SWEET WARRIORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003300130041-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: June 9, 1980
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For & (ease 2005/03/16 : CIA-RDP80B0155O03300130041-1
DCI-5
Side A, 3/4 Y$
STAT MEMORANDUM FOR:
STAT
1. Let's have
2 4 JUN 1980
do a review of the Agency abuses in the
past; how many were real; how many were supposed; and with that a breakdown
to
in/the generic categories.
STAT
-t-
Approved For Release 2005/03/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300130041-1
 _ Appraved.. Fo lease-.2005/03/16: CIA-RRDP80B015. OO 300-'438041-1
oY: ;'.acs..
and sometime poet, a Yale graduate with
CIA are a study in, contrast9..James Jesuss%
NE'ASWEEK
9 June, 1980
Sweet.. Warriors, -
WUdernrss of Mirrrsrs.ByDavid C.Dfar-
t r. 236 pages Harper & Rom S1ZS0.
The twin focuses of David C. Martin's
compact yet mesmerizing history of the I
the mind. of a Medici intriguer- William
King: Harvey.. a, faile& small-towm lawyer
froar Indians, was a pear-shaped;.. foul-
mouthed ex-FBI man with afascination for
g= and a prodigiousappetiteformartinis.
What they had in common was a Cons
appearances, an obsessive antipathy to So--
viet Communism and an instinctive attrac-
tion to the murky world of espionage:
For nearly three decades, these two men
toiled is the labyrinthine vineyards of the-
CIA-Angleton as t.heageUCy's chief coun-
terspy.. Harvey as.ita leading: covert opera-
tive.. In. the end, bout. were- destroyerk-
partly by. events, mainly by theunselve a In
this, Martin maintains, the two were liring.
paradigms of the orgssnizatioa they served.
Like the= the CIA was inevitably seduced
and devoured by bewildering intrigues and
an involuted logic ofits own making; even
tuaily, it became its own worst enemy, a
scorpion striking at itself in what Angleton
once described as a. "wilderness of
mirrors.."
Paranoia That evocativeand mordant-
ly apt phrase (borrowed frourT. S. Eliot) i3 a
fitting title for Martin's closely observed
account. of the CIA's 30 years' secret war
against the KGB--and how its prudent fear
of being penetrated by a Soviet "mole" rip-
ened over time into a. nearly paralyzing
paranoia. Martin, a.NEwSWEEx Washing-
ton correspondent and. longtime- CIA
watcher, tells the tale through the inter-
twined stories of Angleton and Harvey as a
kind of Pilgrim's Progress in reverse. "No
one waged [the] secret was with greater
intensity, with colderrage; thanJame 3Jesusl
Angleton and William King Harvey," Mar-
tin tin writes. The two men werewith the CIA
from the very beginning; they rose as it rose
and fell as it came into disrepute:
As rival counterintelligence officers in
the early 1950s, Harvey had bested Angle-
ton by blowing the whistle on Kim Philby,
the brilliant double agent who served as
British liaison to the FBI and CIA in
Washington from 194.9 to 1951. The coup j
reputation as "America's James Bond" by !
masterminding the construction of a runnel f -
into theeasternzone that allowedtheAllies
to tap Soviet phone lines. Angleton, mean-
while,- stayed is Washington, where his
chess, master's intellect-andfemnt desire
never to let another Philby slip past him.-
made him a formidable chief of the CIA's
counterintelligence. operation`
Maus Hit Menz Both_men.cariied"--the
seeds o# their own. destruction. _Haxvey's
success is Berlin brought him to the atten-
tion of the-White House -and when John.
and. Robert Kennedy decided that Fidel-
be overthmwe, he was gives
d t
h
o
a
Castro
Though Harvey stopped at noth-
the job
..
ing---even to the extent of trying to` enlistr
s
i
n
Mafia hit men in an ilI-conceived assass
tioa plot-it proved to bean impossible as-
sisp?ment.Unaccustomedtofaii Harvey
let his drinking get out-of control; eventual-
ly; he had to be eased out of-the agency.
Angleton lasted longer. But his growing
suspicion of everyone and everything.eve -
tuallyr made- him,. too; more-. of s. liability -
than an asset: He rafts to-talce the Soviet split at face value, believing it. to be a .
Communist diversion, and he discredited
dozens of CIA agents and Soviet defectors
by. insisting they were KGB plants. Sal
effectively did he undermine: the internal
trust that an intelligence agency needs in
order to function that he himself wound up
being accused of working for the Soviets.
The last straw came when he told French L
authorities that the new CIA station chief
in Paris, a man who had been exhaustively
vetted, was not to be trusted. Angleton was
fired in 1974.
The tragedies of Angleton and Harvey-
and Martin presents their stories as such-
were that neither man did-anything more,
than his job: By the same token,`Martin.
contends, the CIA never did anything it
wasn't asked to do by successive adminis--I
trations. The problem was that, like Angle-
ton and Harvey, the agency "had been
asked to do things nobody should have been
asked to do, been given secret powers no,
one should have been given." As Martin's l
shrewd and, illuminating portrait shows,
there is a crazy logic to the bleak universe of
espionage: self-destruction, it seems, comes
with the territory.
AtLANi.,MAYEZ
Approved For Release 2005/03/16 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300130041-1