ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER AT VADM WILLIAM READ RETIRMENT CEREMONY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003000230001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1979
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
VADPI William Read Retirement Ceremony
Norfolk, Virginia
Saturday, 30 June 1979
said,
At the turn of the century, the American philosopher William James
"The world is only beginning to see that the wealth
of a nation consists more than anything else in the
number of superior men that it harbors."
It is to the credit of the U.S. Navy that it has harbored BUT Read, a
most superior man/ for these past 30 ears.
I have known Bill Read for most of those years. (Personal anecdote)
I believe Bill exemplifies those rare qualities/which we try to nurture
`
in all of our officers./ One of these qualities
of great importance toda
Y
is the intellectual capacity to think imaginatively./
I happen to believe that being a naval officeVi s as i'ntel.lectually
demanding a profession as any I know of today./ That is why young officers
should seek to emulate Bill Read/-to follow in his footsteps of not just
embracing the past- old ideas, outmoded concepts, comforta falla 'es
In the field of tactics Bill Read has blazed new trails .( His
reshaping of the destroyer squadron organiz~ "ation /..has stimulated emphasis
6
on the tactical side of our responsibilitids. It may sound odd to some
to say that we need intellects like Bill toldevelop our tactics.) Even
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003000230001-7
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many of us in the profession still conceive of tactics as primarily
matters of braver and command decisions./ We do not think often of
the increasing intellectual content of tactical decisionmaking. And
yet, look at just one example.
The skipper of a major combatant ship like this today finds that
his fighting capability is largely resident in his computer program
Thtrogram limits the captain's options no matter how brave or ingenious
he may be. If the captain does not understand the assumptions, the
i ~~~ ~~
limitations that some civilian put intoylt-4 programs, he may find that
in the moment of battle what he wants to do simply cannot be done.
During the/Vietnam war we sent guided missile cruisers to the
Gulf of Tonkin. Their computer programs were designed to control the
Terrier missile system
Vin defense of a carrier task force in the open
l
reaches of the ocean. /In fact, those cruisers hugged the North Vietnamese
coast and attempted to control the air space over the land.] Few, if any,
skippers realized that their missile control program was not built for
that/and that when the lights lit up and said, "free to fire,"/it was not
so. /The missile envelope over land is markedly different than over water/
Today ship captains must possess the intellectual capacity to understand
all the details of our sophisticated weapons systems and sensors to get
the most out of them./ That's what it takes to be a good tactician; that
is exactly what Bill has enrnuraged in the Surface Force Atlantic..
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 Approved Foroease 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80B0155903000230001-7
Bill is also a super manager/ and the managerial decisions our
Navy faces also require more intellectual sren than we often
acknowledge ./ Bill and I once.... Howes for example, do you coommp_are
the alternatives/of whether a new ship should have one propel r or
two? Common sense tells any shier that he would prefer
maneuverability, redundancy, and speed of two./ But, how much are
those characteristics worth in dollars ?Why do you need to maneuver
much at sea today when you have long-range weapons?/Are you likely
to have battle damage that would put out one screw /and not damage
enough else of the ship to disable it? And while speed is always
nice, what if you could have 12 one-shaft ships instead of 8 two-shaft
ships for the same price? Isn't there a reasonable probability you
might be in the right place in the first instance anyway?
These are diffjcul tra e ffs. But even more difficult is the
intellectual process( of displaying the alternatives on issues like this
in ways that will be fair and clear, and will truly assist decisionmakers
in considering their options. Does most of the ta____f~F work we see today
encourage and facilitate tetAgji-ty_ i ernati ves? The general
answer is no. One of the greatest farces that has been perpetrated on
the U. S. r+4-1-i-tary is the concept of completed staff work. Completed
staff work is really a w ' of eliminating the manager from the decision
1
process Rather than laying out issues
and discussing all reasonable options, "completed staff work" often
attempts, to drive a decisionmaker to a particular decision.
3
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003000230001-7
 Approved For, ease P04 7 :-C IA, 4O 01 5 3 0 0 7`~4
OA*
Besides tactics and management, the_thi-rd ement of being a
naval professional is to e a str&tegi ;t; and Bill Read has perhaps
excelled most here. St ategic decisionmaking also has much more
intellectual content today. Why do we need a Navy at all? We all
know why[ Alfred Thayer Mahan told us that we needed to control the
seas and he gave us a prescription for doing it./ This amounted to
having the best battle fleet around and being able to dest,.roy the
enemy's battle fleet in head-to-head engagements. In fact, not long
after Mahan wrote, he was hopelessly outdated/first by the advent of
the submarine and then by the aircraft. /But despite this, all navies
prepared for World War I in the image of Mahan by building large battle
fleets/ .f And, in that war the only head-to-head engagement,/ the Battle
of Jutland, decided nothing.] The sea war was decided out _on the sQa
lanes of the North Atlantic between the U-boats and the convoys./
Despite these lessons of World War I, generations of naval officers
continued to point to Mahan as the ultimate strate91stt In the disarmament
conferences of the 1920s, they focused on the battleships and overlooked
the submarine. In preparation for World War II they refought the Battle
of Jutland. The potential of the submarine was ignored and the aircraft
carrier was looked on simply as an adjunct for the battleship. And again,
of course, World War II proved that Mahan waste
x
4
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 Approved For lease 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80BO155OP03000230001-7
Because of the lack of successors to Mahan because we have
failed to rise to the intellectual challenge before us- even today
~. I
we lack a coherent, relevant phi 1 oso.pby,_,al a.a._strategy--of naval
warfare./ This is not unrgla d to the fact that in the last decade
the United States Navy has decreased from 1.000 to 460 hips and is
only buying enough today to sustain a navy of about 330./
War am I saying this at a retirement ceremony?/ Because today
the Navy is 1osi a an who ur rstands these issues. He had made
a significant contribution. Young officers and enlisted men and women
who are here must accept the challenges that Bill RaaA i&s farmed so
squarely for 30 years and take up the baton to act on them as has this
superlative officer and exemplar;
I
Bill, you have been an inspiration to all of us. From those who
truly care about the Navy,/we thank you for your ideas, your direction,
your courage.
Marty - helpniate - Uavv wife - your sacrifices have made those
contributions possible i
I wish both all happiness.
To Vice Admiral Dave Johnson Yours is a chat! lend ng~as k. You
are now the controller of the values of the very heart of the Navy. I
envy you. With full confidence in your considerable abilities, I wish
you every success as you prepare to lead a force of ves7 +s manned by
our Navy's greatest asset--her people. God speed!
5
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003000230001-7
 29 June 1979
Approved Fow lease 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80BO15003000230001-7
Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
VADM William Read Retirement Ceremony
Norfolk, Virginia
Saturday, 30 June 1979
At the turn of the century, the American philosopher William James
"The world is only beginning to see that the wealth
of a nation consists more than anything else in the-
number of superior men that it harbors."
It is to the credit of the U.S. Navy that it has harbored Bill Read, a
most superior man, for these past 30 years.
I have known Bill Read for most of those years. (Personal anecdote)
I believe Bill exemplifies those rare qualities which we try to nurture
in all of our officers. One of these qualities. of great importance today
is the intellectual capacity to think imaginatively.
I happen to believe that being a naval officer is as intellectually
demanding a profession as any I know of today. That is why young officers
should seek to emulate Bill Read--to follow in his footsteps of. not just
embracing the past--old ideas, outmoded concepts, comfortable fallacies.
In the field of tactics Bill Read has blazed new trails. His
reshaping of the destroyer squadron organization.. .has stimulated emphasis
on the tactical side of our responsibilities. It may sound odd to some
to say that we need intellects like Bill to develop our tactics. Even
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :. CIA-RDP80B01554R003000230001-7
 Approved Fo elease 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80B01 003000230001-7
4 W
many of us in the profession still conceive of tactics as primarily
matters of bravery and command decisions. We do not think often of
the increasing intellectual content of tactical decisionmaking. And
yet, look at just one example.
The skipper of a major combatant ship like this today finds that
his fighting capability is largely resident in his computer program.
The program limits the captain's options no matter how brave or ingenious:
he may be. If the captain does not understand the assumptions, the
limitations that some civilian put into those programs, he may find that
in the moment of battle what he wants to do simply cannot be done.
-
During the Vietnam war we sent guided missile cruisers to the
Gulf of Tonkin. Their computer programs were designed to control the
Terrier missile system in defense of a carrier task force in the open
reaches of the ocean. In fact, those cruisers hugged the North Vietnamese
coast and attempted to control the air space over the land. Few, if any,
skippers realized that their missile control program was not built for
that and that when the lights lit up and said, "free to fire," it was not
so. The missile envelope over land is markedly different than over water_
Today ship captains must possess the intellectual capacity to understand
all the details of our sophisticated weapons systems and sensors to get
the most out of them. That's what it takes to be a good tactician; that
is exactly what Bill has encouraged in the Surface Force Atlantic.
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003000230001-7
 Approved Fo*lease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B0150003000230001-7
Bill is also a super manager and the managerial decisions our
Navy faces also require more intellectual strength than we often
acknowledge. Bill and I once.... How, for example, do you compare
the alternatives of whether a new ship should have one propeller or
two? Common sense tells any ship driver that he would prefer
maneuverability, redundancy, and speed of two. But, how much are
those characteristics worth in dollars? Why do you need to maneuver
much at sea-today when you have long-range weapons? Are you likely
to have battle damage that would put out one screw and not damage
enough else of the ship to disable it? And while speed is always
nice, what if you could have 12 one-shaft ships instead of 8 two-shaft
ships for the same price? Isn't there a reasonable probability you
might be in the right place in the first instance anyway?
These are difficult tradeoffs. But even more difficult is the
intellectual process of displaying the alternatives on issues like this
in ways that will be. fair and clear, and will truly assist decisionmakers
in considering their options. Does most of the staff work-we see today
encourage and facilitate this ability to judge alternatives? The general
answer is no. One of the greatest farces that has been perpetrated on
the U.S. military is the concept of completed staff work. Completed
staff work is really a way of eliminating the manager from the decision
process by giving him only one choice. Rather than laying out issues
and discussing all reasonable options, "completed staff work" often
attempts to drive a decisionmaker to a particular decision.
3
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003000230001-7
 Approved Fo elease 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80B015V003000230001-7
Besides tactics and management, the third element of being a
naval professional is to be a strategist; and Bill Read has perhaps
excelled most here. Strategic decisionmaking also has much more
intellectual content today. Why do we need a Navy at all? We all
know why. Alfred Thayer Mahan told us that we needed to control the
seas and he gave us a prescription for doing it. This amounted to
having the best battle fleet around and being able to destroy the
enemy's battle fleet in head-to-head engagements. In fact, not long
after Mahan wrote, he was hopelessly outdated,. first by the advent of
the submarine and then by the aircraft. But despite this, all navies
prepared for World War I in the image of Mahan by building large battle
fleets. And, in that war the only head-to-head engagement, the Battle
of Jutland, decided nothing. The sea war was decided out on the sea
lanes of the North Atlantic between the U-boats and the convoys.
Despite these lessons of World War I, generations of naval officers
continued to point to Mahan as the ultimate strategist. In the disarmament
conferences of the 1920s, they focused on the battleships and overlooked
the submarine. In preparation for World War II they refought the Battle
of Jutland. The potential of the submarine was ignored and the aircraft
carrier was looked on simply as an adjunct for the battleship. And again,
of course, World War II proved that Mahan was wrong.
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003000230001-7
 Approved Fo.lease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B0155&03000230001-7
Because of the lack of successors to Mahan; because we have
failed to rise to the intellectual challenge before us; even today
we lack a coherent, relevant philosophy of naval strategy--of naval
warfare. This is not unrelated to the fact that in the last decade
the United States Navy has decreased from 1,000 to 460 ships and is
only buying enough today to sustain a navy of about 330.
Why am I saying this at a retirement, ceremony? Because today
the Navy is losing a man who understands these issues. He had made
a significant contribution. Young officers and enlisted men and women
who are here must accept the challenges that Bill Read has faced so
squarely for 30 years and take up the baton to act on them as has this
superlative officer and exemplar.
Bill, you have been an inspiration to all of us. From those who
truly care about the Navy, we thank you for your ideas, your direction,
your courage.
Marty - helpmate - navy wife - your sacrifices have made those
contributions possible.
I wish both all happiness.
To Vice Admiral Dave Johnson Yours is a challenging task. You
are now the controller of the values of the very heart of the Navy. I
envy you. With full confidence in your considerable abilities, I wish
you every success as you prepare to lead a force of vessels manned by
our Navy's greatest asset--her people. God speed!
5
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003000230001-7