AIR DEFENSE WARSAW PACT DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01500R000100090003-2
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• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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PART II
SECTION 7
AIR DEFENSE
WARSAW PACT DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK
Basic Doctrine and Objectives
1. The objective of Warsaw Pact (WP) air defense is to
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nullify or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy attack from 7
aircraft and missiles.(1) The WP doctrine for air defense
is part of a total strategy which seeks to destroy enemy
aircraft and missiles before they are launched, to divert
or destroy enemy aircraft and weapons while airborne, and to
nullify or reduce the effectiveness of air and missile attacks
through passive air defense measures. A basic WP concept for
air defenses includes a high concentration of firepower.
Air defenses are deployed around important target complexes
and across the most likely approaches to them.
General
2. The Warsaw Pact stresses that coordinated use of all
types of armed forces is required to achieve victory and
regards strategic offensive and defensive forces as being of
prime importance. It devotes significant military expenditures
to the air defense of the homeland and of the armed forces.
The Soviet defense program also includes a limited active
defense against ballistic missiles (1).
3. Air defense of the USSR is assigned to PVO Strany
(Air Defense of the Homeland) (2) which is divided into
three known arms, each performing one of the key functions
of the air defense mission, i.e., air surveillance and
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(1) See Part II - Section 3: Antiballistic Missile Forces. 30
(2) See Glossary.
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control, fighter intercept, and surface-to-air missile 1
(SAM) operations. The antiballistic missile forces may 2
represent a fourth arm of PVC) Strany. PVO Strany is one of 3
the five type forces of the Soviet armed forces and is 4
co-equal in status to the Air Forces, the Navy, the Ground. 5
Forces, and the Strategic Rocket Troops. 6
4. The provision, maintenance, and operation of air 7
defense forces in individual Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) 8
countries are a national responsibility. However, the NSWP 9
national systems are closely coordinated and ultimately con- 10
trolled by a Soviet-dominated command structure to produce 11
a unified WP air dlfense organization. The NSWP systems thus' 12
form an extension of the Soviet national air defense system. 13
5. Although the primary mission of the air defense 14
elements of the Soviet groups of forces in NSWP countries is 15
the defense of their field forces, they would coordinate with 16
the national NSWP systems in the conduct of the air defense 17
battle. During wartime, these same groups of forces would 18
be absorbed into Fronts with identical responsibility for air 19
defense of field forces. The Front air defenses would be 20
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provided by aircraft from Frontal Aviation (FA) and the
ground-based air defense weapons -- along with their associated 22
command, control and warning networks -- of PV0 Voysk (Soviet 23
Ground Force air defense elements) (1). 24
SOVIET HOMELAND AIR DEFENSE FORCES(2) 25
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General
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6. The USSR is divided into 10 air defense districts
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(ADD) (3), which are subdivided into 39 air defense zones
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(ADZs). Most of the latter are further divided into sectors
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(1) See Glossary. 31
(2) See Table A 13, Part III, Section 3.
.(3) Western nomenclature.
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for air surveillance purposes. The ADZ is the lowest 1
echelon at which integrated control over all three 2
functional elements of the air defense forces is exercised. 3
Doctrine 4
7. Soviet air defense doctrine calls for the conduct of 5
a closely coordinated air battle using the combined strength 6
of PVO Strany interceptors and SAM forces, Frontal Aviation 7
(FA) Counterair units, ground force air defense elements, 8
and those naval units whose air defense systems can be 9
incorporated into the overall defense system. It appears the 10
Soviets rely primarily on SAMs for point defense of important 11
fixed targets. SAlls also are used to form barrier defenses 12
on approach routes to some important target complexes, 13
with fighters covering areas forward of the SAMs and gaps 14
between SAM defended areas. Available evidence points to a 15
centralized, tight control (at ADZ level) over all elements 16
which will rely on positive identification by radar and 17
Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF). In the event of system 18
degradation, the Soviets probably have procedures for 19
autonomous operation by SAM and air units. 20
Early Warning (EW) and Ground-Controlled Intercept (GCI) 21
8. The Soviet early warning and ground-controlled 22
intercept (EW/GCI) system is characterized by extensive 23
deployment of radar sites. There are 1,140 EW/GCI sites 24
containing 5,880 radars located in the USSR. Many sites 25
have several different types of radar sets operating 26
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in many frequency bands and different IFF systems. At many
locations radars have been mounted on masts to improve low 28
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altitude coverage. The radar data can be introduced into the
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command and control network manually or by several data
transmission systems. In general, this deployment provides
a widespread, flexible, highly reliable ground based air
defense radar network.
9. Nine MOSS aircraft, the Soviet Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS), provide limited surveillance and
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warning, primarily over the northwestern approaches to the
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USSR. The primary mission of the MOSS is to extend radar
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coverage seaward in portions of the Barents Sea. The Soviet
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Navy also operates radar surveillance ships in each of its
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fleet areas. As yet, however, radar surveillance ship
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deployment remains very limited in the northern approaches.
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Nevertheless, the radar ships have the potential to function
as extensions of the land-based air surveillance system,
particularly against low-altitude targets.
10. The PVO 'Strany and NSWP National Air Defense EW
systems provide dense, overlapping radar coverage against
aircraft at medium to high altitudes over almost all WP
territory. The Leningrad region and some of the approaches
through NSWP countries probably have effective cover
Land others, some in the interior,
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large areas in the USSR almost certainly remain without
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effective cover The Soviets
have passive
bearings on active
radars and
aircraft
Under
and tracking
for example
However, this
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warning units which would be able to obtain
airborne radar or jammers.
11. Soviet fighter ground control system
equipment have an all-weather capability against
attempting to penetrate at medium and high altitudes.
normal operating conditions, ground control
at medium and high altitudes are assured --
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range is progressively reduced as aircraft penetrate at lower
altitudes, primarily because of line-of-sight limitations.
The MOSS AWAC aircraft can be used to provide limited control
of interceptor fighters beyond the radar range of land-based
control systems. A more advanced system than MOSS will be
required to provide a true airborne intercept control capa-
bility at all altitudes. In some coastal areas of the USSR
a shipborne fighter control procedure is also apparently
being developed.
12. During hostilities PVO Strany, FA, and pvo Voysk
forces located in the USSR, will cooperate to provide an
integrated, air deense under overall direction of
PVO Strany. PVO Strany would support PVO Voysk during troop
mobilization and movement until PVO Voysk leaves the USSR.
Under conditions of strategic attack, FA counterair fighters
and PVO Voysk located in the USSR undoubtedly would play a
strategic air defense role in support of PVO Strany at the
outset of war. The NSWP national air defense also would
be coordinated by PVO Strany to maximize WP strategic
air defense effectiveness. The national air defenses of the
GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland are coordinated by a Soviet
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dominated WP staff at Minsk; those of Hungary, Romania, and --
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Bulgaria by a similar body at Kiev. --
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Command and Control --
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13. The command and control network of PVO Strany
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displays redundancy, flexibility, and reliability, and has
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semiautomatic systems for weapons control and air surveillance --
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reporting. High Frequency (HF), Very-High Frequency (VHF), --
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Ultra-High Frequency (UHF), Super-High Frequency (SHF),
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microwave radio links and landlines are used to provide air --
defense system communications. Voice communications and
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a ground-to-air data link are used to control interceptors. 1
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New data link systems have improved Soviet target handling 2
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capability, as well as facilitating the command and control 3
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of increased numbers and types of SAMs. 4
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Weapons Systems(1) 5
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14. General. PV0 Strany forces are deployed to provide 6
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an in-depth strategic defense of the USSR against air threats. 7
Penetrating aircraft would face a series of defenses once
detected. The initial engagement would likely be with
peripheral based interceptors or long range interceptors.
The penetrator would than face the SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and
further interceptor aircraft. SA-1 terminal defenses are
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located only around Moscow. The Soviets have the capability 13
to arm certain strategic SAMs with nuclear warheads and may 14
have already done so. If a period of tension preceded 15
hostilities, the Soviets probably would deploy some AAA 16
from storage. 17
15. SAM. 18
a. SA-2. An SA-2 barrier runs generally from the 19
Kola Peninsula along the western and southern borders of the 20
USSR into central Asia with deployment in the Baltic coastal 21
areas particularly dense. SA-2 point defenses have been 22
provided for most Soviet cities and industrial areas, naval 23
and port facilities, missile test ranges, strategic missile 24
sites, and airfields of Long Range Aviation (DA). It is 25
estimated that SA-2 deployment is complete, and a selective 26
phase-out of some units is taking place. Deployed SA-2 27
systems have been upgraded by improved electronics. 28
(1) See Table A 13, Part III -Section 3.
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b. SA-3. Apart from concentrations around Moscow
and Leningrad, deployment of SA-3 has been for defense of
important military installations and to form a partial
barrier along the Baltic coast between Leningrad and the
northern end of the Soviet-Polish border. NSWP SA-3 sites
continue this partial barrier along the Baltic coast through
the GDR. In addition, there has been extensive deployment
in the Black Sea area of the USSR. The number of ready
missiles at about 30 percent of the SA-3 sites have been
increased by replacing two rail launchers with four rail
launchers.
c. SA-5 are deployed in barrier fashion to
encompass most of the heartland of the USSR including an &A-5
ring around Moscow. SA-5 are also deployed in eastern USSR.
16. Aircraft. APVO interceptors provide the first line
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of air defense and would attempt to intercept enemy aircraft 16
prior to launch of air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). APVO units 17
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also provide a defense in-depth behind SAM barriers, fill
gaps in SAM coverage, and augment point defense of special
target complexes. APVO units are concentrated most heavily
in the area west of the Urals and in the southern maritime
region of the Soviet Far East. All interceptors in APVO have
an all-weather intercept capability. Some, however, are
FARMER and FRESCO whose capabilities are poor, but these
aircraft are gradually being replaced. In recent years,
improvements have been noted in the Air-Intercept (Al) radars
employed by Soviet fighters. Because of the limited
effectiveness of existing Air-To-Air Missiles (AAMs) when
fired downward at targets at low altitude, the Soviets will
either have to continue to engage targets from below or in
near co-altitude intercepts, develop new missiles, or rely
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almost exclusively on guns for fighter armament at very low
altitudes. Air defense aircraft may operate singly or in
groups, depending on the number of targets. Approach to
the target is usually made under close GCI control and may
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be either a rear or head-on attack depending on the fighter 5
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involved. 6
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Electronic Warfare 2.
17. It is clear that the Soviets regard the use of 8
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electronic warfare, particularly electronic countermeasures 9
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(ECM), by an attacking force to be of great concern. The 10
Soviets have developed a variety of electronic counter-
countermeasure (ECCM) techniques to counter this threat.
ECCM measures include a proliferation of radars to provide
frequency diversity across a wide region of the radar band.
Soviet ECCM practices are also revealed in the design of
their radars and by the training of air defense personnel to
operate in an ECM environment. These steps serve to
reduce the vulnerability of Soviet air defense radars to
deliberate electronic interference but, nonetheless, Soviet
air defense capabilities would be degraded by suitable ECM
and other penetration aid techniques.
Defense Alert
18. On selected airfields both in the Soviet Union and
NSWP countries, some fighters and interceptors are held at
varying states of readiness, depending for example, on the
strategic importance of the area and the political climate
at the time. On most strategic air defense airfields in the
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peripheral areas, some aircraft are maintained at readiness
day and night. From the highest state of alert, i.e.,
cockpit readiness at the end of the runway, it is expected
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that these aircraft
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Combat air patrols
in border areas are flown regularly. In
time of increased
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tension, many aircraft would probably be dispensed.
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19. SAM sites in general are believed held at a readiness
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condition consistent with the availability of warning and the
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defensive posture for the respective area. Thus, the
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missiles would not normally be activated until alerted by
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an early warning net.
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Logistics and Maintenance
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20. APVO home bases are believed to
have substantial
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amounts of on-base Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL)
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storage, and additional POL may be found at APVO dispersal
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airfields. However, the stored POL would have to be augmented
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during prolonged hostilities. The very large off-base, air-
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subordinated POL stocks located at central depots would be
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apportioned through the Rear Services Organization. Most APVO
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home bases have ammunition and air-to-air missile (AAM)
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storage facilities. Known off-base stocks of both POL and
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ammunition are generally located near rail lines, the primary
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means of delivery to the airfields. Squadron-level aircraft
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maintenance and repair are accomplished by elements of the
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Aviation Services on the individual operational airfields.
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Major overhaul is performed at centralized aircraft main-
tenance and repair facilities scattered throughout the USSR.
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This system, which eliminates the need for extensive maintenance
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facilities and highly specialized technical personnel and
equipment at each operational airfield, has been effective 31
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in peacetime. However, the lack of specialized personnel
and equipment at the operational level would probably prove
detrimental to APVO maintenance capabilities in any sus-
tained conflict, although it affords flexibility of operations
at dispersal bases.
21. The WP air defense forces can draw on training
aircraft and stored aircraft as a combat reserve(1). Some
trainer aircraft assigned to APVO operational units could
perform combat missions from the outset of hostilities. APVO
could also draw on trainer aircraft in air defense pilot
training schools for use as attrition fillers. Stored
aircraft would not be immediately available, but could be
brought into service after a short period of maintenance.
22. Little is known of PVO Strany SAM logistics and
maintenance procedures. However, sufficient missiles are
believed available, at site and depot storage, to support the
expected high SAM expenditure rates during an initial phase
of hostilities.
NSWP HOMELAND AIR DEFENSES
General
23. NSWP Homeland Air Defense forces generally follow
the Soviet pattern of organization. The Homeland Air Defense
forces of GDR, Hungary, and Romania can be considered to
fill the strategic air defense role over their own territory
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protecting key national targets. Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, 25
and Polish Homeland Air Defense forces would provide a 26
similar defense for their national territories. The latter27
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countries also have tactical air forces (see Part II -
Section 6). The Homeland Air Defense forces are not expected
to deploy forward with the ground forces.
(1) See Part II - Section 3, Table A 10.
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and Control
and 65 GCI
Soviet
about 60
above
part of
in areas
a capability
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Early Warning, Command
24. The NSWP countries
radar sites utilizing
equipment. Additionally,
EW(2) and 40 GCI sites
some
in
is
targets
have some 170 EW(1)
of the most modern
Soviet forces operate
NSWP countries. Coverage
complete along the major
(ACE) border; however,
Baltic coast there is
the Allied Command Europe
of the GDR and along the
for tracking of targets
of the radar. Over considerable
terrain is favorable,
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areas of the
can be detected
NSWP where
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Sightings of many new
additional ones with the
concerted effort is being
to consolidate the EW
communications network
provide flexibility and
Weapons Systems
SQUAT EYE radars with NSWP forces and
Soviet forces suggest that a
made by the WP to close gaps and
and surveillance capability. The
includes VHF, UHF and landlines to
reliability.
NSWP countries have deployed and
sites. These sites are in defense of
industrial areas, and are part of
of the WP area as a whole. A new
formation in the southwestern
SA-2 systems could be made
countries as the Soviets replace their
not include 145 SAM target acquisition
not include 110 SAM target acquisition
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25. SAM
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a. SA-2. The
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manned about 135 SA-2
major cities and important
the peripheral defense
GDR SA-2 regiment is under
area of the GDR. Additional
available to the NSWP
SA-2 with newer systems.
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(1) Thi S figure does
radars.
(2) This figure does
radars.
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b. SA-3. The first SA-3 sites manned by NSWP 1
personnel were seen in Poland at the end of 1970. They were 2
located around Warsaw, where to date four battalions are 3
deployed. Eight new sites have been constructed and 4
occupied in Poland along the Baltic Sea coast and five have 5
been constructed in Czechoslovakia, two of which are opera- 6
tional. Four GDR-manned SA-3 sites are operational, one 7
is under construction, and more could be expected. 8
26. AAA. The NSWP forces commonly use AAA up to 57 mm, 9
mostly radar-controlled. AAA of a larger caliber is still in 10
the inventory of some of the national forces although on a 11
very limited scale. Some SAM sites, radar sites, and 12
airfields have been observed with AAA defense, and it is 13
presumed that this would be common practice in wartime. 14
27. Aircraft. NSWP air forces are composed pre- 15
dominantly of Soviet fighter aircraft types. They are, 16
in general, less well-equipped than their Soviet counterparts, 17
but the numbers of all-weather FISHBED interceptors are 18
steadily increasing. The NSWP nations have about 1,440 19
fighters of which about 1,130 are in homeland air defense 20
units and 310 are in counterair units. At present about 21
80 percent have an all-weather capability. 22
Logistics 23
28. Logistics practices in the NSWP forces are generally 24
patterned after that of the Soviet. Each air force has off- 25
base central POL and ammunition depots. SAM storage 26
facilities exist to supplement stocks on hand at the SAM 27
sites. Rail is the usual means of delivery, and most depots 28
are within close proximity to rail lines. Maintenance 29
organization and procedures are also similar to those of 30
the Soviets, with squadron-level maintenance performed on the 31
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individual homebases and major overhaul accomplished at 1
centralized aircraft maintenance and repair facilities. A 2
problem likely to affect maintenance capabilities in all NSWP 3
forces is a shortage of some spare parts. When depleted, 4
many items must be ordered from the USSR where they are 5
tightly controlled and generally not readily forthcoming. 6
WARSAW PACT AIR DEFENSE OF FIELD FORCES 7
General 8
29. Warsaw Pact field forces will be organized in Fronts 9
during wartime. Air defense of the Front is the overall 10
responsibility of the Chief of the Air Defense Troops of 11
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the Front (PVO Voysk). He also will be directly responsible
for ground force air defense systems. The counterair fighters 13
of tactical air armies (TAAs) will coordinate with and support 14
the Chief of the Air Defense Troops of the Front as needed 15
while remaining under the control of the TAA commander. The 16
"NSWP tactical air defense forces have a structure similar to 17
18
that of the Soviets and are likely to function in the Front
structure as described above. 19
30. Soviet doctrine is followed by relying on in-depth 20
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defenses, a variety of systems deployed in large numbers,
and a high concentration of fire. The Front air defense 22
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resources tend to fall into four general categories:
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a. Counterair fighters.
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b. Highly mobile ground force systems.
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c. Transportable ground force systems.
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d. Mobile command and control, EW, and electronic
warfare equipment.
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31. The combined effect of these tactical air defense
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systems is a complex and effective threat to attacking
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aircraft. The SAM/AAA system provides the WP ground
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forces a mobile, virtually self-contained capability to
1
defend against air attack. Frontal Aviation counterair 2
fighters could provide in-depth defense (within GCI coverage),
conduct offensive counterair operations, fill gaps resulting
from the mobile nature of the conflict, and provide a
flexible reserve should ground force resources be depleted
in combat. Ground based electronic warfare equipment
would be used to attack aircraft avionics and communications
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equipment. The mobility, large numbers of systems, redundancy 9
of coverage and continuing improvement of the overall air
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defense network will make the WP defenses increasingly
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difficult to neutralize. The WP now can engage targets
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at all altitudes, although the low altitude defenses are
generally effective only for point targets. Nonetheless,
for the near term future, the tactical air defense system
will likely continue to be susceptible to ECM, saturation
raids, standoff weapons, and nuclear effects.
Early Warning, Command and Control
32. The WP tactical air defense weapons are netted
together by a dense and overlapping system of early warning,
acquisition, and GCI radars and command and control systems.
The radar systems give excellent coverage at medium and high
altitudes but experience degradation at low altitudes.
However, in specific areas, mast-mounted systems, better siting,
and improvements to the radars will enhance low altitude
coverage. Almost all of the radar and command and control
systems are mounted on wheeled or tracked vehicles and can
rapidly shift their operating areas. The WP employs HF, VHF,
UHF, and microwave radio links in addition to landlines, to
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provide the communication required for the air defense system. 1
In most areas, ground-to-air data link reporting has been 2
introduced and the threat of saturation during low-altitude 3
attack has compelled the WP to expend great effort to improve 4
performance and capacity of their overall data link systems. 5
33. Under wartime conditions, there would probably 6
be a variety of systems used to integrate and control SAM 7
and air systems. Altitude layering, zonal restrictions, time 8
separation, and IFF could all be used to facilitate weapon 9
use. The use of zonal restrictions in the area of the 10
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) would provide 11
relatively free fire zones for Soviet ground force air 12
defense weapons. 13
Weapons Systems 14
34. General. The WP ground forces appear to be attempt- 15
ing to develop and deploy an organic air defense system capable 16
of defending the ground forces from air attack, even in the 17
absence of FA counterair fighter support. This system 18
provides area defense at medium altitudes, and provides 19
defense at low altitudes for point as well as some larger 20
areas due to overlap of point target coverage. The trend 21
is toward a mobile air defense system which can move at the 22
pace of battle. 23
35. SAMs . The transportable SA-2 probably will be 24
phased out eventually in favor of a mobile system. The 25
SA-4 has already replaced some tactical SA-2s in the GSFG, 26
and is doing the same in the USSR. The SA-2 is currently 27
deployed with each of the Soviet Groups of Forces in Hungary 28
and GDR. The SA-2 is used primarily for defense of relatively 29
static rear area installations, as it is not sufficiently 30
31
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mobile to provide continuous support to maneuvering troops.
The transportable SA-3 is deployed at a number of Soviet
airfields in Poland, Hungary, and GDR.
36. The SA-4 brigade is organized into three battalions
with three batteries per battalion. The battery is the
basic firing unit and consists of three transporter-erector-
launchers (TELs) which carry two missiles each. The conversion
of an SA-2 regiment to an SA-4 brigade provides three times
the firepower with about a 15 percent increase in manpower.
In addition to providing medium and high altitude defense
of the FEBA, it will probably be retained for front and army-
level area defense., The SA-4 is presently deployed with
some Soviet forces, and initial equipment acquisition and
possible deployment has been made to Czechoslovakia and
East Germany. A new short nose variant of the SA-4 missile
has been observed in the USSR and also in a Czechoslovakian
parade.
37. The nucleus of the low altitude, ground-based air
1
2
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defense system is based on the SA-6, SA-9, and ZSU-23-4 19
20
systems. These systems will be further augmented by
21
deployment of the SA-8. The large number of SA-7, AAA,
22
and hand-held weapons effectively supplement the other --
23
weapons to provide a point target with a low altitude --
24
screen having a rapid reaction capability. To defeat ECM --
25
and low altitude tactics, the Soviets have introduced optical --
26
tracking for most of these SAM/AAA systems. --
27
38. The SA-6 has been observed with the Bulgarian, --
Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, and Polish ground forces, as
well as the GSFG, CGF, and SGF. In addition to the proven
combat performance of the SA-6, the system is extremely
difficult to locate in a combat environment. The SA-6 can
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be moved rapidly and readied for firing in approximately
15 minutes. A battery consists of a radar and four TELs
with three missiles each. SA-6 regiments are deployed with
some Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions where they
have replaced the towed 57mm S-60 AAA guns.
39. The mobile SA-8 is a self-propelled, low altitude,
short range system mounted on a wheeled vehicle and fitted
with a radar. It is now being deployed with Soviet ground
forces in the USSR. It should further enhance low-to-medium
altitude coverage for ground force point targets. The SA-8
is believed to be ultimately the replacement for the 57mm
S-60 AAA gun in div,isions which do not receive the SA-6.
40. The SA-9 is a low altitude system mounted on the
armored amphibious reconnaissance vehicle BRDM-2. It is
now deployed with all the groups of forces, some Soviet naval
infantry units, the Soviet airborne forces, Polish units and
probably Czech and GDR units. Four IR seeking missiles are
pod mounted on top of the vehicle. Vehicle mounting offers
advantages in command and control, chemical-biological-
radiological (CBR) protection for the crew and the
coordination of fire. Four SA-9 and four ZSU 23-4 are
employed within a mixed missile/gun battery at tank and
motorized rifle regiment level. Some SA-9 are located at
Soviet airfields in Hungary, in conjunction with the SA-3
and may be used for airfield defense or training.
41. The SA-7 is a man-portable SAM which has been most
effective against targets with a speed of less than 700 km/hr
and at altitudes below 3,000 meters. During the October
Middle East War, the SA-7 made close-in attacks against front
line troops hazardous. The SA-7 is being widely distributed
in WP ground force maneuver elements.
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42. AAA. AAA systems complement the SAM weapons,
particularly in low altitude air defense. The WP relies
heavily on AAA up to 57mm, much of which is radar-controlled,
for air defense of ground forces (1)s The towed 57mm
5-60 AAA gun is still the standard divisional air defense
weapon although it is being replaced by the SA-6 or the SA-8
in some Soviet divisions. The proliferation of the combat
proven ZSU-23-4 indicates a continuing Soviet interest in
improving their AAA capability. Many WP armored fighting
vehicles (AFV) are fitted with AA machine guns. It is
estimated that the WP and particularly the Soviets maintain
a significant stock of various types of AAA weapons in depots
or field storage. In addition, provision is made for AAA
defense of some static installations, particularly airfields
and SAM sites. Also, the WP soldier is trained to utilize
his individual or crew-served weapon for air defense. Taken
together, these large and small caliber AA weapons establish
a density of firepower which makes low-altitude operations
over the FEBA difficult. In addition to downing aircraft,
they have the effect of forcing them into the more lethal
field of the SAMs and fighter aircraft.
43. Aircraft. (See Part II - Section 6) The counterair
fighters of the Soviet Tactical Air Armies and the NSWP
Tactical Air Forces would be used for air defense or field
forces. For this mission the air army would use aircraft
for attacks on enemy airfields, for engagements of enemy
aircraft as far forward as possible, and where necessary for
the immediate defense of ground forces. The goal, in any
event, will be the achievement of at least local air superiority
(1) See Part 11 - Section 3.
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over the battlefield. The FISHBED and increasing numbers of
1
FLOGGER are the primary counterair fighters in the WP. The
2
FISHBED probably does not have a highly effective intercept
3
4
capability at low altitudes (below 500m). However, the
FLOGGER is believed to have a limited capability to detect,
5
track, and engage targets flying below the interceptor
altitude.
Electronic Warfare
44. The WP will use electronic warfare as an integral
9
part of its tactical air defense system. The WP has various
10
types of vehicle-mounted electronic warfare equipment. This 11
includes noise and deception jamming systems as well as
12
intelligence collection systems for electronic detection and
13
14
other purposes. Active and passive jammers would be used to
interfere with attacking aircraft avionics, particularly
15
16
radars, and communication systems. The equipment is likely
to be widely deployed and would be used in defense of all 17
18
important targets. The large numbers of radar, frequency
diversity, and operator training combine to give the WP
19
a certain inherent ECCM capability. Despite this, the WP
20
21
is believed to be susceptible to sophisticated ECM operations.
Logistics
22
45. The WP forces probably have stores of SAMs and
23
AAA ammunition at storage sites in the NSWP countries. These
24
stores are probably sufficient to sustain WP forces during
25
the initial stages of a conflict even though an extremely
26
high expenditure rate of munitions is expected. Resupply
27
under combat conditions from depot stocks could be done by
28
29
helicopters or ground vehicles. SAM logistics could become
30
a probleM if the period of hostilities is prolonged or
31
involves rapid troop movements. Additional stocks are
6
7
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available in the USSR. Large amounts of AAA are in storage 1
and in military depots in the USSR. 2
46. Refer to Part II - Section 6, Air Forces, for 3
Frontal Aviation logistics. 4
TRAINING 5
47. APVO operates two training schools which provide a 6
general engineering education and military training, as well
as pilot training, during the 4-year curriculum. Newly 8
graduated pilots are assigned to operational units for 9
further training. Unit training is characterized by 10
repetitive missions with little or no deviation from a 11
standard syllabus. i Strict discipline is enforced, which 12
insures meeting of training requirements but allows little 13
in the way of pilot initiative, realistic aerial combat 14
maneuvers, and individual target acquisition without close 15
ground radar control. Live air-to-air missile firing is 16
regularly practiced. See Part II - Section 6 for further 17
18
details of WP pilot training.
48. The ground force air defense personnel train 19
20
extensively in all aspects of the air defense problem. They
21
continually exercise against simulated and real targets with
emphasis on an ECM/ECCM environment. Mobility and all-weather 22
training are included in their training syllabus which has 23
generally resulted in a high level of readiness for these 24
forces. 25
PASSIVE DEFENSES 26
27
49. An important part of the WP strategic and tactical
air defense is passive defensive systems and measures. These 28
29
include hardening, dispersal, and use of dummy
30
equipment. Camouflage can be carried out by laying down
31
smokescreens, setting up corner reflectors to confuse aircraft
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radar systems, and using various deceptive paints and covers. 1
Furthermore, SAM sites no longer operational can be used for 2
deception. 3
50. Hardened aircraft shelters have been provided at 4
almost half of the APVO bases particularly those located along 5
the periphery of the Soviet Union. The PVO interceptor force, 6
as a whole, however, is not as extensively protected at 7
bases in the interior as their counterparts in FA. Those 8
interior bases without shelters in APVO are equipped with 9
open aircraft revetments. The apparent lack of hardened 10
shelters at APVO bases, however, is explained in part by 11
expected APVO dispersal tactics and the fact that many bases 12
are beyond the range of enemy tactical aircraft. In all 13
other respects, hardened aircraft shelters for APVO are not 14
markedly different from those of FA discussed in Section 6. 15
As in FA, construction programs for hardening of POL storage, 16
command and control, and other facilities are continuing. 17
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 18
51. The great strength of WP strategic and tactical air 19
defenses lies in the capability and number of systems deployed, 20
the commonality of equipment, general standardization of 21
operational procedures, and the effectiveness of the newer 22
systems. Within the USSR, aircraft and missiles are deployed 23
to defend against the entire air threat. However, the PITO 24
Strany system has no effective defense against sophisticated 25
ASMs, such as SRAM, once the ASM is launched. The FOXBAT and 26
SA-5 may have some capability against HOUND DOG type ASMs 27
flying at medium to high altitudes. Other SAM systems may 28
have a marginal capability under favorable circumstances 29
against ASM of the HOUND DOG type. 30
31
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52. In a defense environment not subject to defense
suppression, current APVO fighters and SAMs are capable of
inflicting heavy losses on aircraft at medium and high
altitudes. Except at certain point defended targets, defenses
in the USSR will not be effective against aircraft operating
at low and very low altitudes. The PVO Strany system in
most areas cannot provide continuous low-altitude tracking.
Soviet reliance on close GCI and current aircraft weapon
system limitations also restrict interceptor defense capa-
bilities at low altitudes.
53. The NSWP air defense forces provide an additional
barrier to the West, which provides an additional depth to
defense of the USSR. However, NSWP national air defense
forces, in general, are less effective than those of the
Soviets.
54. The WP has a significant ECCM capability by virtue
of the large number and variety of radars deployed. None-
theless, the system is believed to be vulnerable to ECM,
saturation attacks, and standoff weapons, particularly
at night or in conditions of bad visibility.
55. The air defense system protecting the ground forces
presents an effective threat at all tactical altitudes:
1
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22
23
defense against aircraft at low-altitude is limited to point
24
targets except where defenses overlap. The WP forces in the
25
NSWP countries, particularly those facing the NATO Central
26
Region, have a virtually complete medium to high altitude
27
air defense envelope as well as large areas of low-altitude
28
coverage due to the overlap of point target coverages. The
29
mobility and concentration of firepower available to the
30
Soviet ground forces, and to a lesser extent the NSWP ground
31
forces, provide a dense and flexible air defense cover. This
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system is capable of a massive rate of fire, particularly at I.
low and medium altitudes. The system may be susceptible to 2
logistics problems and possible local weapon exhaustion due 3
to the anticipated high rates of fire, especially during 4
mobile warfare. In the NSWP countries, the density of air 5
movement is likely to be extremely high, and in the case 6
of a fluid ground situation, the successful integration of 7
the various national and Soviet air and ground defense 8
elements will be difficult. It probably will be approached 9
by strictly separating fighter and ground based air defense 10
on the basis of established engagement zones. Although not 11
commonly exercised, procedures for autonomous operation by 12
SAM and air units exist. If the Soviets attempt to maintain 13
a strong centralized control of the tactical air battle, 14
their overall effectiveness will probably suffer. 15
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS 16
PVO Strany 17
56. PVO Strany will probably emphasize qualitative 18
improvements during the next 5 years: 19
a. Soviet air surveillance and control forces will 20
continue to have good detection and tracking capabilities 21
against aircraft at medium and high altitudes. It is likely 22
that the Soviets will continue to improve radars and techniques 23
specifically designed to counter low-altitude penetration. 24
Although additional deployment of radars on towers will 25
enhance coverage in limited areas, little Soviet improvement 26
in ground-based continuous tracking capability at low altitude 27
for large areas of the USSR is foreseen in the near future. 28
Deployment of new AWACS aircraft with a look-down capability 29
over-land represents the best potential solution for large 30
area coverage and tracking, but this development is unlikely 31
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until the early 1980s. It is likely that the Soviet will
attempt to force attackers to fly at higher altitudes by
using ECM against their terrain-avoidance radars. It is
reasonable to expect further Soviet attempts to improve the
capacity, flexibility, and security of air defense command
and control communications, thereby permitting improved
coordination of interceptor and SAM operations. Continued
efforts to harden command and control facilities at regional
headquarters and at operational sites are also expected.
b. Problems of intercepting and destroying strategic
attack aircraft at low altitudes will remain formidable and
?are unlikely to be overcome in the near future. Despite
probable improvements to SAM systems, their limited range at
very low altitudes would require such a large number of systems
as to preclude their deployment as area defense systems,
except in very special circumstances. Given the limited
capability of the SA-1 system, it will probably be phased
out by the early 1980s.
c. PVO Strany is currently seeking advances in the
low-altitude capability of its current interceptor force.
Modernization of the fighter defenses, e.g., the increasing
use of automation and fighters equipped with mixed air-to-air
missiles (AAM), has improved effectiveness at medium and
high altitudes, but this has not solved the problem at low
altitude. The interceptor force effectiveness will improve
as more FLAGON E are deployed and possibly new aircraft are
added to APVO. FLOGGER, believed to have a limited capability
to detect, track, and engage targets flying below the inter-
ceptor altitude, is a candidate as a new low-altitude APVO
interceptor and could begin deployment in 1976. A variant
of some other existing aircraft is also possible during the
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late 1970s. AAM improvements are expected; it also is 1
likely that the Soviets will develop a look-down Al radar 2
and compatible shoot-down AAM which are better than the 3
capability attributed to FLOGGER. AIN? interceptor strength 4
has declined gradually over the years, and this trend is 5
expected to continue as obsolescent aircraft are replaced 6
by smaller numbers of more capable aircraft. 7
d. Emphasis will remain on destruction of ASM 8
carriers before weapon launch as no effective defense against 9
sophisticated ASMs in flight is likely in the near future. 10
e. It is not likely that the Soviets will be able 11
to develop and deploy any exotic new weapons, such as a 12
laser weapon capable of downing an aircraft, during the 13
next 5 years. The Soviets are conducting research on OHD 14
radars which, if successful, may be able to provide a 15
significant increase in early warning time against aircraft 16
approaching at any altitude several hundred miles from the 17
Soviet border.(1) 18
NSWP Homeland Air Defense 19
57. The NSWP National Air Defense forces are expected 20
to improve qualitatively by addition of new aircraft, e.g., 21
late model FISHBED and probably FLOGGER, additional modern SAMs, 22
as well as upgraded and new radar systems. It is also 23
expected that command and control systems and procedures 24
will evolve toward improved integration of NSWP and Soviet 25
strategic defense forces. 26
WP Air Defense of the Field Forces 27
58. WP air defense of the field forces will likely
continue to be based on a dual system of aircraft and ground-
based equipment. The trend of quantitative and qualitative
(1) See Part 11 - Section 3.
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to continue. Emphasis
and firepower. The
the WP mobile low altitude
a minimum capability
Further SA-4, SA-6, SA-7,
radar system deployments
toward a completely
will receive limited
counterair capabilities
will also improve
A new Soviet counterair
early 1980s. In
use of ECM against bombing
Refined electro-
to be deployed
designator could be
homing-type
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
improvement of these forces is expected
will likely be placed on ECCM, mobility,
SA-8 is expected to further increase
defense capabilities probably achieving
SA-8, SA-9, ZSU-23-4, and mobile
are expected in Soviet forces, pointing
mobile air defense. The NSWP forces
numbers of these systems also. The
of the Frontal Aviation fighter force
as FLOGGER deployment continues.
aircraft could enter service in the
tactical as strategic, increasing
and terrain-avoidance radars is likely.
optical sighting aids will continue
for ECCM purposes, and a laser target
used in the late 1970s to guide semiactive,
missiles.
OTHER EUROPEAN COMMUNIST AIR DEFENSES
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Albania
by approximately 100
Chinese military
of both FARMER and
training personnel, has
of this force. Many of
by the USSR are old and the
to be poor. The EW and
generation Soviet
to be Slow due to age
there are four operational
eight systems were provided,
21
59. Fighter defense is provided
aircraft (FAGOT/FRESCO/FARMER/FISHBED).
aid, which has included the delivery
FISHBED-type aircraft as well as
improved the air defense capability
the aircraft originally supplied
serviceability rate is estimated
control function is provided by older
equipment whose capability is thought
and shortages of spares. Presently,
SA-2 sites in Albania even though
22
23
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three by the USSR and five by the Peoples Republic of China. 1
_
Yugoslavia 2
_
60. The air defense capability in Yugoslavia, based on 3
_
the Soviet pattern, is considered to be good. Of about 120 4
_
air defense aircraft, essentially of Soviet origin, 75 have
all-weather capability (F1SHBED D/F/Jx), the remainder
being day fighters. EW and control are achieved by using
Soviet radars, French radars, and a progressively decreasing
number of obsolescent United States radars.
61. There are seven operational SA-2 sites with one
additional site under construction. At least four SA-3
battalions, equipped with four rail launchers, have
recently been observed with at least two battalions (sites)
being deployed along the northern border opposite Trieste.
Additionally, SA-6 and SA-7 SAMs have been introduced into
the ground forces. Coordination of these air defenses
is generally effective, and continuous efforts are being
made towards improvement of deficiencies.
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PART III
SECTION 1
GROUND FORCES TABLES
TABLE G 1 DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET MAJOR LINE UNITS BY
CATEGORY AND TYPE (MID-1976)
TABLE G 2 DISTRIBUTION OF NSWP MAJOR LINE UNITS BY
CATEGORY AND TYPE (MID-1976)
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TABLE G 1
DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET MAJOR LINE UNITS BY CATEGORY AND TYPE (MID-1976) (i)
GROUPS OF FORCES
AND
MILITARY DISTRICTS
TANK DIVISIONS
MOTORIZED RIFLE
DIVISIONS
AIRBORNE
DIVISIONS
CATEGORY TOTALS
DIVISION TOTALS
CAT A
CAT B CAT C
CAT A
CAT B
CAT C
CAT A
CAT C
CAT A
CAT B
CAT C
GDR (GSFG)
10
- -
10
-
-
-
-
20
-
-
20
POLAND (NGF)
2
- -
-
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
2
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (CGF)
2
- -
3
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
5
HUNGARY (SGF)
2
- -
2
-
-
-
-
4
-
-
4
NORTHWESTERN USSR:
LENINGRAD MD
-
1 -
2
1
4
1
-
3
2
4
9
WESTERN USSR:
BALTIC MD
3 -
-
1
3
1
1
1
4
4
9
BELORUSSIAN MD
1
7 -
1
-
1
1-
3
7
1
11
CARPATHIAN MD
1
2 -
-
5
3
-
-
1
7
3
11
SOUTHWESTERN USSR:
ODESSA MD
- -
-
3
4
1
-
1
3
4
8
SOUTHERN USSR:
TRANSCAUCASUS MD
-
- -
-
3
8
1
-
1
3
8
12
NORTH CAUCASUS MD
_
1 -
-
-
5
-
-
-
1
5
6
TURKESTAN MD
-
- -
-
1
4
1
-
1
1
4
6
WEST CENTRAL USSR:
MOSCOW MD
-
2 -
-
1
2
1-
1
3
2
6
KIEV MD
-
6 -
-
-
4
-
-
-
6
4
10
EAST CENTRAL USSR:
URAL MD
-
1 -
-
-
2
-
-
1
2
3
VOLGA MD
-
- -
-
-
3
-
-
-
-
3
3
EASTERN USSR:
CENTRAL ASIAN MD
1
- -
1
3
2
-
-
2
3
2
7
SIBERIAN MD
-
1 -
-
1
3
-
-
2
3
5
TRANSBAIKAL MD
1
1 -
3
1
4
-
_
4
2
4
10
FAR EAST MD
1
- -
4
6
8
-
-
5
6
8
19
MONGOLIA
1
- -
1
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
2
TOTALS
22
25-
27
26
60
7
1
56
51
61
168
(1) For details of Naval Infantry see Part II - Section 5.
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U.)
i uo-F4as - III IIIVII
TABLE G 2
DISTRIBUTION OF NSW MAJOR LINE UNITS BY CATEGORY AND TYPE (MID -1976) (i)
TANK DIVISIONS
MOTORIZED RIFLE
DIVISIONS
AB
DIV
SLD
MTN
BDE
DIV/BDE
CATEGORY TOTALS
DIV/BDE
TOTAL
PERSONNEL
TOTALS
CAT A CAT B
CAT C
CAT A
CAT B
CAT C
CAT A
CAT B
CAT C
GDR
2 -
-
4
-
-
-
-
-
6
-
-
6
POLAND
5 -
-
3
3
2
1
1
-
10
3
2
15
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
3 -
2
4
-
1
-
-
-
7
-
3
10
HUNGARY
1 -
-
3
-
2
-
-
4
-
2
6
ROMANIA
2 -
-
5
3
-
-
-
2
7+
3
-
10+
2 Bdes
2 Bdes
BULGARIA
5 -
-
5
1
2
-
-
-
5+
1
2
8+
Bdes
5 Bdes
5 Bdes
TOTALS
13+ -
2
24
7
7
1
1
2
39+
7
9
55+
5 Bdes
7 Bdes
7 Bdes
(i) For details of amphibious units see Part II - Section 5
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SECRET
PART III
SECTION 2
NAVAL FORCES TABLES
Table N I Estimated 00B of Soviet Submarines by Fleets (Mid-1976
to Mid-1978) and Total 00B (Mid-1981 and Mid-1985)
Table N 2 Estimated 00B of Soviet Submarine Support Ships by
Fleets (Mid-1976)
Table N 3 Estimated 00B of Soviet Surface Combatants by Fleets
(Mid-1976 to Mid-1978) and Total 00B (Mid-1981 and
Mid-1985).
Table N 4 Estimated AOB of Soviet Naval Aviation by Fleets
(Mid-1976 and Mid-1979) and Total AOB (Mid-1982
and Mid-1985)
Table N 5 Estimated 00B of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Navies by
Countries (Mid-1976)
Table N 6 Estimated AOB of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Navies by
Countries (Mid-1976)
Table N 7 Estimated 008 of Warsaw Pact Amphibious Ships,
Landing Craft, and Air Cushion Vehicles by Fleets/
Countries (Mid-1976)
Table N 8 Merchant Shipping of the Warsaw Pact - 1 Jan 1976
Table N 9 Fishing Fleets of the Warsaw Pact - 1 Jan 1976
Table N 10 Estimated Naval Hydrographic/Oceanographic Fleets
of the Warsaw Pact (Mid-1976)
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Z uoT33aS - III DIU
TABLE N 1
ESTIMATED 00B OF_SOVIET SUBMARINES BY FLEETS (MID-1976 TO MID-1978) AND TOTAL 00B (MID-1981 AND MID-1985)
(Additional submarines estimated to be in reserve are shown in parenthesis)
CLASS
TYPE
No.
MISSILE
TUBES
Mid-1976
Mid-1977
Mid-1978
Mid-1981
Mid-1985
NOR BAL BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR BAL BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR
BAL BLA PAC
TOTAL
.TOTAL
TOTAL -
BALLISTIC MISSILE NUCLEAR
DELTA OR SUCCESSOR
SSBN
12/16(115
- -
3
18
19 - -
5
24
19
- - 7
26
)
)
)62(ii)
)62(ii)
YANKEE
SSBN
16
22 - -
12
34
22 - -
12
34
22
- - 12
34
)
)
HOTEL II
SSBN
3
4 - -
2
6
- . - -
-
-
-
- - -
-
-
-
HOTEL III
SSBN
6
1 - -
-
1
1 - -
-
1
1
- - -
1
1
1
TOTAL
SSBN
42 - -
17
9 42 - -
17
59 -I
42
- - 19
61
63(ii)
63(ii)
4
BALLISTIC MISSILE DIESEL
.
GOLF I
SSB
3
2 - -
5
7 - -
5
7 2
- - 5
7
7
7
I
GOLF II OR OTHER
CONVERSIONS
SSB
3
8 - -
7
15
8 - -
7
15 8
- - 7
15
' 15
15
TOTAL
SSB
10 - -
12
22
10 - -
12
22 10
- - 12
22
22
22
CRUISE MISSILE NUCLEAR
PAPA OR NEW CLASS
SSGN
8/UNK
1 - -
-
1
2 - -
-
2
4
- - -
4
10
18
CHARLIE I
SSGN
8
8 - -
3
11
7 - -
4
11 6
- - 5
11
11
11
,
CHARLIE II
SSGN
8
3 - -
-
3
4 - -
-
4 5
- - -
5
- 7
7
ECHO II
SSGN
8
15 - -
14
29
15 - -
14
29 i15
- - 14
29
29
25(4)
TOTAL
SSGN
27 - -
17
44
27 - -
18
45 27
- - 19
46
59
61(4)
Z-?00060001.000t10091.0809dCltl-VIO 9O/60/OOZ eseeieu Jod peAoiddv
Z-?00060001.000t10091.0809dCltl-VIO : 9O/60/OOZ eSeeleti -10d peACLIddV
Z uoT43aS - III .111Vd
TABLE N 1 (continued)
CLASS
TYPE
No.
MISSIL
TUBES
Mid-1976
Mid-1977
Mid-1978
Mid-1981
'Mid-1985
NOR BAL
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR BAL
BLA PAC
TOTAL
NOR BAL
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
TOTAL
TOTAL
CRUISE MISSILE DIESEL
JULIETT
SSG
4
12 -
-
4
16
12 -
- 4
16
12 -
-
4
16
16
10(6)
WHISKEY-CONV (LONG BIN)
SSG
4 - (1)
1(1)
(1)
2(3) - (2)
1(1) (1)
1(4)
- (2)
1(1)
(1)
1(4)
(2)
-
WHISKEY-CONV (TWIN CYL)
SSG
2 - -
1(1)
1(1)
2(2) - -
1(1) (2)
1(3)
- -
(2)
(1)
(3)
(2)
-
TOTAL
SSG
12 (1)
2(2)
5(2)
20(5)-12 (2)
2(2) 4(3)
18(7)
12 (2)
1(3)
4(2)
17(7)
16(4)
10(6)
ATTACK NUCLEAR
ALFA
SSN
3 -
-
-
3 4 -
- -
4
4 -
-
-
4
4
VICTOR I OR SUCCESSOR
SSN
13 -
-
4
17 13 -
- 6
19
14 -
-
8
22
31
32
VICTOR II
SSN
3 -
-
-
3 4 -
- -
4
5 -
-
-
5
8
8
NEW CLASS
SSN - -
-
-
-
-
- -
-
- -
-
-
-
1
11
NOVEMBER
SSN 9 -
-
4
13
9 -
- 4
13
9 -
-
4
13
11(2)
3(10)
ECHO
SSN
i _ _
-
5
5
- -
- 5
5
- -
-
5
5
5
4(1)
TOTAL
SSN
! 28 -
-
13
41
30 -
- 15
45
32 -
-
17
49
60(2)
62(11)
ATTACK, LONG RANGE, DIESEL
TANGO OR SUCCESSOR
SS 3 -
2
-
5 5 -
2 -
7
6 -
3
-
9
13-15
20
I
FOXTROT (iii)
SS I 38 2
-
20
60 ,38 2
- 20
60
36(2) 2
-
20 ,
58(2)
49
36
Z U
UL 1
?iiTOTAT LONG RANGE
RR
14(8) 2(2)
-
2
4(5)
24(5)
10(15)12(10)1(3)
75(15M45(10)3(3)
- 2(7)
2 22(7)
5(20)
72(20)
(10) (3)
42(12)2(3)
-
3
(7)
20(7)
-(20)
67(22)
1 (10) 1 -
52-54(10 56
(i
; 45(8)4(2)
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TABLE N 1 (concluded)
CLASS TYPE
No.
MISSILE
TUBES
Mid-1976
Mid-1977
Mid-1978
Mid-198
d-1985
NOR
BAL
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR
BAL
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR
BAL
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
TOTAL
TOTAL
ATTACK, MEDIUM RANGE, DIESEL
BRAVO
SS
1
-
2
1
4
1
-
2
1
4
1
-
2
1
4
4
ROMEO (iii) (iv)
SS
6(2)
2
2
-
10(2)
6(2)
2
2
-
10(2)
6
(1)
(1)
-
8(4)
2(8)
-
WHISKEY (iv)
SS
10/
10/
10/
10/
40/
5/
5/
5/
5/
20/
2/
2/
3/
3/
10/
(15)
-
(10)
(25)
(15)
(15)
(65)
(10)
(20)
(15)
(15)
(60)
(10)
(20)
(15)
(15)
(60)
TOTAL MEDIUM RANGE
SS
17/
12/
14/
11/
54/
12/
7/
9/
6/
34/
9/
3/
6/
4/
22/
6(23)
(12)
(25)
(15)
(15)
(67)
(12)
(20)
(15)
(15)
(62)
(12)
(21)
(16)
(15)
(64)
ATTACK, SHORT RANGE, DIESEL
QUEBEC (iv)
(5)
(4)
-
(9)
-
(5)
(4)
-
(9)
(5)
(4)
-
(9)
_ _
TOTAL NUCLEAR POWERED
97
-
-
47
144
100
-
-
50
150
104
-
-
55
159
180(2)
186(15)
TOTAL DIESEL POWERED
84/
17/
18/
52/
171/
79/
10/
13/
44/
146/
73/
5/
10/
(W 128/
96-98/
92(6)
(20)(33)
(21)
(22)
(96)
(22)
(30)
(21)
(25)
(98)
(24)
(31)
(23)
? j (102)
(37))
GRAND TOTAL
181/
17/
18/
99/
315/
179/
10/
13/
94/
296/
177/
5/
10/
95/
287/
276-278/
278/
(20)
(33)
(21)
(22)
(96)
(22)(30)
(21)
(25)
(98)
(24)(31)
(23)
(24)
(102)
(37)
(21)
(i) It is estimated that a second DELTA successor class may have about 20 missile tubes.
(ii) The composition of the SLBM force in the 1980s cannot be estimated with confidence. The total of 62 SSBN is
based upon the 1972 SAL Interim Agreement limits.
(iii) The total number of FOXTROT, ZULU, and ROMEO class submarines for the Northern and Baltic fleets represents an
estimated average 008. The actual disposition of units may vary slightly, from time to time, due to interfleet
transfers for refit/overhaul.
(iv) The rate at which ROMEO, WHISKEY, and QUEBEC classes will be
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SECRET
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TABLE N 2
ESTIMATED 00B OF SOVIET SUBMARINE
SUPPORT SHIPS BY FLEETS (MID-1976)
CLASS TYPE
NOR
SUBMARINE TENDERS
MOD DNEPR AS
UGRA AS
DON AS
DNEPR AS
WM BAUER AS
TOTAL AS
1
4
2
2
2
BAL
SMALL SUBMARINE TENDERS
TOMBA ASL
ATREK ASL
MISCELLANEOUS ASL
TOTAL ASL
1
3
2
6
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
2
2
1
1
2
1
2 2
5
2
7
6
3
2
20
REPAIR SHIPS (i)
AMUR AR 5
OSKOL AR 4
TOVDA AR 1
MISCELLANEOUS AR 1
TOTAL AR 11
SUBMARINE RESCUE SHIPS
NEPA ASR
PRUT ASR
EX-T-58 ASR
TOTAL ASR
MISSILE SUPPORT SHIPS
MP-6 AEM
AMGA AEM
LAMA AEM
TOTAL AEM
2
1
5
2
8
3
3
2
2
8
-
1
3
6
4
7
7
1
3 14
3 12
1
I 1 4
7 31
- 1
3 9
1 13
4 23
(i) Repair ships are not employed exclusively as submarine support
ships, but they have this capability.
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US 161/76
PART III - Section 2
111-2-5
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Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2
cn cn
17d
rti tzi
TABLE N 3
ESTIMATED 00B OF SOVIET SURFACE COMBATANTS BY FLEETS (MID-1976 TO MID-1978) AND TOTAL 00B (MID-1981 AND MID-1985)
(Black Sea 00B includes the Caspian Flotilla)
(additional ships estimated to be in reserve are shown in parenthesis)
CLASS TYPE
No.
MISSILE
LNCHRS.
SSM SAM
Mid-1976
Mid-1977
Mid-1978
Mid-1981
Mid-1985
NOR
BAL
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR BAL BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR BAL BLA
PAC
TOTAL
TOTAL
!TOTAL
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
KIEV OR SUCCESSOR CVSG
UNK
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
2
-
2
2
4
'
SAM HELICOPTER CRUISERS
MOSKVA CHG
4
-
.
2
-
2
-
-
.
2
-
2-
.
-
2
-
2
2
2
,
.
SSM/SAM CRUISERS
KARA OR SUCCESSOR (i) CLGM
8 8
1
-
3
- 4
2
-
3
-
5
2
-
3
-
5
8
8
KRESTA I CLGM
4 4
3
-
-
1 4
3
-
-
1
4
3
-
-
1
4
4
4
KRESTA II OR SUCCESSOR(i) CLGM
8 4
5
1
-
2
8
6
1
-
2
9
6
1
-
3
10
12
12
KYNDA CLGM
8 2
-
-
2
2
4
-
-
2
2
4
-
-
2
2
4 '
4
4
TOTAL CLGM
9
1
5
5 20
11
1
5
5
22
11
1
5
6
23
28
28
CRUISERS
SVERDLOV CLCP
2
-
-
1
1 , 2
-
-
1
1
2
-
-
1
1
2
2
2
i
SVERDLOV CLG
2
-
-
1
t
- 1 1
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
1
-
1
1
(1)
i
SVERDLOV CT
2
1
2(1)
2(111 7(2)
-1
2
1
2(1)
2(1)1
7(2)
2
1
2(1)
2(1)
7(2)
6(3)
4(2)
1
CHAPAEV CL
1
1(1)
-
- 1(1)
-
1W
-
- 1
1(1)
-
1(1)
-
-
1(1)
(1)
-
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Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2
TABLE N 3 (continued)
CLASS TYPE
No.
MISSILE
LNCHRS.
SSM SAM
Mid-1976
Mid-1977
L Mid-1978
Mid-1981
Mid-1985
NOR
BAL
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
OR BAL BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR BAL BLA
PAC
TOTAL
TOTAL
TOTAL
KIROV CL
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
TOTAL CLCP/CLG/CL
2
2(1)
4(1)
3(1)
11(3)
2
2(1)
4(1)
3(1)
11(3)
2
2(1)
4(1)
3(1)
11(3)
9(4)
6(3)
MISSILE DESTROYERS
NEW CLASS DLGM/DDGM
UNK
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
9
RRIVAR DDGSP 4
4
4
8
-
-
12
4
8
1
-
13
i 5
7
20
1
15 20
20
RASHIN DLGM 4
4
1
2
2
-
5
1
3
3
-
7
3
4
1
9 12
12
RASHIN DLG
4
1
0(1)
7(1)
4
12(2)j -
(1)
6(1)
4
10(2)
i -:
0(1)
5(1)
3
8(2) 7
7
RANIN DDG
2
4
1
-
2
7 4
1
-
3
8
14
1
-
3
8 8
5(3)
KRUPNYY DDGS
2
-
-
1
1 -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
MOD KILDIN DDGS
4
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
-
3
3
3
KILDIN DDGS
1
-
-
1
1
-
-
1
1
-
-
-
1
1
3
3
SAM KOTLIN DDG
2
2
1
3
2
8 2
1
3
2
8
2
1
3
2
8
8
6(2)
TOTAL DLGM/DDGM/DDGSP/DLG/DDGS/
12
12(1)
15(1)
10
49(2) 11
13(1)
16(1)
10
50(2)
12
12(1)
17(1)
11
52(2)
59
62(5)
DDG/
DESTROYERS
KOTLIN DD
2
3
3(1)
8(1)
16(2 2
3
3(1)
8(1)
16(2)
2
3
2(1)
7(3)14(4)
12(2)
8(2)
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Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2
IN)
Z uoT1DaS - III DIV,I
TABLE N 3 (continued)
CLASS (ii) iiVE
No.
MISSILE
mull
Mid-1976
Mid-1977
Mid-1978
_
Mid-1981
Mid-1985
NOR BAL BLA
PAC
TOTAL kNOR
BAL BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR BAL
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
-Turn-
TOTAL
SKORYY DD
4(4).5(4) 5(5)
4(5)
18(18)3(4)
4(4)
5(5)
4(5)
16(18)
3(4) 3(4)
5(4)
3(4)
14(16)
8(10)
-
TOTAL DD
6(4) 8(4) 8(6)
12(6)
34(20)5(4)
7(4)
8(6)
12(6)
32(20)
5(4) 6(4)
7(5)
10(7)
28(20)
20(12)
8(2)
DESTROYER ESCORTS
UNK
NEW CLASS
- - -
-
-
- -
1
-
1
- -
3
-
3
12
24
RIGA DE
4(3) 6(2) 8(2)
12(2)
30(9)
4(4) 5(2)
6(2)
10(2)
25(10)
3(4) 4(2)
5(2)
8(2)
20(10)
(5)
KOLA DE
1 - (1)
-
(1)
- -
(1)
-
(1)
- -
(1)
-
(1)
-
-
MIRKA DE
- 14 6
-
20 - 14
6
-
20
- 14
6
-
20
20
12(8)
PETYA I and III DE
8 2 6
6
22 7 2
4
6
19
7 2
4
6
19
19 13(6)
PETYA II DE
13 - 4
10
27 13 -
4
10
27
13 -
4
10
27
27
26(1)
TOTAL DE
26(3)22(2)24(3)
24(2)
100(10)24(4)21(2)
21(3)
26(2)
92(1)
23(4)20(2)
22(3)
24(2)
89(11) 83(12)
75(20)
COASTAL ESCORTS
GRISHA OR SUCCESSOR (i)PCEP/PCE
2/-
10 - 10
6
26 10 2
10
7
29
12 4
10
8
34 40
POTI PCE
15 20 16
14
65 15 20
16
14
65
14 18
15
13
60 50
TURYA OR SUCCESSOR PCH
3 8 6
13
30 4 10
8
15
37
5 12
9
17
43 50
STENKA OR SUCCESSOR PCS
- 29 10
29
68 - 30
10
30
70
30
10
30
70 70
SO 1 PCS
- 17 12
6
35 - 7
5
3
15
- 3
2
-
5 -
TOTAL PCFPWR/PcH/Prs
28 74 54
68
224 29 69
49
69
216
31 67
46
68
212 110
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Z uoT30aS - III .1111/cl
TABLE N 3 (continued)
CLASS (ii) TYPE
No.
MISSILE
LNCHRS.
SSM SAM
Mid-1976
Mid-1977
Mid-1978
Mid-1981
NOR
BAL
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR BAL BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR
BAL
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
TOTAL
MISSILE PATROL CRAFT
NANUCHKA OR
PGGP
SUCCESSOR (i)
6
2
2
5
8
1
16
2
6
8
2
18
3
7
8
3
21
24
OSA I PTFG4
17
16
10
29
72
15
16
10
29
70
15
16
10
27
68
44
OSA II OR SUCCESSOR (i) PTFG4
9
18
6
15
48
9
18
6
15
48
9
18
6
15
48
48-64
TOTAL PGGP/PTFG
28
39
24
45
136
26
40
24
46
136
27
41
24
45
137
116-132
TORPEDO PATROL CRAFT
SHERSHEN OR
PT
SUCCESSOR
17
15
10
8
50
17
15
10
8
50
17
15
10
8
50
40
P6/P4 PT
8
12
10
10
40
6
10
9
10
35
-
7
6
7
20
-
TOTAL PTF/PT
I
25
27
20
18
90
23
25
19
18
85
17
22
16
15
70
40
HIGH SPEED CRAFT
PGM
SLEPEN
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
1
-
1
1
PBH
PCHELA
-
13
7
-
20
-
13
7
-
20
-
12
6
-
18
12
TOTAL PGM/PBH
-
13
8
-
21
-
13
8
-
21
-
12
7
19
13
FLEET MINESWEEPERS (iii)
NATYA OR SUCCESSOR MSF
6
8
7
3
24
7
9
8
4
28
8
10
9
5
32
40
YURKA MSF
11
13
10
11
45
11
13
10
11
45
_.
13
10
11
45
45
T.58 MSF
4
-
-
11
15
3
-
-
10
13
2
-
-
10
12
-
L
1
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TABLE N 3 (concluded)
CLASS (ii)
TYPE
No.
MISSILE
LNCHRS.
SSM SAM
Mid-1976
.
Mid-1977
Mid-1978
Mid-1981
NOR
BAL
BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR BAL BLA
PAC
TOTAL
NOR BAL BLA
PAC
TOTAL
TOTAL
T.43
MSF
15
20
10
20
65
10
20
10
20
60
10
15
5
20
50
10
TOTAL MSF
36
41
27
45
149
31
42
28
45
146
31
38
24
46
139
95
SMALL MINESWEEPERS
(iii)
SASHA
MSM
-
9
3
-
12
-
8
2
-
10
-
5
2
-
7
-
T.301
MSM
-
2
1
-
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
SONYA OR SUCCESSOR
MSC
4
8
-
4
16
4
10
4
6
24
6
12
6
8
32
48
VANYA
MSC/MHC
17
23
16
17
73
17
23
16
17
73
17
23
16
17
73
65
ZHENYA
MSC
-
3
-
-
3
-
3
-
-
3
-
3
-
-
3
3
TOTAL
MSM/MHC/MSC
21
45
20
21
107
20
43
24
19
110 123
43
24
25
115
116
(i) Successor class may not have the same missile system or
number of missile launcher
uoT33aS - III 1-11Vd
(ii) 00B for the various classes of coastal escorts, patrol and
high speed craft, and minesweepers cannot be estimated with
confidence beyond 1981.
(iii) About 15 percent of the total number of fleet minesweepers
and 10 percent of the small minesweepers are likely to be
in a reserve status.
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uot43aS - III 111Vd
'Si
TABLE N 4
ESTIMATED AOB OF SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION BY FLEETS
(MID-1976 AND MID-1979) AND TOTAL AOB (MID-1982 AND MID-1985)(1)
STRIKE SUBSONIC
MID-1976
M1D-1979
MID-1982
MID-1985
NORTH
BALTIC
BLACK(ii)
PACIFIC
TOTAL
NORTH
BALTIC
BLACK(ii)
PACIFIC
TOTAL
65
72
56
100
293
(iii)
55
66
45
84
250
205
120
pc
I.J.J
CO
E
co
STRIKE SUPERSONIC
?
24
40
( i vd
?
64
15
(iv)
38
42
(iv)
?
95
(V)
150
(0)
190
(vii)
TANKERS
23
13
28
79
20
15
20
25
80
80
65
RECCE
SUBSONIC
56
9
6
53
124
(viii)
55
20
10
50
135
(viii)
100
(viii)
80
(viii)
SUPERSONIC ?
3
3
?
6
?
3
3
?
10
15
20
HELICOPTERS
6
5
7
8
26
8
5
10
7
30
25
10
ce
1--
V') <
?cm.
FIXED WING (ix)
56
21
36
55
168
63
21
41
55
180
210
225
HELICOPTERS 55
30
85
70
240
40
15
120
50
225
275
305
UNKNOWN
V/STOL ?
?
15
?
15
?
?
60
(x)
?
60
70
105
(i)
(ii)
Forty-five Medium Fixed Wing and 85 Helicopter transport not included here,
Numbers shown do not include 24 BADGER, 7 MAIL, 12 HORMONE A, 2 BACKFIRE, 2
Kulbakino (Training a/c.).
(iii) Includes 11 BADGER A and 10 BEAGLE free fall bombers in the Baltic Fleet, b
(utility) tow target role (10 Baltic Fleet, 6 Northern Fleet).
(iv) Includes 15 BACKFIRE.
(v) Includes 40 BACKFIRE. (Possibly some for use in reconnaissance role.) Fleet
(vi) Includes 95 BACKFIRE. (Possibly some for use in reconnaissance role.)
(vii) Includes 140 BACKFIRE. (Possibly some for use in reconnaissance role.)
(viii) Includes two CUB signal intelligence collection aircraft in each Fleet.
(ix) MAIL, MAY, and BEAR F.
(x) Fleet subordination may vary.
but included in Table A 1.
MAY, and 2 BEAR F at Nikolayev/
ut does not include 16 BEAGLE
subordination not known.
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SECRET
TABLE N 5
ESTIMATED 00B OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT NAVIES
BY COUNTRIES (MID-1976)
(Excluding Amphibious Ships and Craft)
CLASS TYPE /Itg- 'POLAND BULGARIA ROMANIA
SUBMARINES MEDIUM RANGE
'WHISKEY SS - 4 2
ROMEO SS - 2
SAM DESTROYER
SAM KOTLIN DDG 1
NEW CLASS DDG 1
DESTROYER ESCORTS
RIGA
DE 2 2
COASTAL ESCORTS
HAI
KRONSHTADT
SO 1
OBLUZE
GDANSK
OKSYWIE
SHANGHAI
POTI
PC 12
PC - - 2 3
PC 4 -
PCS - 14 (i)
PC - 9
PC - 4
PCS/
PGM
PC
12 (i)
3
MISSILE PATROL CRAFT
PTFG
12
12
3
OSA I
TORPEDO PATROL CRAFT
SHERSHEN
PTF
15
-
6
_
WISLA
PT
-
12
-
-
P6
PT
-
3
-
-
P4
PT
-
-
8
ILTIS
PT
38
-
LIBELLE
PT
5
-
-
_
HUCH WAN
PTH
-
-
-
MINE WARFARE SHIPS
143
MSF
-
12
2
-
KRAKE
MSF
3
-
-
-
M 40
MSF
-
-
-
4
KRONGULEC
MSF
-
12
-
-
KONDOR
MSC
34
-
-
-
VAN VA
MSC
-
-
4
-
T301
MSM
-
-
1
10
PERSONNEL STRENGTH (ii)
17,500
26,000
10,500
11,000
(i) Numbers include some units from GDR Coastal Border Brigade (GBK)
Polish Maritime Frontier Guard (W0P), and Romanian Maritime Frontier Guard.
(ii) Numbers include Border Guards etc., and all naval elements.
SECRET
US 161/76
111-2-12 PART III - Section 2
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Z-?00060001?000t10091.0808dCIU-VI3 : 9O/60/OOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV
?a
rs.)
3 uomaS - III JAM
TABLE N 6
ESTIMATED AOB OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT NAVIES BY COUNTRIES (MID-l976)
AIRCRAFT ROLE
GDR
POLAND
BULGARIA
ROMANIA
TOTAL
FIGHTER BOMBER RECCE
-
10
-
-
10
FIGHTER BOMBER ATTACK
-
36
-
-
36
ASW HELICOPTER (HOUND)
10
5
6
4
25
TRANSPORTS - FIXED WING
-
2
-
-
2
TRANSPORTS/RECCE HELO
6
27 (i)
-
-
33
TRAINING AIRCRAFT
-
3
-
-
3
(i) This figure includes 25 HARE.
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TABLE N 7_
ESTIMATFD 008 OF WARSAW PACT AMPHIBIOUS SHTPS,_LANDING CRAFLANILAIR__CUSHION VEHICLES BY FLEETS/COUNTRIES
(MID-1q7)
-1
611
Fri
C)
rrl
?4
A.
Amphibious Vessels with a Primary Amphibious Role.
(Those vessels used regularly to land amphibious troops and judged to represent
the primary assault lift of the navy.)
CLASS
SOVIET NAVY
Total
NSWP NAVIES
Grand Total
TYPE
North
Baltic
black
Laspian
Pacific
UN
Poland
bulgaria Komania
ALLIGATOR
LST
2
3
4
-
4
13
-
-
- -
13
ROPUCHA
LST
-
3
-
-
-
3
-
-
- -
3
POLNOCNY
LSM
13
16
13
9
11
62 -
23
- -
85
ROBBE
LSM
-
-
-
-
-
- 6
-
- -
6
VYDRA
LCU
-
-
-
-
-
- -
-
10 -
10
LABO 100
LCU
-
-
-
-
-
- 12
-
- -
12
MFP
LCU
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
9 -
9
EICHSTADEN
LCP
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
15
- -
15
MARABUT
LCVP
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
- -
3
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z uot438S - III lad
TABLE N 7 (Continued)
B. Amphibious Vessels with a Residual Role Only. (Units designed as amphibious vessels and retaining a physical capability to
land amphibious troops but which have not been observed to be used in that capacity in recent years.) (i)
SOVIET NAVY
NSWP NAVIES
CLASS
TYPE
North Baltic Black Caspian Pacific
Total
GDR Poland Bulgaria Romania
Grand Total
MP-8
LSM
1 - - - -
1
1
MP-4
LSM
1 - - - 5 (10)
6 (10)
6 (10)
SMB-1
LCU
- (5) (15) (10) 5 (5)
5 (35)
5 (35)
VYDRA
LCU
- 5(5) 3(3) 5(5)
13(13)
13(13)
MP-10
LCU
- - - - (5) (5)
(5)
T-4
LCM
Numerous in all fleet areas for use in on/off-
loading follow-up units.
Air Cushion
Vehicles
AIST
LACV
- 3 - - - 3
3
LEBED
LACV
- 2 - - - 2
2
GUS
LACV
- 7 4 - 7 18
18
(i) Additional units estimated to be in reserve are shown in parenthesis.
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Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2
Z uoT333S - III IIIWI
TABLE N 8
MERCHANT SHIPPING OF THE WARSAW PACT (1 JAN 1976)
(Seagoing hips of 100 GRT and Over, in Thousands of DWT)
COUNTRY
DRY CARGO (i)
CONTAINER
RO/RO
REFRIGERATED
BULK CARRIER
TANKER (POL)
TANKER (SPE.)
PASSENGER (ii)
TOTAL
No. DWT
No.
Dia
No.
DWT
No.
DWT
No.
DWT
No. DWT
No. DWT
No. DWT
No. DWT
USSR (over 1000 GRT)
Northern Fleet
195
988
-
-
-
-
-
-
23
210
4
12
-
-
9
6
231 1,216
Baltic Fleet
270
1,800
5
38
9
90
20
100
10
50
45
585
2
5
7
18
368 2,686
Black Sea Fleet
335
3,300
4
32
9
55
5
23
51
810
160
4,000
10
28
30
70
604 8,318
Pacific Fleet
330
2,175
5
38
--
_
2
-
9
24
170
63
450
-
-
-
-
23
58
447 2,900
Total
1130
8,263
14
108
18
145
27
132
108
1,240
272
5,047
12
33
69
152
1650 15,120
USSR
Caspian Sea Fleet
25
63
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
50
275
1
4
2
1
78 343
River-sea Fleet
230
640
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
60
280
-
-
-
-
290 920
Under 1000 GRT
65
31
4
4
58
-
-
-
-
2
2
-
-
-
-
76 45
Total
320
734
4
4
5
8
-
-
-
-
112
557
_
1
_
4
_
2
_
1
444 1,308
USSR: Grand Total
1450
8,997 18
112
23
153
27
132
108
1,240
384
5,604
13
37
71
153
2094 16,428
NSWP:
Poland
177
1,400
-
-
1
2
4
9
97
1,863
10
830
3
30
5
10
297 4,144
GDR
108
812
-
-
3
11
8
53
14
270
16
607
-
-
5
13
154 1,766
Bulgaria
57
390
1
2
-
-
-
-
29
362
22
506
-
-
5
8
114 1,268
Romania
67
335
-
-
-
-
-
-
26
561
7
435
-
-
1
2
101 1,333
Czechoslovakia
8
43
-
-
-
--
-
6
177
-
-
-
-
-
14 220
Hungary
20
90
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
20 90
Total
437
3,070
1
2
4
13
12
62
172
3,233
55
2,378
3
30
16
33
700 8,821
NSWP: Under 1000 GRT
72
55
20
18
-
-
1
1
-
-
14
10
-
-
3
1
110 85
NSWP: Grand Total
509
3,125
21
20
4
13
13
63
172
3,233
69
2,388
3
30
19
34
810 8,906
GRAND TOTAL: WP
1959
12,122
39
132
27
166
40
195
280
4,473
453
7,992
16
67
90
187
2904 25,334
(i) Includes timber carrier, cargo-passenger, cargo-training
(ii) Includes short-sea passenger and passenger-car/rail ferries
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z uoTapaS - III IVIcl
tzi
TABLE N 9
FISHING FLEETS OF THE WARSAW PACT (1 JAN 1976)
(Trawlers and Support Ships of 100 GRT and Over, Rounded to the Nearest 100 GRT)
COUNTRY
TRAWLERS
FACTORY TRAWLERS
FACTORY SHIPS &
REF. TRANSPORTS
AUXILIARY SHIPS (i)
RESEARCH SHIPS
TOTAL
No. GRT
No. GRT
No. GRT
No. GRT
No. GRT
No. GRT
USSR
868 305,000
164 57,600
469 227,900
1,033 384,600
245 31,300
264 809,700
145 409,500
158 505,200
204 597,000
- -
139 846,600
32 253,300
44 409,100
196 1,277,900
95 98,900
105 109,100
38 23,400
58 98,200
170 254,200
48 15,100
6 1,300
24 31,900
14 12,700
39 44,100
4 2,100
1,382 2,071,700
403 775,700
743 1,253,100
1,642 2,557,800
392 147,400
Baltic Fleet
Black Sea Fleet
Northern Fleet
Far East Fleet
Caspian Sea Fleet
Total
4,562 6,805,700
87 92,100
506 2,885,800
419 500,000
2,779 1,006,400
771 2,321,400
NSWP
182 56,500
133 57,200
- -
- -
83 174,000
13 39,300
29 89,900
29 76,400
7 48,000
8 42,500
4 36,300
6 33,300
8 11,600
5 1,600
- -
- -
3 3,700
5 2,900
- -
- -
283 293,800
164 143,700
33 126,200
35 109,700
Poland
GDR
Romania
Bulgaria
Total
515 673,400
8 6,600
25 160,100
13 13,200
315 113,700
154 379,600
GRAND TOTAL
3,094 1,120,100
925 2,701.000
531 3,045,900
432 513,200
95 98,700
5,077 7,479,100
(1.) Includes tankers, tugs, training and floating workshop ships
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ESTIMATED NAVAL
TABLE N 10
HYDROGRAPHIC/OCEANOGRAPHIC FLEETS
OF THE WARSAW PACT (MID-1976)
COUNTRY
TYPE
CLASS
NUMBER
USSR (i)
AGOR
ABKHAZIYA
4
NEVELSKOY
1
AKADEMIK KRYLOV
3
NILOLAY ZUBOV
9
POLYUS
3
AGS
BIYA
9
KAMENKA
9
LENTRA
8
MEL ITOPOL
3
MOMA
23
TELNOVSK
4
SAMARA
16
T-43
20
MP-8
1
MOD TELNOVSK
2
MOD KEYLA
1
MOD LENTRA
5
AGSB
MOD DOBRYNYA NIKITICH
1
TOTAL
122
POLAND
AGS
MOMA
1
TOTAL
1
GDR
AGSC
JORDAN
1
KFK
1
SCHOLLE
1
TOTAL
3
BULGARIA
AGS
Single Ship
1
AGSC
VARNA
1
TOTAL
2
ROMANIA
AGS
FRIPONNE
1
TOTAL
1
(1) There are, in addition, approximately 100 Soviet non-naval units,
mostly of 500 GRT and over, subordinated to various research
institutions.
SECRET
US 161/76 111-2-18 PART III - Section 2
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Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2
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TABLE A 1
TABLE A 2
TABLE A 3
TABLE A 4
TABLE A 5
-TABLE A 6
TABLE A 7
TABLE A 8
TABLE A 9
TABLE A 10
TABLE A 11
TABLE A 12
SECRET
US 161/76
PART III
SECTION 3
AIR FORCES TABLES
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT
AIR FORCES BY MAJOR COMPONENTS (MID-1976)
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET
AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE (MID-1976)
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF INTERCEPTORS OF
SOVIET AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE (MID-1979, MID-1982,
AND MID-1985)
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION
(MID-1976, MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985)
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET
FRONTAL AVIATION (MID-1976)
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET FRONTAL
AVIATION (MID-1978, MID-1982, AND MID-1985)
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET MILITARY
TRANSPORT AVIATION (MID-1976, MID-1979, MID-1982,
AND MID-1985)
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT AIR
FORCES (MID-1976)
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT AIR
FORCES (MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985)
WARSAW PACT RESERVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT (MID-1976)
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET CIVIL AVIATION
(MID-1976, MID-1979, AND MID-1985)
WARSAW PACT HARDENED AIRCRAFT SHELTERS (MID-1976)
111-3-1 PART III - Section 3
Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2
E uoT3DaS - III IIIV43
TABLE A 1
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES BY MAJOR COMPONENTS (MID-1976)
AIRCRAFT ROLE
SOVIET
FRONTAL
AVIATION
SOVIET
AVIATION OF
AIR DEFENSE
SOVIET
LONG RANGE
AVIATION
SOVIET
NAVAL
AVIATION(i)
SOVIET
MILITARY TRANSPORT
AVIATION
TOTAL
SOVIET
TOTAL
NON-SOVIET
WARSAW PACT
TOTAL
WARSAW
(ii) PACT(iii)
ix
wInterceptor
E"Counterair
x
-
2465
-
-
-
2465
1130
3595
2030
-
-
-
-
2030
310
2340
2iGround
4,Reconnaissance
Attack
1640
-
-
-
-
1640
542
2182
405
-
-
-
-
405
66
471
TOTAL
4075
2465
-
-
-
6540
2048
8588
Bomber
200
-
735
357
-
1292
18
1310
Reconnaissance
330
9
(iv)
35
156
(v)
-
530
170
700
Electronic
Warfare
75
-
50
35
45
205
-
205
Tanker
-
-
65
79
-
144
-
144
wHelicopter
-43
Fixed Wing
-
-
-
168
-
168
-
168
-
-
-
240
-
240
-
240
Transport
Medium/Heavy
44
40
30
48
760
922
25
947
Helicopter
Medium/Heavy
1950
115
10
77
370
(vi)
2522
356
2878
GRAND TOTAL
6674
2629
925
1160
1175
12563
2617
15180
(i)
(ii) Does not include about 85 aircraft of NSWP naval aviation (see Table N 4).
(iii) Excluding 4555 reserve combat aircraft (s e Table A 10).
(iv) AWAC aircraft.
(v) Includes 26 HORMONE B Reconnaissance helicopters.
(vi) Miscellaneous helicopters not accounted for in other air force tables including helicopters subordinated to Soviet
military transport aviation.
Does not include some 15 V/STOL aircraft estimated for SNA by mid-1976.
cra
BCf3
CD
0-
0
0
0
8
CD8
th
. .
0
CO
0
0
th0
0
0
0
0
0
0
CD
0
0
0
C.4
c uoTaDas - III 111Vd
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION
TABLE A 2
DEFENSE
(MID-1976)
"0
"0
0
OF SOVIET AVIATION OF AIR
CD
H
AIR DEFENSE DISTRICTS
tzl
0
AIRCRAFT
CD
TYPE
ARKHANGELSK LENINGRAD
MINSK
KIEV BAKU TASHKENT MOSCOW(i)
SVERDLOVSK
NOVOSIBIRSK
KHABAROVSK
TOTAL
to
INTERCEPTORS
260 180
170
270 330 165 385
170
145
390
21465
co
AWAC
9
9
MEDILIM/
0
HEAVY
TRANSPORT
2 3 20
2
3
40
MEDIUM
03
0
HEAVY/
CO
HELICOPTER
14 5
7 9 LI 27
1
22
26
115
0
0
(i) Includes PVC Headquarters.
0
0
0
0
0
0
c.0
0
0
0
TABLE A 3
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF INTERCEPTORS OF SOVIET AVIATION
OF AIR DEFENSE (MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985)
YEAR
AIR DEFENSE DISTRICTS
TOTAL
ARKHANGELSK
LENINGRAD
MINSK
KIEV
BAKU
TASHKENT
MOSCOW
SVERDLOVSK
NOVOSIBIRSK
KHABAROVSK,
MID-
1979
230
150
150
250
310
140
350
150
130
370
2230
MID-
1982
230
150
145
240
305
140
335
150
125
360
2180
ID-
985
230
150
145
225
290
125
300
150
125
300
2040
E up-P.09S - Ill DM
0
CD
a
-n
102
CD
CD
0
CD
0
. .
-0
CO
0
CO
0
(11
0
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
CD
0
0
0
C.4
E uoT309S - III IIIWI
TABLE A 4
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION
(MID-1976, MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985)
1st
ARMY
2nd
ARMY
3rd
ARMY
TOTAL
1st
ARMY
2nd
ARMY
3rd
ARMY
TOTAL
1st
ARMY
2nd
ARMY
3rd
ARMY
1st 2nd
TOTAL ARMY ARMY
3rd
ARMY
TOTAL
BACKFIRE
20
20
10
50
60
40
25
125
75
75
50
200 75
75
50
200
BEAR/BISON
BOMBERS
20
65
55
140
20
50
40
110
10
40
20
70 -
20
20
40
BADGER/BLINDER
BOMBERS
280
165
100
545
215
145
_ _
90
450
170
100
50
320
110
90
25
225
TOTAL BOMBERS
320
250
165
735
295
235
155
685
255
215
120
590
185
185
95
465
BEAR E/BADGER F/
BLINDER C
RECONNAISSANCE
5
15
15
35
15
15
10
40
20
20
10
50
20
20
20
60
BADGER A/BACKFIRE
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
20
15
15
50
15
15
10
40
10
10
10
30
10
5
5
20
TANKER
35
-
30
65
30
-
30
60
30
-
30
60
30
-
30
60
TOTAL
COMBAT SUPPORT
60
30
60
150
60
30
50
140
60
30
50
140
60
25
55
140
TRANSPORT
MEDIUM/HEAVY
15
5
10
30 15
10
10
35
15
10
10
35
10
10
10
30
HELICOPTER
MEDIUM/HEAVY
5
10
5
5
5
15
5
5
5
15
5
5
5
15
225
165
GRAND TOTAL
400
285
240
925
375
280
220
875 335
260
185
780
260_
650
0
citTja
tx9
8
co
8
th0
-0
co
0
0
(73.1
0
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
CD
0
0
0
C.4
cs,
C-'
E uoT1DaS - III IIIVd
TABLE A 5
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET FRONTAL AVIATION (MID-1976)
LALIBLE2A_FT
TYPE
NORTH
pH
.?
CENTRAL
SOUTHERN
RESERVE
CENTRAL ASIAN -)11
MD x'
TRANSBAIKAL MD
FAR EAST MD
---1
jr-
(3
.2
CY
cl
m
z
CL-
I?
m
c:c
0
44
crl
0
V)
4.nm
=
a
=
MOSCOW MD
KIEV MD .
m
gOld
2Bomber(iii)
4'Nonnuc1ear
N e w Counterair(i)
375
130
50
70
55
130
120
50
70
55 40
30
15
60
100
1350
Counterair(i )
_
-
-
30
50
25
-
10
85
60
40 40
60
105
I
145
30
680
Nuclear Fighter/
55
215
80
-
90
90
50
45
40
1
75 40 - 20 , 10
90
90
990
Fighter/Bomber i 70
35
35
-
80
35
70
-
-
40 - 30
40
125
90
650
Reconnaissance(iv) 15
65
40
15
25
25
15
15
25
35 15 -
e
41
p_SILEIQTAL
140
690
285
95
315
230
265
1190
200
280 150 80
155
195
445
360
4075
BEAGLE/BREWER
Bomber
-
50
40
-
1
1
30
-
20
- -
-
-
30
30
200
7?nectronic
Reconnaissance
30
30
20
5
15
15
25
10
38
35 10 -
-
25
35
45
330
Warfare
5
20
10
5
5
10
5
1 -
5
5 - -
-
-
-
5
75
TOTAL COMBAT
AIRCRAFT
175
740
315
105
385
295
295
230
235
340 160 80
155
220
510
440
4680
Helicopters(v)
70
280
55
20
175
15
140
65
90
190 80 60 75
50
275
285
1925
Medium Transport
3
8
3
5
2
-
-
3 3
7
7
44
1---
GRAND TOTAL 248 1028
373
130
562
310
435
298
325
530 240 140 233. 273
792
732 6649
(1) FISHBED J/K/L.
(11) FIREBAR. FISHB
(iii) FITTER A/C, FL
(iv) FISHBED H, FOX
(v) Medium and hea
FLOGGER.
ED D/F, FRESCO.
OGGER, FENCER.
BAT B.
vy helicopter regiments and flights assigned to TAAs.
NOTE:
There are no Frontal Aviation formations in
the Volga, North Caucasus, Ural, and
Siberian MDs.
C ucippaS ? III IllVd
TABLE A 6
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET FRONTAL AVIATION
(MID-1978, MID-1982, AND MID-1985)
AIRCRAFT
NORTH
CENTRAL
SOUTHERN
44
.
=
- z
,,
COCO. CO?
w
6Co
n
0
9
.
m
-4
0
COC;?)
0R
RESERVE
8 .
h D EMI
E-I
FAR
9
m
?=4
E
C. )
STERN
2
a
g
H
m
E-I
.
Q
pl
TOTAL
2
2
u
z
.
z
41
u
.
.
aF
.
.
44
z
.
1
a
0
44
44
u
0
,,.?
Co
m
.
2
.
.
.
5
..,
C.)
R
u
.
1-1
M
R
z
<
c'7'
.
.
w
,-4
w
M
m
m
74
P
i-i
x
_
p4
V,Fighter
EReconnaissance
'-4
4.
ttl'Fighter
5Reconnaissance
1-1
4,
Counterair
-
370
125
80
120
80
125
100
120
120
80
80
80
120
210
160
1970
Bomber
125
259
120
-
190
185
120
60
40
130
40
-
55
40
220
145
1720
25
60
30
15
30
35
25
15
30
30
20
-
15
40
40
60
470
SUBTOTAL
150
680
275
95
340
300
270
175
190
280
140
80
150
200
470
365
4160
omber
-
-
-
-
20
20
-
10
-
10
-
-
-
-
30
30
120
econnaissance
25
30
15
-
10
10
25
-
30
30
-
-
30
30
35
270
CM
5
30
15
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
-
-
5
5
5
100
SUBTOTAL
30
60
30
5
35
35
30
15
35
45
-
-
-
35
65
70
490
TOTAL
180
740
305
100
375
335
300
190
225
325
140
80
150
235
535
435
4650
e1icopier(i)
90
280
100
60
200
60
140
100
110
200
90
80
100
120
240
280
2250
cv
m
m
-1-1
m
1-;
Z
Counterair
-
350
120
80
120
80
120
100
120
120
80
80
80
120
210
160
1940
Bomber
125
250
120
-
190
185
120
60
40
130
40
-
55
40
220
145
1730
25
80
40
15
45
45
40
15
35
35
20
15
40
40
60
550
SUBTOTAL
150
680
270
95
345
310
280
175
195
285
140
80
150
200
470
365
4220
Bomber
-
-
-
-
20
20
-
10
-
10
-
-
-
-
30
30
120
Reconnaissance
20
15
-
-
-
5
10
-
30
25
-
-
25
30
30
190
ECM
5
30
15
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
-
-
5
5
5
100
SUBTOTAL
25
45
15
5
25
30
15
15
35
40
-
-
-
30
65
65
410
TOTAL
175
725
285
100
370
340
295
190
230
325
140
80
150
230
535
430
4630
Helicopter (i)
90
280
120
60
200
80
140
100
100
200
90
80
100
120
240
300
2300
Lc,
m
1
r:
1-t
Z
a4Counterair
41
E,Fighter
m
LD
I
;ECM
-
330
110
80
120
80
120
100
120
120
80
80
80
120
200
160
1900
Bomber
120
230
120
-
190
200
120
80
40
130
40
10
55
40
220
135
1730
Reconnaissance
30
85
45
15
50
50
50
20
30
45
20
-
15
40
40
60
595
SUBTOTAL
150
645
275
95
360
330
290
200
190
295
140
90
150
200
460
355
4225
Bomber
-
-
-
-
20
20
-
10
-
10
-
-
-
20
20
20
120
Reconnaissance
15
10
-
-
-
-
-
-
30
20
-
-
-
20
30
30
155
5
25
15
5
5
5
5
5
5
S
-
-
,
5
5
5
100
SUBTOTAL
20
35
15
5
25
25
5
15
35
35
-
-
5
45
55
55
375
TOTAL
170
680
290
100
385
355
295
215
225
330
140
90
155
245
515
410
4600
elicopter (i)
90
280
120
60
200
80
140
100
100
200
90
80
100
120
240
300
2300
NOTE: It is estimated that the Volga, Siberian, and North Caucasus MDs will not have TAAs throughout the period.
(1) Medium and heavy helicopter requirements and flights assigned to TAAs.
0
tri
0
CD
TABLE A 7
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION
(MID-1-976, MID-1979, MID-1g82, AND MID-1985)
YEAR
AIRCRAFT CATEGORY
LENINGRAD MD
VOLGA
CARPATHIAN
BALTIC
BELORUSSIAN
MOSCOW MDs
ODESSA
KIEV
MDs
NORTH CAUCASUS
TRANSCAUCASUS
TURKESTAN
URAL MDs
TRANSBAIKAL
CENTRAL ASIA
SIBERIA
FAR EAST MDs
TOTAL
MID-
1976
Electronic Warfare ,
-
45
-
-
-
45
Medium Transport ,
95
-2730
225
70
70
690
Heavy Transport-
50
20
-
-
70
TOTAL ------
95
325
2,5
70
70
805
----i
MID-
n979
Electronic Warfare
-
60
-
--
-
60
C70-
---
Medium Transport
95
220
T 5.-
ir
TO
f---
70
PfeavY-7FiFsport
15-
-- 4-5---
2-7
15
5--
10-5
--g-35
TOTAL
110
325
240
-
217-
85
75
MID-
1982
Electronic Warfare
-
's
60
21-5
-
-TO
-60
Medium Transport
77
655
1
HeavyTransport
20
1-1-0
15-17-- --
40
20
15
rum.
3n
'
250
90
85
865
MID-
1988
Electronic Warfare
-
60
-
-
-
60 --
Medium Transport
---8-5-
I
205
TU
77
TUTU
Heavy_Transport
TOTAL
25
11T ?
C5?
50
2-5-5
25
20
185
335
95 - -
-90
885-
E uoT 4Das
03
H
E uo-p3a5 - III JWd
TABLE A 8
'ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES (MID-1976) (i)
AIRCRAFT ROLE
GDR
POLAND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
ROMANIA
BULGARIA
TOTAL
FIGHTERS
National Air Defense
280
215
90
85
180
30
880
All Weather
Clear Air Mass
-
85
30
55
40
40
250
Counterair
-
100
80
-
-
20
200
All Weather
Clear Air Mass
-
20
30
-
-
60
110
Ground Attack
42
195
155
-
80
70
542
Reconnaissance
-
36
25
-
-
5
66
SUBTOTAL
322
651
410
140
300
225
2048
BEAGLE
-
18
-
-
-
-
18
Reconnaissance (ii)
18
54
45
-
18
35
170
Helicopter (iii)
52
41
140
40
47
36
356
Transport Medium
10
10
2
-
3
-
25
SUBTOTAL
80
123
187
40
68
71
569
TOTAL
402
774
597
180
368
296
2617
(i) Does not include aircraft of NS14P naval aviation (See Table N 4).
(ii) BEAGLE (includes some BEAGLE ECM), CRATE SIGINT collection aircraft.
(iii) HOUND and larger
<
M
W O.
t=1
C) 11
PV 0
t.i -I
H
0
CO
0
CO
0
th
0
0
0
0
0
0
CD
0
0
0
CA.1
It)
Approved For Release 2002/09/05 : CIA-RDP80601500R000100090003-2
E uo-nDaS - III LIVd
TABLE A 9
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES (i)
(MID-1979, MID-1982, AND MID-1985)
Aircraft Role
GDR
POLAND
CSSR
HUNGARY
ROMANIA
BULGARIA
TOTALS
c.
r--.
a,
,--1
National Air Defense
290
290
125
125
200
70
1100
Counterair
40
124
110
-
10
76
360
Ground Attack
60
180
140
25
80
70
555
Reconnaissance (ii)
35
95
60
-
28
40
258
TOTAL
425
689
435
150
318
256
2273
Helicopters (iii)
77
69
170
55
78
45
494
co
r-i
National Air Defense
290
275
120
115
190
70
1060
Counterair
75
124
110
-
25
74
408
Ground Attack
84
155
130
30
80
60
539
Reconnaissance (ii)
40
100
60
5
40
36
281
TOTAL
489
654
420
150
335
240
2288
Helicopters iii)
84
100
170
60
80
54
548
u-1
co
-1
National Air Defense
290
285
115
100 190
70
1050
Counterair
80
120
100
_ , 35
70
405
Ground A tack
96
150
120
40 80
60
546 r
Reconnaissance (ii)
40 J
100
60
10
40
36
286
TOTAL
506
655
395
150
345
236
2287
Helicopters (iii)
82
100
170
60
80
55
547
(i) Does not include NSWP naval aviation.
(ii) All fixed wing type.
(iii) HOUND and larger.
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TABLE A 10
WARSAW PACT RESERVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT (i)
(MID-1976)
TRAINING AIRCRAFT (ii)
Storage Aircraft
Total
Combat Units
Operational
Conversion Units
Schools
SOVIET
725
205
2135 (iii)
500
3565
NSW?
345
-
505 (iv)
150
1000
TOTAL
1070
205 2630
650
4555
(i) Excluding DOSAAF,for which insufficient data is available to assess overall numbers.
(ii) Including MIDGET.
(iii) Excluding 1130 MAYA and 30 L-39.
(IV) Excluding 250 MAYA.
E uoTlpaS ? III .LIIVci
0
CD
c-)
?n
1-3
CD
c7
CD
8
co
8
th0
0
-0
co
th
co
rt.)
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C uonDaS - III DIVd
TABLE A 11
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET CIVIL AVIATION
(MID-1976, MID-1979, AND MID-1985)
YEAR
,
JET
TURBOPROP
HELICOPTERS
AND
LIGHT PISTON
LIGHT
MEDIUM
HEAVY
LIGHT
MEDIUM
HEAVY
TWIN PISTON
1976
400
450
70
750
690
35
900
13,000
1979
750
600
115
940
650
30
750
10,000
1985 I 900
I
750
150
875
580
25
750
10,000
i
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m m
H
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TABLE A 12
WARSAW PACT
HARDENED AIRCRAFT SHELTERS (MID-1976)
NSWP SOVIET
BULGARIA 180
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 250 55
GDR 95 695
HUNGARY - 185
POLAND 120 280
ROMANIA 1
USSR - About 2700 (i)
TOTAL 646 3915
(i) About 2000 shelters are located at FA basel,,, and the remainder at APVO bases in the USSR. (See Part
II - Section 7).
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PART III
SECTION 4
ALBANIAN AND YUGOSLAV TABLES
TABLE Z-1 Summary of Albanian Armed Forces
TABLE Z-2 Summary of Yugoslav Armed Forces
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TABLE Z-1
SUMMARY OF ALBANIAN ARMED FORCES
Data on the Albanian Armed Forces are provided in
the table below. For further details see SHAPE studies on
countries bordering ACE.
GROUND FORCES
Personnel Strength
Army (including 5,000 personnel sub-
ordinated to ground elements of
National Air Defense 30,000
Frontier Troops 7,500
Interior Troops 5,000
TOTAL 42,500
Order of Battle
Infantry Brigades 5
Armored Brigade 1
Artillery Regiment 3
NAVAL FORCES
Personnel Strength 3,000
Order of Battle
Submarines 4
Large Submarine Chasers 4
Other Coastal Patrol Types 60
Minesweepers 8
AIR FORCES
Personnel Strength (excluding 5,000 personnel
of ground forces subordinated to elements of
National Air Defense 7,600
Order of Battle
Fighters 95
Transports 5
Helicopters 35
TOTAL 135
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TABLE Z-2
SUMMARY OF YUGOSLAV ARMED FORCES
Data on the Yugoslav Armed Forces are provided in the
table below. For further details see SHAPE studies on
countries bordering ACE.
GROUND FORCES
Personnel Strength
Army (including 15,000 personnel assigned
to ground-based elements of
Air Defense)
208,000
Frontier Guard
15,000
TOTAL
223,000
Order of Battle
Infantry Divisions
9
Artillery Regiment
9
Infantry Brigade
11
Infantry Regiment
2
Mountain Brigade
2
Armored Brigade
7
Parachute Battalion
1
NAVAL FORCES
Personnel Strength
19,300
Order of Battle
Submarines
5
Destroyers
1
Large Submarine Chasers
19
Guided Missile Boats
10
Other Coastal Patrol Types
58
Minesweepers (including 14 MSM/MSI)
28
Utility and Miscellaneous Landing Craft
41
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AIR FORCES
Personnel Strength (excluding 13,700 personnel of
ground forces subordinated to
elements of National Air
Defense)
31,100
Order of Battle
Day Fighters
40
All-Weather Fighters
80
Ground Attack
135
Reconnaissance
40
Transports (Light and Heavy)
55
Helicopters (Light and Medium)
95
TOTAL
435
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PART IV
ILLUSTRATIVE CONCEPTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF
1
2
WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE EARLY STAGES OF WAR WITH NATO 3
(1976-1977) 4
SECTION 1 5
INTRODUCTION 6
1. This Part describes examples of major military 7
operations the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies might undertake 8
in a war with NATO during the period from mid-1976 to mid- 9
1977. It is emphasized that the campaigns illustrated which 10
have been selected from a whole range of scenarios are only 11
a guide to what is generally and logistically possible, and 12
must not be taken to indicate what is considered to be the 13
most likely operation. Therefore, these illustrative concepts 14
must not be used as the only basis for defense planning. 15
2. The operations presented do not consider any assistance 16
which the Pact forces might receive from subversive elements 17
located outside the Warsaw Pact. No allowance is made for 18
military requirements associated with non-NATO contingencies or 19
for damage caused by the effects of Allied military actions. 20
3. As discussed in Part I, Section 1, there is a 21
possibility that Albania and Yugoslavia might become aligned 22
with the Warsaw Pact. The capabilities of their armed forces 23
are therefore described in Part II and their numerical strengths 24
in Part III, Section 4, although their participation in 25
operations is not considered in this part. 26
27
28
29
30
31
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PART IV
SECTION 2
ILLUSTRATIVE CONCEPTS OF
OPERATIONS OF WARSAW PACT FORCES
IN A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EXCHANGE
OBJECTIVES
1. Warsaw Pact (WP) objectives in a strategic nuclear
exchange would be to destroy the NATO capability and will to
wage war, while defending key control, military, industrial,
and population centers -- particularly those of the USSR. The
selection of targets and the choice of weapons would be
dependent on the WP presumed desire to secure specific NATO
industrial facilities and resources relatively intact.
OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPEAN NATO
Land-Based Missiles and Aircraft
15
2. Land-based missiles of all types would be used against 16
key targets such as urban/industrial areas, bomber and tanker 17
bases, missile sites, military control centers, governmental 18
control centers, naval bases, and probably nuclear storage 19
centers in North America and European NATO countries. The
USSR would seek a high initial salvo capability with these
4422
missile systems. Attacks by Long Range Aviation (LRA), Frontal
Aviation (FA), and Naval Aviation (SNA) would likely follow
23
initial ballistic missile strikes. LRA bombers would probably
24
have a mission of striking preassigned targets and might also
25
have a mission of assessing the success of missile attacks,
26
striking surviving targets, and providing targeting data for 27
residual missiles. Air-to-surface missiles (ASM) would be used
28
against some targets and their stand-off capability would add 29
to the bbmbers' survivability. WP air forces would employ a 30
1
2
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
20
31
combination of high and low altitude penetration techniques,
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and could be expected to take advantage, within their 1
capabilities, of poor weather, darkness, deception techniques, 2
and electronic countermeasures. 3
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) 4
3. Soviet SLBMs would be primarily targeted against 5
North America in the event of general war. As more DELTA 6
class ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs) have become 7
available in recent years, the long transit from Soviet 8
bases required for large scale participation in an initial 9
attack on North America by YANKEE class SSBNs, with their 10
shorter-range SLBM, has become less of a constraint on the 11
weight and timing of Soviet SLBM participation in a strategic 12
nuclear exchange. The number of SLBM deployed (or maintained 13
on station) would be influenced by such variable factors as 14
requirements for surprise, transit time, the duration of any 15
pre-hostilities period of tension, and the extent of NATO 16
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) surveillance. 17
4. Some ballistic missile firing submarines, mainly 18
diesel-powered units, are more suitable for use against 19
Europe. Their targets could include SSBN bases; communication 20
and control centers are other likely targets for initial 21
attack. 22
OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO NAVAL STRIKE FORCES 23
Method of Employment Against Carrier Strike Forces 24
5. In the Atlantic and Pacific, the burden of detecting, 25
tracking, and attacking the NATO carrier strike forces would 26
be borne primarily by the Soviet HF/DF net, submarines, SNA 27
aircraft, and some LRA aircraft. Reconnaissance satellites and 28
Intelligence collection ships (AGI) would also assist in this 29
endeavor but would primarily be used for surveillance. 30
31
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Surface forces are likely to be deployed in the Norwegian
Sea, operating in conjunction with air and submarine
elements. In the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea, the
majority of submarines would probably be deployed in a wide
band across the approaches to the likely carrier launch
areas -- although CHARLIE and VICTOR class nuclear powered
submarines could deploy independently to intercept the strike
forces. I
The
extent of deployment undertaken would depend on the time
available to the Soviets and the need to conceal such
movements from NATO detection. If such deployments were
achieved, the attacks by submarines -- particularly by those
armed with missiles -- in conjunction with attacks by ASM-
equipped BACKFIRE and BADGER aircraft, could pose a
considerable threat to NATO carrier forces. ASM-equipped
BEAR and BACKFIRE aircraft of LRA would also be a threat in
more distant waters.
6. In the Mediterranean, submarines, aircraft, and
surface forces could all play a part in integrated anti-
carrier operations. From the observed operations of the
Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SOVMEDRON), it is believed that
surveillance and reconnaissance would be performed by surface
combatants, AGIs and any aircraft available in the area at the
time, and probably reconnaissance satellites. Some submarine
and surface components would seek to be within range of the
carrier groups prior to the outbreak of hostilities and thus
in position, when ordered, to fire first. Attacks by
Black Sea Fleet Air Force ASM-equipped aircraft would be
probable.
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1
Method of Employment Against NATO Ballistic Missile Submarines
7. Because of the widespread area to be searched, Soviet
_
2
_
naval forces have little chance of countering the NATO SSBN
3
force at sea. Nonetheless, the Soviets may employ their
forces in the following manner in an attempt to counter this
threat:
4
6
a. Submarines, particularly nuclear-powered attack
7
types, could deploy in an attempt to intercept SSBNs when they
8
leave their bases or while they are in transit to patrol areas.
9
b. ASW aircraft could attempt to detect and destroy 10
submarines in open seas areas. 11
c. Surface ships could be used for anti-SSBN 12
operations in certain focal areas.
d. Mines could be placed in SSBN focal areas and 14
harbor entrances. 15
DEFENSE OF WP AGAINST AIR AND MISSILE ATTACK 16
General 17
8. The present WP air defense system has a formidable
18
capability against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes, 19
13
and a limited one against targets 1 25X5
I
except in heavily defended areas(1). Soviet and NSWP air DIA
defense forces in the NSWP countries would be coordinated
and controlled by the Soviets. Antiballistic missile (ABM)
defense would allow for a limited defense in the Moscow area.
Method of Employment
9. The WP could probably obtain good warning of air
attacks. It would attempt to disrupt NATO air attacks by ECM.
The high density of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and radars
(1) See Part II - Section
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within the NSWP area and the peripheral of the USSR, and the 1
-
diversity of frequencies they use, reduce the vulnerability of 2
-
the air defense system to NATO ECM. 3
-
10. WP air defense forces are intended to provide an 4
_
in-depth strategic defense. Once detected, penetrating aircraft 5
would face a series of defenses. Interceptors would provide 6
the first line of air defense. Then penetrating aircraft 7
would face SAM barrier defenses and point defenses of important 8
targets. Interceptors would also provide a defense in depth 9
behind SAM barriers as well as point defense of special target 10
11
complexes outside areas of SAM point defense.
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OBJECTIVES
PART IV 1
SECTION 3 2
ILLUSTRATIVE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 3
TO DENY NATO NATIONS FREE USE OF THE SEAS 4
5
1. In any war with NATO, Warsaw Pact (WP) general 6
purpose naval forces would conduct operations aimed at 7
achieving the following major objectives (not in order of 8
priority): 9
a. Location and destruction of NATO naval forces; 10
b. protection of WP shipping and sea lines of 11
communications; 12
c. establishment of naval supremacy in those 13
maritime areas considered crucial to the security of the WP 14
countries; L.
d. disruption and denial of NATO sea lines of 16
communications; and 17
e. offshore defense and support of ground operations 18
CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING OPERATIONS 19
General 20
2. The Soviets would not willingly undertake hostilities 21
at sea with NATO without being prepared for escalation to 22
general war. However, naval incidents of various kinds could 23
occur as accidental or isolated events in peacetime or during 24
periods of tension. 25
3. In a war with NATO the extent to which WP naval forces 26
would undertake operations toward the foregoing objectives 27
depends in general upon: 28
a. The nature and relevance of the conflict to 29
maritime theaters; 30
31
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b. the circumstances under which the conflict
started;
c. the strength and disposition of available WP
naval forces; and
d. the strength and disposition of NATO naval
forces.
4. If the Soviets were to initiate hostilities
deliberately, they probably would seek to maximize the
strength and disposition of their predeployed forces at
least risk of compromising the element of surprise. If
hostilities were to break out suddenly, WP naval forces
probably would seek both to ensure the immediate security
of their home waters and to initiate operations against NATO
naval forces and sea lines of communication. A protracted
period of preparation prior to hostilities would be needed
to enable the WP countries to maximize the readiness of their
forces.
Logistic Considerations
5. Applicable considerations of logistics and supply
are discussed in Part II - Section 5, paragraphs 47 through
52.
Forces and Weapon Systems
6. In the initial stages of hostilities a large proportion
of Soviet submarine, naval air, and major surface forces would
be concerned primarily with locating and destroying NATO
naval forces capable ?of delivering nuclear strikes. In
1
2
3
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6
7
8
9
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21
22
23
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25
26
27
addition, a number of submarines, naval aircraft, and major
28
surface combatants could be available for allocation to other
29
tasks. Almost all naval forces, including about a third of
30
Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) aircraft, have a mining capability.
31
A portion of SNA has a free fall bombing capability. Soviet
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Long Range Aviation (LRA) and to a lesser degree Frontal
Aviation (FA) and Soviet Homeland Air Defense Troops (PVC)
Strany) would also be used in support of maritime operations
to the extent they were available and considered necessary.
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
7. ASW operations involving surface, submarine, and air
forces probably would be mounted in the areas bordering the
WP countries in the early stages of hostilities. As required,
the Soviets would also initiate ASW operations in the eastern
North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, Mediterranean, western Pacific,
and perhaps the Indian Ocean.
Mine Warfare
8. The WP would probably lay extensive minefields at or
before the outbreak of war. For offensive mining to be
effective during the initial phase of a war, minefields would
need to be laid before hostilities commenced; if such mine-
fields were laid, the task probably would be carried out by
submarines. Such minefields could be reinforced by air-dropped
mines on the outbreak of hostilities. It is difficult to
assess what effort would be allocated to mining. If there
were to be in an extended period of hostilities, the WP
might undertake mining to deny NATO freedom of movement and
use of ports. Minelaying by merchant and fishing vessels
is also possible in certain areas.
OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC, INCLUDING THE BARENTS SEA, THE
NORWEGIAN SEA, AND THE APPROACHES TO EUROPE
Composition of Forces
9. Soviet naval forces available in these areas are those
of the Northern Fleet augmented by suitable units able to
deploy from the Baltic.(1)
(1) See Part III - Section 2, Tables N 1 through N 6.
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Methods of Employment 1
10. In addition to those forces concerned primarily 2
with location and destruction of NATO nuclear strike forces, 3
Soviet attack submarines and some cruise missile units 4
probably would be deployed in focal areas and across shipping 5
routes for attacks on NATO warships and merchant ships; 6
suitable surface forces would be used to defend Soviet 7
coastal sea lanes, to support any ground forces campaign 8
aginst the Scandinavian Peninsula, and to attack NATO 9
surface forces and merchant ships; naval air forces are 10
likely to be used for offensive operations and reconnaissance 11
against ships and shore targets, in ASW, and in electronic 12
warfare roles; amphibious forces would be used to conduct 13
assault operations and support land campaigns. Offshore 14
installations may also be possible targets. 15
11. The capture of bases in Norway could benefit the 16
Northen Fleet forces by making the passage through the 17
Norwegian Sea into the Atlantic more secure, increasing the 18
range of air cover, making further dispersal bases available, 19
and by reducing transit distances to operating areas. 20
OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC AND ADJACENT WATERS 21
Composition of Forces 22
12. Soviet naval forces in the Baltic, some of which 23
are better suited for operations on the high seas than in 24
this enclosed area, are assessed to exceed the requirements 25
for gaining and maintianing local naval supremacy. There are 26
thus likely to be some deployments to other areas or transfers 27
28
to another fleet prior to hostilities, if circumstances allow.
However, the naval forces of the GDR and Poland would be 29
available to augment the Baltic Fleet. (1) 30
31
(1) See Part III - Section 2, Tables N 1 through N 6.
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Methods of Employment 1
_
13. Suitable naval and naval air units, supported by 2
_
WP air forces, would be used to neutralize NATO defense 3
capabilities. This would be followed by flank support and 4
amphibious assault operations, designed to secure the Baltic 5
approaches in conjunction with other forces. Thus, the WP 6
naval forces would be freed for operations in adjacent waters 7
and open oceans. Control of the Baltic approaches is vital to 8
subsequent naval operations in this area. Once this control 9
has been established, remaining suitable Baltic Fleet forces 10
could deploy outside the Baltic area. 11
OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 12
Composition of Forces 13
14. Soviet naval forces in the Black Sea appear to 14
exceed the requirements for maintaining naval supremacy and 15
for conducting amphibious operations in that area, mainly due 16
to the commitment to provide the majority of Soviet surface 17
naval forces in the Mediterranean. The submarine component 18
of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SOVMEDRON) is provided 19
from the Northern Fleet. In addition, the naval forces of 20
Romania and Bulgaria would be availabe to support the Black 21
Sea Fleet. (1) It is expected that the Soviets would build up 22
their forces in the Mediterranean prior to hostilities.(2) 23
Method of Employment 24
15. Suitable naval and naval air units in the Black Sea, 25
supported by WP air forces, would be used to neutralize NATO 26
defense capabilities, in support of land campaigns, to conduct 27
amphibious assaults, to secure the Turkish Straits, and then to 28
establish maritime supremacy in the Aegean, thus freeing WP 29
30
(1) See Part III - Section 2, Tables N 1 through N 6.
(2) The composition and normal operations of SOVMEDRON are 31
discussed in Part II - Section 5, paragraphs 79 and 80.
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naval forces for operations in the Mediterranean. Control 1
of the Black Sea approaches is vital to subsequent naval 2
operations in the whole area. Once this control has been 3
established, ramaining suitable Black Sea Fleet forces 4
could deploy to the Mediterranean. 5
16. Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, especially 6
the missile-equipped submarines and surface units, would try 7
to be in position, either prior to the outbreak of hostilities 8
9
or shortly thereafter, for immediate action, when ordered,
10
against major NATO naval units. Soviet units not in position
to contribute to this task would probably attack other NATO 11
naval forces, merchant ships, or key shore installations as the 12
opportunities arose. In addition, SOVMEDRON would strive to 13
assist the WP main effort against NATO's southern flank
including southern Anatolia, or in the Balkans.
OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS
Compostition of Forces
17. Soviet naval forces normally available in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans are those of the Pacific Fleet. (1)
Soviet naval deploments to the Indian Ocean are usually
made by units of the Pacific Fleet, although ships and
submarines from the other fleets in transit to the Pacific
occasionally deploy there. With the reopening of the Suez
Canal, Soviet options for transfers via this route have
increased, but the Soviets will recognize the risk of sudden
closure of the Canal.
(1) See Part III - Section, Tables N 1 through N 5.
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Method of Employment 1
18. Upon the outbreak of hostilities between the WP 2
and NATO, the foremost concern of the Pacific Fleet would 3
be to protect the Soviet coastal areas against air or ground 4
attack. It would also be concerned about any enemy carrier 5
strike forces or missile submarines which might be in 6
position to pose a threat. Little early assistance would 7
likely be available for the European fleets due to concern 8
over China's intentions and US actions. Withdrawal of some 9
SNA units from their primary bases to dispersal airfields, 10
along with sorties of available naval units from the naval 11
bases to off-shore positions, is likely. Out-of-area 12
activity may increase, but would not necessarily be directed 13
toward Chinese waters or the eastern Pacific. Naval Infantry 14
would be employed as required to help secure egress through 15
the Japanese Straits and to secure or retake Soviet coastal 16
or inland waterway areas (to include ports, naval bases, 17
and shipyards) along the Sino-Soviet border in the event of 18
Chinese action. Antishipping activity would be directed 19
against any naval forces attempting to penetrate the Sea of 20
Japan. Those Soviet units deployed to the Indian Ocean would 21
22
likely attack NATO naval units in the area and attempt to
either harass, blockade, or sink NATO merchant shipping, 23
24
especially oil traffic.
25
26
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PART IV
SECTION 4
ILLUSTRATIVE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AREA OF
ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE 4
INTRODUCTION 5
1. Purpose. The purpose of this Section is to provide
Illustrations of the sort of operations which might be carried 7
out by the Warsaw Pact (WP) in the area of Allied Command 8
Europe (ACE) and adjacent areas, having regard to the Pact's 9
assumed knowledge of NATO dispositions and capabilities, to 10
Pact concepts of operations, to the forces available to it 11
and to NATO in varying circumstances, to the constraints to 12
which the WP is likely to be subject, and to the terrain. 13
2. The Soviets would expect Central Europe to be the 14
decisive theater of general purpose forces' operations in a 15
large-scale NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Whether they would 16
launch offensives all along NATO's flanks concurrently with 17
any campaign in Central Europe is uncertain. The WP has the 18
means, described in Annex A of this Section, to conduct 19
offensive operations in Scandinavia and southern Europe while 20
simultaneously carrying out an offensive against the NATO 21
center. Early Pact offensives toward the Turkish Straits and 22
northern Norway are more likely than in the other flank areas 23
such as Italy and the rest of Scandinavia. 24
3. As noted in the introduction to Part aV, these 25
descriptions are not intended to imply predictions. The
26
evidence on which reliable predictions could be based is not 27
available; calculations as to forces and objectives could be 28
wrong; terrain has been considered only in its broadest aspects;
29
and perhaps above all, no account has been taken of the Soviet 30
predilection for surprise. FOR THESE REASONS AMONG OTHERS, 31
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IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO REGARD THE CONTENTS OF THIS SECTION 1
AS ANYTHING MORE THAN EXAMPLES OF SOME POSSIBLE WAYS IN WHICH 2
OPERATIONS COULD DEVELOP. The theaters considered are: 3
Western Continental Europe; the Scandinavian Peninsula; 4
Southern Europe and Western Turkey; and Eastern Turkey. There 5
are brief references to Iran and Berlin. 6
4. Contingencies. There can be little doubt that the 7
Warsaw Pact has plans to cover all contingencies such as 8
defense against a NATO attack; a war arising quickly from 9
local clashes, or spreading quickly from other geographical 10
areas; or a Soviet attack mounted in a period of deteriorating 11
relations, after partial or complete mobilization and 12
reinforcement of forward areas. There is extremely little 13
evidence as to any WP preference for a surprise or deliberate 14
attack. 15
5. Options. In this Section, since it is impossible to 16
cover every contingency, only examples approaching the two 17
extremes are considered: 18
a. Option 1. A war in which hostilities commence 19
with little preparation and before forward reinforcement takes 20
place; 21
b. Option 2. A war in which hostilities commence 22
only after the WP preparations are substantially complete. 23
The mobilization status of NATO is not addressed. There are 24
of course intermediate situations, which to a limited extent 25
can be developed by a process of interpolation, but this 26
27
process has some appreciable dangers, since plans for Option 2
28
are not necessarily mere extensions of plans for Option 1.
Such intermediate situations, for example, could permit the 29
WP to mobilize and deploy East European-based forces with no 30
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comparable activity occurring in the Western Military
Districts (WMD) of the USSR until it is perceived that a war
is likely.
As
6. In this Section, it is assumed that in both options,
the WP would mobilize and would reinforce potential combat
areas as soon and as quickly as possible; thus in Option 2
reinforcements would arrive before hostilities commence, while
in Option 1 they would arrive only in the course of hostilities,
but the speed of the Pact buildup would be the same in both
cases. It is reasonable however to conclude that, taking
military considerations alone, they would prefer to attack at
the moment when the balance of forces is most favorable to
them. It is quite impossible to predict this moment, which
depends upon WP perceptions and actions, the intelligence
gained by NATO, and consequent NATO reactions, as well as on
non-military considerations, the dynamics of which are
impossible to portray. These issues are discussed fully in
Part I - Section 6. It should be repeated that what follows
are illustrations; these are, of course, guided by such basic
intelligence as is available but are not intelligence
predictions of the actual course of events.
7. It is assumed that all the campaigns illustrated would
be carried out as nearly simultaneously as possible. A
concurrent attack on Iran as well as against NATO is assumed
to be unlikely, but since the Soviets must provide for the
contingency of hostilities with Iran, appropriate forces
have been allotted. For the same reason, no forces normally
facing China have been considered in the illustrations.
8. It is assumed that WP forces generally would be
directed against NATO countries closest to their peacetime
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locations and that mobilized forces which have not reached
standard combat effectiveness would not be withheld from
commitment on that account. The effect of Allied interdiction 3
on movement and supply has not been considered, nor the possible 4
effect of hostile action by disaffected indigenous elements. 5
Clandestine and subversive operations by the WP are also not 6
considered. Isolated and local acts of aggression are not 7
addressed. 8
FORCES EMPLOYED 9
9. General. With the exceptions noted in the paragraphs 10
above, all Warsaw Pact Armed Forces could be committed to war 11
against NATO. Sections 2 and 3 of this Part deal with strategic 12
and naval operations, however, so these forces are here 13
considered only insofar as they might contribute to the combat 14
or general purpose forces facing ACE. 15
10. Strategic Forces. In nuclear operations, strikes 16
by tactical missile and air units could be supplemented by 17
strategic missile strikes against targets of importance to 18
theaters and Fronts, such as nuclear delivery systems, air 19
defense facilities, headquarters (HQ), and logistic and 20
reinforcement facilities, which might be beyond the range or 21
capability of tactical weapon systems. 22
11. Air Forces. The bulk of air operations in the 23
combat zones would be provided by Soviet and NSWP tactical 24
air forces.(1) These operations would be initiated by 25
aircraft already within range of most areas of ACE, 26
reinforced by the forward deployment of other Frontal 27
Aviation (FA) aircraft from within the Soviet Union. In 28
addition, aircraft of Soviet Long Range Aviation (LRA) would 29
30
(1) See Part II - Section VI.
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support general purpose forces by executing offensive air 1
operations requiring greater range and bomb-carrying capa- 2
bilities. Units of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) could also 3
be employed for maritime and coastal, including amphibious, 4
operations. Most of the foregoing forces are capable of 5
nuclear or nonnuclear operations. Additional electronic 6
warfare support could be provided by Military Transport 7
Aviation (VTA). Because of the speed with which aircraft can 8
deploy, the geographical location of air forces in peacetime 9
is not necessarily a guide to their wartime operational 10
deployments. Air power would be allocated roughly proportion- 11
ately to theater and Front objectives. 12
12. Naval and Amphibious Forces.(1) Amphibious assault 13
operations often in conjunction with airborne (ABN) assaults, 14
would be carried out. Naval units, including naval aviation, 15
would be likely to provide support on the sea flanks of 16
ground operations. 17
13. Ground (including Airborne) Forces. Operations 18
would in virtually every case be initiated by forces already 19
in or close to the combat zones. These could be strengthened 20
as soon as possible by additional forces, many of them 21
initially at a lower state of combat effectiveness and sometimes 22
of equipment, from rearward areas. Concepts for the operations 23
24
of ground forces are set out in Part II - Section 4,
paragraphs 24 to 32. The intensity of operations, and to25
some
extent their nature, would be influenced by the forces 26
27
available at the opening of a conflict, but would not be the
28
(1) Details of Naval Infantry and Assault and Administrative
29
Lift Capabilities are given in Part II - Section 5.
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same in all areas. Strong offensive thrusts in key areas
would be balanced by secondary operations in others. Airborne
operations, subject to a favorable air situation, could be
used in various ways, to extend ground forces' operations
beyond the range of heliborne attacks; for intelligence and
sabotage activities; and for distant tasks not directly
connected with ground operations.(1)
14. Assumed Allocation of Ground and Air Forces. The
ground and tactical air forces assumed to be employed are set
out in tabular form in Annex A to this section. Additional
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details of the grouping of these forces for both options are 11
provided in the text relating to each campaign. Reinforcements 12
for use against ACE or elsewhere could be drawn from forces 13
in the Kiev, Moscow, Ural, and Volga Military Districts (MDs). 14
In these illustrations, Soviet and indigenous forces in 15
Hungary are assumed to operate against NATO's Southern Region. 16
However, they could be employed to reinforce operations 17
against the NATO Central Region. 18
GENERAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES 19
15. The principal objectives of the WP in campaigns 20
described in this section would be to destroy NATO's will 21
and capability to fight. To this end they would aim in each 22
theater to: 23
a. destroy NATO nuclear delivery means. 24
b. destroy other NATO forces. 25
c. seize strategic areas to further their own or 26
hamper NATO's operations. 27
d. prevent NATO reinforcement. 28
29
(1) See also Part II - Section 4, paragraph 71.
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CAMPAIGNS AGAINST WESTERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE
16. Concept. These campaigns may be regarded as
constituting a single Theater of Military Operations (TVD)
stretching from the Baltic to the Austrian Alps. Operations
could be initiated by three Fronts; a Northern Front,
comprising three Polish armies and the Polish airborne and
sea-landing divisions, responsible for operations against
Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark, and developing operations
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westwards on the flank of the Central Front, to the 9
Bremerhaven-Wilhelmshaven area; a Central Front comprising 10
Soviet (GSFG and NGF) and GDR forces responsible for operations 11
into the Federal Republic of Germany developed from the 12
remainder of the GDR; and a Southern Front comprising Soviet 13
(CGP) and Czech forces responsible for operations against the 14
Southern Federal Republic of Germany and possibly Austria 15
developed from Czechoslovakia. The Northern, Central, and 16
Southern Fronts could subsequently aim to exploit across the 17
Rhine to the North Sea, Atlantic and Mediterranean Coasts, 18
but such exploitation phases are not illustrated further in 19
this Section. The organization of WP forces is flexible and 20
operations subsequent to the initial days of a conflict may 21
take several forms. In both options it might well be that 22
a fourth Front, comprising some of the forces initially 23
engaged and some of those arriving from USSR, could at some 24
stage be constituted as the area of operations widened, but 25
in Option 1 at least it is more likely that all early 26
reinforcements would be placed initially under the operational 27
control of the leading Fronts. A Theater Reserve could be 28
constituted from divisions not initially allotted to 29
reinforcing armies. Subject to lift availability, airborne 30
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divisions from Western USSR could be committed at any stage
of the campaigns.
17. Air Operations. The prime aim of the WP air forces
would be to neutralize as quickly as possible NATO's tactical
nuclear response capability and to establish air superiority.
This would involve widespread attacks on NATO airfields as
well as attacks on other nuclear weapons facilities and control
centers. It seems likely that for the foreseeable future
their overall strategy will remain the same, although there
may be some changes in the tactical implementation as more
new aircraft and weapons enter service. A maximum effort
would probably be critical to the success of such an air
campaign. In order to achieve a maximum effort consideration
would likely be given to reinforcement. However, early
movement of reinforcement aircraft could provide warning to
NATO. Not all these aircraft could be accommodated in
existing shelters. Many would be exposed to severe attrition
on the ground. Therefore, in the interests of surprise, and
to reduce the risk of attrition, the initial assault in
Option I may be conducted by aircraft presently based in
Eastern Europe as well as those FA and LRA aircraft in the
Western USSR which could reach targets within ACE. Aircraft
in East Europe could be reinforced by aircraft from rear
areas during or immediately following the initial attack.
Most of the air operations described are not likely to be
carried out other than in daylight and in reasonable weather
conditions.
18. Forces Available. See Annex A to this Section.
Further details of possible groupings are given under each
Front below; in addition to the forces set forth in Annex A,
units of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and of the Polish and GDR
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navies, including amphibious units, would support land 1
operations of the Northern Front. 2
Northern Front 3
19. In pursuit of the general objectives stated in 4
paragraph 15, forces of the Northern Front would seek to 5
destroy NATO forces in Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland, with 6
the further objectives of control of the Baltic Sea and exits, 7
assuring passage to the open ocean, and the elimination of 8
Denmark from the war. Airborne and amphibious forces would 9
support the main effort with attacks both on the flanks and 10
in the Danish Islands. Other forces of the Northern Front 11
could be used west of the Elbe to control North Sea ports, 12
and to protect the flanks of the Central Front. 13
20. In Option 1, depending on the preparation time 14
allowed, assault forces could initially consist of four 15
Soviet divisions (2nd Guards Tank Army) and three GDR divisions 16
which are already facing Schleswig-Holstein and the Hamburg 17
area. These forces could be assisted by the Polish airborne 18
and sea-landing divisions whose movements would depend largely 19
on the availability of Soviet transport. Upon arrival of the 20
Polish Front, the Polish 1st (Silesian) and 2nd (Pomeranian) 21
Armies would probably assume first echelon roles, allowing 22
2nd Guards Tank Army and East German divisions to revert to 23
operations on the northern flank of the Central Front. The 24
Polish 3rd (Warsaw) Army would probably become available as 25
a second echelon of the Northern Front within several days. 26
In Option 1, local control of the ground forces might be 27
exercised initially by the Central Front Hq until the Northern.
Front
Front Hq became operational. 29
21. In Option 2, it would be possible to establish the 30
Polish Front organization in the GDR prior to D-Day. The 31
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three Polish armies, airborne division, and sea-landing 1
division would conduct broadly similar operations in both 2
options. Reinforcement of the Front would be drawn from the 3
theater reserve, which probably would be formed primarily 4
from units in the Baltic MD. Baltic Fleet Naval Infantry 5
units would also be available to support operations in this 6
area. 7
Central Front 8
22. The objective would be the destruction of NATO forces 9
in the area by penetration of NATO defenses in perhaps two 10
main zones. Operations could be directed to the crossing of 11
the Rhine to secure North Sea, Channel, and Atlantic ports and 12
airfields through which reinforcements might come. GDR 13
Border Troops and other paramilitary forces could be committed 14
initially to the reduction of Berlin. 15
23. In Option 1, operations could be initiated by GSFG, 16
NGF, and units of the GDR under Soviet control, less those 17
elements initially committed to the Northern Front sector. 18
Major thrusts, dictated largely by terrain factors, could 19
develop along the general axes Magdeburg-Hanover and 20
Eisenach-Frankfurt, with holding or flank protection operations 21
in other areas. Of the 21 divisions initially available. most 22
could be committed to the Front first echelon. The remainder 23
would be available to rapidly exploit success or major gaps 24
25
in NATO defenses. A division of NGF and those elements
initially employed in the Northern Front sector could 26
reinforce Central Front operations. Airborne forces would 27
also be available to conduct operations as required. 28
24. In Option 2, 28 Soviet and GDR divisions would 29
probably constitute the Front organization. A portion of the 30
theater reserve, possibly comprising 10-12 Soviet Category A 31
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and B divisions from the Western MDs, could be available to
support this Front. In these circumstances, the two main
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2
thrusts could develop largely as described above, but the 3
intensity of combat within them, and on the flanks, could be 4
higher.
Southern Front
5
6
25. The initial objective of the Southern Front might 7
be to engage facing NATO forces by two thrusts on the line 8
Karlovy Vary - Karlsruhe and Pisek - Stuttgart with sufficient 9
intensity to secure flank protection of the Central Front and 10
to prevent any redeployment of NATO forces. The additional
threat of an attack by Hungarian-based forces through Austria
?into the southern FRG cannot be discounted. NATO forces
would be engaged all along the Front; at an appropriate stage,
forces from Czechoslovakia could intensify their frontal
assaults to complement operations of the Central Front. Their
further objectives could be the crossing of the Rhine and
penetration of France.
26. In Option I, the initial attacks would be carried
out by forces of the Czech 1st and 4th Armies. Control,
although perhaps nominally Czech, would be exercised in
effect by the Soviets. CGF, and available forces from the
Czech Eastern MD, could constitute the Front second echelon.
27. In Option 2, it would be open to the Soviets to
Initiate hostilities with the forces of CGF and the Czech
1st and ilth Armies in the first echelon. The second echelon
could initially comprise available forces from the Czechoslovak
Eastern MD, but these could readily be augmented by Soviet
forces from the theater reserve (primarily the Carpathian MD).
If a fourth Front is introduced, it is conceivable that part
of the forces of the Southern Front could be allotted to it.
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28. Air Forces. In all the above illustrations, the
term Front is taken to include WP air forces in support as
1
2
well as those air armies from the WMDs which could be available 3
for operations in advance of the arrival of corresponding
ground forces.
Logistic Considerations
29. General. The operations described above envisage
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7
the employment of up to 70-80 divisions before it becomes 8
necessary to engage parts of the theater reserves or forces 9
from the Kiev, Moscow, Ural, and Volga MDs. At the opening 10
of hostilities, up to 35 divisions of this force could be 11
actively engaged, and this figure might rise to 45-50, as 12
operations develop and a possible fourth Front enters combat. 13
However, all divisions, once present in the theater, would be 14
consuming POL and other supplies, and even rearward divisions 15
could have limited expenditure of air defense ammunition. In 16
both Options, the consumption of forward stocks by air forces 17
could reach a peak within the first few days, then decline as 18
a result of attrition. The following paragraphs consider 19
successively the forward movement of reinforcements (but not 20
of general reserves), of ground support elements of air forces, 21
and of logistic stocks; the availability of stocks in the 22
forward area; and the question of stock distribution within
23
the forward area. 24
Forward Movement
25
30. Available transportation resources for the forward
26
movement of reinforcements, ground support elements of air 27
28
forces, and logistic stocks include rail, road, sea, and air.
29
Sealift, however, is quite vulnerable, and except for the
Northern Front, would be slow and involve difficult lateral 30
31
movement. The bulk of reinforcement and resupply movement
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must be met by road and rail. The airlift of the VTA could 1
be required for ABN forces, although logistic requirements, 2
such as the movement of nuclear warheads, might have priority. 3
Supplementary airlift could be accomplished by Aeroflot. 4
31. It is expected that units based within 300 kms of 5
their alert locations would deploy by road on wheels and tracks 6
along pre-planned routes. About 47 divisions therefore have 7
the capability for direct movement to initial deployment
sites using organic transport. Beyond this distance units may
use rail or move wheeled vehicles only by road. Tank trans-
porters may be used either to ferry tracked elements to high-
capacity rail lines or for the long haul forward delivery of
up to four tank divisions. However, railroads are the main
means of long distance transportation and the capacity of the
seven principal through-routes from the Soviet frontier to
the western borders of East Germany and Czechoslovakia is
estimated to be over 500,000 metric tons per day. Soviet and
WP forces are generally well situated to take advantage of
the comprehensive nature of the transportation network. Many
units could move on routes other than the main through-lines
while others could use only sections. Only reinforcing
forces from the Soviet Union are likely to use the full
through-routes. A good highway network is also available
and adds flexibility to the lines of communication. If
highways had to be used for long distance movement, the
through-put capacities of the eight major routes is assessed
at about 120,000 metric tons per day. It is further estimated
that it will take four to five days to convert the CEMA
pipeline system west of Brest to carry refined POL products.
Thereafter the POL resupply capability into East Germany is
estimated at about 70,000 metric tons per day and at about
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45,000 metric tons per day into central Czechoslovakia. 1
Establishment of this capability would substantially reduce 2
the demand on road and rail resupply resources. However, it 3
should be recognized that in practice these theoretical road, 4
rail, and pipeline tonnages could decrease due to possible 5
technical failures, the need for maintenance, and the need to 6
make space for other essential traffic. 7
32. Activities affecting the speed of forward movement 8
include the mobilization time of units, the availability of 9
road and rail capacity and, for units moving by rail, the 10
positioning of rolling stock, movement to rail facilities, 11
loading on trains, transloading at the Soviet frontier and 12
offloading at destinations. Unit and logistic movement would 13
occur at the same time, frequently over the same elements of 14
the network, and would, to some extent, compete for route 15
capacity. A number of operating problems, such as those 16
described in paragraph 31, could also occur when the lines 17
of communication are subjected to a sudden and heavy demand. 18
These impediments would probably not stop the overall 19
transportation system from functioning, but could cause local 20
delays which would increase the number of potential warning 21
indicators. 22
33. Under Option 2, a deliberate buildup of about 86 23
divisions, together with full army and Front level support, 24
air elements and logistic stocks, could be moved into 25
26
deployment locations opposite the NATO Central Region in
27
10-14 days depending on movement priority, stockage levels,
28
and operating conditions. In this illustration the movement of
560,000 metric tons of logistic stocks into the theater to 29
achieve operational planning levels and the redistribution of 30
just over 100,000 metric tons from base depots in the theater 31
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to field echelons, were taken into account. It should be
noted, however, that these calculations reflect demands placed
on the assessed movement capability of the transportation
network during an operation when speed is essential. The
1
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4
entire process of forward movement, of course, has never 5
been rehearsed on a scale approaching that required for war 6
and it is uncertain whether the Pact could actually accomplish 7
this operation in the time frame indicated. There is also no 8
way of knowing when the Pact would initiate such a movement or 9
whether it would even seek to carry out a reinforcing 10
operation in the manner described herein. Conversely, the 11
WP does have the capability to undertake some of the required 12
preparations covertly prior to M-Day. Such actions could 13
include collection of rolling stock, induction of key 14
reservists or depreservation of stored equipment. 15
34. Under Option 1 the time frame would be significantly 16
lower depending on the size of the force involved, the degree 17
of surprise intended, the amount of overt preparation 18
permitted, the logistic stock level selected, and the phasing 19
of pre- and post- D-Day activity. 20
Storage Capacity(1) 21
35. General. According to Soviet logistical doctrine, 22
each Front should maintain enough supplies in its depots, 23
and in the mobile stocks in its armies and divisions, for 30 24
days of combat. Altogether, in a theater of military 25
operations--which might contain several Fronts--the Soviets 26
prescribe stockage of from 2 to 3 months of supplies. 27
28
Ammunition and POL would make up the bulk of Pact logistical
29
stocks. There is little information on the actual contents
of Pact depots in Central Europe, but we have calculated the 30
31
(1) See Part II - Section 4 and 6 for Ground and Air Force
Logistics.
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theoretical capacities of the identified Pact ground force 1
ammunition and POL depots. 2
36. Ammunition and POL. The capacity of WP ground 3
force ammunition depots within the GDR, Poland, and 4
Czechoslovakia is estimated to be about 1.6 million metric 5
tons. Based on 80 percent capacity, and on an average 6
consumption of 35,000 metric tons per day in the theater, 7
this provides an estimate of over 30 days of combat supplies 8
for the whole force, in addition to stocks on wheels. POL 9
stocks in GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are so large (about 10
4 million metric tons available for military use, based on 11
80 percent of storage) as initially to place no constraint 12
on military operations of a force of the size envisaged. 13
These stocks would suffice for more than 80 days of operations 14
at normal rates for the entire force without counting oil 15
deliveries by pipeline to refineries in the GDR, Poland, and 16
Czechoslovakia. These figures are, at best, a rough U.
approximation of Pact supply status, but they do suggest 18
Pact stocks in Central Europe accord with the doctrinal 19
requirement to stock for 30 days. 20
37. Stock Distribution in the Forward Area. Stocks held 21
on wheels in the forward area would be adequate for initial 22
combat consumption. It is estimated that any necessary 23
redistribution of stocks from forward area depots to field 24
depots on the lines of advance can be completed within some 25
48 hours by the transport resources of ready forces, and not 26
interfere with resupply or reinforcement. Calculations based 27
28
on consumption rates have tended to show in the past that
29
road transport available in peacetime forces in the forward
30
area (for example GSFG) have been adequate for nuclear war or
31
for conventional operations of short duration, but could be
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insufficient in other circumstances. However, improvements 1
in Front, army, and divisional transport scales noted 2
throughout 1974 suggest that these constraints are being 3
eased. It would still be necessary however for reinforcing 4
formations to arrive with a full scale of their own logistic 5
transport, whether organic or autokolonna, and allowance for 6
these vehicles, travelling forward loaded, has been made in 7
movement calculations. 8
CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE SCANDINAVIAN PENINSULA 9
38. General. Campaigns against the Scandinavian 10
Peninsula would probably constitute a TVD with operations 11
being implemented by HQ Leningrad MD and HQ Northern Fleet. 12
Plans would be harmonized with at least the Northern Front 13
command of the Western TVD. WP objectives would be to destroy 14
NATO forces and facilities in Norway, leading to extensions of 15
the Soviet early warning and air defense systems, to the 16
dispersal of Northern Fleet base facilities to convenient 17
18
Norwegian fiords and to protection of the access routes of
the Northern Fleets. 19
39. Forces Available. Details of ground and air forces 20
are provided in tabular form in Annex A to this section. 21
22
Additional ground and air forces could, if required, be drawn
from Baltic MD or what is believed to be a general reserve, 23
at the expense of other compaigns. ABN forces would probably 24
be included and amphibious support would be provided by naval 25
infantry of the Northern Fleet. The fleet itself would 26
provide direct support to operations. 27
28
Operations
40. Operations against Norway could he -mounted either 29
30
Into North Norway directly, or into North Norway through
Finnish Lapland or even through aweden into Norway. In 31
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Option I readily available forces would not be sufficient to
mount simultaneous attack against Norway and Sweden.
41. In Option 1 the main initial operation could be a
land attack through Finnish Lapland as well as across the
Norwegian-Soviet border by the two divisions readily available
in the area. This operation could be supported by airborne
forces seizing key areas ahead of the advancing troops and by
amphibious attacks along the coast. Second echelon forces of
a further two or three divisions could be drawn from the
central or southern portions of the Leningrad MD suoject to
movement limitations. It would also be open to the Soviets to
exert pressure on Finland to permit the passage of forces
across her territory. No effective Finnish opposition should
be expected in the north, although the Soviet Union might have
to employ forces to secure her position in Finland.
42. In Option 2, the size of the initial assault could
be extended by a further two divisions in addition to
employing up to one division and naval infantry on amphibious
tasks. These further divisions could be provided by the
lower category forces from Leningrad MD. Option 2 could also
open to the Soviet Union the possibility
Sweden, an operation which would require
of attacking through
sizeable land, air,
and missile forces. It is probably beyond the capacity of
Leningrad MD alone
on Sweden to allow
through Sweden are
to supply the necessary forces. Pressure
free passage might be exercised. Operations
not developed in this document, but some
relevant logistic information is given in paragraphs 43 and 45.
Logistic Considerations
43. Forward Movement. The roads in the north have
greatly improved over the last decades. The Soviets are
presently building a road from Leningrad to Murmansk. When
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completed, this highway will increase ground movement 1
capability toward Finland and Norway. Roads in the north 2
are subject to periods of severe adverse climate, such as 3
heavy snowfall and spring thaw, the effect of which varies 4
from occasional closure to restricted movement especially 5
on the secondary roads. In an advance direct from USSR into 6
North Norway about one motorized rifle division (MRD) could 7
be moved per day, if required, and about two divisions could 8
be moved through Finland. In addition, a seaborne force of 9
one division could be landed through ports in Northern Norway. 10
Between Narvik and the Bodo area the movement capability may 11
be reduced to less than a division per day pending reestab- 12
lishment of bridges, ferries, etc. The capacity of the 13
existing rail and road network is adequate to support the 14
deployment of units. 15
44. Resupply. The roads into and through North Norway 16
toward Narvik have a daily resupply capacity estimated at 17
18,000 metric tons. Further south the road between Narvik, and 18
Bodo could also supply about 18,000 metric tons per day,
Provided that suitable craft are available to utilize ferry
crossings. South of Bodo, road and rail could resupply
nearly 30,000 metric tons per day, provided that the supplies
came by sea through Bodo. The transportation system in this
region is capable of conducting resupply of ammunition and
POL to meet operational requirements of force deployment.
45. Availability of Stocks. Stocks in Leningrad MD
are more than adequate to initiate and support operations
at the scales indicated above. The stocks are indeed so
large (87 days ammunition, 93 days POL) that it is likely
that part of them is destined for Central Europe.
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CAMPAIGNS AGAINST SOUTHERN EUROPE AND WESTERN TURKEY
46. General. These campaigns could represent the major
part of a single TVD stretching from the Alps to the Caspian
Sea. The theater could comprise three, and possibly at a
later stage four Fronts, including Soviet, Hungarian, Bulgarian,
and Romanian forces.(1) A Danube Front, formed initially of
Hungarian and Soviet forces in Hungary, could be responsible
for operations through Austria into southern FRG or against
Northern Italy, which could also involve the engagement of
Austria and/or Yugoslavia or the cooperations of the latter.
This Front may also operate into Greece via Yugoslavia. A
Balkan Front, formed initially from Bulgarian forces, supported
by Soviets, and including Romanian forces, could be
responsible for operations against Greece and Turkey; as
operations against these two countries diverged, it might be
reconstituted into two separate Fronts. A theater reserve
could be formed from forces in Odessa MD not initially
committed. Soviet forces in the Kiev, Moscow, Ural, and
Volga MDs are also considered available for employment in
southern Europe. Airborne forces could be committed at any
stage of the campaigns, subject to the availability of aircraft.
Amphibious forces in the Black Sea could also be involved.
47. Forces Available. Details of the ground and air
forces available for this theater are provided in tabular
form in Annex A to this Section, and further details of
possible grouping are given under each Front below. In
(1) This TVD would probably also include the Caucasus Front
oriented against Eastern Turkey and/or Iran. However, for
the purposes of this document, details concerning operations
in Eastern Turkey and/or Iran are discussed as a separate
campaign in paragraphs 60-68.
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addition, units of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and of the
Bulgarian and Romanian navies, including amphibious units,
could supplement and support operations against Turkey. Some
role might initially be played by units of the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron (SOVMEDRON).
Danube Front
48. In pursuit of the general objectives stated in
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
paragraph 15, forces of this Front could aim to destroy NATO
9
forces in Northern Italy, Greece, or the southern FRG.
10
Employment of this Front in an offensive role would be
11
dictated largely by the status of Austria and Yugoslavia
12
the outset of hostilities or the willingness of the Soviets
13
to violate neutrality.
14
49. In Option 1, the forces initially available could
15
be one Soviet and one Hungarian army from Hungary, comprising
eight divisions and supporting air forces. A second echelon
consisting of the remaining Hungarian forces could be
available, but at a lower state of combat effectiveness.
The capability of such a force would be heavily conditioned
by the attitude of Austria and/or Yugoslavia. Tn the event
of total Yugoslav cooperation, the threat to Italy and Greece
would increase.
50. In Option 2, it would be open to the Soviets to
build up forces in Hungary to a level permitting major
offensive operations against Italy or Greece if Yugoslav
forces cooperated, or operations to "hold" Italian or Greek
forces if Yugoslavia were uncooperative. In both cases,
forward bases for naval and air operations could be obtained.
The level of forces required to carry out such an offensive
operation would probably not be less than an additional six
to eight Soviet divisions, since in even the most favorable
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situation, the Soviets would possibly retain sizeable forces 1
2
for security within Yugoslavia. Such an addition to the
3
Danube Front could only be achieved with a considerable
4
deployment of forces from outside the area. There could be
5
some limitations on the speed of deployment of a force of
6
this size.
7
Logistic Considerations
8
51. Forward Movement. There are three road and two
rail routes crossing the USSR/Hungarian frontier, with an 9
10
optimum initial movement capability of five divisions or
11
190,000 metric tons of resupply per day. The combined use
12
of present roads, and railways would allow the movement of four
13
divisions or 175,000 metric tons of resupply per day through
14
Yugoslavia to Italy. Using main rail lines and roads through
15
Austria, about two divisions or 40,000 metric tons of resupply
16
could be moved daily under the best conditions. Routes do not
17
impose any effective limitation on the resupply of the forces
18
envisaged in the preceding pargaraphs.
19
52. Stocks. Stocks of ammunition and POL currently
20
held within Hungary amount to about 55 and 65 days supply
21
respectively for the forces already within that country. In
22
the event of reinforcement, there are sufficient stocks of
23
ammunition and POL within the country for some 40 to 45 days
24
respectively and additional stocks could be moved forward
25
from the Soviet Union concurrently with the movement of
26
forces.
27
Balkan Front
28
53. Operations against Western Turkey and Greece could
29
be intended to destroy NATO forces within these two countries
30
and eliminate them from the war. Early objectives could
31
certainly include the seizure of the Turkish Straits that
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control the exit from the Black Sea and selected Aegean
1
Islands, and seizure of a direct outlet to the Aegean coast 2
3
in Northern Greece. Subsequent objectives might be the rest
4
of Western Turkey and mainland Greece. This could have the
5
effect of completing control of the Aegean Sea including the
acquisition of air and naval bases and facilities there. 6
54. In Option 1, the forces initially available would 7
8
be six divisions and five tank brigades of the Bulgarian Army,
together with the Bulgarian national air force and Soviet air 9
units from Odessa MD. Romanian forces could constitute a 10
second echelon until further Soviet forces became available. 11
12
Fleet units, amphibious and ABN forces could cooperate in this
13
option. These forces would not be sufficient to launch
14
simultaneous large scale attacks on both Greece and Turkey,
15
and indeed Bulgarian forces alone could not support a sustained
major offensive against either country. However, with Soviet 16
17
support, Bulgaria could develop operatons against Turkish or
18
Greek Thrace. Such operations could open into separate thrusts
19
against the Turkish Straits or against Thessaloniki.
20
55. In Option 2, it could be expected that significant
21
Soviet ground and air forces from Odessa MD and Romanian
22
ground and air forces would have arrived in Bulgaria before
23
the opening of hostilities. In these circumstances, it
24
would be open to the Soviet Theater Commander to launch
25
simultaneous large scale attacks against Greece and Turkey. --
26
The attack on Turkey could be led by Bulgarian.forces as --
27
above, with Soviet and some Romanian forces ready to reinforce --
them in simultaneous operatons against the Bosporous and
29
Dardenelles. With the additional time to prepare, amphibious
30
and possibly ABN operations on the Black Sea coast of Turkish
28
31
Thrace and the eastern parts of the Bosporous could be more
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extensive. Bulgarian forces in the west, supported by some
Romanian forces and possibly by Soviet forces, could mount an
attack on Greece through the passes of the Rhodope mountains,
probably with Thessaloniki as an initial objective. An attack
could also be mounted through Yugoslavia. After the seizure
of the initial objectives in Greece, operations could be
directed towards control of the Aegean Sea area.
56. Granted initial success in these operations, forces
facing Greece could be likely to develop their operations
into the Greek mainland, while forces attacking Turkey could
seek to secure and widen their control of the Black Sea exits
in preparation for deeper operations. A feature of the
possible operations into Southern Europe and Western Turkey
is the extent to which it might be necessary to call upon
forces from the interior of the Soviet Union if these
operations are to be pursued to a logical conclusion. Such a
course would present obvious dangers to the Soviet High
Command.
Logistic Considerations
57. Movement of Forces. Movement from USSR into
Bulgaria would mainly be restricted by the limited Danube
crossing points. The combined rail and road routes could
support the initial movement of about two divisions
per day
or 143,500 metric tons of resupply. Under good conditions,
forces already in Bulgaria could move nearly three divisions
or 88,000 metric tons of resupply per day into Turkish Thrace,
ana about three divisions per day or 87,000 metric tons of
resupply per day into Greece. These modest figures may lay
the WP open to some risk of defeat in detail. If rail and
road routes through Yugoslavia also became available in the
Monastir Gap and Vardar Valley, their combined use could add
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about two divisions or 64,000 metric tons of resupply per day 1
to the threat against Greece, but this is only likely to occur 2
at a later stage. 3
58. Stocks. Stocks of ammunition in Bulgaria and 4
Romania are sufficient to support operations for up to 50 5
days for the force envisaged in Option 2. POL stocks are 6
so large as to place no constraint on military operations of 7
the scale envisaged. Stocks from the Odessa MD could be used 8
to support Soviet forces in operations bordering on the Black 9
Sea. 10
59. Resupply. The resupply requirements of the forces 11
mentioned above are not limited by movement considerations. 12
13
CAMPAIGNS AGAINST EASTERN TURKEY (AND IRAN)
60. General. A campaign against Eastern Turkey (and 14
15
if necessary against Iran) could constitute either a separate
16
Front within the Soviet Southwestern TVD or an additional TVD.
17
Operations against Iran are unlikely to be undertaken
18
voluntarily by the Soviet Union while engaged with NATO but
19
she would be obliged to maintain sufficient forces free of
20
other commitments to conduct at least an aggressive defense.
21
Against Eastern Turkey, The Soviet Union has the option of
22
conducting limited offensive operations designed to prevent
23
redeployment of NATO forces, or to strike into Turkey in
24
order to destroy her forces, secure the southern flank of the
25
WP, and link up with thrusts into Anatolia. In this section
26
the latter course is assumed. ABN forces would be used in
27
either case, and amphibious forces could be used against the
28
Black Sea coast.
29
61. Forces Available. Details of ground and air forces
30
available for this theater are set out in tabular form in
31
Annex A. They comprise those available in the Transcaucaus
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and North Casucasus MDs, and in the case of Iran, the five
divisions in the Turkestan MD; ABN forces; and probably
elements of the Black Sea Fleet including amphibious elements
and naval aviation. In the event of operations against Iran,
the Caspian See Flotilla could also be available. Additional
forces from the interior of the Soviet Union could be allotted
if required.
Operations
62. In Option 1, the attacking forces could comprise
seven divisions in Transcaucasus MD (excluding divisions which
could be reserved for Iran). A second echelon could be
provided, after some delay, from the low category divisions
in Transcaucasus and North Caucasus MDs. These forces could
be inadequate to advance deep into Turkey until reinforcements
arrive, but they might aim to open the way for follow-up
forces to advance along the Black Sea coast road and through
Erzerum.
63. In Option 2, a higher category division from North
Caucasus MD could be added to the first echelon forces; a
1
2
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
second echelon could still be constituted from low category
20
21
divisions. Operations could follow the same course of action,
22
in somewhat greater intensity, but the possibility of
immediately exploiting a breakthrough would be enhanced.
23
Logistic considerations (see pargaraph 65) could, however, 24
limit the concentration of Soviet forces.
25
64. In both Options, small, lightly armed forces, could
26
be landed almost at will on the northeastern Turkish coast.
27
Logistic Considerations
28
65. Forward Movement. Along the west coast of the
29
Caucasus there is one rail and one road leading into the
Turkish frontier area. These routes have a combined optimum
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initial movement capability of about one division per day or
67,500 metric tons of resupply. In an attack, under good
conditions, forces could be moved through border areas at the
rates given below, but the movement rate by road may rapidly
decrease:
a. from Transcaucasus into Eastern Turkey, the
1
2
3
4
5
6
movement capability is two and a half divisions per day or 2..
42,000 metric tons of resupply; 8
_
b. from Transcaucasus into Iran, the movement 9
_
capability is about four to four and half divisions per day 10
__
or 88,000 metric tons of resupply; 11
c. from Turkestan into Iran, the movement capability 12
is three divisions per day or 34,000 metric tons of resupply; 13
and 14
d. from Trabzon to Erzurum the movement capability
is one division per day or 6,700 metric tons of resupply.
66. Stocks. Ammunition stocks held in the Transcaucasus,
North Caucasus, and Turkestan MDs are sufficient to support
operations of the force envisaged in Option 2 for up to 25
days. POL stocks are so large as to place no constraint
on operations of the scale envisaged.
67. Resupply. The resupply of the forces mentioned
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
above is not limited by movement considerations. 23
Further Developments 24
68. If successful in initial operations, the Soviet 25
Union might aim to extend this campaign to reach the 26
Mediterranean near Iskenderun. 27
28
29
30
31
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SUMMARY OF SOVIET AND NSWP
GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES BY REGION
NATIONALITY AND LOCATION
CATEGORY
A
DIVISIONS
CATEGORY
B
CATEGORY
C
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT (i)
COMBAT AIRCRAFT
HELICOPTERS (ii)
MISSION
SOVIET
Northern part of
Northwestern USSR
NATO's Northern
(Leningrad MD)
2
2
4
175
70
Region
SOVIET
GSFG
20
0
0
740
280
NGF
2
0
0
315
55
NATO
CGF
5
0
0
105
20
Central Region
Western USSR (iii)
3
18
7
975
330
and Southern part of
NSWP
NATO's Northern Region
GDR
6
0
0
42
52
Poland
10
3
2
369
41
Czechoslovakia
7
0
3
290
140
SOVIET
SGF
4
0
0
230
65
Central or Southern
Region of NATO
NSWP
Hungary
4
0
2
0
40
(i) FA or NSW? tactical air forces only. Does not include LRA, AVMF, VTA, or national air defense aircraft.
(ii) Medium and heavy helicopters only.
(iii) Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian MDs.
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NATIONALITY AND LOCATION
DIVISIONS
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT(i)
CATEGORY
A
CATEGORY
B
CATEGORY
C
COMBAT AIRCRAFT
HELICOPTERS (ii)
MISSION
SOVIET
Moscow MD
0
3
2
160
80
Considered Strategic
Kiev MD
0
6
4
80
60
Reserve
Ural MD
0
1
2
0
0
Volga MD
0
0
3
0
0
Airborne Divisions
7
0
1
0
0
See Text
SOVIET
Southwestern USSR
(Odessa MD)
0
3
4
235
90
NSWP
Bulgaria
5 + 5 Bdes
1
2
155
36
NATO
Romania
7
3
0
80
47
Southern Region
SOVIET
Southern USSR
(Transcaucasus MD)
0
3
8
340
190
(North Caucasus MD)
0
1
5
0
0
(Turkestan MD)
0
1
4
155
75
(i) FA or NSWP tactical air forces only. Does not include LRA, AVMF, VTA, or national air defense aircraft.
(ii) Medium and heavy helicopters only.
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ANNEX 1
GLOSSARY
GENERAL TERMINOLOGY
AA Anti-Aircraft
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AACV Airborne Armored Combat Vehicle
AAICV Armored Amphibious Infantry Combat Vehicle
AAM Air-to-Air Missile
AAMG Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ABN Airborne
ACV Air Cushion Vehicle
ACW Anti-Carrier Warfare
AD Air Defense
ADD Air Defense District
ADP Automatic Processing
ADZ Air Defense Zone
AEM Missile Support Ship
AEROFLOT Soviet Civil Aviation
AFV Armored Fighting Vehicle
AGI Intelligence Collector
(Sometimes, SIGINT Ship)
Al Airborne Intercept (Radars)
Aircraft Operational
Altitudes Very High Altitude above 16,000m
High Altitude 8000-16,000m '
Medium Altitude 300-8000m
Low Altitude 100-300m
Very Low Altitude below 100m
AMM Anti-Missile Missile
AOB Air Order of Battle
AO Naval Oiler
AOR Underway Replenishment Ship
APC Armored Personnel Carrier
APVO Aviation of PVO
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AR Repair Ship
Armed Assault A helicopter with an armament and troop
Helicopter cargo lift capability. Used in con-
junction with heliborne assault operations.
AS Submarine Tender
ASL Submarine Tender (small)
ASM Air-to-Surface Missile
ASR Submarine Rescue Ship
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
AT Anti-Tank
ATB Air Technical Battalion
ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile
AW All-Weather
AWAC Airborne Warning and Control
Ballistic Missile A Missile Without Airfoils
BEPO Bereitschaftspolizei - Emergency Police
in GDR
BMD Soviet Airborne Armored Combat
BMP Soviet Amphibious Armored Infantry
Combat Vehicle
BRDM Soviet designation for Amphibious
Reconnaissance Vehicle
BTR Armored Personnel Carrier
BW Biological Warfare
CBU Cluster Bomb Unit
C3 Command, Control and Communications
CC Gun-Armed Cruiser
CEMA Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.
An international communist body for
coordinating trade and economic planning
comprising the following countries, in
alphabetical order: Bulgaria, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Mongolia,
Poland, Romania, USSR. Associated
country: Yugoslavia. (Also abbreviated
as COMECON, CMEA, CAEM (French), RGW
(German), and SEV (Soviet).
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CEP
CL
CGF
Chaff
CHG
CLCP
CLG
CL CM
Clear Air
Mass Fighter
Combat Aircraft
Combat Effectiveness
Common User Equipment
Composite
Materials
COMSAT
Counterair
Cruise Missile
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Circular Error Probable. A measure of
the accuracy of a missile/projectile,
used as a factor in determining probable
damage to a target. It is the radius of
a circle within which half of the missile/
projectiles are expected to fall.
Light Cruiser
Central Group of Forces (Soviet Forces
in Czechoslovakia).
The general name applied to radar
confusion reflectors, normally of thin,
narrow metallic strips of various
lengths and frequency responses to
generate echoes.
Helicopter Ship (SAM armament).
Guided Missile Cruiser (SAM armament)
with Command Facilities.
Missile Cruiser (SAM armament).
Missile Light Cruiser (SSM and SAM
armament).
A fighter which requires visual
acquisition of the target in order
to conduct its attack.
An aircraft used in operations against
the enemy directly or indirectly but
excluding transport aircraft.
The ability of a unit to accomplish
its mission in combat.
Items of equipment common to military
and civilian use.
Layers of metallic or non-metallic
materials bonded together.
Communications Satellite.
Air operations, both air-to-air and
air-to-ground, conducted to attain
and maintain air superiority. Both
air offensive and air defensive
actions are involved. (The former
range throughout enemy territory and
are generally conducted at the
initiation of friendly forces. The
latter are conducted near to or over
friendly territory and are generally
reactive to the initiative of enemy
air forces.)
A flat-trajectory aerodynamic guided
missile.
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CVSG
Aircraft Carrier, whose primary
mission is to engage in sustained
ASW operations and escort convoys.
Also, provides close air support
for amphibious assault and to
ground forces. Equipped with
surface-to-air missiles with a
range of over 10 miles.
CW Chemical Warfare.
DD Gun Armed Destroyer.
DDG Missile Destroyer (SAM armament only).
DDGM Missile Destroyer (SSM and SAM armament).
DDGS Missile Destroyer (SSM armament only).
DDGSP Missile Destroyer (SSM and point
defense SAM armament).
DE Destroyer Escort.
Designation
Laser
DICBM
DLG
DLGM
DOSAAF
DWT
ECCM
ECM
Illumination of a target by a laser beam
whose reflected energy may be used by a
homing weapon.
Depressed Trajectory ICBM. An ICBM
travelling on a trajectory lower than
the normal minimum energy trajectory.
Destroyer, Large (SAM armament only).
Destroyer, Large (SSM and SAM armament).
All-Union Voluntary Association for
Cooperation with the Army, Aviation,
and Fleet.
Deadweight Tons.
Electronic Counter-Countermeasures.
Electronic Countermeasures.
EEC European Economic Community.
Electro-optics
Electronic
Warfare
Field of study concerning devices such
as image intensifiers, infrared devices
and lasers which employ a combination
of electronic and optical principle.
That division of the military use of
electronics involving actions taken to
prevent or reduce an enemy's effective
use of radiated electro-magnetic energy
and actions taken to insure our own
effective use of radiated electro-
magnetic energy.
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ELINT
Endo-Atmospheric
Intercept
ESM
EW
Exo-Atmo spheric
Intercept
FA
Fluorescent
Antibody
FOBS
Frequency
Diversity
FRG
FROG
Front Divisional
Slice
Fuel Cell
GATT
GBK
General Purpose
Forces
GCA
GCI
GDR
General War
GHz
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Electronic Intelligence
Intercept of one missile by another
at an altitude where the atmosphere
has an effect on the terminal phase of
the intercept.
Electronic Warfare Support Measures
Early Warning
Intercept of one missile by another at
an altitude where the atmosphere has
little or no effect on the terminal
phase of the intercept.
Frontal Aviation
A technique for the rapid identification
of BW agents. The agents combine with
specific substances (antibodies) which
are obtained with fluorescent dye and are
therefore readily detected under a
microscope.
Fractional Orbital Bombardment System
The use of several radars operating
against the same target at the same
time to minimize countermeasures and
mutual interference.
Federal Republic of Germany
Free Rocket Over Ground
A division and its proportional
share of Army and Front troops
of all sorts. For further details
see MC 200.
Device which transforms chemical energy
directly into electrical energy.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Coastal Border Brigade (in GDR Navy)
For definition see 'Soviet General
Forces'
Ground Controlled Approach (radar)
Ground Controlled Intercept (radar)
German Democratic Republic
Unrestricted conflict between the
Warsaw Pact and NATO
Gigahertz (109 Hertz)
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GM Guided Missile. A missile directed to
its target while in flight or motion.
GNP
Gross National Product. The total
value of goods and services produced
per year, including depreciation.
GOSPLAN The State Planning Committee of the USSR
Ground Attack
Any air weapon delivery against surface
targets -- normally performed by air-
craft of Frontal Aviation.
GRP Glass Reinforced Plastic
GRT Gross Registered Tons
GSFG Group of Soviet Forces Germany
GTT Soviet Tracked Oversnow Vehicle
HE High Explosive
Helicopter Gunship
A helicopter performing as a ground
attack aircraft with a permanent
armament capability and no troop
lift capability.
HF High Frequency. (Frequencies in the
bank 3-30 MHz)
Hypersonic
Aircraft
Generally, those aircraft capable of
air speeds of Mach 3.5-5.5 and above.
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IDF Interceptor Day Fighter (Clear Air Mass
Fighter)
IFF
Identification Friend or Foe. A system
of radio interrogation and reply generally
used in connection with radar for
identifying an aircraft, ship or craft.
IMF International Monetary Fund
IR Infrared
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
KGB Soviet designation for Committee of
State Security
kt Kiloton (equivalent in explosive power
to one thousand tons of TNT)
LACV Landing Air Cushion Vehicle
Laser Device to generate a beam of coherent
radiation
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LCM
LCP
LCU
LCVP
LF
Limited
Aggression*
Landing Craft, Mechanized
Landing Craft, Personnel
Landing Craft, Utility
Amphibious Craft (small)
Low Frequency (frequencies in the
band 30-3000 KHz)
Any armed attack against NATO forces
or territory, or actions at sea or in the
air, under conditions of self imposed
military restraint in which it appears
that an armed attack imperils neither
the survival of nation(s) nor the
integrity of military forces as indicated
in a. and b. of Major Aggression.
Restraints include voluntary restriction
on the objective sought, the areas
involved and on the weapons and forces
used by the enemy. Limited aggression is
considered to include overt incursions and
hostile local actions as defined in
MC 14/3.
Limited War Any international armed conflict which
is not General War
LORO Lob-on-Receive-Only, a passive scan
technique used as an ECCM
LRA Long Range Aviation
LSM Medium Landing Ship
LST Tank Landing Ship
Mach Number
Major Aggression*
A number representing speed as a ratio
relative to the speed of sound in the
surrounding atmosphere.
Any nuclear or non-nuclear armed attack
against NATO forces or territory, or
actions at sea or in the air, in which
it has been clearly determined that the
aim and scope of an armed attack are
such as to imperil, directly, either:
a. One or more NATO countries, to the
extent that survival as free and
independent nation(s) is immediately
at stake, or
b. The integrity of military forces,
to the effective accomplishment of
NATO strategic objectives are
immediately subject to unacceptable
deterioration.
* See Annex A to MC 14/3, dated 16 January 1968.
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MBFR
MCM
MD
MF
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
Mine Countermeasures
Military District
Medium Frequency (frequency in the
band 300 KHz to 3 MHz)
MHC Coastal Minehunter
MHz Megahertz
Microwave A radio communications system employing
Link wave lengths of less than one meter
(usually high directional and confined
to line-of-sight distances).
MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable
Re-entry Vehicle
MOB
Mod
MOD
Monovalent
Vaccine
Main Operating Base(s)
Modification
Ministry of Defense
Sepcific against a particular disease
MPD Main Political Directorate
MPO Soviet designation for Maritime
Frontier Guard
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MRD Motorized Rifle Division
MRV Multiple Re-entry Vehicle
MSC Coastal minesweeper
MSF Fleet Minesweeper
MSM Medium Minesweeper
Mt Megaton (Equivalent in explosive power
to one million tons or TNT)
MVD Ministry of Internal Affairs (USSR)
NBC Nuclear Biological and Chemical
NGF Northern Group of Forces (Soviet Forces
in Poland)
NIS
NRE
Soviet designation for the Soviet
Navy's Observation and Communication
Service
Non-Rotating Earth (used, e.g., as a
reference for standardizing the
description of missile ranges)
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NSR Northern Sea Route
NSWP Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
OB Ground Forces Order of Battle
00B Naval Order of Battle
Operational
Aircraft
An aircraft which can be used for a
military role in offense, defense, or
support thereof.
OT Territorial Defense in Poland
PBH Hydrofoil Patrol Boat
PBV Post Boost Vehicle
PCE Coastal Escort, Large Subchaser
(500-1000 tons)
PCEP Patrol Escort, Point Defense
PCH Hydrofoil Submarine Chaser
PCS Small Submarine Chaser
Penetration Devices such as decoys or chaff which
Aid are used to facilitate the penetration
of defenses.
PGGP Patrol Guided Missile Boat (SSM and SAM
armament)
PGM Motor Gunboat
Phased Array
A type of radar aerial in which scanning
is achieved by changing the phase of the
signal fed to the antenna by electronic
means instead of by mechanical means.
POL Petrol, Oil and Lubricants
Polyvalent Those having a simultaneous capability
Vaccines against several diseases
PT Motor Torpedo Boat
PTF Fast Patrol Boat
PTH Hydrofoil Motor Torpedo Boat
PTFG Large Guided Missile Boat
Pulse A radar pulse modulation technique
Compression which achieves some resolution
advantages of using shorter pulses.
PVO Soviet designation for Air Defense
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PV0 Strany Soviet designation for Air Defense of
the Homeland
PVO-Voysk Soviet designation for Air Defense of
Theater Forces
Re-entry
Profile
The path followed by a body re-entering
the earth's atmosphere
R&D Research and Development
Repeater A receiver-transmitter device which
Jammer when triggered by enemy electronic
radiations, returns synchronized
impulses to the enemy equipment for
purposes of deception of jamming.
RSFSR Russian Soviet Federated Socialistic
Republic
RT Voice Transmission
RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle
RV
SALT
SAM
Secondary Radar
System
Semi-Conductors
SGF
Re-entry Vehicle. The payload and
equipment which return to earth
through the atmosphere
SAL(T) Strategic Arms Limitation (Talks)
Surface-to-air missile
A radar system in which the aircraft or
ships under surveillance carry trans-
ponders which are activated by signals
from interrogating radars. The signals
from the transponders may be coded.
Materials with Special Electrical Properties
Southern Group of Forces (Soviet Forces in
Hungary)
SHE Super High Frequency
SIGINT Signal Intelligence (electronic and
communications). See also ELINT
SLAR
Sidelooking Airborne Radar. An airborne
radar, viewing at right angles to the
axis to the vehicle, which produces a
presentation of terrain or moving targets
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SLD Sea Landing Division
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication
SNA Soviet Naval Aviation
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Software The programs which translate human
instructions into forms which can ,be
understood and acted upon by computers.
Soviet General Include:
Purposes Forces
a. Theater forces, i.e., ground combat
and tactical air forces plus their
associated command, support and
service elements up through the
level of military districts and
groups of forces;
b. Naval general purpose forces, i.e.,
naval forces subordinate to fleets
and separate flotillas, including
naval air forces, but excluding
strategic attack missile submarine
forces; and
c. Military airlift and sealift elements.
In addition, Soviet command and
service elements providing general
support to all components of the
Soviet military establishment are
considered where appropriate.
SOVINDRON Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron
SOVMEDRON Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
SRF Strategic Rocket Forces
SS Diesel-Powered Torpedo Attack Submarine
SSB Diesel-Powered Ballistic Missile
Submarine
SSBN Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile
Submarine
SSG Diesel-Powered Cruise Missile Submarine
SSGN Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile
Submarine
SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSN Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine
S&T Science and Technology
STOL Short Take-Off and Landing
TAA. Tactical Air Army
TASM Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile
TEL Transporter-Erector Launcher
Terrain A radar that enables aircraft to fly
Following at a constant altitude above the ground
Radar contours.
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Theater Forces See 'Soviet General Purpose Forces'
TV Theater of War (Soviet designation)
TVD Theater of Military Operations
UHF Ultra High Frequency (frequencies in
the band 300-3,000 MHz)
VG Variable Geometry. A term referring to
an aircraft which is capable of altering
the sweep of the wings while in flight.
VDS Variable Depth Sonar
VHF Very High Frequency (frequencies in the
band 30-300 MHz)
VLF Very Low Frequency (frequencies in the
band 3-30 KHz)
VOPO Volkspolizei - Peoples' Police in GDR.
VOR VHF Omi-Range
V/STOL Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing
VTA Soviet designation for Military
Transport Aviation
VTOL Vertical Take-off and Landing
VVS Air Forces (USSR)
WOP Maritime Frontier Guard (Polish Navy)
WP Warsaw Pact
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REGIONAL TERMINOLOGY
Political Regional Definitions
The communist world consists of the following:
USSR
Communist China
Albania
Bulgaria
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Mongolia
North Korea
North Vietnam
Poland
Romania
German Democratic
Republic (GDR)
Yugoslavia
The Soviet Bloc is defined as consisting of the
following members of the Warsaw Pact:
USSR
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Poland
Romania
GDR
For a fuller discussion of the political alignment of
Albania, Cuba and Yugoslavia, see Part I, Section 1.
Geographical Regional Definitions
Europe: All European countries on the continent
from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains.
Eurasia: Europe and Soviet Asia.
North America: United States and Canada.
Nordic Area:
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Western Continental
Norway
Sweden
Europe:
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
France
Federal Republic
of Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Switzerland
Western Insular Europe: British Isles and Eire
Scandinavian Peninsula:
Iberian Peninsula:
Southern Europe:
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Gibraltar, Portugal and Spain
Greece, Italy, Turkish Thrace
and Yugoslavia
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Eastern Europe:
Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia
German Demo- Hungary Poland
cratic Republic Romania Yugoslavia
South Eastern Europe:
Albania Romania
Bulgaria Turkey
Greece Yugoslavia
Middle East:
Cyprus Israel
Iran Jordan
Iraq Lebanon
Turkey
Egypt
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Far East and Southeast Asia:
Bhutan Japan South Vietnam
BurmaLaos Pakistan
Cambodia Macao Philippines
Ceylon Malaysia Sikkim
Communist China Mongolia Soviet Territory in
Formosa Nepal the Far East
Hong Kong North Korea SW Pacific Islands
India South Korea Thailand
Indonesia North Veitnam Tibet
North Africa:
Algeria Egypt
Morocco Tunisia
Libya
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ANNEX 2
AIRCRAFT
1
_
2
_
DESIGNATION
OF CURRENT SOVIET
FIGHTERS
3
_
Fixed Wing
4
_
Single Jet
FAGOT
MIG-15
5
_
FISHBED
MIG-21
6
_
FISHPOT B/C
SU-9(U)/SU-11(S)
7
_
FITTER A
SU-7
8
_
FRESCO
MIG-17
9
_
Twin Jet
FARMER
MIG-19
10
FIDDLER
TU-128(S)
11
FIREBAR
YAK-28P
12
FLAGON
SU-15(C)
13
FLASHLIGHT
YAK-25
14
FOXBAT
MIG-25
15
Variable Geometry Wing
(VG)
16
FITTER B/C
SU-17(C)/Unknown
17
FLOGGER
MIG-23
18
FENCER
SU-19(C)
19
BOMBERS
20
Fixed Wing
21
Twin Jet
BEAGLE
IL-28
22
BREWER
YAK-28
23
BADGER
TU-16
24
BLINDER
TU-22
25
Four Turboprop
BEAR
TU-95
26
Four Jet
BISON
M-4
27
Variable Geometry Wing
(VG)
28
BACKFIRE
TU-Unknown
29
30
31
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ANNEX 2
DESIGNATION OF CURRENT SOVIET AIRCRAFT
FIGHTERS
Fixed Wing
Single Jt
Twin Jet
Variable Gometry
BOMBERS
Fixed Wing
Twin Jet
Four Turboprop
Four Jet
1
2
3
4
FAGOT MIG-15 5
FISHBED MIG-21 6
FISHPOT B/C SU-9(U)/SU-11(S) 7
FITTER A SU-7 8
FRESCO MIG-17 9
FARMER MIG-19 10
FIDDLER TU-128(S) 11
FIREBAR YAK-28P 12
FLAGON SU-15(C) 13
FLASHLIGHT YAK-25 14
FOXBAT MIG-25 15
Wing (VG) 16
FITTER B/C SU-17(C)/Unknown 17
FLOGGER MIG-23 18
FENCER SU-19(C) 19
20
21
BEAGLE IL-28 22
BREWER YAK-28 23
BADGER TU-16 24
BLINDER TU-22 25
BEAR TU-95 26
BISON M-4 27
Variable Geometry Wing (VG)
28
BACKFIRE TU-Unknown 29
30
31
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COMBAT TRAINERS 1
Single Jet MAIDEN USU-9 2
MAYA L-29 3
MONGOL UMIG-21 4
MOUJIK USU-7 5
MIDGET UMIG-15 6
ISKRA(1) TS-11(1) 7
L-39 (1)
8
Twin Jet MASCOT UIL-28
9
MAESTRO UYAK-28
10
MAGNUM YAK-30
11
MANTIS YAK-32
TRANSPORTS 12
Criteria(2) 13
Light Transport Payload under 6,800 kg. 14
Medium Transport Payload 6,800 to 21,000 kg 15
and a combat radius of at 16
least 1,100 km. 17
Heavy Transport Payload over 21,000 kg and a 18
combat radius of at least 19
2,200 km. 20
Light(3) 21
Twin Reciprocating CAB LI-2 22
COACH IL-12 23
CRATE IL-14 24
25
(1) These aircraft have not been given designations by the
Air Standardization Coordinating Committee. ISKRA is 26
the indigenous designation.
(2) These cri_teria are based on most economical fuel loads. 27
(3) A large number of small transports are used for liaison
and light cargo duties but are not considered in AOBs. 28
These aircraft include the CLOD (AN-14), CO1T (AN-2),
and CREEK (YAK-12). 29
30
31
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Twin Turboprop COKE AN-24
CURL AN-26
CASH AN-28
CLANK AN-30
CUFF BE-30
Twin Jet COOKPOT TU-124
Three Jet CODLING YAK-40
Medium
Twin Turboprop CAMP AN-8
Twin Jet CAMEL TU-104
CRUSTY TU-134
Three Jet CARELESS TU-154
Four Turboprop CAT AN-10
COOT IL-18
CUB AN-12
Heavy
Four Turboprop CLEAT TU-114
COCK AN-22
Four Jet CLASSIC IL-62
CANDID IL-76
CHARGER TU-144
HELICOPTERS
Light
Single Reciprocating HARE MI-1
Twin Reciprocating HEN KA-15
HOG KA-18
HOODLUM KA-26
Twin Turboshaft HOPLITE MI-2
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1
Medium -
Single Reciprocating HOUND MI-4 2
-
Twin Turboshaft HIP MI-8 3
_
HORMONE KA-25 4
_
HIND MI-24 5
_
Heavy 6
_
Twin Turboshaft HARKE MI-10 7
HOOK MI-6 8
_
MISCELLANEOUS 2.
ASW 10
--
Twin Reciprocating/Amphibian MADGE BE-6 11
__
Twin Turboprop/Amphibian MAIL BE-12 12
Four Turboprop MAY IL-38 13
BEAR F TU-95 (modified) 14
AWAC 15
Four Turboprop MOSS TU- (unknown) 16
Reconnaissance 17
Twin Jet MANDRAKE(1) YAK-27RV(S) 18
MANGROVE YAK-27R 19
PROTOTYPES 20
Fighter 21
V/STOL 22
Jet Undesignated Unknown 23
Helicopter 24
--
Heavy Four Turboshaft 25
Twin Rotor HOMER MI-12 26
(1) Primarily a high-altitude target aircraft.
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28
29
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ANNEX 3
SUBMARINE RANGE CATEGORIES AND ENDURANCE
1. For convenience, submarines are arbitrarily
categorized for range according to their endurance capability.
2. The following tables show Warsaw Pact and Yugoslav
submarines, divided into these categories.
RANGE CATEGORIES
CLASS
MAX. OPERATIONAL
ENDURANCE
a.
Warsaw Pact Units
All nuclear classes
90
days (i)
Long
(over 10,000 nm)
GOLF
75
days
FOXTROT
75
days
JULIETT
75
days
TANGO
75
days
ZULU
75
days
Medium
(5,000-10,000 nm)
BRAVO
50
days
ROMEO
50
days
WHISKEY
50
days
Short
(under
5,000 nm)
QUEBEC
30
days
b.
Yugoslav Units
Short
(under
5,000 nm)
HEROJ
30
days
SUTJESKA
30
days
(i) Limited only by crew endurance and availability of
consumables.
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