on the former, see, for example, Refs. 15 and 24.
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The Threat of Chemical Warfare , 77
he lim- ever, it is one contention of this article that depending on the goodwill. of one's
ent of q opponent in wartime, that is, assuming that the current in-force treaty which con-
ho play strains only actions rather than capabilities will have any effect in a crunch, is
detailed unwise and may well lead to disastrous consequences. In fact, since 1925 two of
all com- the three uses of CW in conflict have been by signatories of the Geneva Conven-
ence be- tion against defenseless forces which had no capability for retaliatior-in: kind.i2
nstrain- $ Allowing a potential treaty which is merely under discussion--and about which
there is considerable fundamental disagreement between the negotiating parties
that the as to terms and, in particular, verification provisions-to determine the U.S. pos-
ter from ture at this stage makes a travesty of the arms control negotiation process. Arms
the toxic control negotiation is meaningless if the Soviets can halt U.S. efforts to redress
)t under- Soviet advantages merely through their continuing presence at the negotiating
ideration table, with no noticeable reins on their own programs. ]Further, while the propo-
n of that nents of a treaty such as that currently under negotiation will. argue that the pur-
aid to the pose of the treaty is to constrain capabilities by eliminating a class of weapons-
,er needed t unlike the Geneva Protocol-the authors believe that, because of the difficulties
associated with verification, this purpose is simply unachievable. The security of
amined at our forces would again rest essentially on the goodwill and conscience of the So-
cal, radio- viets to uphold their side of the bargain. The only Soviet motivation that the
Y assump- authors believe can reasonably explain the continuous Soviet interest in negotiating
on view of a chemical weapons ban is a deception or propaganda move whose objective is the
radioactive continued debilitation of U.S. efforts to redress the balance, thus cementing an
arsaw Pact asymmetry in their favor. This would also mesh with and follow an apparent So-
ti-radiation vier disinformation scheme designed to influence President Nixon to halt chemical
d.11
9, 1 and biological weapon development in 1969, as reported in Ref. 25. And the con-
s as a solu- ft - tinued curtailing of any improvements in the U.S. CW retaliation areas is exactly
at the terms what is happening,
will be ob- A better approach to a two-aspect policy of arms control negotiations and neces-
preparatory t nary improvements was indicated by Brigadier General Lynwood B. Lennon, then
ary, particu- - Deputy Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy for the Army, as quoted in Ref. 6:
pes fora new Chemical warfare deterrence and chemical weapon arms control efforts are not
nts in the re- p lementary approaches to an eventual elimination of chemical warfare. Near-term
ection. How- Oil national and collective security requirements need not and should not be sacrificed
12. The three uses were Italy against Ethiopia in 1935, Japan against China in the 1940s, and
! ,rrr a ;ainsr Yernen in 1967. Japan had, at the time of use, not yet ratified the Convention; it
slid so in 1970.
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 International Security 178
otia-
notion that dof such eterrencegmust
to the allure of all illioive arms
info ce the tcommon senent. The
reinforce
ti ons seems clearly to o
continue until an enforceable verifiable agreement can be reached. (p. 17, emp a-
sis added.)
Fifth, collateral changes in other aspects of the overall military balance-
strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, canoe Its not to be recogn zed. As fo ceecom-
situation more important, and this pp
ponent balances shift, the relative posy ibe s of total foce r Changes postures
in the nuclear
l
h
oa
the contribution of each aspect s
balance, at both the strategic and theater levels, have perhaps weakened the NATO
lion of the nuclear deterrent umbrella the option of increasing NATO's conventional
nations have generally considered warfare posture to match the Warsaw Pact ventby U.Sa unrealistic;
nuclear supei ority
this deficiency was viewed for my years as offset appl However, ifthat offset does not apply at aari?a asymmetry-in ~ hemay . m cal welwarl
posy
in the opposite direction, another serious tares--may have a real impact the delicate relative role of chemical warfare postures
In addition to a shift in the potential balance
in the overall force balance, there have been changes in the CW posture postures itself, as discussed above; the asymmetelof thesefand other authohs, r
two sides has increased. Furthermore, in the opinion
the imbalance is continuing to grow (Ref. 3, p. 89) and may soon reach the stage
where it becomes threatening to (1.) our ability to survive in Europe, (2) our ability
to fight in Europe, and (3) our ability to control escalation.
One of the more disconcerting aspects of chemical warfare is that the greatest
advantages and incentives for the use of chemicals exist when othe a combatants
have capability
asymmetry in chemical warfare
been used only when such ~ n imbalance
Historically, chemical weapons
existed; and, conversely, their use has o in actuality ential user. absence whenana balance in
extensive
a potential off ive
capabilities has been perceived by
use of gas in World War II is a good eampe of the
eason forsnot
both sides, athe of
symmetry-or perceived offensive symmetry. On r
se-
employing chemical weapons appears to have been a perception that the other side wou had an equal or better capability and,
antahence, the lae supriseafir t use mig 1t pro-
vere and would undermine any ges that t
vide. In particular, the British considered using t deciedd do he to
ob wn. Atlthe
thought-and correctly-that the German capability
same time, the Germans considered using CW but did not, because their intelli-
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gence attributed a greater capability to the Western powers. (This particular
German intelligence assessment was based on an analysis of the amount of U.S.
research in the area of insecticides, particularly DDT. The abrupt cessation of
publications about that research as the capabilities involved in the research moved
to support the war effort was taken by the Germans to mean that the CW aspect
of the research, i.e., nerve agents, had become a war priority.)
The impact of defensive postures depends, to a considerable extent, on the fact
that chemical warfare agents as a class can largely be countered through the use of
appropriate protective equipment, given adequate warning, training, and doc-
trine. In addition to the relative ease, technically, of developing such protection
against chemical weapons, as compared with many other types of defense, it is not,
as has been noted, particularly expensive to procure in adequate quantities. While a
protective posture is unlikely to be perfect, it could have considerable effect, and,
hence, would minimize the incentives for the use of chemicals, particularly for an
attacker who is depending on speed for his own troops and who would be ham-
pered at least somewhat if his own troops had to don their protective gear-wheth-
er to pass through self -imposed contamination or because of fear of retaliation.
In contrast, it is in a situation of asymmetry in both aspects that a user of CW
can attain both maximum effect on his opponent and, because of minimum fear of
retaliation in kind, a minimum hindrance of his own forces.
Thus, there appears to be a significant vulnerability in a critical aspect of U.S.
and NATO military capability, and actions under way to reduce the present vul-
nerability do not match the seriousness of the threat. United States/NATO forces
should expect to have a toxic environment forced on them, and, if they are not
prepared to operate within such an environment and impose comparable problems
on the Warsaw Pact forces, Soviet use would clearly have disastrous consequences
for NATO.
Decisions on the importance of improvements in the chemical warfare posture
will have to be made in the near future-that is, what budgetary and other priori-
ties should be assigned to the solution of this problem, recognizing that improving
the current U.S. position is not a "big money" question. Decisions are also needed
on the value of arms control and disarmament measures which attempt to limit this
area of military capabilities. It is important not to confuse a national policy of no
first use and a national goal of effective arms control with the need to be able, first,
to cope with the imposition of a toxic environment, and, second, to respond in kind
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International Security 180
if and as long as that remains a U.S. policy option. At present the United States is
not prepared to do either. And this imbalance tends to invite exactly that which
should be avoided, that is, Soviet use of their chemical warfare superiority.
However, redressing the imbalance, or even understanding its implications, is
not a short-term proposition, The protective posture improvements required
cannot be accomplished by the mere infusion of funds to buy more masks and
protective garments. What is required is a major change in attitude toward chemi-
cal munitions and an understanding of how to conduct operations in a toxic
environment. Additionally, the issue of retaining, destroying or replacing the
chemical munition stockpile is to be re-examined this year, after another year's
experience in the ongoing arms control negotiations in Geneva. What is required
here is a clear understanding of the risks of such a treaty as that now being dis-
cussed and the role of a retaliation-in-kind capability for both deterrence and war-
fighting.
Unusual attention and direction from the top in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and also in the armed services are now required to avoid continu-
ing in this position of grave weakness vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact forces. The first
step should be to preserve those basic assets and experienced skills required to build
a basis of understanding. Considerable data exist, together with a modicum of
experts who have weathered the decline and fall of CW preparedness. Immediate
attention and moderate funding are warranted to stabilize these capabilities and,
using them as a base, to plan a rebuilding effort and establish priorities. The initial
priority should be to build the foundation for a widespread understanding of
chemical warfare and toxic environments.
Immediate actions that should be conducted within all agencies and appropri-
ately coordinated and disseminated include, first, detailed analysis and evaluation
of the total Soviet and Warsaw Pact CW offensive capabilities and employment
strategy in both nuclear and conventional conflicts. This should be disseminated not
just among people concerned with the CW area, but among all agencies and con-
tractors whose concern includes some aspect of the posture in Europe. Second, and
in parallel, analysis, test, and evaluation efforts should be undertaken to under-
stand the impact of different dose level exposures, particularly low-level exposures,
on the -operation and effectiveness of weapons systems and on the performance of
military missions; these efforts should also examine how military operations might
be conducted when toxic environments are imposed on various force elements,
considerable work is required to rethink the prob-
Third
,
installations, or areas.
lem of deterrence of and response to the use of chemical weapons in a conventional
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of
1U-
a's t
ild
of
ate
nd,
Xial
of
pri-
ion
tent
not
on-
nd
er-
res,
ght
ob-
The Threat of Chemical Warfare 181
conflict. Today, the only "solution," given the asymmetry and the paralysis result-
ing from the arms control efforts, appears to be to depend upon tactical nuclear
weapons to deter the employment of chemical weapons--an interesting peacetime
alternative, but one that will be of little comfort in a crisis.
Until these problems are addressed in considerable depth, the United States
should not curtail CW activities out of a "spirit of the negotiations" and, in nego-
tiating, should not continue to unilaterally constrain its security choices. A ban. on
chemical munitions, for example, would eliminate the option of retaining a U.S.
CW retaliatory capability. Unless it were adequately verified, which certainly ap-
pears to be impossible today, the ban would not constrain the Soviets from con-
tinuing to upgrade their already formidable capability. We hope that the 1978
review called for by the President will examine the entire range of CW-related
security issues.
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March 8,1978, p. 6.
2. Chemical Weapons and U.S. Public Policy, A Report of the Committee on Chemistry and
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3. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S., USAF, United States Military
Posture for FY 1979, January 20, 1978.
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6. Lepkowski, Wil, "Chemical Warfare: One of the Dilemmas of the Arms Race," Chemical and
Engineering News, January 2,1978, pp. 16-21.
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8. Department of the Army Field Manual FM 3-10, "Employment of Chemical Agents," Depart-
ments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, November 1966.
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Army, Washington, D.C., 1976
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September 1974, pp. 21-23.
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MWVWffl
 Approved For Release 2005/01/13 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300310056-5
International Security 1 82
Bartlett to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, January 24, 1977 (Washington, D.C.:
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Organization, October 1976.
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1974).
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Posture," to be published in U.S. Defense Policy: Issues and Alternatives, James E. Doman,
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