CONVERSATION WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI, 3 OCTOBER 1979
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01554R003200090028-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
January 4, 2017
Document Release Date:
July 5, 2005
Sequence Number:
28
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 4, 1979
Content Type:
MFR
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Body:
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4 October 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, 3 October 1979
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2. We talked about the budget. He indicated there is strong
resistance to a supplemental, but at the meeting tomorrow we will have
to decide whether to recommend reopening the issue. If we are to
reopen it, it will have to be on the grounds of impact on SALT.
I described my concept of how to get the FY 81 budget
put together for a November submission to the Congress. He
thought it was a sound plan but again would hinge on whether
the SCC would in effect endorse it -- the importance of doing
it this way for SALT. (S)
3. I thanked him for the assistance to (U) 25X1
4. He indicated that he had not sat in on thel 25X1
meetings enough to have good MEMCONs on it. Keep this on my agenda
for State. (C)
.5. I arranged to read the Dobrynin-Vance and Gromyko-Vance
MEMCONs in Bob Gates' office. can have such access 25X1
also if he calls Bob and arranges to go down and read them. (S)
6. He indicated, upon my inquiry, that
memorandum of record of his conversations with
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7. We talked about the evidence.of a nuclear detonation. I
suggested that a public announcement now might be better than after
a leak. He indicated, because of the criticism of the premature
announcement on Cuba, perhaps we should hold off even at the risk
of a leak. (DDCI)
I indicated my preference for going to the Soviets
enough prior to any public announcement, before or after a
leak, to probe as to whether they have confirmatory evidence.
He thought this was a good point. He requested that our repre-
sentative on Henry Owens' Working Group transmit that concept
to Henry in advance of another mini-SCC meeting on that subject.
(Bruce Clarke) (TS)
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9.. I gave him a copy of the predicted SSCI position to be
delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 10th. (C)
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11. I gave him a chart on Soviet economic assistance to Cuba and
how it has grown over the years. We talked about ways to increase the
US propaganda capability for publicizing such events. He thought it
would be very difficult to get VOA to fall off its insistence that it
has to be otherwise published information before they will broadcast
it. (S)
12. I informed him that we were going ahead with the
program. (S)
13. I did not cover the PLO issue as
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had done it earlier. (S) 25X1
144. I did not cover the issue because I had covered it
with the President and Brzezins i. S)
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18. I delivered the talking paper on the NID. He reacted negatively.
He feels we must immediately put out some directives that by a certain
date the percentage of sensitive items in the NID will be reduced by "x"
percent and that because the sensitive items are being deleted, the
distribution will not be changed but there will be supplementary hand-
delivery distribution on a need-to-know basis for the sensitive material
that was withdrawn from the general publication.
After some period of discussion, I believe I have gained his
recognition that while one could do that to the NID, it wouldn't come
close to solving the problem. Producing the DINSUM reports on the Cuban
brigade of 29 August and later, and pointing out they went to 276 addressees,
including Capitol Hill, was a help here. (Unfortunately, I didn't get to
read the DINSUMs in advance. I didn't recognize that I had them in my
folder until I was talking with Dr. Brzezinski--I would like to see them
and read them.)
Dr. Brzezinski didn't want to get involved in a jurisdictional
battle between ourselves and DIA and INR and NSA. I pointed out to them
that I had the authority to control dissemination under the Executive Order,
but needed support from the NSC in how we are going to try to exercise
that authority. That's what I was suggesting.
He indicated he would have someone on his staff work with
Bruce Clarke on the issue. (S)
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19. I delivered both talking points to me and his
draft memorandum for Presidential signature. Brzezinski felt that a
new committee might attract more attention. Perhaps we would call it the
SCC(S-Special). I said that was fine with me. Maybe we could call it
the SCC(SRC). (S)
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