ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LAWYERS STATE OF INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002900300001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 12, 1979
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
American College of Trial Lawyers
Roca Paton, Florida
Monday, 12 March 1979
STATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Three months before the attack on Pearl Harbor I went to Amherst, a
small liberal arts college in New England, with the vague intent in mind
that the following summer I would become an office boy in some large
Chicago law firm and decide if I really did want to go on to a career in
the legal profession. The war and a career in the Navy intervened and I
thought I was never going to get my law education until President Carter
appointed me Director of Central Intelligence.
That may sound strange to you but almost every day I get a tutorial
on the law,from my General Counsel, who tells me what I can and cannot
do. In fact, there is a great deal stirring between the law and intelli-
gence today. The greater degree of control by law than ever before is a
part of the many changes that are taking place in our nation's intelli-
gence activities. I think it is the one feature perhaps which would
interest you most, but first I would like to sculpt for you the general
nature of the fundamental and far-reaching changes that are taking place
in the intelligence process as a whole. They derive from three basic
factors. First, the changing perception the United States has of its own
role in international affairs. Second, the great technical sophistication
which has come to characterize the process of collecting intelligence
information. And third, the much greater interest and concern about
intelligence activities of the public in general.
Let me start with the changing perception of our role in the world.
I believe that the United States is in a state of transition in its
public attitudes towards foreign affairs from an activist, interventionist
outlook to one where the restraints or limits on our ability to influence
events in other countries is more widely recognized. This is not to say
that we are retrenching into an isolationism. In fact, as a nation, I
believe we are gradually emerging from our post-Vietnam, total aversion
to any semblance of intervention on the international scene. Clearly, we
must continue to play a major role on the world scene. Yet, the circum-
stances today are such that we must gauge much more carefully than
ever before when intervention may be desirable or feasible.
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04, for instance, at the difficulty that we have today simply
c c?c no whoa we are for and whom we are against. Traditionally we
cften favored those people whom the Russians were against. But look
at sore of the choices we had in 1978. About this time last year, there
was a vrar in Ethiopia. The Russians were against Somalia. Somalia was
headed by a Marxist dictator who was the aggressor; a difficult side for
us to he for. At the end of 1978 there was a war in Cambodia. The
Russians were for the Vietnamese who were attacking Cambodia. Cambodia
was headed by Pol Pot, perhaps the most repressive regime on the face of
the globe since Hitler; again, a difficult choice for us.
In short, Communism today is not monolithic and it is hard for us
to tell the black hats from the white hats. In addition, it is not
nearly so clear today that the consequences of a nation succumbing to
Communist influence are as irreversible as we often thought in the
past. We have seen Indonesia, Sudan, Egypt, and even Somalia subjected
to considerable Soviet influence and then return to independence. So
today there is a legitimate question in our body politic as to whether
it is always necessary to come to the rescue of countries being subjected
to Communist pressure.
Even when we do decide that some struggling nation deserves our
support, there are problems in providing that support today which did
not exist just a few years ago. One of these stems from the revolution
in international communications. Today any international action one may
take is instantly communicated around the globe; instantly subjected to
analysis; and instantly judged. And that public, international judgment--
often approbation or criticism--influences events and inhibits major
countries like ours or the Soviet Union, even though these countries
voicing their approbation or criticism are often second or third level
powers.
If we attempt to sway other countries diplomatically, we are not
nearly as effective as we could be 20 or 25 years ago when most free
nations of the world followed our lead in such fora as the United Nations.
Today, one country has one vote and the major powers are generally on the
minority side of those votes.
Today if we believed that it was in our national interest to inter-
vene militarily somewhere, the memory of Vietnam reminds us that when
the pendulum of offense and defense in military weaponry is tending
towards the defense, as it now is, even a minor military power can give a
major one a very difficult time.
What all this adds up to is that the leverage of influence in
international affairs must be exercised much more subtly. We must be
more concerned with long term influences rather than just putting a
finger in the dike. We must be able to anticipate rather than react
to events. We must be able to interpret the underlying forces which can
be influenced and driven over time. For us in the intelligence world
this means that we must vastly expand the scope of our requirements.
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-,irt_v years aa. 'ur primary concern was to I.ee, -rack, o. ov
military activities. Today our geographical interests are much more
widespread than just the Soviet Union. The subject matter in which
we must be intimately familiar encompasses not just military technology,
but politics, economics, food, population, narcotics, terrorism, the
health and psychiatry of foreign leaders, energy reserves, and many
other fields. There is hardly an academic discipline, there is hardly an
area of the world that we must not be able to provide good information
about to national leaders. This is an exciting, a demanding time for
intelligence and one of fundamental change in the intelligence process
of our country.
The second factor that is driving change is the technological
revolution affecting how we collect intelligence. Basically there are
three ways of acquiring foreign intelligence: by photographs from
satellites or airplanes; by intercepting signals such as those that
are passing through the air right here and now--signals from military
equipment, signals from communications systems; and by human collection--
the traditional spy.
The first two, photographic and signals intelligence, are called
technical intelligence as opposed to human intelligence. The capabilities
here, thanks to the great sophistication of American industry, are
burgeoning. There is so much information flowing in that our real
problem is-how to process, handle, and do something with it. Interestingly
though, rather than denegrating the value or need of the traditional spy,
it has increased his importance. Broadly speaking, technical intelligence
collection tells you what happened in some other country in the past.
When I give that information to a policy maker the first thing that I am
asked is, why did that happen and what is going to happen next? Uncovering
people's intentions and plans is the unique forte of the human intelligence
agent. The challenge that we face is being able to coordinate photographic,
signals, and human means of collection, orchestrating them so that the
three complement each other and so that we collect all needed information
in the least expensive way with the least risks. For example, what the
photograph can't tell you, you look for with signals or the human. This
may sound very logical and very simple, but because technical capabilities
are burgeoning and many are relatively new and in some ways overwhelming,
we can no longer do business in the traditional way.
Because intelligence is a large bureaucracy spread over a number of
different government agencies and departments, it has taken some fundamental
restructuring to accommodate these changes. I have two jobs. I am head
of the CIA but I am also the Director of Central Intelligence. In the
latter role I coordinate all of the national intelligence activities of
the country. Just over a year ago the President, in a new Executive
Order, strengthened my authority over the budgets and collection tasking
of all these intelligence activities. That change, that process, is
still evolving today. It is coming along nicely but it is not yet
complete.
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+f r;, n mange
since the investigations of 1974 through 1976.
s n'es_ ~" rs hrougth,, to American intelligence activities more
P /l,c attention :han has ever, in the history of mankind, been brought
to hear on a mac- intelligence organization. That process, I am afraid,
destroyed sore of the confidence and support the American public has
traditionally had for its intelligence activities. And, while I am
beginning to sense a gradual return of that support and confidence, I
also recognize a lingering suspicion as to whether intelligence organiza-
tions may be invading the privacy of the American citizen. In any event,
enough of the allegations about previous abuses of intelligence were
true, even though most were exaggerated, that corrective action has been
necessary. It has been taken and has been taken thoroughly.
We now have a series of oversight procedures which serve as a very
important check on intelligence. It begins with the President himself,
who takes a direct and personal interest in what we are doing. It
goes from there to an Intelligence Oversight Board which looks into the
legality and propriety of intelligence activities, and reports directly
to the President. And it goes from there to the two committees of the
Congress empowered exclusively to conduct intelligence oversight. And
finally, of course, the press is much more interested, much more perse-
vering in learning what we are doing today than ever before.
The impact of all this added visibility has been substantial and
has had a traumatic effect within the Intelligence Community. Some of
this publicity is wanted. We need to regenerate that sense of confidence
that we are not invading the rights of the American citizen. One way of
doing that is through our being more open. We are publishing more and,
incidentally, when you leave today, we will have on the tables in the
foyer some examples of the materials that we have published in the
last year or so which we think are of interest to the American public and
which are unclassified. We are answering questions, we are speaking more
in public as I am with you today, and we are participating more in
symposia and academic conferences.
But some of the publicity is unwanted. It is unhelpful and it
involves improper disclosures of intelligence information. This is
demoralizing for a service that has traditionally, and of necessity,
operated in secret. If you were a CIA case officer overseas attempting
to persuade some foreign person to spy on our behalf at the risk of his
or her life, then you must have confidence that you can assure that
individual his identity will be protected. Today our people do not have
the same sense of confidence that they did a decade ago. And so openness
is a traumatic change for them which can have a negative impact.
Not the least of the traumas we are experiencing derives from the
increasing legal context of everything we do. I am sure you appreciate
that there is a natural tension between the effective and impartial
administration of criminal justice and the successful prosecution of
intelligence. I hardly need remind you that criminal justice requires
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that all relevant information be made available to both the prosecution
and the defense. And yet, you can readily appreciate that national
intelligence interests often require that evidence derived from intelli-
gence sources be protected against disclosure. The resulting dilemmas
can be very painful and are not infrequent.
Are these real dilemmas? Yes. I think that when Attorney General
Bell, last week, had to drop the prosecution of a case against two ITT
officials in order not to disclose intelligence secrets, it is a genuine
dilemma. There would be no dilemma, no problem, only if on the scale of
national values every law enforcement interest were always superior to
any intelligence interest. Intelligence information would always be
brought forward as needed. Or if, on the other hand, law enforcement
interests were always subordinated to intelligence interests, any
criminal proceeding would be terminated should any intelligence information
be threatened with disclosure.
Clearly neither view is correct. The values are variable and cannot
be readily ordered in advance. Each case must be separately judged on
its own facts, and intelligence interests must be placed in perspective
with other interests such as justice and precedence, when deciding
whether and on what basis to proceed with prosecution.
It is the Attorney General who has the discretion to decide whether
a prosecution is warranted and on what basis to go forward. That is
not to say, however, that I have no role in influencing that decision
whenever intelligence interests are concerned. On the contrary, I have
a necessary task.
In the first place, I am responsible for ensuring that no relevant
information is withheld from the Attorney General. Access to relevant
information, regardless of its classification, should not be a point of
dispute. In my view, the Attorney General has a clear right and a need
to review all such information so that his decisions may be taken with
the fullest factual perspective.
Beyond this, I feel that I am responsible for giving the Attorney
General an estimate of the potential impact of the public disclosure of
intelligence information that may be relevant to a criminal prosecution.
Again, I believe that this kind of an estimate is something the Attorney
General must have to make informed decisions and to properly weigh the
consequences of those decisions. If it should happen that I conclude
that the Attorney General has come to the incorrect balance, I must then
appeal to the President to decide whether the best interests of the
United States favor prosecution or not. In brief, I cannot frustrate
a prosecution simply by withholding secret information from release.
That choice lies with the Attorney General and I must appeal that choice,
if I do not agree with it. In the two years I have been privileged
to work on these thorny issues with Attorney General Griffin Bell, we
have never had, because of his great cooperativeness, anything but a
harmonious resolution of these issues. But they are not easy for either
one of us.
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e-e are funda?-ental reasons this issue presents such
d Yf c_1:v. ne is simply the fact that a criminal trial in this country
is a ,:!lic event. I have no quarrel ti;ith the constitutional guarantees
that r,~_e it so. At the same time I cannot ignore the fact that eviden-
tiary uses of intelligence information involves a high probability that
it wil enter the public domain. There are few ways to avoid that
outcome or to limit the exposure of the information to trial participants.
Other constitutional provisions secure to an accused broad rights of
cross-examination. Rules of procedure confer on the defense wide-ranging
pre-trial discovery. These features make the judicial process almost as
uncertain as it is open. For example, what lines of defense will be
followed and what scope of discovery and cross-examination will be
allowed do not lend themselves to precise advance measurement. They are
unpredictable, and that means that the decision to prosecute is more
difficult for those who must gauge, before the course is set, where it
all might lead. Again, I'm not complaining about any of this or suggesting
any radical reforms that would strip away rights of the accused. I am
only trying to describe how it looks from my position.
What I have been saying takes on greater force when you consider
the necessities of proof under some of the basic criminal statutes which
are of special concern to intelligence agencies. Let us suppose, for
example, that a government employee is arrested while attempting to
deliver a highly classified document to a foreign agent, and the delivery
is frustrated by the arrest. A crime has been committed under the
espionage laws. Yet prosecution would exact an extraordinary price. The
government would be required to show that the information in the document
was of enough significance to materially injure the national security if
it had fallen into the hands of the foreign government. That burden of
proof would very likely require that the document itself be offered as
evidence and that a government witness confirm its accuracy. The net
result would be that the trial proceedings would have succeeded in doing
exactly what the defendant was being tried for attempting but failing to
do, that is, transmit and disclose the information. Moreover, the
accuracy of that information would have been verified in the bargain. I
am sure you will agree that a spectacle of this sort would not be pleasant
to contemplate for those who had to struggle with a decision to prosecute.
We have avoided this dilemma once recently, but it was indeed a very
risky and uncertain matter.
Another well publicized problem in trial proceedings is the last
minute discovery blitzes that have been favored by defense counsels in
some espionage cases, the recent case of the U.S. vs Kampiles for example.
It is unfortunately true that whenever the CIA or just intelligence is
involved, it is inviting for a defense attorney to hope to collapse the
prosecution by pressing for more disclosure than we are likely to be
willing to provide. Hence, the shotgun approach which is evolving
against which there are no easy countertactics.
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Ju ges, ~, e by no reans insensitive to use dile;; as.
They will f-o- to time regulate pretrial discovery in espionage
prosecutions by _rctective orders affording the defendants and defense
counsel access tc sensitive materials but restricting their freedom to
further disseminate such materials. Unfortunately, the terms of these
orders have varied widely and seem to have nothing to do with the dif-
ferences in the cases themselves.
For example, some of the orders have conditioned access to
sensitive materials by defense witnesses on both security clearance
grounds and court approval, whereas others, have only been on the basis
of court approvals. In some cases, U.S. vs Moore for instance, the
protective order has authorized defense counsel to maintain custody of
materials in a safe furnished by the government, whereas in others, like
the Kampiles case, the material remained totally in the custody of the
government at all times. In a recent case, arrangements were made where
the materials were kept in a safe of ours which in turn was kept in the
judge's safe.
Let me not, however, leave any impression that all of the interests
of intelligence are on the side of not disclosing or not prosecuting. We
in the Intelligence Community have legitimate interests on both sides of
this issue. On the other hand, our concern for protecting national
secrets is genuine. Beyond concern for individuals such as I mentioned
before, individuals who are willing to risk their lives in our nation's
behalf, there is a wide-range of clear damage to our national interest
when information which ought to stay secret is disclosed. Sometimes our
relations or negotiations with other sovereign nations are undermined or
our continued access to information jeopardized. Foreign intelligence
services simply will not share information with an organization that
appears to be an information seive; and expensive technical systems I
have described can be frustrated and countered if their details are
disclosed.
Thus, even though we in intelligence are indeed generally inclined,
perhaps overly inclined, to hold back from prosecution to protect classi-
fied information, there are also many cases where we intensely want to
see the prosecution proceed. Those that concern us most involve espionage.
Beyond that, are the irresponsible, I would even say traitorous individuals
who deliberately disclose classified information. The seriousness of
these losses causes the Intelligence Community to strongly support the
prosecution of the individuals who do the disclosing. My blood boils at
the obvious callousness and selfishness of such persons. They not only
deserve the punishment that may result from prosecution, but we need to
prosecute these offenders to deter others. Thus, we have incentive to
lean over backwards in releasing information which is essential to such
judicial proceedings. In the two years I have been Director of Central
Intelligence, I have held my breath while releasing data to permit the
prosecution of nearly a half a dozen espionage cases. Nevertheless, the
incentive to continue releasing information for the purposes of such
prosecution remains strong.
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,'other set of emmas we face centers on the iy rules and
reaula ions which have recently been applied to intelligence agencies,
especially those to protect the privacy of American citizens. Because
they are new and often complex and because they must be interpreted in
the licht of our sometimes unique activities, they have impacted heavily
on the speed and flexibility with which we have traditionally been able
to operate. Very often, questions of Constitutional Law have been involved
which have required both the Attorney General's legal staff and my legal
staff to take the time to think through a legal issue in the midst of an
operational crisis. In all such instances, the Attorney General and his
staff have gone out of their way to provide timely opinions and advice.
But, in practice, and as a result, our options have often been limited..
An example in the electronic surveillance area will illustrate what I am
talking about.
Over a year ago, a small country was under seige. At one point the
only good source of information from within the country was the ham radio
transmissions of an American missionary. In light of the President's
Executive Order prohibiting electronic surveillance of a United States
person, could we legally intercept that transmission? If we could, at
what point would it become illegal electronic surveillance? The decision
was made that as long as the missionary was using CB or ham radio bands
we could listen. But that if he tried to disguise the broadcast--which is
not unreasonable if you are broadcasting clandestinely and in fear of
being caught--that would evidence a desire for privacy and we would have
to stop monitoring.
While we recognize and applaud these efforts to ensure the constitu-
tional and privacy rights of Americans, and in most instances we can
adapt to them, the issues are complex and they must be assimilated by my
people in the field who are not attorneys. The initiative of the intel-
ligence operator can be dulled by this need to insure that all applicable
legal standards are met, and the uncertainty as to whether they are being
met can lead to overcaution. In fact, today, our operators are almost
forced to avoid operations which could involve US persons. This in turn
could reduce our flexibility to respond in crisis situations when the
lives and property of American nationals may be involved.
This year it is my hope that legislation defining charters for the
Intelligence Community will be passed by the Congress. This legislation
would establish for the first time the authority for specific intelligence
activities, as well as the boundaries within which we must operate.
Written with care and sensitivity to problems like those I have just
discussed, it may help to resolve some of these difficulties. Overreaction,
either by tying the Intelligence Community's hands or by giving it
unrestricted freedom would be a mistake. On the one hand inviting a
repetition of past abuses, on the other emasculating necessary intelligence
capabilities.
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ter these comrments, particularly about our legal problems,
let me assure you that in my view the intelligence arm of our government
today s strong and capable. It is undergoing substantial change which
is never an easy or a placid process in a large bureaucracy. But, out of
the present retamorphasis is emerging an intelligence community in which
the legal rights of our citizens and the legal constraints and controls
on intelligence operations are balanced with a continuing need to maintain
an effective means of garnering information necessary for the conduct of
foreign policy. This is not an easy transition. We are not there yet.
But we are moving rapidly and surely down the right path. When we reach
our goal we will have constructed a new model of intelligence, a uniquely
American model, reflecting the ideals of our country. As we proceed, we
need your support and understanding. I am therefore most grateful that
you have asked me to be here today and have listened so attentively.
Thank you very much.
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AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS
Boca Raton, Florida
12 March 1979,
Matteson, Blackmun,.Attorney General Bell, ladies
and gentlemen.
Three months before the attack on Pearl Harbor I went to Amherst, a
small liberal arts college in New England, with a vague intent in mind
that the following summer I would become an office boy in some large
Chicago law firm and decide if I really did want to go on to a legal
profession since I'd been involved. The war and a career in the Navy
intervened and I thought I was never going to get my law education until
President Carter appointed me Director of Central Intelligence.
Now that sounds strange to you but what I am saying is that almost
every day I get a tutorial in the law from my General Counsel, who tells
me what I can and cannot do. And, in fact, there is a great deal of
stirring between the law and intelligence today and it's part of a very
general stirring, a very broad set of changes that are taking place in
our nation's intelligence activities. One feature of these is a greater
degree of control by law than ever before. But that is 'only one feature,
I think it is one perhaps that would interest you most. But I would first
like to sculpt for you the general nature of these very fundamental and
very long reaching changes that are taking place in our intelligence
process. They derive from three basic factors. First, there is a
changing perception the United States has of its own role in international
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affairs. Secondly, is the great technical sophistication which has come
over the process of collecting intelligence information. And third, is
the much greater interest and concern about our nation's intelligence
activities by the public in general.
Let me start with the changing perception of our role in the world.
I believe that the United States is in a state of transition in its
public attitudes towards those affairs. The transition from a very
activist, interventionist outlook towards one of much greater recognition
of the restraints or the limits on our ability to influence events in
other countries. This is not to say that we are, in my view, retrenching
into a isolationist mode. Clearly, we must continue to play a major role
on the world scene. I happen to believe that as a nation we are gradually
emerging from our post-Vietnam aversion to intervening in other nations'
affairs. And yet, the circumstances today are such that we must gauge
much more carefully than ever before when intervention may be desirable
or feasible.
Look, for instance, at the difficulty that we have today in simply
deciding whom we're for and whom we're against. Traditionally we were
in favor of those people that the Russians were against. But look at
some of the choices we had in 1978. About this time last year, there
was a war in Ethiopia. The Russians were against Somalia. Somalia was
headed by a Marxist dictator who was the aggressor in that event, a
difficult choice for us to be for. At the end of 1978 there was a war
in Cambodia. The Russians were for the Vietnamese who were attacking
Cambodia. Cambodia was headed by Pol Pot, perhaps the most repressive
regime on the face of the globe since Hitler; a difficult choice for us
to be for.
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In short, Communism today is not monolithic and it is hard for
us to tell the black hats from the white hats. In addition, it's not
nearly so clear today that the consequences of a nation succumbing to
Communist influence are as irreversible as we often viewed it in the
past. We've seen Indonesia, Sudan, Egypt, and even Somalia, subject to
very considerable Soviet influence at one time and then come back out and
be independent again. And so today there is a question in our body
politic as to whether it is always necessary to come to the rescue of
countries being subjected to Communist pressure. And yet we do decide
that some struggling nation does deserve , there are
problems today which did not exist just a few years ago.
One of these stems from the revolution in international communica-
tions. Today any move that we make in particular is instantly communicated
around the globe and instantly subject to approbation or criticism. And
somehow, I'm not sure I understand how or why, that public international
approbation or criticism influences events and inhibits major countries
like ours or even the Soviet Union, even though those countries voicing
their approbation or criticism are generally second or third rate powers.
And today if we attempt to use political pressure on other countries,
it's not nearly as effective as it was 20 or 25 years ago when most free
nations of the world followed our lead in such fora as the United Nations.
But today in those fora we have created one country, one vote and the
major powers are generally on the minority side of those votes. And today
if we want to intervene militarily, the situation is different as we all
remember it in Vietnam even a minor military power today. When the
pendulum of offense and defense in military weaponry is pending towards
the defense, even a minor military power can give a major one a very
difficult time.
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What all this adds up to, I believe, is that the leverage of influence
in international affairs must be exercised much more subtlely today. We
must be more concerned with long term influences rather than just putting
our fingers in the dike. We must be able to anticipate rather than react
to events. We must be able to interpret the underlying forces which can
be influenced and driven over time. For us in the intelligence world
this means that we must vastly expand the scope of requirements that we
must meet for our country. Thirty years ago our primary concern was to
keep track of Soviet military activities. Today our geographical interests
are so much more widespread than just the Soviet Union. Today the
subject matter in which we must be intimately familiar encompasses not
just those things involved in military technology, but political, economic,
food, population, narcotics, terrorism, the health and psychiatry of
foreign leaders, capacities, energy reserves, and so many
other fields. There is hardly an academic discipline, there's hardly an
area of the world that we must not be able to provide good information
about to our national leaders. This is an exciting, a demanding, a
earth-shaking change in the intelligence process of our country.
The second factor driving change today that I mentioned was the
technological revolution in how we collect intelligence. Basically there
are three ways of gaining information overseas. One is by photographs
from satellites, from airplanes. Another is by intercepting signals,
signals such as those that are passing through the air with us right here
today. Signals from military equipment, signals from communications
systems that we collect by airplanes or ships or ground
And the third means is what we call human intelligence, the traditional
human spy.
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The first two, photographic and signals intelligence, are what we
call technical intelligence as opposed to the human. And the capabilities
here, thanks to the great sophistication of industry in our country, are
simply burgeoning. We have so much information flowing in that our real
problem is to process and handle it and do something with it. And this
is, indeed, a challenge. Interestingly though, this has not denegrated
of that old traditional spy. Why? Because, very broadly
speaking, the technical intelligence collection tells you what happened
in some other country some time in the past. When I give that information
to our policy makers the first thing they do is say, "Stan, why did that
happen and what's going to happen next?" And finding out people's
intentions and plans is the forte of the human intelligence agent. So
the change that we are facing today is to be able to coordinate these
three means--photographic, signals, and human--of collecting the necessary
information and being able to orchestrate that in a manner that will get
us the information in the least expensive, the least risky way. But to
be sure that we get it in a complementary manner so that what the photo-
graph can't tell you, you look for with the signals or the human, and
vice versa. This may sound very logical and very simple to you, I'm only
suggesting that because these burgeoning technical capabilities are
relatively new, it is not the traditional way we have done business.
And because intelligence is a large bureaucracy spread over a number
of different agencies and departments of our government, it takes some
fundamental restructuring to do this. Just over a year ago the President,
in a new Executive Order, gave me as the Director of Central Intelligence--
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I have two jobs, I'm head of the CIA but I'm also the head of the Director
of Central Intelligence and in that role I'm to coordinate all of the
national intelligence activities of our country. And in that role the
President strengthened my authority over the budgets and over the directives
to go out and collect information of all the intelligence activities.
That change, that process is still in evolution today. It's coming
nicely but it is a very fundamental change.
The third factor that is driving change is the increased public
attention to intelligence ever since the investigations of the period
1975 to 76. Those investigations have brought to our nation's intelli-
gence activities more public attention than has ever, in the history of
mankind, been brought to bear on a major intelligence organization. The
process, I'm afraid, has ruined some of the confidence and support of the
American public for its intelligence activities. I believe and I am
pleased to sense a gradual return to that support and confidence. But
with it I also recognize a lingering suspicion as to whether the intelli-
gence organizations of our country may be invading the privacy of the
American citizen. In any event, enough of the allegations about previous
abuses of intelligence were true, even though most were exaggerated, the
corrective action in this area has been necessary. It has been taken and
has been taken thoroughly I believe.
We now have a series of oversight procedures which serve as a very
important check on intelligence. It begins with the President himself,
who takes a very direct and personal interest in what we are doing. It
goes from there to an Intelligence Oversight Board which reports to the
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President only and it is constituted only to look into the legality and
propriety of our intelligence activities. And it goes from there to the
two committees of the Congress empowered exclusively to conduct oversight
of our intelligence activities. And finally, of course, there is the
press which is much more interested, much more persevering in uncovering
what we are doing today than ever before.
The impact of all this has been very substantial. This added visi-
bility has had a virtually traumatic effect within the Intelligence
Community. Some of this publicity is wanted publicity and we need to
regenerate that sense of confidence that we are not invading the rights
of the American citizen and hence, we are being more open. We are
publishing more and, incidentally, when you leave today, we will have on
the tables in the foyer some examples of the materials that we have
published in the last year or so which we think are of interest to the
American public and which are unclassified. We're answering questions
as I am with you today, speaking more in public and
participating more in symposia and academic conferences.
But much of the publicity we have today is also unwanted. It's
unhelpful and it involves improper disclosures of intelligence informa-
tion. And this is traumatic for a service that has traditionally, and of
necessity, operated in a large measure of secrecy. And if you were what
we call a case officer in the CIA and you were overseas attempting to
persuade some foreign person to be a spy on our behalf at the risk of his
or her life, and you must have that sense of confidence that you can
assure that individual his identity will be kept quiet. And today our
people don't have that same sense of confidence they did perhaps a decade
ago. And so that makes it a traumatic change for them.
7
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And not the least of the traumas we're going through is the
increasing legal context of everything we do. I'm sure you appreciate
that there is a natural tension between the effective and impartial
administration of criminal justice and the successful prosecution of
intelligence. I hardly need remind you that criminal justice requires
that all relevant information be made available to both the prosecution
and the defense. And yet, you can readily appreciate that national
intelligence interest often requires that evidence derived from intelli-
gence sources be protected against disclosure. The resulting dilemmas
can be very painful and are not infrequent. Are these real dilemmas?
Yes. I think that when Attorney General Bell, last week, had to drop the
prosecution of a case against two officials in order not to
disclose intelligence secrets, it is a genuine dilemma.
There would be no dilemma, no problem, only if one of two things
pervailed. If in our scale of national values we felt that every law
enforcement interest were always superior to any intelligence interest
and, therefore, whatever intelligence was necessary to
prosecution. Or if they felt the reverse, that law enforcement interests
were always subordinated to intelligence interests and therefore any
criminal proceeding would be terminated if intelligence information was
threatened, would there be no dilemma. Clearly neither view is correct.
The values are variable and cannot be readily ordered in advance. Each
case must be separately judged on its own facts and intelligence interests
must be placed in perspective with other interests such as justice and
precedence.
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t is the Attorney General who has the discretion to decide
whether prosecution is warranted and on what basis. This is not to say
however that I have no role in influencing that decision whenever
intelligence interests are involved. On the contrary, I have a necessary
task. In the first place, I'm responsible for ensuring that no relevant
information is withheld from the Attorney General. Access to relevant
information, regardless of its classification, should not give pointed
dispute. In my view, the Attorney General has a clear right and a need
to review all such information so that his decision may be taken with the
fullest factual perspective. Beyond this, I feel that I am responsible
for giving the Attorney General an estimate of the potential impact of
the public disclosure of intelligence information that may be relevant to
prosecution. Again, I believe that this kind of an estimate is something
the Attorney General must have in order to make his informed decisions
and to properly weigh the consequences of those decisions.
If it should happen that I conclude that the Attorney General has
come to the incorrect balance, I must then appeal to the President and
have him to decide whether the best interests of the United States favor
prosecution or not. In brief, I cannot simply frustrate a prosecution by
refusing to disclose to the public classified information. That choice
lies with the Attorney General and I must appeal that choice, if I do not
agree with it. Let me say that in the two years I have been privileged
to work on these thorny issues with Attorney General Griffin Bell, we
have never had, because of his great cooperativeness, anything but a
harmonious resolution of these issues. But they are not easy for either
one of us.
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And there are a number of reasons why they are tough decisions.
One is simply that a criminal trial in our country is a public event
constitutional guarantees that make it so. But at the same
time I cannot ignore the fact that the evidencuary use of intelligence
information means that there is a very high probability that it will end
up in the public domain. There are few ways to avoid that outcome for to
limit the exposure of the information just to the trial participants. In
addition, there is of course pretrial discovery and the right of cross-
examination. These features make the judicial process almost as uncertain
as it is open. For example, what lines of defense will be followed, what
scope of discovery of cross-examination will be allowed simply don't
limit themselves to precise advance measurements. They are unpredictable.
That means that the decision of whether or not to prosecute is all the
more difficult for those who must gauge before the course is set where it
may all lead. Again, I'm not complaining about all this or suggesting
any radical reform. I'm only trying to describe how it looks from my
position.
What I have been saying takes on even greater force, I believe,
when you consider the necessities of proof on just how the basic
criminal statutes which are of special concern to intelligence activites.
Let me set you a hypothetical, legal case. One in which a government
employee is arrested while attempting to deliver a highly classified
document to a foreign agent, but in which the delivery is frustrated
by the arrest. The crime has been committed under our espionage laws,
yet the prosecution of this crime could involve an extraordinary
price. The government would very likely be required to show proof
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that the information in the document, if disclosed publicly
would materially injure the national security. That burden of proof
would very likely require that the document itself be offered as
evidence and that a government witness confirm the accuracy of that
document. The net result, as you can readily see, would be that the
trial proceedings themself would accomplish exactly what had been
frustrated by the arrest. The disclosure of the very information to
the foreign power and others and on top of that it would have been
delivered not under some question by a spy but by the absolute
authenticity of having it verified by a government witness in the court.
I am sure you can agree that the spectacle of this sort is not
pleasant, is not easy for us to contemplate and to struggle with a
decision under these circumstances as to whether to prosecute it.
I am happy to say in one case recently, U.S. vs Kampiles, we were
able to confront this dilemma, but indeed it was a very risky and
an uncertain course with lots of hazards around it.
Still another problem in trial procedures, is the last minute
discovery ----- that we find have been favored by defense counsels
in espionage cases recently. Again, the case of the U.S. vs Kampiles
for example. It is unfortunately the case that a member of the CIA
or just intelligence involved it is becoming more and more -------
for the defense attorney to attempt to collapse the prosecution
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by pressing for more disclosures than he thinks we are likely
to be willing to provide. Hence, a shotgun approach is
evolving against which there are no easy counter tatics.
Judges, though, are by no means insensitive to these dilemmas.
They will, as you know, from time to time regulate pretrial
discovery in espionage prosecutions at least, by protective
orders limiting access to the defense, or at least limiting
what the defense can do in terms of publicizing the information
they receive. Unfortunately, the terms of these protective
orders vary widely and they seem to have nothing to do with the
differences of the cases themselves. For example, some of the
orders have conditioned access to sensitive materials by
defense witnesses on both security clearance grounds and on
court approval. Whereas, in other cases it has only been
on the basis of court approvals. In some cases, U.S. vs Moore
for instance, the protective order had authorized defense
counsel to maintain custody of materials in a safe owned
by the government. Whereas in others, like the Kampiles case
the material remained totally in the control of the government
at all times. Ingeniously, in just a recent case, arrangements
were made where the materials were kept in a safe which was
mine, and my safe was kept inside a safe which was the judges.
With all this, let me not leave the impression that all
of the interests of intelligence are on the side of not disclosing
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00300001-1
or not prose~Rved F r I a Q1/ /07.
e ine IAres s -R P or B01of 5 si d4RQ0 es.
To begin with our concern for protecting national secrets is very
genuine. Beyond concern for individuals, such as I mentioned
before, individuals who are willing to risk their lives in our
nation's behalf, there is a wide-range of clear damage to our
national interest when information which must stay secret is
disclosed. Sometimes our relations for negotiations with
foreign powers can be undermined and frustrated and also
our continued access to necessary information is often jeopardized.
Foreign intelligence services simply do not want to cooperate and
share with an intelligence service they feel is an information
seive. And these expensive technical systems I have described
can be frustrated and countered if their details are disclosed
to other nations.
So, thus we in intelligence although we are generally inclined
probably overly inclined to hold back from prosecution, also we
find many cases when we intensely want to see the prosecution
proceed. Clearly, those that concern us most are ones involving
espionage. Beyond that, we are very concerned with irresponsible
I would say, even traitorous individuals who deliberately disclose
classified information today. The seriousness of these losses
causes us in the intelligence community strongly to support
prosecution against them. My blood literally boils at the obvious
callousness and selfishness of some of these individuals who
jeopardize our country. They not only deserve the punishment
they may receive through prosecution, but we as a nation need to
prosecute in order to deter others from following in their footsteps.
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Tnus, we do have an incentive to lean over backwards.
And in the two years I have been privileged to be in this position
I have held my breath on at least half a dozen occasions when
we have taken espionage cases to court and thus far, I beleive,
we have been successful in protecting the national interest.
There is one other set of dilemmas I would like to touch on
briefly. This is the increasing number of rules and regulations
that are being applied to our intelligence activities. Some of
them in law, some of them in the directive in the executive branch
of the government. These are particularly, rules and regulations,
that protect the privacy of American citizens because they are
new, often complex and because they must be interpreted in the light
of our sometimes unique activities, they have impacted heavily on the
speed and flexibility with which we have been able to operate.
Very often, questions of Constitutional Law have been involved,
and they require that the Attorney General's legal staff and my
legal staff take time to think out a legal issue in the midst of
an operational crisis. In all such instances, the Attorney General
and his staff have gone out of their way to provide timely opinions
and advice. In practice the options we have had have often been
limited. Let me give you again, one example. A real example
involving electronic surveillance. Over a year ago in a small
country there was a seige, a state of insurrection and at one point
the only good source of information that we had as to just what
was going on was the transmissions on a ham radio of an American
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missionary. Now the issue came up, could we legally intercept
that American's transmission and if we could at what point
would it become illegal electronic surveillance. The decision was
made that as long as the missionary was using CB or ham radio we
Tape: Side B
would have to stop monitoring. Well, we recognize the--------
----------privacy rights of our citizens and in most instances
we can adapt to them, but the issues are very complex and they
must be assimilated by my people in the field who are not
------ the initiative of the intelligence operator can be dulled
by this need to insure that all applicable legal standards are met,
and uncertainty as to whether they are being met can lead to
over caution. In fact, today, our operators are almost forced
to avoid operations which could involve US persons. This in turn
could reduce our flexibility to respond in precious situations, when
the lives and property of our nationals may be involved.
This year it is my hope that legislation defining charters
of intelligence communities will be passed by the Congress. This
legislation would establish on the one hand, the authority for
our intelligence activities, and on the other hand the boundaries
in which we must operate. If they are read with care and
sensitivity with the problems such as those we have been discussing,
it may help to resolve some of these difficulties. Overreaction,
either by tying the hands of the intelligence community or by
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giving it unrestricted freedom would be a mistake. On the one
hand it is inviting a repetition of past abuses, on the other
hand emasculating our necessary intelligence capabilities.
Let me though, after all these comments, particularly about
our legal problems, assure you that in my view the intelligence
arm of our government today is strong and capable. It is undergoing
substantial change. This is never an easy or a placid process
in a large bureaucracy. Out of the present metamorphasis, however,
is emerging an intelligence community in which the legal rights of
our citizens and the legal constraints and controls on intelligence
operations are balanced with a continuing need to maintain an
effective means of garnering information necessary for the conduct
of our foreign policy. This is not an easy transition to make.
We are not there yet, but we are moving rapidly and surely down
the right path. When we reach our goal we will have constructed
a new model of intelligence, a uniquely American model suited to
the ideals of our country. As we go down that path, we need
your support and understanding and I am therefore most grateful
that you have asked me to be here today and have listened so
attentively.
Thank you very much.
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Q&As
American College of Trial Lawyers
Begins:
I assure you all that we absolutely have the capabilities
to police the forthcoming SALT Treaty. I cannot assure you,
this audience, of that in a way that would be persuasive
because it is a very highly classified matter. In addition,
it is a matter that requires a great deal of -----------
and different people will view that differently. There is
almost nothing one can verify with a 100% certainty.
What I am going to do in the months ahead, once the Treaty
is signed is give the Senate of the United States every
shred of information about each of the 60 some provisions
of the Treaty and will tell them my confidence of being able
to tell you whether the Soviets are living up to this provision
is so and so, and the possibility there cheating, if we don't
catch them is so and so, and the consequences to our security
if they did cheat is so and so. It is going to be an extremely
complex process and I believe I can weigh it out in all the
details the Senate of the United States will need. I regret
that I cannot be open enough with the American public to give
every detail to the public. I think you are going to have
to rely on the Senators, as are your representatives, who will
get all the detailed classified information.
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Q.
Can intelligence -------both avoid another cataclysmic war and
tremendous expense ----------------
A. Now on armaments and the risk that those armaments entail,
certainly hope so. I certainly think that is one of our
principal tasks, is keeping the leaders of our country well
enough informed so that they don't either overreact to a
threat that is developing politically, economically or
militarily. Nor do they fail to anticipate one far enough
in advance that I was trying to stress in my comments, so that
we can and will do something about it rather than waiting until
it becomes a crisis. I view that as my primary objective
and my primary contribution and I hope we can and will make it
well.
Q. Asking about the contents on the H bomb that has been enjoined
from publication.
A. No, I do not. I hve to defer to the Attorney General here, this
does not come under my purview--I am sorry.
Q. Were we caught short in Iran?
A I wondered if that question would arise.
We win some. We lose some. Very seriously, we would
have liked to have done better in Iran. We don't think
we did as badly as the newspapers would allege. What we
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did and I have a very clear track record. Is we tr ?d
the growing signs of discontent in a number of different
areas in the Iranian community. We saw discontent in the
religious community, business community, with the people
who had not influence on the political process, others
who ---------economically, but not enough, others who
--------economically much at all. There were all sorts
of these groups of discontent around that country.
I think we were reasonably portraying those. What we
did not forsee that a 78 year old cleric, who had been
out of the country for 14 years would be the factor that
would coallesce all these groups of discontent. In short,
it appeared to us, and me personally, as late as October
of last year that while there were these pots of discontent
on the stove, the Shah with his strong powers of police force,
would be able to put the lid on any one of those. But what
happened was they all merged into one big pot, and boiled over.
Clearly, the Shah did not anticipate that and he was pretty
close to the scene. Nor do I know of any other intelligence
services or academic people, or newspaper columnists who were
predicting that. I should be better than any of those, I admit,
I don't want to forgive myself. But we really thought the Shah
had the situation under control. Clearly, we were aware there
was a problem. This I believe is one of the first truly revolutionary
situations that any of us have seen in our lifetime. A true
revolution generated by the people.
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RECORDING TIME/60 MINUTES
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