FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01500R000200110036-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 7, 2001
Sequence Number: 
36
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 31, 1974
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01500R000200110036-2.pdf90.17 KB
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TCS H A N D L E R } O R '40M1 'CI B( ( O~ bYIT1~~36-2. NSA & DIA Dec lass Instructions on File FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT KIQ 25: What are the size and composition of the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA)? I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PROpUCTION STRATEGY A. The priority with respect-to this KIQ will be on the development of a National MBFR data base. The emphasis will be on data in sufficient detail to support the MBFR negotiations. The information must include identification and location of all Warsaw Pact military units and in stallations in the NGA; aggregate manpower levels of NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces personnel in the NGA; composition of NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces in the NGA (with a breakdown of personnel assigned to combat, rear services, command and support activities); composition of NATO and Warsaw Pact air and air defense forces, listing personnel by service and function; ag- gregate counts of key items of equipment -- tanks, air- craft, artillery, nuclear weapons and missiles -- in the N.GA.by force and country; and Warsaw Pact unit TOE data. TCS HAVDL ~V ? I ~1 ? I ;Bp~'~ %O J p 6-2 25X1X1 & NSA Production. The primary community output will be in the US MC-16l position paper/NIE 11-14 effort. DIA, CIA and will be the principal participants under the aegis of the NIO. NOTE: Readiness, mobilization and reinforce- ment are considered in KIQ 27; logistics ~n KIQ 28. III. COMMENTS OF THE NIO/CF &NSA. A. The greatest evident deficiency at the outset of work on this KIQ' is the insufficient number of analysts assigned at CIA and DIA to work in this area in the short term because of the demands for MBFR support. Although gener- ally speaking adequate amounts of information are collected there are some areas where additional effort is needed. More useful data can probably be provided by: co-=unity is to provide the support required by Secretary Schlesinger in his attempts to optimize NATO conventional B. It does not seem profitable to reduce the present level of analytic effort devoted to MBFR, but if the-Intelligence Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200110036-2 MISSING PAGE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S): P Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP80BO150OR000200110036-2