NOTE TO STEVE FROM JOHNS HOPKINS PRESIDENT CLUB MEMBER RE: ROLE AND PURPOSE OF WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IN INTELLIGENCE.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002900020001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 5, 1978
• Content Type: NOTES

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Baltimore, Maryland
Thursday, 5 October 1978
Thank you very much for having me with you. Thank you for your
very kind words Steve, and I'm very grateful that you would honor me by
saying that you thought I was trying to do the intelligence job for our
country in a way that the people of the country would be proud of
because I really do feel that is important and I don't think a day goes
by that I don't also feel the pressure of making sure that I'm not
failing to do the job the country needs to have done. Those are difficult,
almost contradictory choices at times. What I would like to talk about
a little bit tonight and I hope I will leave us some time for discussion
and questions because I enjoy that much more than the lecture. I'd like
to talk about what I think the role and purpose is of what we are trying
to do in intelligence: what we need to do with it, what effect it has,
and what the society needs to ensure on the one hand that we are going
to be effective but on the other hand that we're doing only what we're
supposed to do.
I think today that good intelligence is more important to our country
than any time since the centralized intelligence function was organized
in 1947. We were then, you recall, the dominant military power, we were
totally independent economically; and we were certainly the major actor
on the political scene. Today we are still, in my view, the preeminent
military, economic, and political force in the world. But we, as almost
any nation, must recognize that actions outside of our control today can
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have major impact upon us. I dont think I need belabor aLt wi a
group of people like this who have dealt so much in the international
sphere, I'm sure, in your businesses and in your personal lives. But
today with military might proliferating, with economic interdependence
being the keyword, and with political activism and independence the
characteristic of not only well established nations but many of the new
ones, our role in the world is changing and is one that requires that we
have information about what other countries are doing. Sometimes they
do it deliberately to be inimical to us because they think that is in
their best interests; sometimes they are just pursuing a selfish interest
regardless of its impact on us or other countries of the world. In
either event many nations do what they do on the world scene that
impacts on us in a cloak of secrecy and we must find some way of
protecting ourselves against actions that do have a bearing on us. Only
if we are well informed can our decision makers make good decisions.
Today the leverage of good information, good intelligence, is much
greater I believe than when we were so dominant in all these fields of
military, economics, and politics. Today that leverage, I believe also,
is more useful than it was in the past because the usefulness of military
leverage has considerably declined in my view. Today we need good
information about what other countries are doing if we're going to
negotiate means of reducing tensions around the world by common agreement.
How can we sign away the fate of this country if we cannot assure the
public that we can verify the kinds of arrangements that we make to
reduce tensions. Now in the best of all possible worlds, countries
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would exchange this information and we wouldn't have to spy on each
other. But I need not amplify on the fact that most of the nations of
the world are not open societies, and we cannot count on the free
flowing exchange of information. So our first role, our first mission
in intelligence is collecting what we call foreign intelligence, informa-
tion about what is going on in other countries. From it derives neces-
sarily our second role, which is what we call counterintelligence, its
the obverse. It's ensuring that other countries don't steal the secrets
which we have and we must preserve. We are certainly, in my view, the
most open society the world has ever known and yet we must keep our
secrets, we cannot afford to develop expensive weapons systems, expensive
intelligence collection systems and then disclose their characteristics.
They can be compromised and all our efforts and money wasted all too
easily. We cannot negotiate treaties if our hand is told in advance, as
it was in this morning's Washington Post. So counterintelligence, our
second function, is neutralizing, frustrating, defeating the efforts of
others to penetrate our society and find the things which we have
decided must be kept secret.
The third role that we perform is covert political action. Now
covert political action is a difficult term, a difficult area, but it is
the attempt to influence events in foreign countries without the moti-
vating force being known, without it being identified that it was the
United States that was trying to do this. This is not really an intel-
ligence function. Intelligence is the gathering of information and
its evaluation. But historically, since 1947, the government has
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 el ected E%MWjA?sft1;0~yMpa~ ;0~yM : R' d` Qf %1 j' 92?RRO~ggq l-2
authority in our government to conduct covert political action. One of
the cardinal principals of our foriegn policy as a country is to do
whatever we can to avoid military conflict while still preserving our
national interests. Generally we try to influence events overtly
through diplomacy, economic pressure, threats, negotiations, whatever
it may be. But there really are times, in my view, when an attempt to
influence overtly could be a dilution or a negation of our efforts if it
were known that we were doing it. For example, we sometimes today
are on the one hand negotiating with a terrorist group, and on the other
hand infiltrating it, trying to undercut it while we are still ostensively
working with it. Sometimes we are financing individuals or institutions;
we are trying to defend democratic standards in their countries when
they are up against tremendous pressures of totalitarianism or funds
that are funneled in from the outside. Sometimes today we are using
intermediaries to try to influence the decision makers in other countries
in our direction, to support our policies. But if it were known that we
were the motivating force behind that, it would be of much less value to
that type of intermediary intercession on our behalf. In short, I
believe there is within the spectrum of our tools of foreign policy a
place, a limited place, for a covert political action capability. It
can, of course, be preferable as a recourse to sending in the Marines if
you got to that point where other things don't suffice.
What do we as intelligence professionals need in order to do these
three roles of collecting foreign intelligence, protecting ourselves in
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 counte4'g9I ~i e~48 r?i1~i?2s ~-E e$46~~~~' ~ 9~@Q~BPI0 at we
are authorized to do. Well first, I believe very sincerely we need the
support and the understanding of the American people. No public
institution can survive over time without that support in our democratic
society. Now we had that support for many years strictly on faith,
on the faith and understanding of the American people that there were
some secret things that needed to be done. Unfortunately over the last
3-1/2--4 years that faith has been questioned. There were abuses of
some of the privileges, there were allegations of abuses that didn't
actually take place, but one way or another some of that faith has
evaporated. I still believe from my talks around the country that the
American public has a very firm understanding that they need and want a
good intelligence capability. But at the same time, I think the public
deserves to understand a little bit more of what we do, and why we do
it, so that their faith and trust can rest in something more tangible.
My presence with you tonight is part of the evidence of my personal
commitment to being more open about those areas of our activities where
we can be open.
Now the second thing that we need to do our job is almost a contra-
diction and that's the ability of this country to keep its secrets
better. And if that sounds contradictory let me explain. Governments,
no less than individuals need to have some secrets, especially in the
field of intelligence, but there has been too much secrecy in our
country. There are too many government documents that are classified
one way or another. By making as much as possible available to the
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are reducing the corpus of remaining classified information and thereby
protecting it better, garnering a greater sense of respect for it.
Churchill, I believe, said when everything is classified, nothing is
classified. We have got to move back to where people respect the
classified label once more. But this means also that there must be
within the country, I believe, a greater recognition of the legitimacy
of secrets. Secrets are not moral or immoral, good or bad, they are a
necessary corollary of living in the kind of world, the kind of society
we live in today. But too often in recent years there has come to be a
feeling that anybody favoring secrecy is automatically somebody trying
to cover up wrongdoing. Whistle blowers have automatically become
heroes, public servants who defend the secrets have automatically
become suspect. Let me assure you that there are established procedures,
not only for keeping secrets, but for complaining that secrets are being
improperly kept. I have yet to find a whistle blower who tried to use
the legitimate channels to bring to people's attention that there were
improper secrets. Instead they go to the public, and I suspect they're
more interested in fame and fortune than they are in reforming the
system. Let me not overstate it, there are none of us who are either
required, as I am, by law to help protect our secrets, they do it
because they know its important to feel that the public should take us
just on faith. They can't just be asked to accept our word that what
we're doing in the way of preserving secrets is correct. There are real
risks in secrecy and in the entire activity of intelligence for our
country.
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First, there is the risk of the abuse of human r hts; the Bill of
Rights only applies to Americans. But nonetheless, our performance
around the world in intelligence activities, if it systematically
violates human rights, will very much lessen the importance of our
example and we can't diminish that importance. Our influence in the
world is still in large measure, I believe, on the example that we set.
And beyond this, as we all recognize from the abuses and accusations of
abuses in the past, in the intelligence function there is always a
danger that the privacy of American citizens will be accidentally or
intentionally violated--their basic rights will be infringed. We cannot
ask you, the public, to accept us on faith. But what we have done, I
believe, in our country over the last several years, is to erect out
of the crucible of 3-1/2 years of intense public criticism of intelligence,
a series of control mechanisms which we hope will be in balance and give
assurance to the American public on the one hand that give us enough
authority, enough capability to serve the American public in the way
that it should be served by the intelligence function. What are these
controls? Well there are four of them in nature: general guidelines,
specific prohibitions, injunctions against actions, short of total
prohibition, and oversight, overview procedures. Let me go through them
very quickly.
There are two general guidelines which I've used and issued to
our people. One, espionage is an extraordinary remedy. The clandestine
means of gathering information is never done, in my view, if there's a
chance, a good chance, that information could be found by open, overt
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means. We must carefully assess the risks of doing t dings clandestinely
to be sure the benefits of the country are going to be commensurate.
The second guideline is that actions which we take in secret must, in my
view, be defensible in principle in public. Now we cannot go before the
public and defend a particular clandestine or covert activity in a
particular circumstance. It would almost be a contradiction of terms,
of course, to disclose that you are going to spy on some nation in a
certain way. But I do believe that the general classes of action which
we undertake must be defensible before the American public in terms of
the attitudes, standards, the policies of our country. And as I will
come to in a bit, they must be defensible in greater detail before the
appropriate committees of the Congress. Now the second category of
controls are the prohibitions I mentioned. There are some activities
such as assassinations, which are simply so repugnant to our national
standards that we can outlaw them completely. Another example is acts
that are equivalent to waging war. We in intelligence have no business
conducting acts that are equivalent to war because the initiation, the
conduct of war in our country is controlled by laws of Congress. Those
are limited in number, that is, specific, total, flat prohibitions. The
more difficult area of what I call injunction. There are a few of these
clear-cut prohibition cases because what is suitable, permissible in one
environment, one set of circumstances, may be quite different under
another. What we will do in wartime is different than what we'll do in
peacetime. What we will do with respect to a totalitarian country is
different than what we'll do with respect to a democratic country.
There must be then in the rules that govern intelligence activities some
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privacy and our rights in our democratic society. The government has
procedures for balancing the need of the government to know information
and the right of the citizen to part with it. None of us would tolerate
a search of our house without a warrant properly issued. In short,
there is an injunction against search, but there is a mechanism to
permit it under controlled circumstances. And that's what we're trying
to establish in the Intelligence Community: Injunctions against the
general case of doing certain things, a recognition that this is not
what we would like to do, but there may be circumstances in which
different levels of authority, according to the risks involved, maybe
the President, sometimes the National Security Council, sometimes
myself, sometimes my subordinates, who can authorize activities which
are normally enjoined against.
Finally, there are the oversight procedures to check on this entire
process of guidelines, prohibitions, and injunctions as well, of course,
as the effectiveness. Are we doing the job? And these oversight
procedures start with something called the Intelligence Oversight Board.
Today is composed of former Senator Gore, former Governor Scranton, Tom
Farmer, a contemporary of Steve's and mine at Oxford, a Washington
lawyer. These three men are a board reporting only to the President of
the United States and only empowered to look into the legality and the
propriety of intelligence activites. And any member of the Intelligence
Community, any whistle blower, who feels that something is being done
wrong may communicate with them directly--not through me. Beyond that,
over the last two years, we've established in the Congress a committee
in each house dedicated to the oversight of intelligence functions.
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I'm happy to say to you that I believe e rela
very well. They are cooperative, they are helpful to us, at the same
time they are diligent in being overseers, checkers, investigators.
Many in the Intelligence Community were skeptical about this when it
happened. Most of them I think have come around to recognize there are
real positive values for us in this oversight process by the Congress.
Ultimate accountability is always a sobering thing. Most of you here
face that accountability in a profit and loss sheet. You don't have
that in government, you won't have that in intelligence. We are doing
things that are risky, we're doing things that are very important and
patriotic, it's easy to get carried away. But the knowledge that
ultimately you're going to have to account, makes you be judicious;
makes you recognize that as you make a decision, that you know you are
willing and able to defend. The committees of Congress today are in the
process of drawing up legislation for what they will call charters,
charters that will establish certain guidelines, certain prohibitions,
certain injunctions, and this oversight mechanism. Those are going to
be the bedrock of the intelligence function of our country in the years
ahead. Those charters will probably be enacted by the next Congress. I
hope they will. They are important to us. I am enthusiastic about
getting them into being. They give us, first of all, the foundation for
legitimacy for what we do, the establishment of this panoply of directives
will also give the intelligence officer on the street who represents you
and me, day-to-day, hour-by-hour, who must make decisions on his own, a
good set of guidelines, a good set of general understanding of what we
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expect from him. All in all, we have to be careful that we find the
right balance, that we don't have so much control that we have intelli-
gence by timidity, that we don't have so many people overseeing that we
are bound to have leaks. We're not there today but the relationships
are evolving well. But I think it'll be a couple of years yet before I
can come back and talk with you and say I'm confident that we are there,
that we have found that right mix, enough control, enough oversight, but
still the basic effectiveness that is needed for the interests of our
country. I am confident we are pointed in the right direction, there
are going to be interesting, difficult debates ahead both as we establish,
over time, the relationship for the oversight boards and committees, and
as we write these charters and enact them into law.
It is a very exciting time for intelligence in this country. We are,
in my opinion, evolving a uniquely American model of intelligence. One
that is in tune with the standards, the attitudes,.the values of our
country but one which if we do it right, will, in my opinion, conti.nue
our capability of being what I believe we are today--the best intelligence
service in the world. Thank you.
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JOHN HOPKINS PRESIDENT'S CLUB
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
Q: (Inaudible)
A: Candidly, my problem is when intelligence gets close to domestic
political issues (I was talking to Steve about his good friend, Sol
Linowitz), I ended up testifying with Sol Linowitz about the Panama
Canal. He about the value of the treaties, me about the alleged
nefarious activities of Torrijos and the drug traffic and all these
things. What we testified upon that day was in the newspapers a
couple of days later. Some of my sources were endangered and I am
sure you recognize that the source of intelligence may be a human
being, it may be a satellite, it may be a signals listening post, it
may be an airplane with a photographic capability. But I tell you,
when you sit home at night and think that what you told somebody
today may cost somebody his life tomorrow, you are cautious. Its a
problem and I don't know the full answer to it when you get close to
these domestic political issues. But I'll also say that when it
comes to really serious intelligence, the committees of the Congress
show great circumspection. It is so great because they haven't
had some of this information before and when they receive it, and
we try to limit this to our oversight committees as much as possible,
they are sobered by it, by possessing it and recognizing the impli-
cations of leaking it. So I think we can handle this. Yesterday
afternoon I sat in a Congressman's office, and very politely I said
to him, "Sir, I am not going to tell you that -information," and
I do that over and over again and it is not easy. I took a beating
in the press last spring because I would not disclose how we knew
the Cubans had been involved in supporting the invasion of Shaba in
Zaire, and we take it on the chin but the only recourse was to
disclose my source and I cannot do that when a man's life is at
stake. '
Q: How many people are on those Congressional committees?
A: Eleven in the House and seventeen in the Senate and we are hoping
for two things. First, we're hoping the Senate will reduce. its
size, and there is some indication they will, and the second is
that over time I sincerely hope that they will come to a joint
committee. The other big problem is the size of the staffs and that
bothers me more. Talking about that, I was-walked into one committee
one day and there were 20 staff and three senators. I had four
staff with me to support me. It was delicate and it had some
domestic political overtones, so I said to the Senators, "Gentlemen,
I'm asking my four staff members to leave the room because if
this testimony appears in the papers tomorrow morning you are
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either going to accuse me personally of leaking it or you're going
to do it." Eighteen of the staff left the room. I did that four
days in a row, mind you, four different committees and every one of
them I testified without support. They didn't get as good answers
as they would have liked to have had.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: No, each time you're up there you run into the same problem. We try
to limit the information about how we collect intelligence, how we
do our job as opposed to the product, the information which many
committees require. We try to limit the knowledge of how we do it
to the committees of oversight. But when the Appropriations Committee
Chairman looks you in the eye and says you don't get any money
unless you tell me, he's got a little leverage there. But maybe we
are disclosing information to the Appropriations and Intelligence
committees, the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees have
jurisdiction over us also and there's a law we must tell them all of
our covert political actions, all eight committees, four in each
chamber. But its gradually atrophying., We tell them we're ready to
tell you and they say don't bother today. So we're getting them
down and it'll take time because Congressional perogatives do not
change overnight, the chairmen don't give up their authority.
Q:
Admiral, what is the status now of any efforts to control dis-
closure by former employees of CIA?
A: Its a very difficult issue. As you know, we have prosecuted Mr.
Snepp because he did not fulfill the contract he signed with us. We
didn't prosecute him because he disclosed anything, and I won't
answer the question because that court case is still in litigation,
as to whether we didn't do that because he didn't disclose anything
classified, or because we chose not to because we would have to
disclose so much more classified information to prove it, you
see what I mean. But being able to convict him on a civil charge
of failing to fulfill a contract, and taking away the profits of
his book, we think that's been a helpful inhibitor to others. Mr.
Agee is still running around outside this country, last week in a
book that thick, he named 300 of our employees, he is a most trai-
torous person. That's all I can say, again, because litigation is
pending, but we're certainly debating it here, but we have very
severe limitations on us as to what we can do. We always have the
one in a free judicial society that we may have to disclose more
than its worth to convict. That's a judgment you have to make in
each case, but you also have a lack of law with real teeth in it to
do that and its a difficult issue because none of us want to jeopar-
dize the freedom of speech in this country.
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equivalent to British Official Secrets Act?
A: No, I don't. I don't think that would be appropriate in this
country or tolerated in this country. As you've probably been
reading, the Official Secrets Act is under considerable pressure in
Great Britian right now. At least the extreme versions in which,
literally, if you disclosed how many picture books that were used in
the foreign office last year, you could be prosecuted. I don't
think that's the way to go but I think there should be some legal
inhibitions on members of the Intelligence Community, people who
join us and recognize they're dealing with fragile materials,
from disclosing them during their service or afterwards. You have
to consider that very carefully because it's a criminal offense
to have done that and a newspaperman can be convicted for not
disclosing in court that this criminal gave him the information and
that gets us into a very big donnybrook. We're trying to see if
there's a way legally to work something out there.
Q: Admiral I was a peon in the military in World War II, but always
felt that if my commanding officer had directed me do something
that I would carry it out as ordered. We were in a very sensitive,
very crucial, very valuable post. I suppose your home base superior
is your Commander-in-Chief, but in the past few years the integrity
of the CIA has been compromised by the Commander-in-Chief. You
talk about this program of accountability. Will that give you a
new superior officer, a new person to report to rather than the
Commander-in-Chief. Do you think your position is being compromised?
A: No its a very trenchant question and its a very appropriate one
because to the extent that I am more and more beholden to the
intelligence committees, there comes the question of do I have
two masters and do I respond to them in lots of ways. And one of
the issues that has to be resolved over time through practice and
through the development of these charters, is how much will these
committees try to manage the Intelligence Community as opposed to
overseeing it. Last year they took one item out of my budget for
$12,000. I have a budget in the billions and they delved down
in and said we don't want this one little thing down here. $12,000!
I mean, can you imagine all the effort it takes to do that. Now
that's micromanagement and we're trying to wean them away from
that. I spent the whole morning on the Hill today trying to get
some micromanagement out of my budget for next year. Now it's a
temptation for them to do that, it's a temptation for them after
they get their appetite whetted to start telling what to do and
how to do it. And if they want a study done or intelligence col-
lected on something, they task me. I really can't respond to
that--I work for the President. As far as the ethical issue,
if I am asked to abuse my trust by the President of the United
States I don't think there is any way you can organize legislative
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control against that. I think that has got to e the integrity of a
man in my position. There is no way, when I have been asked by
the Confirmation Committee of the Senate when I was up for confirma-
tion, I was asked that question and I said, "Sir, if the President
tells me to do something I believe is either improper or illegal, I
will go back to him and tell him why I think he is wrong and argue
with him. If I lose, I will either have to have been persuaded that
he was right, or I will resign." They asked if I would come to them
and I said, "No, I don't think I should work around my Commander-in-
Chief. I'd rather resign." After I resign, you can call me, you
have the option. That's another thing, but I'm not going to plan
and use the intelligence committees as a way of avoiding my respon-
sibilities of standing tall if I have to stand tall.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: If the trend toward leaks continues at the rate it has in the
last year or two, we could become less effective. But what we're
doing in openness is never talking about how we collect our infor-
mation. That's where the leaks hurt. We can't go talk to the man
on the street in some Communist country and say will you come to
work for the CIA if he really thinks the New York Times is going to
find out about it tomorrow. You just can't do it, its impossible.
So when I say openness, I say controlled openness. I talk to the
press, talk to you, my Deputy is authorized to do that, nobody else
is my organization is authorized to do that without approval. We
have a Public Affairs Office that deals as our intermediary with
much more forthrightness with the press today, but under very strict
control. We have a man down there who knows what he is talking
about and knows how far to go and where not to go. I also believe
we can talk about the product of intelligence which is a primary
form of openness. If we give a report out to the public that the
Soviet Union's prospects for producing oil is going down, that
they're not going to be net energy exporters in 1980; if we did that
knowing that we weren't disclosing how we got that information, it's
valuable to the public, it's started a genuine debate in this
country on an important topic and I think we have contributed to it
and we're benefitting the American public and why shouldn't they
know something that I can release without hurting our ability.
That's the long way around your question. The answer today is no,
but we've got to be able to keep reassuring more intelligence
services with which we cooperate, people we work with overseas, that
we're going to be able to keep their relationships private.
Q: Admiral, looking at your speech and the four constraints that
you mentioned, the third or fourth if I remember correctly you
had under the heading injunctions. This you illustrated by the
fact that nobody wants his house searched but it can be if you get a
search warrant. Now I understood you to say, what you said in your
talk was, that these were things that your agents could not do but
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you could give them--you or the President--could give em right
to do. I have two questions with respect to that. I wonder if you
would illustrate what you are talking about, in real life, give us
an example of the kind of thing a CIA agent is not supposed to do,
to keep them upright. And secondly, who sets the parameter of
the classification of injunctions and how can that relate to the
spectrum of things which are absolutely prohibited such as assassi-
nations. In that regard, if you set the parameters, could you
at a later time perhaps bring in something that is prohibited
in the injunction.
A: Well, first some of these prohibitions, and some of these injunctions
will be established by law in the charters. One of the delicate
things we have to work out is, if they get too many of what I think
should be injunctions into prohibitions, we could have our hands
tied in circumstances. But we don't want them tied or shouldn't
have them tied. Secondly, to give you an example: if we were going
to put a telephone tap on the the office of the prime minister of a
friendly country, I don't want some operative in the field to decide
to do that. And I will establish concrete rules in my organization
at what level that type of thing can be done. Because that would be
terrible to our foreign policy if they found out. We recruit agents
all around the world, we find people whom we think will provide us
information--ours is the job of espionage. Recruiting the private
secretary to the prime minister is a heck of a lot different than
recruiting a bum in a bar who happens to work in the nuclear power
plant, or something like that. So there are very delicate nuances
and as I say, some are so important that you go to the President;
some my deputy or his deputy can handle.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: That's a very difficult question to answer but I have not found them
in competition. There are individuals on it who we think are
sometimes stubborn because they come to a conclusion we don't
like and they want to be right. But generally I have found them
to be capable, dedicated individuals and I think they have carried
out their job very well thus far and I don't have any complaints.
I would like to see fewer of them because I'm worried about the
security. The House committee is only 20 some staff while the
Senate has 50 some staff. That's just more than are needed and
I think they begin to generate work.
Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002900020001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002900020001-2
Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002900020001-2