ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002700460001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 6, 1978
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Admiral Turner's Speech at Stanford University - Monday
evening - 6 February 1978
Thank you very much Brian - How are we coming through in the
back? Alright?
I appreciate the opportunity to be with you tonight because
it is always stimulating and fun to be back on a college
campus. I haven't had any tomatoes yet! Seriously. You
have to be fast with your foot work when you make a remark like
that!
Seriously, it is very important to us in the Intelligence
Community and in your government today, to keep wide and open
avenues to the academic community. After all, so much of
what we do is really academic-type research and need influence
from the academic community. We need understanding; we need
support. We get it in abundance and we're very greatful for it.
Buy beyond that the life blood over the long run of the
intelligence of our country depends on continuing infusions of
bright, young college graduates into the intelligence profession.
We don't need many, but we need some of the highest quality that
this country can produce. And over the long run it's going to
be critical to our future. Because I think today, perhaps more
than any time since this country in 1947, first established a
peace time centralized intelligence organization, the importance
of the product of that organization is of great, great value to
our c untr G heater than 30 years aggo when we first went in
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business. Why? Let me just say that in the three areas in
which we do our intelligence work - military intelligence,
political, and economic - there are greater demands on us today
than ever before.
Take the military for instance. The military equation
today is vastly different than it was in 1947. We were then
by far the dominant military power in the world. There was
no one that could touch us. But look what's happened since
then. The Soviet Union, not being able to compete with us
effectively in the political and economic spheres, has chosen
to compete in the one area where they really could - the
military. Today, we are in a position of being much closer
to military parity than ever before. There are of course,
vast quantitative and qualitative differences between our
military forces and their's. So we are in a situation where
neither country could contemplate war with the other without
assuming there would be tremendous risks. Now in this kind
of a situation intelligence becomes a much greater asset in
the military sphere simply because if you know what the enemy
can do and perhaps something about what he intends to do you
can use your own military capabilities to much greater advantage.
Now an enemy or an opponent doesn't normally tell you these
things. But over time he gives away clues here and there and
it is our job in the intelligence world to try to piece those
clues together and get some feeling for his capabilities and
his intentions in the military sphere. As we do this, we
hope that we are able to give to our policymakers, to the people
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who s e programs tor our governmen , a greater ability
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to do that job well for you and for me. We hope for instance
that we give insight to our negotiators in SALT. We hope
that we give ideas to our military leaders that may shape
our military forces so that they will best be able to deter war.
After all, when you are in a situation of near military parity,
it is both risky and destabilizing if your intelligence allows
the other side to gain an advantage on you. Because if that
advantage gets too big the risks become very high.
Similarly in the political field. Thirty years ago
we were the dominant political power and many, many of the
smaller nations simply followed our lead. I don't have to
talk today about how different that is; how many of the smaller
nations of the world simply refuse to take the lead, of course,
from either the Soviet Union or the United States. I say that
with approbation too, there is no reason they should. But what
that means for us, is that if we're going to play the leadership
role in the world that has been cast upon us, if we're going
to do the best we can to help keep the world free and peaceful,
we must understand the moves, the cultures, the attitudes, the
aspirations of so many of these countries and learn to work
with them in a spirit of partnership. That's a different world
than the totally independent, one-way attitude that we could
take some thirty years ago.
Similarly in the economic sphere. Let me touch only
lightly by saying that 30 years ago we were independent
economically. Today, we are interdependent. It is almost
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trite simply to refer to OPEC and the cost of oil to point
our our economic interdependence because it goes in much
wider spheres. And again, if we do not have good intelligence
information we are going to lose our shirts in the economic
arena of international economics today.
What happends when the Soviet Union, the European
economic community, Japan, take independent economic actions
about which we are not forewarned could be devastating to
our economy here, to your pocketbook and to mine. And so,
we must again in the intelligence world of our country keep
abreast in this area much more than ever before.
In addition to these increasing needs for good intelligence
today we have still another requirement that is upon us.
It's upon us because of the past three years of very strong
public criticism of some of the past of intelligence in this
country. I'm very happy that today I see us beginning to
turn the corner on that criticism. I'm beginning to sense
that the country is taking a very healthy, constructive
approach to intelligence. I'm beginning to ask the question
how do we have adequate intelligence for our country within
the democratic standards that we want and without abuses of
the American rights? I believe that we are working in that
direction and that we are going to be able in the next few
years to change the intelligence operations for this country
which will meet these growing needs in the conomic, political
and military spheres. And we'll do so within the confines
of our democratic standards and while protecting the rights
of our citizens.
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Let me then talk about four changes that we are
making in the ways we go about conducting intelligence
today as illustrative of how we're going to both meet the
needs and meet the standards of democracy.
To begin with we are shifting the product of intelligence.
The product 30 years ago was one - one product. It was
military intelligence about the Soviet Union. We were probably
interested also in six or seven countries in Eastern Europe that
border on the Soviet Union and we were interested from time to
time when the Soviets made a foray out in the Third World and
try to establish a position in some other countries. But
basically the product of the United States Intelligence Community
was determined by where and what the Soviet Union was up to.
There was also one other characteristic of the intelligence
product in those days. When the Soviets made a foray out
into the rest of the world this country called upon the Central
Intelligence Agency not only to provide good information about
what was going on but to try to influence the events themselves.
You recall we were there in Iran in 1953. We were there in
Guatemala in 1954. We were, perhaps unfortunately, there in
Cuba in 1961 and afterwards. We were there constructively
throughout the VietNam conflict and we were there as recently as
1975 in Angola attempting to change the political complexion
of that situation until the Congress said that that was not what
this country wanted and called a halt to it. But look at how
the world has changed over this 30-year period. Look at how
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United States interests have expanded. Today we don't need
intelligence on just the Soviet Union -- six or eight or ten
other countries. Today we have legitimate needs to know
what's going on in most of the 150 some countries of the world.
When I brief your country's policymakers, I'm as likely to be
talking about places like Zimbabwe or Namibia or Somalia or Benin
as they are countries that we've all known throughout our lives.
I am likely to be talking about OPEC and the organizations
that we hardly knew existed 5 or 6 years ago. So today the
intelligence product in our country must first cover a much
broader geographical area, and secondly, a much wider range of
topics not just military intelligence on the Soviet Union.
There is one other change today and that is that our
attitude toward political action, toward interferring in the
internal events of other countries is quite different than it
was in the past. As reflected, as I mentioned, in the action
of the Congress over Angola in 1975. I would not say, however,
that we can or we should eschew the possibility of taking
political action when it is in the best interest of our country.
But I will say that is is clear that the country wants to use
that device more judiciously than in the past and under much
greater control. I'll talk about those in just a moment.
In sum though on this first point, the product of the
United States Intelligence Community today is good intelligence
information about the economic, political and military
developments in a wide range of countries around the world
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and much less on political action than it was in the past.
Now the second change in what we are doing today is in
what I would call the production line. The production line
of intelligence is changing remarkably. You know that
over the centuries the plain old human intelligence agent -
the spy-has been the basic bread and butter way of collecting
intelligence information. You know Joshua sent two spies
into Jericho before he marches around with his trumpets. And
since then the spy has been an essential ingredient of
intelligence ever since.
In the last decade or decade and a half, however, there
has been a revolution on how we collect intelligence data.
Today we have advanced technical systems for collecting
information that just boggle one's imagination and the quantity
of data that can be collected today is multiplying more than
geometrically. This vast increase in data changes the way we
go about intelligence in many, many facets. But ironically, it
also happends to make the use of the human intelligence agent
more important than before. You see, when we have a vast
quantity of technical data and we begin to pass this to the
policy makers of our country, what do they do? They turn to me
and they say, "That's nice, that tells us what happened yesterday
or maybe today, but what we really want to know is why that
happened and what they're going to do tomorrow?" Well that,
of course, is the forte of the human intelligence agent.
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And so today as more data comes in through these technical
systems it must be complemented by the traditioned human
intelligence operator. But is is a different production
line. It is one in which we must now have a complementary
between the technical and human; it must be like a well-oiled,
well-meshed machine.
Still a third area in which we are changing remarkably
is in the question of openness. Normally, traditionally,
intelligence is operated in maximum secrecy. Yet, I believe
in our country today we can no longer do that. Now it is
difficult to make an adjustment from maximum secrecy to
a much greater degree of openness because there is a great
deal about intelligence that if made public simply vitiates
having the intelligence whatsoever. But our Intelligence
Community today, in this country, has no option but to operate
in a greater degree of openness. There are inherent disadvantages
in this, particularly if you take into account the way the KGB
operates against us. But there are also substantial advantages
to us in. greater openness. For instance, in the last three
years of intense criticism that I mentioned earlier the Intelligence
Community did not receive much understanding and support from the
American public; even when it was, as frequently was the case,
falsely accused because it had not taken the time and made
the effort to generate that understanding and support in the past.
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Even though in countless ways it had earned such support.
Now, we cannot, even today, in a policy of greater
openness start discussing all the things about intelligence
and we particularly cannot discuss the ways in which we get
intelligence because as soon as you do they really dry up;
the countermeasures will be taken to cut them off. But we
can and are doing is to look at each study or each estimate
that we produce from the intelligence derived, the research
that I referred to earlier, and when we finish a study or an
estimate today we look at it and we say, "It says here on
the cover Top Secret, or secret, or destroy before reading,"
whatever it may be. And we ask ourselves, if we take out of
that the information which really must be held tightly will
there still be enough of value to the American public if we
publish it. And if the answer is yes we do publish it. And
over the past year we averaged 2 studies a week that we've
made available to the public. And we think this is providing
a service and giving the public a return on its investment
and we hope at the same time, generating some sense of
renewed confidence in what we are doing.
For instance, we published a study last summer on the
Soviet economy. We said that prospects for it are perhaps
more bleak today than anytime since the death of Stalin.
And that has real implications for all of us. It has implications
for stability in the world. It has implications for the
ability of the Soviets to earn the foreign exchange
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to come and buy technology and manufactured goods in our
country. And we publish studies on the world steel outlook
and international terrorism, on the world energy prospects
and so on. And we hope that in the process of doing this
we are not only providing you, the public, a service but
that we are also providing ourselves a service in terms of
helping to keep those secrets which need to be kept, because
one of our problems in keeping secrets is when too much
information is classified no one respects the classification.
And that is the case today and so we're hoping to reduce that
amount of classified information to a minimum.
Let me say in all seriousness that there is a lack of
respect for classified information in our country today. I'm
very concerned for our society when individuals like Ellsberg
or the recent man Snepp who wrote a book on the CIA. When
people like that feel that they can take it upon themselves
as individuals to decide what should be and what should not
be classified information in our society, they have established
a principle by which, in logical extension, everyone of you
here-everyone of the 215 million Americans in this country-
have the right to go out and decide what the government should
keep private and what it should not. And that I submit to
you would be nothing less than choas. I suggest that we have
moved into the post-Watergate period today far enough to
understand that it is time for this country to return the
where the public places a modicum of confidence in its
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Let me emphasize that I'm not asking you to take us
on face alone. Because also out of this crucible of three
years of criticism has come another very important change
to the American Intelligence Community. And this is a new
process of oversight. I've emphasized that we must keep some
secrets and therefore we cannot truly have full public
oversight of the intelligence process in the United States.
But what we are creating in its stead is a surrogate public
oversight. The surrogate for you the public are the President,
the Vice President, the National Security Council, a body that
has been constituted called the Intelligence Oversight Board,
and two committees of the Congress. One in each chamber
dedicated exclusively to overseeing the intelligence process.
I can assure you that we report much more vigorously and much
more forthrightly today than every before on our activities
to these surrogate oversight bodies. Out of this there are
risks and out of this there are strengths. There are strengths
in our keeping closer in touch with the American public through
the oversight process, through reporting to the Committees
of the Congress. There are strengths in having others look
at the difficult risky decisions that we must take from time
to time and see them from different perspectives. There are
also dangers - dangers that we will end up with intelligence
by timidity; failure to want to take risks under this situation
of oversight and there are risks of too many leaks as a result
of proliferating the number of people who need to know that
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delicate information. But I believe that we will in time
strike a proper balance between the risks on the one hand
and the right and the desiribility in the American public
knowing more about what we are doing on the other, and at
least having the assurance that what they cannot know
themselves there are officials of both the Executive and
Legislative Branches who do and who are exercising that
oversight.
Two weeks ago tomorrow the President took these
trends in American intelligence that I've been describing
to you and he put them into a new Executive Order which
will reshape American intelligence for years to come.
That Executive Order has three characteristics. The first
is that it establishes an organ by which I will receive my
guidance, priorities, for what we do in intelligence, because
I'm not the one to set those, I'm not the consumer of the
intelligence, I'm the producer. I will now receive from this
group of the Secretary State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary
of Treasury, National Security Council Advisor to the President,
a set of goals a set of priorities against which to work. That
will be very, very helpful.
Secondly, as Brian has indicated, the President in the
Executive Order has strengthened some of my authorities to
bring together the large and diffuse intelligence apparatus
of our country and to be sure that it is well coordinated
and that it is efficient and it is not overly expensive.
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But at the same time ensuring that within it, on the research
on the analytic side, there is ample room for dissenting
differing opinions to reach the top policy makers.
And finally, the last part in the President's order
establishes through the Attorney General a series of very
important checks and balances on how intelligence is conducted
whenever it may impinge in any way on the rights of the
American citizens. I believe that the new procedures we are
following, the new orders of the President and legislation
which is going to follow in the Congress will, between them,
do two things:
They will continue to let us have an intelligence
capability in this country that is second to none as it is
today, and they will do so in a way that will protect the
rights of the citizens and ensure that we are doing what
needs to be done for the protection and defense of our
country and nothing else. I can assure you I'm dedicated to
those goals.
Thank you.
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Questions & Answers - Stanford University Speech - 6 Feb. 1978
I have a question on the use of CIA money, or the money
that's directed to any of the bodies of the government
structure, to domestic political organizations whose
sole purpose seems to be to influence votes and policies.
That's a general question, and in particular I would
like to know whether you have any information about an
organization called the U.S. Labor Party which was a
leftist organization which was so thouroughly infiltrated
that it ceased to exist as a leftist organization--and now
flourishes with several offices around the world as something
called the New Solidarity International Trust Service.
My question is, are they using CIA money?
A: Let me unequivocally state that the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, State Department
Bureau of Intelligence and Research none of them... the
FBI is another thing, I'll get to that. A segment of the
FBI has intelligence purposes, the rest of it is law
enforcement. The intelligence portion of the FBI, the
intelligence portions of the other organizations that
I've mentioned, had no business in and do nothing in the
way of domestic intelligence or information collection.
That is not our business. Law enforcement is the province
of the FBI in its duly constituted mode and it does look
into the activities of American citizens under it's proper
judicial arrangements. But we do not provide money to
the Americal Labor Party or whatever the organization was
you stated. We do not have any business spying on the
American citizens and the regulations I've been describing
to you and some of the new ones that have just been
instituted are to prohibit that and to enforce very
stringent rules when in the course of collecting foreign
intelligence information we inadvertently come across
some information about Americans. There are very tight
rules on that and generally speaking we have to get out
of the act when an American comes on to the scene when
we're doing foreign intelligence. Sometimes that can be
very inhibiting. For instance, we do a great deal today
about anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics and when you're
working on a narcotic issue and you're in the middle of a
foreign narcotic ring and an American appears, who is also
involved in it, we have to get out of the act. It's very
tough because we're loosing a very good opportunity. But
it's one of those prices we're paying in order not to do the
kind of thing that you're suggesting.
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Q: Time quotes you as saying that we're producing--as
to the CIA--and it was known in the past that President
Nixon had a very poor attitude as to the CIA's productivity
in information and other activities. When you say we're
producing, do you mean just in intelligence gathering or
are you talking about covert activities also?
A: Alright, let's be sure we understand our terms. Covert
action, political action, that I talked about a little
bit as the influencing of events is not really an
intelligence function. It has always been given to the
Central Intelligence Agency by the government as the
only one to do this kind of thing. But that function
has become almost miniscule in terms of our budget and
in terms of the number of people assigned to it. It is
much more today a residual capability of potential for
use under the strict controls that have been established.
But we are producing good intelligence. We are producing
the best intelligence in the world. I would not say we
are complacent, that we don't have areas in which we can
improve. We are working on that. But we are producing
very valuable intelligence and President Carter has
repeatedly say that one of the best surprises to him
upon becoming President of the United States was the
high quality of the intelligence product that he had
received.
(Turned tape over)
A: ..........The first question was if the CIA was
testifying on interfering in Chile and the second is are
we today involved in destabilizing the government of
Jamaica. The answer to the first question is - I've...
I haven't criticized my predecessors, I haven't investigated
in great detail what was done and what was reported to
have been done. But as to the Government of Jamaica
today, the answer is absolutely no. We have never, in
the past or at the present, tried to interfere with or
destablize the government of Mr. Manley.
Q: (inaudible)...
A; If I comment and say whether it was justified or not
it would be an implication that something was down
there, and I'm not willing to do that. Because I
just (someone from the audience says "something was
done and that's a fact") Sure that's fact but what
you think was done and what that, lady thinks was done
and what I think was done are all three different things
and until we can get on the same premise we can't have a
decent discussion!
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Would you please comment in some detail on the types
of covert intervention activities for which the CIA
is involved in abroad which you as the Director of
CIA are specifically permitted and those which you
are not... (inaudible).
A: How many of you would want me to answer a question
that said would I give you the details of all our
present covert action? No, I will not answer that
question because as I said to you we must maintain
some secrets. But what I will tell you is that there
have been several covert actions approved during my
time in office. But each one of them have gone through
the following process: They have gone through the
National Security Council (Secretary State, Secretary
of Defense and so on), they've debated it, they've discussed
it, made a recommendation to the President, the President
has signed and said that this is in the best interest of
the United States Government and it is then my responsibility
to take that information to the Committees of the Congress--
8 Committees of the Congress--and notify them what we're going
to do. Now I suggest to you that's a pretty good check
that this isn't some wild scheme. Finally, let me say to
you that if I could tell you what we're doing in the
way of covert action today, and you could all publish it
in a book, you wouldn't make any money. It's not that
exciting.
Q: ....(inaudible)
A: There is nothing that I or the Intelligence Community
will do that will violate the laws of the United States
of America governing the rights of its citizens and any
other person in the United States who are under its
jurisdiction. But if you ask me at the same time to
comply with all the laws of all the totalitarian and
inhumane states in the world, I will not try to do that
also.
Q: Your predecessor on the platform--Senator Joe Biden of
Delaware--who serves on the Senate Committee on Intelligence
--said that between 40 and 60 serious breeches of national
security, ranging from outright murder to major espionage
comparable to the Rosenberg case, have gone unprosecuted
because open trials would jeopardize national intelligence
sources. Do you confirm or deny that?
A: Neither! Senator Biden is on one of my oversight committees
so I can't contradict him I guess. No seriously, I don't
know where he got his counts 40 to 60 but I will say to you
that there do come some difficult decisions, in order in the
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who is accused of having committed a crime. You
clearly must make available all relevant information
to that accusation. And sometimes the cost of
doing that in terms of what we must disclose
would cost maybe some people their lives around the
world. It is exorbitant to being able to prosecute.
Each time we have to make that decision, not to adduce
the necessary classified information, it is a very
difficult one and reaches a very high level for decision.
But it does at times have to be made. Whether there was
40 or 60 of them I'm not certain of that detail.
Q: When you were discussing Jack Welford you seemed to
articulate a form of argument which goes as follows:
This man did something which, if everybody took it
upon himself to act for the same principles in the
same way, would be disastrous and wrong so what he
did was wrong. And it is only right if everybody
could act the same way for the same principles. I
wondered if in view of that, you're willing to call
right American efforts to influence the complexion
of political situations in other countries? If you're
willing to say that somebody in the KGB coming up with
a plan for influencing political affairs in other
countries like the United States, is OK if they take
it to 8 committees of the politbureau and all the
various quadrants that they have is it okay for them
to go around influencing political situations outside
the democratic process?
A: I don't say that it is OK. I think the question is
whether it is alright if the KGB conducts covert
actions against us if they cleared it with 8 committees
politbureau. It's a view of some extension of my logic
which was not entirely clear to me! I say that the KGB
doesn't act by any ground rules and we must live with
that reality in life today. But that does by no means
justify our following the laws and the rules, or lack
thereof really, of the KGB. We'll do things in accordance
with our laws; our executive orders and our sets of
morality.
Q: ...(inaudible)
A: The question is what is the state of morale after all
this investigation of the analytical side of our house
in particular? What are we doing to enhance it's capability?
I would say that relatively speaking the analytic side of
the house as opposed to that which collects intelligence
clandestinely, has faced better in wake of all the criticisms.
But no one in the Central Intelligence Agency or the other
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agencies of our intelligence community can really
feel the same sense of pride that we had 10 or
15 years ago because of all this criticism. It
doesn't mean that the criticism wasn't justified
or shouldn't have taken place but we are going
through a period where we're rebuilding the morale
on both sides--the collection and the analysis sides
of the house. I'm trying to put new vigor into the
analysis side in particular. I'm doing so, as I mentioned
at the beginning of my remarks, by bringing in as much
confusion from the outside such as stimulus and ideas
and imagination as we can; and particuarly from the
academic community. I'm establishing a roster of
academicians and others who will be consultants and
advisors to ensure that our analysis is not one-sided,
to ensure that we're bringing out the pros and cons of
these issues. And it is this kind of stimulus I think
will bring the morale of that part of the Agency back
up to where it deserves to be.
Q: ...(inaudible)
A: How do I feel about the multi-disciplinary approach to
problem solving? Generally speaking, I'm all for it if
you can get the people who really understand it. We have
and, before my time, they created several interdisciplinary
groups within the Central Intelligence Agency's analytic
organizations to try to take advantage of these new
techniques. Again, it is why we must have interchange
with college campuses to take advantage of all the latest
analytic techniques that are available.
Q: As an American who has come from abroad, I'll tell you that
from experience there is no facet of American life or
no institution in America which has created more of a
sense of embarassment or animosity among people in foreign
countries than the CIA. In my view in many cases, that by
comparison Richard Nixon was like George Washington. Owing
to that and owing to your statements earlier, do you plan to
make an effort to change that reputation of the CIA? Do you
honestly feel that is is feasible that such a change in
reputation is possible? And if not, what does that say for
the prospects for the CIA?
A: The question is can we ever overcome the international
suspicion, hatred, animosity toward the Central Intelligence
Agency. I certainly hope so. I think it would be
catastrophic to our country if we couldn't. Nct that the CIA
as such is that critical but a good intelligence operation is.
If we have to change the name, we have to change the name,
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but that isn't going to change anything. We've got to
have an intelligence activity and I sincerely believe
that when in this country we do stop flagellating
ourselves and do start taking a constructive approach
on how to conduct intelligence; I think that will lessen
it somewhat. I would suggest to you that while you have
been much criticism of the CIA overseas, I also see
great respect for it in other areas overseas. Because
it is respected for it's effectiveness, it's respected
for its professionalism and I think we'll make the balance
of that respect outweight the last bit of suspicion and
mistrust over time.
Q: ..... I'm not at Stanford. In 1939 I graduated from
Harvard. I have my doctor's degree. Mr. Director, I
ended up in intelligence. I have spent 32 years of my
life abroad working for American intelligence; 21 years
for the FBI. I like Stanford University, I have no
intentions whatever of Santa Anna and saying, "Aw, these
punks...". But, I have a lifetime behind me of what
I think are accomplishments and I conclude tonight, because
many of you are here present to hear the head of the CIA
attempt to answer a group of very difficult questions which
in the first place he can't answer--he was in the Navy.
... (inaudible) ... Why are we dismantling the clandestine
service?
A: We are not dismantling the clandestine service. You've
all read that I've asked 820 people to leave the Agency
over a 2-year period and let me assure you that all of
that is coming out of the Headquarters overhead. In
fact it is the unnecessary number of people who are
administering the people who are out in the field doing
the work. I sincerely believe that the clandestine
service, the human intelligence portion of our Intelligence
Community will be stronger as a result of this paring down
to fighting trim.
Mr. Turner, I think your going to talk about new rights
of intelligence... .Yet, the only major study intervention
abroad for the last 3 decades that you criticized is the
one in Cuban and I think that's a failure. .... (inaudible)
A: Would we terminate our working alliance with the regimes
in South Africa and Iran? We will follow the dictates
of the policies of the United States of America. As long
as the country maintains relations with those countries, we
will maintain intelligence liaison with those countries.
We will not in any way - in any way - do things to assist
them in their internal security measures in their country,
or in any way make agreements which will permit them to do
intelligence work inside our country. We simply exchange
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information with those intelligence services about
what happens in third areas of the world.
Q: ....(inaudible).....
A: I'm not either denying or confirming it because I
don't know that and I know that we're not doing that
today. I only know for this period..
Q: Admiral Turner, I can understand your not wanting to
discuss covert activities which are presently ongoing
but I wonder if you could discuss the criteria to which
you submit proposed covert activities before you submit
them to the oversight committee and second, whether you
can give an example of covert activities that you may have
proposed to the oversight committee that they have rejected.
A: I'll do my best to answer that as fortnightly as I can. I
do not propose covert activities to the National Security
Council. I feel it is my responsibility to have available
covert action plans if they are likely to be of use to our
country. When I go to the National Security Council meetings
and I think it is possible that there will be a need of
covert action, I will have a plan in my pocket. And if the
discussion in the Council is such that there seems to be
illicited from the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense
and the others a requirement for covert action, I
will take the plan out of my pocket and volunteer it.
Sometimes they will accept it sometimes they won't. I'm
not in the business of pushing covert action because I'm
not a policymaker of the government. I'm there to provide
objective intelligence information and when necessary to
suggest or to offer what covert actions we have the
capability of undertaking. There have been covert actions
turned down, there have been covert actions approved. I'm
not at liberty to discuss specific ones at this time. But
let me suggest, because of the unease of my position on
wanting to maintain a covert action potential in this country,
an example: What if a terrorist group obtained a nuclear
weapon and was threating us or other parts of the world. I
think you and the American public would find me remiss if
we didn't have an ability to get intelligence about what
was going on; some ability to do something about a terrible
situation like that.
Q: Do you plan any more massive firings of CIA people
and, also, you said that it was just Headquarters
overhead, did you fire anyone overseas anywhere?
A: First, I don't have anymore plans such as that. What
I did was remove 820 positions--eliminated 820 jobs.
But the people in those jobs weren't necessarily the
ones to leave the Agency. We had a screening process
for who was asked to leave. Some of the people we asked
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replace them. But the 820 positions in the
Headquarters in Langley will not be replaced. There
will be nobody in those jobs by the end of two years.
Q: ...(inaudible)...
A: There sure are. How do I know what is going on in the
covert action field? Are there mechanisms to ensure that
I'm informed? I can only say to you that I'm violating
a law and I'm violating the Executive Order of the
President if I don't keep those people up above informed
of what's going on. I assure you that I don't want to
go to jail anymore than anyone else and I don't want to
disobey the orders of the President anymore than anybody
else. And, therefore, I'm keeping myself informed and
ensuring it. The only assurance I can give of that is
that in scouting these 820 positions I've removed, earlier
in my time in the Agency, I found 5 instances of people
who were not conforming with the rules; the way they were
doing their jobs or weren't keeping their superiors fully
informed. And those five people don't work for us anymore.
....(inaudible)...
A: The gentlemen has indicated that I said that we're doing
more in economics and less in military, that we're
facing a major threat with Japan in the economic sphere
and am I then trying to do things against Japan that we
might be doing against the Soviet Union because of their
military threat. Let me make a couple of points. One,
is that military intelligence on the Soviet Union has
still got to be our number one issue but we've got to
extend ourselves much further into this economic sphere.
I did not really single out Japan. I said if the Soviet
Union, the European economic community, Japan any of the
major economic powers of the world take actions without
our knowing it we're going to be in trouble. The Japanese,
the European Economic Community generally keep them. We
have no intentions no designs to take any kind of covert
action against the economic position of Japan.
Q: Mr. Turner, would you mind sharing with us the opinion you
mentioned having concerning the events of Santigo early 1970.
A: I don't think I mentioned having any opinion on that. Let me
say this. It is clear in some instances the Central
Intelligence Agency did things that it should not have done.
It is also clear that in some instances it did things that
were quite authorized, quite acceptable to the American
public at that time, and which in retrospect and the change
of time our attitudes are culture our standards have changed
in this country and indeed you could look back and be
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critical. I'm not trying to white-wash everything
that's done and say it's all good. But I'm also
not willing to stand here and say that I'm spending
a great deal of my time in exhuming the past and
trying to wear a hairshirt. I'm here to see to it
that we have the best intelligence service this
country can have into the future. To the extent
I need to dig into the past to ensure that the abuses
don't recur I will and am doing that. But I'm
concentrating much more on the future and on building
our intelligence on the sound types of foundations that
I have described tonight. And I'm very greatful that this
hall would be filled with people like yourselves who
are concerned, as I am concerned, to ensure that we do
have a continuing ability to obtain that information that
is essential to our country.
Thank you so much.
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