ADMIRAL TURNER'S TALK TO THE HOUSTON COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS HOUSTON, TEXAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002700430001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 31, 1978
• Content Type: SPEECH

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31 January 1978
ADMIRAL TURNER's TALK
to the
HOUSTON COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Houston, Texas
Thank you very much, thank you Bill. Thank all of you
for coming out. One treat when you do some public speaking
is to talk with a group like this that you know is very
serious and very interested in our country's foreign affairs.
I look forward primarily to trying to make my remarks short
enough so we will still have some time for discussion and
questions because I would enjoy that very much. Bill,
I think that the difference in our backgrounds is that when
I went to Annapolis I didn't have the foresight to get to
know Jimmy Carter, and so therefore he had the, perhaps, lack
of good sight or understanding to appoint me to this position.
You undoubtedly knew Jerry Ford and you see what happened....
Now we have a phrase in the intelligence world, part
of the jargon in the trade, that when yoir anonymity disappears
and you can no longer escape being identified as an
intelligence officer your "cover is blown". As Steve has
just told you, that's happened to me twice in the last few
days. Seriously, I hope you'll read one or the other of
these stories about the intelligence community which
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happened to come out under my picture. I can assure you
they say very little in there that is complimentary about me
and, of course, to that degree they are wholly inaccurate.
But, although there are critical phrases of what's going on
in intelligence today, I'm very encouraged that they have
been produced because they try to grapple with the question
of how we can have an effective intelligence organization in
a democratic society. The intelligence community of our
country has not received much treatment in the media for
three years now that wasn't purely critical. I believe we
are now seeing a turnaround. I'm encouraged by the constructive
tone and debate that I think is starting to emerge and :I'm
excited at the prospect and believe we are going to usher in
the next few years what will be looked back upon in the
future as a new era in American intelligence. I can assure
you that I believe sincerely that we can have an effective
intelligence operation in this country that is compatible
with our standards in society and which will protect the
rights of our citizens. I can also assure you that we won't
have that without changes; we won't have that without some
controversy; we won't have that without shaking up some
bureaucracies; and you don't ever do that easily. All of
you can change your business organizations, I know, just
like that, and educational institutions are no problem
whatsoever. But government bureaucracies are hard to change.
The change, the adaptation we are going through in intelligence
today I think is very much akin to experiences some of you
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may have had in the business world if you started out with
a family business and then moved into being a corporation.
What I'm saying is there are a lot of family businesses
that start with good products, are very successful, but
after 30 years or so they suddenly find the product needs
updating, maybe diversification. With that they incorporate
and the world becomes different for them.
The analogy in the intelligence world is that we started
for the first time, 30 years ago last September to have an
organized peacetime, intelligence community organization in
our country. It came out of OSS in the military and all of
World War II but it was regularized by the establishment
by the post that I hold, the Director of Central Intelligence,
which coordinated all intelligence activities of the country
and the post of the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency which I also hold, which is the central intelligence
gathering and analyzing organization with lots of other
intelligence activities around it housed in the Department
of Defense, the Department of State, Department of Energy,
the FBI, and so on. But that family organization, that
family business of intelligence that we set up 30 years ago,
had one product when it began. That was seeing what was going
on in the Soviet Union. Primarily, what was going on
militarily there. We were concerned also with Soviet
satellites in Eastern Europe. We looked carefully when the
Soviets made a foray, an attempt to establish a beachhead in
some foreign country. But basically, the intelligence
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product of the early days was determined by what the Soviets
were doing and where they were doing it. There was one
other characteristic of it that I would like to mention..
In those days when the Soviets did make a foray out in the
field somewhere, this country called upon its intelligence
organization not just to tell all about what was going on--
to provide intelligence--but to do something about it, to
help out, what we call political action. We were there
in Iran in 1953; we were there in Guatemala in 1954; we
were perhaps unfortunately there in Cuba in 1961 and thereafter;
we were there very constructively throughout the Vietnam
conflict. And as recently as 1975, we were there with
political action in Angola until the Congress decided otherwise.
But now, look today, 1978, at how different some of these
things are than in 1947 when we started.
Today we are interested in intelligence in a lot more
than 8, 10, or 12 countries of the world. This country has
legitimate needs to get intelligence information about almost
all of the 150 some odd countries that there are. We are not
interested in just military intelligence. We are interested
in the political and economic. I want to stop and say,
don't think military intelligence is not important to us,
it's number one, that's the greatest threat to our country,
but we must be abreast of these other areas too. And it puts
new demands on us. Finally, let's take a look at this
political action question, because I believe that the attitude
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of our country today is that political action--to interfere
in the events of other countries--is not nearly as accepted
as it once was 5, 10, or 20 years ago. It's not that I
believe we should do away with that capability. We must
have it in that instance when it is critical to our national
interests. Those instances in my opinion will be less
frequent today. We will judge them more judiciously and
we will do them under greater control, and I'll speak of
that in a minute. So, the product of American intelligence
is shifting today from narrow emphasis, from one country and
one subject, to a broad emphasis of collecting intelligence
much more than doing political action on a wide range of
topics in a wide geographical sphere. When you make that
kind of an adjustment, and change your product that much,
it is disturbing to established routines and outlooks. You
need different kinds of people, different kinds of thinking,
different kinds of analytic tools. We are going through that
adjustment and it is disturbing.
Now, another reason that businesses move from family
status to incorporation, is often that their production line
itself is outdated. They need new equipment, new modern
equipment that takes capital and they go and incorporate
to obtain it. Well, the production line of intelligence
today is also changing, it has to be a different mechanism.
Gentlemen, in the last 5 to 10 years, the quantity of
intelligence information that we obtain by what we call
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technical means--sophisticated technical devices--is just
burgeoning out of your imagination. You go out to water
your garden with a garden hose today, it's like moving
to a fire hose tomorrow and a water main the next week.
That has tremendous implications for the structure of the
organization of this intelligence community. Now interestingly,
we all recognize that the basic ingredient of intelligence
over the centuries, since Joshua attacked Jericho and sent
some spies inside the city first, has been the human spy,
that's been the basic element of intelligence, always has
been and I believe always will be. But today as this
quantity of technically collected data pours in, interestingly,
we need more of the human element of intelligence. Why?
Because if I take a decision maker some nice fresh,
technically collected data, in a very broad sense what it
tells me and him is what was happening someplace yesterday or
today. The first question I get is, hey Stan, why, why did
they do that and what are they going to do tomorrow? That
is the forte of the human intelligence agent, finding out
what people's intentions and purposes are. So the more we
collect data technically, the more we need to compliment
that with human intelligence collection. But here, the
production line is different. It used to be a single machine.
most of the emphasis was on the human intelligence effort.
Today it is a series of machines that must be well-oiled and
meshed together. No one is able to do the job in itself.
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A given intelligence agent is just as important as ever,
but he is no longer the only star in the sky, he is one
in the galaxy, maybe first among equals. But this again,
this change of the production line, requires adjustments,
it requires changes in techniques, it requires careful
consideration of the implications of what you get from
one source and how it plays back to another. How you
compliment each other instead of just going out and
doing the whole job yourself. That isn't an easy
adjustment and we are going through that today.
Often too, the family business grows along over a
period of time and you find that you can't run the business
as it modernizes with the same old family personnel policies.
Uncle Charlie, cousin Bill, may not be just the right skills
that fit into the organization as it comes along in time.
In our intelligence world today we are facing much the same
situation. We have been blessed for the last 30 years to
have some of the most dedicated public servants in this
intelligence game, people who came in with that sense of
dedication at the end of World War II during the height of
the cold war, the Korean War, and they have given us yeoman
service for all these years. Gentlemen, today I have to
make provisions for the Central Intelligence Agency of the
1980's and the 1990's. We have a situation where our top
talent, these marvelous people who have seen us through this
period, are all aggregated at the top and the age-spread
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the average-age spread, the spread between the top vice-presidents
in my organization, strictly at the Central Intelligence
Agency, is very narrow today. One of these days they are
going to leave, not very far off, 3 or 4 years they will be
ready for retirement. i have a different problem from any
one of you here, I believe. Doctor, at your medical firm,
if a lot of you leave at one time, you go out and get some
more doctors from other firms and other walks of life and
the same with most of your corporations if your vice-
presidents all leave at the same time. You can go out in
the market and find replacements. Where do I go to find
a trained spy? I've got to grow those from inside which
means I have to have a progression system that brings them
along in adequate quantities. Because when I assign a man
to a very sensitive, risk taking post I don't want to have
a choice of one, I want to have 3 or 4 candidates who have
been groomed, who have been given the background, so that
I have full confidence that that man performs for the United
States of America in a way that you and I want him to in
that circumstance. So we have been in the process today of
discarding a menial personnel management system and going
to a slightly less personal one of a corporate nature. A
competitive one, one in which there must be adequate
movement, so that people can be brought along and we have
a constant stream of candidates for the important jobs at
the top. But Gentlemen, when you have to ask 212 of your
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faithful employees to leave, and retire in 2/3rds of their
cases as I did last November, it is not pleasant and it is
not happy, but it had to be done for the long term health
of the organization. So, these are difficult times, difficult
decisions that have to be made as we move out of the family
business into a real intelligence corporation.
Now, the family business also generally stays out of
the public limelight. But when it incorporates it has to
make stockholder reports and subject itself to much greater
scrutiny. Much the same is the case in the intelligence
world today. We are simply at a place where we must be
more open with the American public. It has disadvantages,
it has dangers, especially when you compare it with the KGB
and its method of operation. But it also has advantages. In
the recent years past, the intelligence community when
criticized in the media drew very little support from the
American public, because it had never taken the time to
share enough with the public to let it understand what was
going on and what was necessary and much of the criticism
was exaggerated or incorrect. Today we are trying and it is
a very difficult adjustment. To be more open. Not to the
extent of baring our country's secrets and particularly not
to the extent of baring information about how we collect our
intelligence because once you share that with the public you
may well deny yourself the opportunity to collect it that
way again, be it technical or human means that have done it
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for you. But, for instance, we are sharing much more about
what we do and what we produce. When we produce something
of importance in terms of an evaluation or an estimate, we
look it over very carefully and we ask ourselves, can we
take out the highly classified information and still have
enough of a corpus left here to be of real value to the
American public, and if so, we do publish. I'm sure many
of you or most of you read of our publication last spring
of a projection of world energy and where that was going.
Many people have criticized our study. We called in the
critics, we've had good exchanges on it, but we've not been
persuaded to change our general estimate. But we are looking
for clues to tell us whether things are going in the direction
we predicted or whether they are going some other way and we
are willing to be told we are wrong if the evidence says that.
But we hope and I believe the evidence shows we have
improved the quality of American debate on this topic by
publishing this study. Similarly we amplified it somewhat
later with one on the particular energy situation in the
Soviet Union, one which I believe not even many of the oil
corporations and studying in great depth. While again, we
may be right, or we may be wrong, but some of the statements
coming out of the Soviet Union in recent weeks seem to be
confirming what we have been saying. We hope we have
stimulated the debate and provided some factual data so other
people will study this in greater depth also. Later we
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published a study about the Soviet economy in general,
partly because of our projection of their energy problem,
but partly for other reasons we have come to the conclusion
that in the next 4 or 5 years they are going to have some
bleak times. That has considerable implications for some
of you because their ability to generate foreign exchange,
to enter our market for manufactured goods and technology,
doesn't look to us as if it is going to be very favorable
from their point of view. We are hoping to contribute
more to the knowledge of the American public and, as I
said, to the quality of debate, by publishing where we can.
When you are in an operation where much of it can't be done
unless its kept secret, it's a difficult adjustment to
the organization when you make a shift from maximum secrecy
to at least a reasonable degree of openness.
Now, finally, when a family corporation goes public,
you also must subject yourself to oversight from its board,
from its stockholders. And so to we are in the throes of
adjusting the American intelligence organization to a much
greater degree of oversight today. In our business, as a
public corporation, as a servant of the public, it is unfortunate
but there is no way we can let the public have total view, total
visibility of what we do. So we have had to create what I
call, surrogate public oversight. It is some way to give the
public assurance that there are not abuses, that it is
doing what it is supposed to do, that it is doing it well and
efficiently for the country. The surrogate oversight is done
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today by my board of directors. That consists of the
President, the Vice President, the National Security Council,
two committees of the Congress dedicated to intelligence
only, and something known as the Intelligence Oversight
Board. I report to these much more regularly and much
more completely than has been done in the past. There are
hazards here too, but there are also great strengths,
strengths of staying in touch with the American people and
what they are thinking and what they want us to do. The
strengths of frankly sharing some of the responsibilities.
As Congressmem absorb this information and know about it, it
is a very sobering experience to them, and I have great
faith that they will hold those secrets and they have held
those secrets well. There is great strength to me also in
having some one a little more detached than myself to pass
judgment on some of the difficult and risky decisions that
have to be made, to give a different point of view on them.
But there are risks, there is the risk, for instance, that
with all this oversight we will come to have intelligence
by committee, we won't take risks. There is the risk that
we will have leaks and that we will not be able to hold our
intelligence secrets if they are shared with this many
committee oversight people. I can't tell you that that's
going to work, but I'm optimistic and we are working to
establish those rules with the Congress.
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You may have read in the paper that a week ago there
was a historic moment for American intelligence when the
President signed a new Executive Order which will set a
framework in which we can move in these five directions
I've indicated to you. And that new Executive Order
has three basic tenants in it. The first, it is to
establish under my chairmanship a committee with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
National Security Council Advisor to the President, Secretary
of Treasury, that will give the basic guidance to the
intelligence community. What do they want? I'm not the
one to determine what they want. I'm not a consumer of
intelligence, I produce it. But it is of no use if I
don't produce it for the people who are making decisions
for our country. This is an important step forward to ensure
we have the guidance that we need in order to tell what
to collect, what to analyze and what estimates to give. The
second tenant of the new Executive Order is to give me as
the Director of Central Intelligence greater authorities to
ensure there is the proper coordination of the entire and
substantial mechanism of our country; that it is pulled
together so things don't drop between the cracks; that you
and I as taxpayers don't pay for duplicatory capabilities;
so that we do it efficiently. The third tenant is to
establish better procedures to ensure that the rights of
American citizens are protected against any potential
abuses of the intelligence process. This has been largely
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by interjecting the Attorney General in who establishes
the rules under which I will operate whenever there is
any possible interference with the American citizen.
I believe that this new Executive Order and these
three new directions that we are moving are going to
build a stronger intelligence community for us and one
that does have good roots in our democratic traditions.
Now the Congress will take this Executive Order and develop
legislation, incorporating some of it, putting in other
things they feel should be codified in law. As we work
out that with the Congress, these balances that have to
be established between enough oversight to be sure we are
doing the right things and not too much oversight so
that we don't come to have timidity and leaks, will be
worked out. Our relathionships with the Congress have
been good in this regard but it will be as I said, a
year, and year and a half maybe before they settle down
and I can give you a final status report. But I can say
to you in closing tonight, I'm optimistic and I'm bullish
for the prospects because I think we are doing something
exciting in building a different model of intelligence
than has existed before and one that it is particularly
and peculiarly adapted to our society and our time.
Thank you.
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QUESTIONiAND ANSWERS
HOUSTON COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
31 JAN 78
Q: I'm very grateful and I know all of us are for the organizational and
the philosophical changes you're undergoing but I don't know that anybody
in the room, after hearing you talk., has really gotten any of the drama
out of the CIA. Could you share with us one of the difficult, risky
decisions you have had to make, or has come about in which you wanted
some oversight?
A: Well, if somebody calls us or sends a wire in and says, Mr. Director,
I'm about to establish a covert relationship with the foreign minister of
this country who is now going to act as a spy against his own country,
commit treason and tell us what's going on in his country. Now, you know
if that's the Soviet Union, I'll send you back a go, because if we get
caught they expect it. But let's say it's country X that is basically
friendly to us and with whom Cy Vance is going to be out there tomorrow
in a conference. I'm not giving you a real example, I'm purposely
obfuscating it as to the characteristics, but it's atypical of the type
of thing you have got to do. It's a difficult, risky situation because
if it blows, either because the man is fooling us and he is really a
double agent working both sides of the street, or because he is genuinely
for us but one of us makes a mistake and he gets caught, U.S. relations
with country X are going to be a real problem. The value of our relationship
with country X is something a little beyond my ken, because I'm inclined
to want intelligence, right? But the equities in the country are more
than getting that information. It must be balanced in some degree with
the potential losses. So, I must go to somebody else and say, I think
there is an 85 percent probability that I can keep this thing quiet for
3 years or whatever it might be. That is where I would like oversight
because I think it is going to have some second view of that situation.
Q: The question that is on my mind, and you brought it up when you
mentioned President Carter's executive office, is that in the minds of
some reporters and commentators you are a virtual intelligence csar. The
Wall Street Journal today was concerned about putting together under a
central person, I guess that's you, all of these powers and all of these
agencies that heretofore have been separate. Now the Journal didn't
seem to think in its editorial that the collecting of information
wouldn't be very harmful. They seemed to be worried more about the
interpretation of the gathering of information. You have undoubtedly
read the editorial. What is your response to their worries?
A: Your point and theirs is especially well taken and perceptive.
Nothing that we have done, none of the powers given to me as the Director
of Central Intelligence either are intended or in any way will impinge on
the freedom of the intelligence agencies of our country to interpret
the data that we collect. I have been given more authority to manage
primarily the collection agencies where you go out and get the information.
But it is very seldom that intelligence information is explicit, you have
got to interpret it, analyze it, put it in perspective and make an estimate.
Today, we have three principal estimating agencies: the Defense Intelligence
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Agency under the Defense Department, the State Department Bureau of
Intelligence and Research in the State Department, and the Central
Intelligence Agency and one of its components--it is not collecting
information, it is analyzing information. All three of them get information
from everybody. I have been given new authority under this Executive
Order to insure that nobody squirrels something over here and does not
share it with all the analyzers. But I have not got the authority to
order the Defense Intelligence Agency or the State Department Bureau of
Research on what conclusions to come to when they analyze their dumps.
I count on the State Department being a specialty in political with a
secondary in economics, Defense to being a specialty in military with a
secondary in political, and the Central Intelligence Agency to cover all
three. So when I want an estimate on the economic future of country Y,
I'm going to get at least two views, and maybe three, of that. Finally,
let me say that if I ever try to run roughshod over those other people
as a csar, Mr. Brown and Mr. Vance are cabinet officers and I don't
think they are going to let me get away with it. I don't think concern
of the csar of intelligence is a foundation in fact. But I'm given the
authority to insure--and it has happened in my day, which is brief, 11
months--that two agencies are running out collecting information, both
at risk to the country, I don't think that that's a bad kind of tsar
sort of authority to have, or at least some more authority to bring that
together. Also, more than worrying about two people doing it, I'm even
more concerned about nobody doing it.
Q: Does this come out in the articles in Time and Newsweek that this
information will be shared by all branches and it 4o-b- e squirreled
away. In other words, does it answer the Wall Street Journal editorial?
A: No, not expressly that way. It is sometimes difficult to get the
media to keep things straight.
Q: Don't you find in running around the countryside that there is a lot
more sympathy for less oversight than more oversight. I get the feeling
that the more you get away from Washington, the more content we would
be to have much less oversight. That's what the KGB would not like. I
think a man in your position and with the background of that agency who
knows what they're doing wants proper oversight but I would say let the
oversight remain at certain times but not too much.
A: I appreciate that comment because it shows confidence in the organization
to police ourselves and to keep things on track and I can assure you we
intend to do that. But I'll be candid with you. I get out on the road
like this about once every 5 weeks to make 4 or 5 speeches in a couple of
days and try to have an interchange because I feel it is very valuable to
get away from the Easter Seaboard and talk with people. I get two impressions
about the American attitude towards intelligence once you do get away from
the seaboard. One is a very strong basic support but, two, is a very deep
underlying suspicion generated by these last three years of criticism,
some of it merited, some of it not, that we may be going about the
business in the wrong way. To the degree that some traditional oversight
will help to calm that and make the American public willing to have
confidence in us and let us take some of the risks, I think it is worth-
while, but clearly I don't think we, have gone overboard at this stage.
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How the legislation is developed by the Congress will be very. ..(inaudible)...
I don't think it will but it could be.
Q: With regard to recruitment, I would like your reaction to the fact
that it appears from the outside that during the last decade it appears
that recruitment at the lower levels, those from the universities and
getting quality, first rate people,.secondly in the last 5 years or so a
dimunition of interest in things international and a dropping off in
fact, of those who study this very much, have you found this a problem?
A: No. It is always difficult to measure quality. I am very encouraged
that even the young people seem to see through a lot of this vocal
criticism. We get high quality young men and women coming into the
intelligence agency today. We happen to want people who have more than
two or three years of experience of any sort. We're getting a little
more mature person perhaps, but our numbers are up and we generally feel
the quality is close to what we want.
Q: What do you propose to do about those who do violate the rights of
the American citizen, either those who are known to have done so publicly
or those that you find have done so and it is not a public knowledge?
A: Before I made the decision to reduce the size of the Central Intelligence
Agency, which meant asking some to leave, I came across 5 cases of
individuals who were not following the rules. They were involved in
activities which the Central Intelligence Agency should not be involved in.
They were thereby implicating the Agency, although the Agency really
wasn't doing it, but they were using their Agency status to do things for
personal benefit. In one or two cases they had directly disobeyed
orders of their superiors on overseas assignments and were off doing
what they thought was good for the Agency and the country but they were
doing it on their say, not their bosses say. I was required to read the
thing thoroughly and to hear the thing personally and tell him to leave.
They are not on our payroll any more and anybody I find violating the
law, violating my regulations, will not work for us any more. If you are
going to generate trust in the intelligence organization you have got
to do that. I believe I have got it under control but I know what's going
out tonight.
Q: Are those people not under Civil Service?
A: No.
Q: Are you exempt from the Civil Service?
A: I have the only authority in the government to dismiss people with no
cause or no reclama. I have to exercise that judiciously, but I just
can't take 3 or 4 years of Civil Service procedures to get a man who is
of` in a foreign country doing things that his chief is unaware of or
has told him not to do--taking a risk for our country that we don't want
taken--we can't wait for all that time to get him off the payroll.
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Q: I have a couple of things from an article that you might like to
comment on. One is that the reductions in force have been totally in
the clandestine operations and not in the analytical operations within
the headquarters organization. The other one which is really the essense
of the article--and 'I'll quote it: "We need be thinking of no conspiracy....
it is far from encouraging that the CIA has recently come up with estimates
of Soviet and Saudi Arabian oil capacity that coincides so neatly with
the administration's domestic political needs." Now that has nothing to
do really with the oil production of the Saudi Arabians and so on, but
the accusation is there and implied and I would like you to comment on it.
A: The answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the second
question is no. Only the clandestine service, the agent operating in
the human intelligence portion of the Central Intelligence Agency was
reduced in strength for the basic reason that long before I came there
it was widely known that that portion of the agency was very over-strength.
Partly because it has historically been that way and partly because of
this shift I described from intelligence collection away from political
action towards intelligence collection. We' don't need as much political
action backup as we did before. Basically, we simply were overstaffed
and what we have cut from that section of the agency is not its fighting
arm, we haven't cut the overseas portion, we have cut only the headquarters
staff, the overhead. There are fewer people telling everybody else what
to do. I thought it was critical to make that move quickly because I have
found that while you are getting in good people at the bottom they have
got to be with us 5 or 6 years and they saw this oversupervision and
under utilization and they wer leaving. The second part of your question
is have I been politicized because I supported administration policy. The
answer is no. But you have to take my word for that. One of these days
I might put one out that is against the administration policy. I was
accused of doing that already. Actually it wasn't a public report, but
there was a big to-do over AWACS. You may remember I got in the press
about that because supposedly the report I gave on AWACS, which was
classified, cut the President's policies down. It wasn't really intended
to do that but it was just a forthright statement of what the facts were
concerning that situation in that country. It wasn't taking a position
because that is not my job to take a position on policy. But some people
interpreted it as not being supportive of the President. So I can only
say that as some sort of evidence that I'm calling them as I see them.
I have put the test on that if it can be unclassified and you would benefit
by having it, I'm going to declasify it. Sometimes I will be accused of
being politicized but that is the risk I take to provide you with a.
service that I think is worthwhile.
A: Admiral, a spy in a foreign country must work in private. He can't
go around with a sign saying "I am a spy." Now, when his cover is broken
his effectiveness is lost, and perhaps his life is in danger. My question
is might it not be appropriate--the British have their secrets act--some
legislation or some authority to have such effective punishment against
those who have been in the service and who are privy to the most delicate
information, to write a book or expose, name names. As we saw in Washington
itself not too long ago, a publication daily publishing the names, whether
they were adtive of course I have no way of knowing, but the names. This
man is a spy in Greece, this man is a spy there. This, in my book, is
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such a terrible thing that I wonder if it would not be desirable to have
a secrets act or the equivalent in this country so that we could either
stop them from doing such or punish them so severely that there wouldn't
be the same things publicized, things that just have no business being
publicized.
A: That is a very difficult question to respond to because I can't
imagine anyone here who doesn't sympathize with what you are saying. I
certainly do because these revelations are terrible. I'm glad you commented
in passing on the list of people who were spies in Greece for us. They
often get the wrong people, some poor innocent person is damned here and
I can't come out and say who is a spy and who is not because by process
of elimination you can tell who it is.. It is really very damaging. It
is a philosophical question of the rights to freedoms of our citizens. I
am very strongly opposed to an official secrets act because it would
get into their sources as well as ours. That is, if a man in my organization
tells a man in a newspaper organization some secrets and we have a criminal
statute that says my man can.ibe sent to jail for having done that, then
the law today also says the newspaper man can be required to provide
evidence in a criminal case. That, of course, gets into the First Amendment
and a very important philosophic debate there. So, I am very sympathetic
and I want to find ways to strengthen our ability to keep people from
doing the reprehensible things you cite. Here the proper judicial line
in this is very difficult to judge and I don't profess to know how best
to do it. But we have got to tighten up and an attitude such as you
express may be a very big part of it. The last CIA employee who recently
published a book -- the publisher, a television network -- cooperated
with him to do it in a covert way because they were afraid that if I
knew they were doing it I would get an injunction against them. I think
an injunction is a legal act in this country. The man had also signed
an oath and given me his word orally that he would not publish it without
letting us see it and check it for security information. Two reputable
organizations in this country with big names helped him circumvent those
procedures. I think that is reprehensible and I think they ought to be
criticized instead of praised and the man ought to be criticized instead
of praised. The media had overlooked his character because he is saying
some nasty things about us. Justified or unjustified, he was a hero and
I don't think he is.
Q: On the energy reports, do you intend to continue publishing energy
studies and before you answer could I say I, hope so. Those of us who are
working for the development of American resources believe the facts are
on our side if we can just get them out to the American people in a voice
which is more powerful than a political voice and more powerful than an
academic voice. Second, those of us that are in this area are trying
to take some political action in a regular American legitimate way and
we need the facts that you have.
A: I'm committed now. That was one of the decisions I had to make when
I decided to go with opening up these reports. If data comes in tomorrow
which reverses and makes us look bad for having published the last one,
it is pretty tough for me to sit on that. So I'm going to have egg on my
face if that happens. If some data comes in tomorrow which shoots down
Jim Schlesinger's energy policy, we have to publish that. I'm on the spot,
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I'm on the griddle; my bets are going to be bested one of these days
because it is going to happen. So, yes, I intend to keep publishing
these energy studies. It is a question now of asking whether the information
is worthy of another publication.
Q: Admiral, you talked about the 800 people which have been thrown out, what
is the actual full-time present employment level of the CIA and the
employment level of the KGB?
A: We don't 'discuss our employment level in an absolute figure, nor do
we really have a clear handle on the KGB but it is considerably larger
than we are. But let me say that we are still--and I intend to keep it
this way--the number one intelligence organization in the world. I think
we have an edge on the Soviets for a couple of reasons. One is that we
do have a tremendous edge in technological intelligence collection, we
are one of the more sophisticated countries in that regard. Secondly, on
the interpretation of intelligence, I don't think you can possibly be as
good it interpreting intelligence when you are living in an autocratic
society and your head might get chopped off if you come up with the wrong
answer, as you can where we seek competing and differing views. I therefore
believe that despite the massiveness of their effort that we are and
will be able to stay ahead of them.
Q: Perhaps I ought to ask this of the Director of the FBI but we get
reports that the Soviets and Eastern Bloc countries have stepped up their
industrial and technological espionage. Is this correct?
A: I think that is basically true. Today, the number of visitors from
the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union .........(end of tape).
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Delighted
1. Privilege
2. Relations BC-IC much on mind
John Butts suggested discuss ways BC could help IC--
I'd like to explore whether ways IC help BC
Believe trends driving us to coincident interest--
Trends in IC--reshaping
IC--taking from crucible 3 years
criticism and investigation
1. Product changing
shifting from concentration on SOV-MIL to wider
range of countries and wider range of topics,
inc],uding lot of emphasis on international economics.
1e not just another route to military
information.i Interested in economic information
?
because 'economic questions of themselves
importance to national position
- 30 years ago / 51-
growing
O ^Tr -- , fy TM-&~ ar s
o `'$'~ +~.-r;- t [" r+llCTl /~'~" ~ iiT J Clry--dominant political
power; independent economically; only possible
threat--military looked at Soviet Union, 1. 16 --n;,s
mss- nt-o- 'h-i:rd-Wo 1d
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o Product depended on what Soviets up to acid-whe e.
Turned out what up to not military adventures
as much as to MIL t reat and political subversion.
_41e~_AVP'_4_ 6_1411"44
just intel collection.
On what Sov doing in attempting subvert, but
Also covert political action
o Influence events about which reporting--Iran,
Guatemala, etc.
- Look how world changed - 10~
o U.S. has commercial & political relationships
150+ countries. They are independent pol; we are
interdependent with them econ. Means Qust keep
abreast on their problems & attitudes, & for most
these pro lems are onLissues of econ. & pol. not MIL
i - ~..-7' `i-
o Covert action down but capability retained
- Less useful--today's climate
- More judicious use
- Controls
Product today
o Intelligence information--economic/political/military
wide geographic area
- Examples--recurring requests to support USG;
1. Predicting Soviet Grain Harvest
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2. What is the technological status
of the Soviet Union--& other countries?
How is technology transfer through
commercial channels affecting that status?
What is their ability to assimilate that
technology? In part reflects military
balance--also economic balance.
3. Economic balance & interaction between
ourselves & principal developed ecmies--
Work closely Mike Blumenthal and Juanita
Kreps--try not duplicate their efforts--
often we have unique sources, sometimes
best net work and frequently most analytic
talent. e.g., Reported Schmidt in Jan.
state of nation address quoted Citibank
figures--Show 1% faster growth FRG would
only stimulate additional growth 5/100%
UK; 7/100% France. I subsequently informed
our decision-makers we don't agree with
Citibank. We estimate the impact will be
greater by about a factor of 4.
Issue--not who's correct--but government needs independent
view of these commercial considerations--intel gathering
and analysis function provides wider range data this area
than any other. Our interests becoming more coincident
because the information which is ourproduct-hAs i h
content today of direct relevance to you.
er
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2. Not only product production line changing
Traditional reliance---human agent
Increased technical capabilities. Thanks
to you--vastly increased quantities of data
Means increased need for human,collection
o More facts collected-Vmore nee
interpret/motives/plans. Only human
agents can provide. Come in two versions:
clandestine and overt/open.
o Clandestine intell agents--scarce, costly,
risky
Fundamental rule: don't risk
clandestine assets if info
available overtly
0 With MIL secrets clandestine collection is
usually only way--closed societies
o Don't find many American citizens wander
openly around Soviet military maneuvers and can
report back on mil intell. In economic
sphere your business contacts are expanding
not only in Soviet Union but
so many other 150 nations; many of you sit
down with bankers or other businessmen from
Soviet Union or other foreign countries; only
once in 30 years did I ever sit down w/Soviet
Admiral--then very guarded manner.
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In short, as needs shift more to economic & political
intelligence--open, overt, human production line more
valuable than was just few years ago.
- American business community one best potential
components of that open production line.
Many instances your representatives overseas
have far better feel for a country's politics
& economic conditions than do all our government
officials in same country--including mine.
- Bureaucracies simply tend isolate themselves
with other bureaucracies----Unfortunate--True
Sometimes also it's ver beneficial to get your
feel for trends in foreign country--because you
have automatically interpreted it--whether market
going up or down in your business
With us we derive economic data clandestinely. We
must then interpret it ourselves--offsetting sources
& placing it in broader context
Suspect seldom as good as you at that kind interpreta-
tion--we don't have same pressure of profit & loss
statement. Hence in many instances we stand to gain
a great deal from your interpretation of international
scene.
TherN are, howeeer, other in'tances, we ha advantage
X P%1
of being able col\ate info from,numbel'\ open sources--
e.g., Mat technology Soviets b
ying &",why may"-,,,not
be appareXt to individual corpora i'qns wl q each
fraction of 'hole
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As we pull together -"see proper picture--clue
Actual case--led,"to classified sDirces for
ylCCL L_Cl
dependence on overt human collection, our
ope~f contac. with
you are becoming more
,__
~
~s9aluable.
in
properly
access to that open information availaBle in the U.S.
business community?
DCD- CIA's overt collectors inside U.S.--have offices
in
39 cities--in phone book
- Qak~, say-I'd,, like a to u,.,,
- totally open & above board. , /.
Opportunity--American citizen--offer--You not just American
citizen
Reasonable question to ask: What you as President, CEO,
Chairman, mix your responsibility to your country and your
Board or your stockholders? Clearly I can't answer tht.
Most corporations, I believe, simply take position their
policy is to cooperate with any government agency which
asks for information.
But what I can address is our policies & actions to keep such
a relationship confidential.
extremely good--I am required by law to protect
-6-
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- Governs open as well as clandestine.
Unique info which could point to specific
company is regards the same as the company
name. Thaat-info is also protected even
from FOIA pressures under sources & methods
legislation
DCD looks on the sanctity of their open
relationships with business world in just
the same way that the clandestine service
looks on its covert rela J an-hips with
agents/spies. Ra-reiy r- 'rsn,,;~~
cessary-four-~na1'so the
exae-source to 1'
rietaryNinterests--
y conscious that in calling a matter
of fo eign intelligence interest to our
1
1
\_
attention may reveal some proprietary
ro
data. Recog ze st
q obligation to
protect not only our ide\tity but all
s~ch information.
Special controls\on proprietary i o in addition
to classification. n't be quoted u ess we go
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Still recognize risks to you in associating with
organizations so severely & publicly criticized
in past.
Am sure you rec2c.Lnize much hyperbole
But-jam trend--provides some reassurance
Greater ter oversight
TQs13 much mo P 22i.ITa~^^a~~~~?~,~ fir
uc
Can't have public oversight
Surrogate
Pr ident, NSC, IOB, Cogress
Ris s
Strengths
Assurances to you that not dealing with organizations
are operating out control
Hopefully there's another side to the coin--
ao~ 041-1
Feedback to BC from both overt and covert activities of ICS
especially from large bank of analysts
Coincides with qff trend like discuss--openness
Embarked for number of reasons:
Need more support from public--think we'll
get when show return for investment.
publishing studies that can be declassified
without hurting intelligence equities--better
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chance weather storm last,3'years--
frequentlyfalsely accused--no one
f
- 'In this busVess, taking.-"risks for
fi
country. /May make mistake--notfbreak
s
law, b`t whether'xi
k worthwhile or not--
wan public s sport. Ev n during some
m?stakes p t--net go d plus
2. More open because want to reduce amount classified
info--Protect rest.
Now no one respects--e.g., Ellsberg, Snepp
3. Same time, opens opportunities to serve BC
Examples this year: 2/wk avg.
1. Energy - clearly shows we think price
pressures going to with us
next 4-5 years.
2. Steel - Not just existing but, expanding
plant facilities around world
will continue to exceed demand.
3. Soviet
Economy - Long run--problems of foreign
exchange--hard currency--affect
ability to enter markets.
4. Terrorism - Unfortunately, trends for
Americans & American firms
to be target of foreign
terrorism show increase.
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Plus unclass. economic weeklies:
1. Economic Intelligence Weekly--
2. International Energy Bi-weekly--
Suspect most of your companies subscribe
Single copies of any--Photoduplication Service,
Library of Congress
Whole service--12.5% firms here subscribe
Library of Congress
Have some exam es on tables in back. toni.g"
Don't contend analysts better anyon(Selse_ -Do hope
publishing cotVibute to nat debate--elevating
debate to Ht issues.)
Not,always sure what most important issues--BC
Basically publishing in unclassified form studies for
government but may tip one way or other in business
interested.
1. Have mechanism of our contacts DCD knowing
what BC wants--but not always adequate
o Interested on political projections that
might allow an assessment the likelihood of
nationalization or some other kind of
discrimination against foreign ownership...?
A.
o How the rise of the Communist Party in
Italy, for example, is likely to affect
investments.
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o Whole issue of Canadian separatism.
for investments?
o Stability of OPEC? Prospects?
o Prospects for investments in South
Africa?
o what do the Chinese want? --Where will
they possibly invest their money? How will
the want to pay for goods and rvices?
o Gui nce on dealing wit the Soviet Union
or Eastern rope or C?
e.g.,--who to d 1 with on specific issues
- the r aliti or psychology of
dealing w' h these countri i.e., how they
negot' te; how far should you go in
2. -can % divert resource
to purposes of business--my stockholders are
taxpayers--Board of Directors, President &
Congress
Must account to them--expenditure resources
Can look for areas of common interest
Can't be your security officers or economic
analysts
But when we understand what you are interested in
and it is coincident with what we are doing we
can and would like to be of greater service
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3. Also have the problem of preferential
distribution. Don't want to get into the
middle of providing information to one
company and finding another wanted it also
Generally must do through Congress, Commerce,
1. IC on move today--Number new directions four which
2. Desire for strong better controlled IC reflected--
President decision E.O.--Congress interest
reflected new committees and legislation just
intro on Intell.
3. Out these trends-
--oppo tun' ies for greater,
proper, circumspect interaction--I hope to
Here tonight looking for your views on BC--IC
relationship
o Want to build on productive relationship that
now exists.
o Primarily needs good two way communication/exchange
of ideas; anxious expand channels now have any
appropriate way.
o Turning to you tonight to suggest ways to do that.
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MACC lNJfPt.N
RECORDING TIME/6O MINUTES
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