REMINDER MEMO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003200180013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: January 15, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200180013-8
TAPE 36
Side A, 1/16 -~
15 January 1979
X1 Tal k to
about the desirability of taking some trends
implications to the meetings with Brown and Vance, e.g., both of them
asked where we are going in Iran. Not next week, but next month.
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200180013-8
 Ironically, the 0 Corr ttee'2 first
approval of s>_Qc~ie 1~1~ILs
its rejection of $IOD,ODO in ai to
UNITA came only eight days before
Angola's transitional government, made
up of all three parties and the Portu-
guese, was installed on January 30,
1975. Marcum scecul3tes that the 40
Committee, when it refused to help
UNITA, was "apparently moved by past
connections and habits to think in terms
of 'our team' and 'theirs."' Our deci-
sion not to aid Savimbi's UNITA when
his movement was militarily almost
helpless assured its later defeat. As long
as Washington believed it had a winner
in the FNLA, UNITA could be dropped.
That view of UNITA prevailed until mid-
July when the FNLA began to look like
a paper tiger. Then the 40 Committee
approved the first grant of. military aid
to Savimbi's party. The CIA knew that
the outmoded arms sent to UNITA could
not prevent its defeat; it nevertheless
thought these weapons would at least
make the MPLA's eventual victory more
costly.
Here Stockwell makes one of his
grimmest revelations-that the US delib-
erately pursued a "no-win" policy in
Angola. Colby, he writes,' advised the
National Security Council in July 1975
that "the -CIA would have to spend $100,
million to be su -e of winning in Angola,
and a 'S100-mi!iion -program would be
too big to keep secret." Stool well asked
a superior wha. he was exp led to do
with the mere 514 million tl a CIA was
supposed to give Roberto an i Savimbi.
He, was told: "the best we c n. The 40
Committee paper reads that we 'are to
prevent an easy victory by So net-backed,
forces in Angoa." Later, re ilecting on
a CIA memo to Colby which spelled out
the "no-win" policy and sta ed the ob-
jective of avoiding "a cheap Neto vic-
tory," Stockwell writes: "I wondered
'what 'cheap' meant. Would it be meas-
ured in dollars or in African lives?"
Henry Kissinger told a news con-
ference in Brussels in December 1975
That "the United States favors a solu-
tion'" Jn:i w' I oars .,-jfattieS in
Angola' ran: negotiate .with' each other
free of outside interference and in which
the problem of Angola is handled as an
African issue." But-in fart the CIA had
been interfering, and with 'destructive ef-
fects. When Stockwell met with Savimbi
in Angola in late August 1975, the
UNITA leader suggested repeatedly "that
the ultimate. hope for Angola still lay at
the conference table rather than on the
battlefield." ,
2A i~?-' ~P~ O ' 3200t T13=8n~otasshowed jl:at they
is vim t is MAO to a
- - ... ,3. .... ~.,
sent representatives to meet in Lisbon 4 vuucu "cc s 1115[
approval of CIA assistance for the
with MPLA leaders in late August. Por- FNLA in January 1975 came only one
tu
l
guese newspapers specu
ated about an
alliance between the MPLA and UNITA.
On August 29, informed political jour-
nalists in Lisbon-wrote that the MPLA
and UNITA hart agreed to a cease-fire
and their reports were not, denied. In
September,. the CIA reported to
Washington on Savimbi's "feelers to the
MP LA for a negotiated solution." This
immediately prompted headquarters to
send a CIA station officer.from Zaire in-
to Angola to te1 the UNITA leader that,
as Stockwell puts it, "We wanted no
'soft' allies in . our war .against the
MPLA." This, Stockwell writes, was the
last opportunity for UNITA and the
MPLA to negotiate with each other free
from -outside interference. ;.Instead they
met .on the battlefield, aided respectively
by South Africans and the Cubans, and
UNITA, as the CIA had foreseen, was
defeated.
Marcum presents considerable evi-
dence suggesting that a UNITA-MPLA al-
liance would have been more workable
than, . the short-lived UNITA-FNLA
alliance.'at the. end of the war. Whether
UNITA and MPLA could in fact have
agreed to work together .in September
1975 if the.-CIA had not discouraged
Savimbi, no one can say., But had such
an , alliance been allowed : to emerge
without the CIA or Soviet Union under-
mining it, Angola would be a very dif-
ferent and less troubled country' today.
The .estrangement and resistance of
UNITA's supporters are still among the
main problems: facing the Neto govern-
ment. ; .:..
Superficially,, the- no-win :policy had
been "successful," for the MPL.A's vic-
tory :was -far .from' cheap. at "cost" the
Russians between' $300'million and $400
million' in military assistance; 'tens of
thousands.: f Ang clans lied:-Obviously
the victory was ft ? mgr -.:expensive, for
Angola -the i for ither the ,US or-.the
USSR*. The cost in liv s would -have
been cons?deiab ater-without
Chant;tag ti o 1LC: ine- : the. Congress
had't,ot-rej..cted th.'adrsinisttati?.;n's re-
quest for an-additional'S28 million for
Angola in December 1975..;, , . . .
month after the Hughes-Ryan Amend
ment was passed in December 1974. Yet
the first briefing of a congressman on
the CIA's ac i' did not take place un-
til July 25-half a year later. Almost
two weeks before the briefings began,
the 40 Committee had approved an ad-
ditional : S14 million for the CIA's
Angolan operation; thereby drawing the .
US further into the civil war. The tim-
ing of the briefings illustrates a major
weakness in the Hughes-Ryan Amend-
ment, which does not require congres-
sional approval of CIA operations, only
that Congress be informed. The An-
golan operation also showed that the
amendment does not oblige the CIA to
be complete or even accurate when it
briefs ,congressmen. Colby told Senator
Clark neithetl- that: the iG1;a. had':' been
assisting the FNLA before July 1975 nor
that it was also aiding UNITA. Before
Clark left for southern Africa, Colby
told him "no American arms would be
sent into Angola."
The Agency, as Stockwell observed,
also went to extraordinary lengths to
hide the truth from Clark during his
fact-finding trip to Angola and Zaire in
August 1975. Clark was scheduled to
meet with Mobutu, Roberto, Savimbi,
and Neto. Concerned that .he would dis-
cover the full extent of its operations on
his, trip, CIA headquarters cabled the
Kinshasa station chief to prepare Rober-
to and Mobutu for their meetings with
the senator. Stockwell asked his CIA
colleagues whether they thought they
could get away with "coaching African
politicians before they met. with one of
our senators." A"fellow officer told
him, :'"Clark shouldn't waste our tax-
payers' , money -con esuch?" u: trip f.. you
couldn't trust senators any further than
you could throw them." Clark returned from his August trip
convinced that American involvement
was a mistake; he immediately put this
v w to Colby, who simply replied that
r'he disagreed. Frustrated;.. Clark con-
'cludcd that : the.. Hughes-Ryan Amend-
,ment provided :'for nothing' more than
an cx-post-facto communication to Con-
gress-. of -decisions already reached
3r against CIA funds for ....[with] no `provision for advice or
Angola created the impression that Con- consent." Classified' briefings,--he said,
'gress had finally succeeded in' gaining "actually becorae'an impediment to cf-
control' over the CIA's activities, and fective oversight" .'Once he- had been.(
that the Hughes-Ryan's Amendment, briefed by the CIA, `Clark, the senator
passed ; in 1974 to exert : congressional best informed about Angola? .could-no.
control over the 'Agency, ;was 'working longer question government 'witnesses
effectively.'- Most congressmen probably appearing before his corpinittee about
believed that it was no longer possible for sensitive matters. Nor could he take part
.the US to ' become involved 'clandestinely in the
!
public - debut '-
ecauses as
Approved For Release i 91EJ4 1KbPI FPY5 4 003 "OQr'bbe "he wai.-now. muzzled
Coll TII~UL"
 Approved For RWse 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP80B01554F3200180013-8
Tape: DCI-17
Side: A
Start: 0+++
1979
15 JA /N1979
REMINDER MEMO: Call Dick Stolz about Ambassador Joseph
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200180013-8
 0 1 5 JAN 1979
2 PDB items - facing
List of issues
2 all-purpose strategic curves -- following
 Approved For ease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP80B0155*3200180013-8i 5 JAN 1979
CHINA ISSUE
Last fall Bob Bowie briefed on China's economy. Since. then
Deng has opened things up even more--foreign credits pseudo-joint
ventures, etc.
We believe Chinese may seriously underestimate effort and time
scale to develop their country.
Opens up questions of where west expects China to fit into inter-
national order.
Credit is easy today because everyone excited at prospective
market--but where will Chinese products be marketed in due course?
Could generate substantial shift in world trade pattern.
How much credit today that won't pay off 5-10 years if all goes
well. How much military technology to fuel one side of Sino-Soviet tensions.
Do other Western leaders share such concerns? Are there discussions
yet on how to accommodate both PRC & USSR?
Will we be able, willing, to attempt to encourage some-overall
discipline with respect to how China is brought back into world community?
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200180013-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200180013-8
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200180013-8
 Approved For R.se 2005/04/ _, k- 2DP801301554R00180013=F SAN 1979
PRES BRIEF - Intro
We talked two months ago about problem of my trying to keep
abreast policy concerns and prospective decisions so as to provide.
intell support - and problem of gaining intelligence feedback from
policy discussions with foreigners.
Problem aggravated by need for intense secrecy
e.g., none of us in intell knew impending move toward PRC --
did not analyze potential impact
You suggested we take 15 min. from a briefing to have discussion
Like to do today -- brought Frank and Bob.
Like get feel what your concerns are--
What policy issues contemplating--not necessarily
how going solve.
Start with review what provided in PDB over past year.
Move from there to discussion--problem areas which we
think important because they are not only immediate issues
but matters of long-term import.
We'll between us give few ideas why we think
these issues are important.
Hope can discuss whether you share our attitudes
or have other info or other concerns.
25X1
pproved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200180013-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200180013-8
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003200180013-8