REMINDER MEMORANDUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003200090030-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: October 3, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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REMINDER MEMORANDUM
Follow up on your conversation with Admiral Davies.
3 Oct 79
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REMINDER MEMORANDUM 3 Sep 79
1. When did we get the first HUMINT reports using the word "brigade?"
2. Why did the Soviets decide to emphasize 17 years? At least if our
analysis is anywhere near correct, there really has been some change in
this 17 year period.
3. Should we continue a major analytic push on when the brigade became
combat?
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t7cRff - DCI
cc: Dr. Brzezinski
Bruce Clarke
NID IN PERSPECTIVE
3 Oct 79
I. Leaks and the NID
A. Share your concern about leaks
B. Two issues
-- Leaks of security info
-- Premature leaks of politically sensitive data
C. My memo to you of 25 September detailed NID distribution,
criteria for NID items, and classification of NID material.
II. Value of NID
A. We could reduce distribution and content, but:
-- We would pay a price in a less well-informed Administration
with increased risk of people working at cross purposes.
-- It would raise questions about the credibility of the NID
and the impact of political considerations in CIA
publications.
B. Appropriate distribution on the Hillis not only useful, but
necessary:
-- The Congress demands to be kept informed
- The creation of Intelligence Committees has heightened
these demands
- The NID covers this requirement to a large extent and is
particularly valuable as a document of record
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- Without it would would have to provide the Congress
some alternative service.
? Several years ago Agency tried to withhold NID
and provide a substitute publication ("The
Congressional Checklist") but this created
distrust, increased demands for the NID.
III. NID's record
A. Very likely have been leaks of security info, but by no means
worst offender
B. Leaks of politically sensitive data - record is impeccable - 25X1
In short, any system to prevent premature publication
of sensitive material depends on a clearance procedure
with NSC or State, and such has'been followed by
the NID
IV. Focus on NID alone won't solve problem
A. Leakers have ample access to sensitive data without relying on
the NID
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-- Defense, NSA, and State each produce current intelligence
publications that are disseminated outside their
organizations;
DIA's goes to the Hill.
-- Restrictions on the dissemination of sensitive info, to
be effective, would have to extend down to raw intelligence.
B. Three generic sources of leaks:
1. Capitol Hill
-- NID seen by eight committees--usually only read by
staff, who then alert members
-- Info flows directly to the Hill from various intelligence
agencies on subjects of political sensitivity;
sometimes in routine distributions; sometimes in
response to requests.
-- DCI authorities presently inadequate to control
2. Executive Branch
-- Most leaks are for political purposes, i.e., to sell
some policy or program. Such program sponsors.are in
DoD, State and NSC generally, but others, including CIA,
also play a role. The info for most such leaks is
readily available from within DoD, State and the NSC.
3. Officials, authorized and unauthorized, who give background
briefings.
-- The bulk of the politically sensitive leaks, e.g., PRC
meetings, are not of intelligence, but of policy
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matters and come from backgrounders (I believe),
not from malicious poeple. Many of the serious
intelligence leaks are incidental to such policy
leaks.
V. Can we reduce "sensitivity" of NID?
Yes--but to a rather limited extent
-- Sensitivity is not easily controlled by classification.
- Clearly TS is usually more sensitive than Confidential,
but the line almost stops there. Codewords are
generally to protect the source, not the substance.
Curtailing content of the NID to "lesser" codewords
may protect some intelligence sources, but not have
much impact on the sensitivity of the content.
VI. Recommendations
1. Review distribution of NID and of DoD and State finished
intelligence publications as well. Establish a policy for
distribution, e.g., Assistant Secretary level and above.
Note: Will require some NSC support to DCI
2. Review distribution of raw intelligence to other than DIA,
NFAC and INR who normally process into intelligence products.
Note: White House would have to be included.
3. As suggested, ask NID and INR and DIA recipients to propose
sequential sharing of publications.
(r r 4~, r
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4. Presidential support for ne system which
will reduce volume of codeword material and establish a
very restricted category for very sensitive material.
25X1
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