COMMENTS ON MURPHY COMMISSION PAPER ON ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000900060002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 13, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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13 December 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Comments on Murphy Commission
Paper on Economic Intelligence
1. The summary, para. 9, does not provide a fair
description of how foreign economic policy is formulated,
and coordinated. While it is essentially. correct that
the process is relatively unstructured and still in a
state of flux, CIEP and the NSC do not dominate the
scene. The leading policymakers in the field of foreign
economic affairs are, in fact, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Director of OMB, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers, and the Executive Director
of CIEP. This group meets daily as the Executive
Committee of the President's Economic Policy Board. All
of these officials and their.respective organizations
.are free to, and do on a continuing basis, task the
.intelligence community and CIA's Office of Economic
Research. Moreover, the recently established Economic
Intelligence Subcommittee of the National Security
Council Intelligence Committee -- chaired by an assistant
secretary from Treasury and with representation at this
same level from State, Commerce, Agriculture, Export-.
Import Bank, STR, CEA, CIEP, NSC, and CIA -- is specifically
designed to provide a forum for economic intelligence
consumers to express their needs. .
2. The fact that many departments with economic
policy responsibilities are not members of USIB does not
pose a barrier to intelligence support. CIA's Office of
Economic Research is tasked directly by consumers through-
out the Washington economic community and all members of
this community are represented as either members or asso-
ciate members on the Economic Intelligence Committee of
USIB. In addition, economic intelligence studies prepared
by CIA are given wide distribution to interested policy
officials and working-level analysts throughout Washington.
CIA economic analysts and managers as well as the National
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Intelligence Officer for Economics maintain extensive
contacts with policy officials to ensure that CIA's
product is responsive to consumer needs. The Office of
Economic Research also has two officers who daily brief
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce,
.the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and
the Executive Director of CIEP on current economic
intelligence developments.
3. With respect to intelligence support of govern-
ment agencies responsible for licensing the export of
U.S. technology, CIA works closely with the Office of
Export Administration in the Department of Commerce.
CIA representatives participate as intelligence
consultants on all of the interagency committees that
deal with the problems of trade controls.
4 ing Director
nomic Research
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MEMORANDUM FOk: Deputy Director of Intelligence
SUBJECT: Murphy Commission Report
1. Attached is a copy of a draft report con-
cerning "Intelligence and Policymaking in an
Institutional Context" prepared by Bill Barnds
for the Murphy Commission. We are treating
this as a working paper. The Commission will be
meeting on 16 December, and have asked for our
informal comments by c. o. b. Friday.
2. I am also sending copies of the attached
report to the General Counsel and Legislative
Counsel for their review and comments. Should
you have any questions, please let me know.
AD/DCI/IC
CCt, ffi-?o A E... -IMPDET CLI
FORM NO. lol S 10? I0f
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(DATE)
25X1
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INTELLICENCE All) POLICY TAKING
IN AN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
by
William J. Barnds
Commission on the Organization of the
United States Government for the Conduct of lore en Policy
Nov :ether .IB, 19714
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TABLE OF CONTI'NTS
Summary - i -
Introduction
The Raw "laterial of Intelligence Production - 7 -
The Structure and Production of the
Intelligence Community -1 6_
The Role of Intelligence in the Policy
Making Process
Key Issues in the Intelligence-Policy
Making Relationship -3 3-
Establishing Requirements for Collectors -3 3-
Guiding and Evaluating the Reporting of
U.S. Embassies -3 6_
Policy Guidance to the Intelligence
Corirnunity -3 8--
Evaluating; Intelligence Production -3 9-
Coordination or Competition in Intelligence
Activities -4 1-
The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) System -4 4-
Intelll-;ence Support for U.S. Foreign Economic
Policy -4 7-
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SU, "J .I.1RY
1. The U.S. intcl]Jgence system remains heavily focused on military
considerations and uoon discovering and evaluating potenti~~l Military
threats. }Io over, changing conditions in the world have added new
tasks, particularly in the area of economic intelligence, without
reducing old responsibilities significantly T?- a trend that presents
growing problems in a time of fiscal strinc ency. (pp. 1-6).
2. The information collected for processing; and analyzing by the
intelligence community comes from a variety of sources ranging from.
the mundane to the esoteric. There has been a rapid rise in the
importance of technological collection methods in the past decade
or so, especially on military matters involving Communist states.
Nonetheless, material in the public domain, reports of U.S. officials
stationed abroad, and reports from foreign agents continue to play an
important role in the intelligence process. (pp. 7-16).
3. The structure of the intelligence community reflects the basic
decision made shortly after the Second World War that, while departments
with policy responsibilities should have an intelligence capability
of their own, there should also be a central agency to produce its own
studies as well as to coordinate the work of the community as a whole.
Each of the intelligence organizations has its particular strengths
and weaknesses, but the basic structure of the intelligence community
in the area of intelligence production is sound. (pp. 16-21; 27-28).
4. The functions of intelligence in the policy process are: (1) alerting
policy makers to events abroad; (2) estimating future developments;
(3) appraising the likely consequences of possible U.S. courses of action,
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with foreign c?OVe7`r dims. Both intelli^ence officers and policy
IllcO,ers oust perform certain tasks If the. l lt"t c-shit) is to be success-
ful. However, differences in viewpoint about the appropriate relation-
ship between Intell.:i.gence officers and policy makers --- and between
their respective organizations --- remain widespread. Some stress
that this should be an arms-lcen th relationship so as to assure objective
intelligence judgments; others stress the need for continuing contact
and interaction so that intelligence will be relevant to the policy
maker's concerns. (pp. 22-27).
5. Three broad conclusions about the performance of the tasks required
for an effective intelligence-policy making relationship seem warranted;
First, several of them are being performed in an inadequate manner.
than
Second, the situation is better/it was a few years ago, when distrust
and lack of confidence characterized the relationship. Third, sulxstant:a:l
improvements are possible without major reorganizations or drastic in-
creases in the workloads of busy men, although some changes in working
styles. would be required. (pp. 27--31).
6. Despite recent efforts at improvement, deficiencies exist in the
establishment of realistic collection requirements a problem which
will become more serious as more sophisticated technologies permit the
collection of an ever-growing volume of information. (pp. 29; 33-36).
7. Policy makers do an uneven job of providing guidance to the Intel-
ligence community and evaluation of the intelligence product. The
Nixon Administration's dissatisfaction with intelligence production
led it to establish the National Security Council Intelligence Co-i~Rittee
to guide and evaluate the work of the intelligence community, but this
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by policy makers -- has remained a paper organization. The National
Intelligence Officer system is one attempt to bridge rh:Ls gap. The
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAP) could u eful.ly
direct its attention to the problems of guidance and evaluation.
(pp. 29; 31-32; 38-41; 44-46).
8. An even more serious weakness is the failure of hi ;h--level policy
makers to keep the intelligence community informed of U.S. policies wn `~
under consideration. Under such circumstances the intelligenceeoffices-
must try to estimate what his own as well as foreign governments are,
doing. There is no satisfactory solution to this problem unless policy
makers are less secretive about their activities and their longer-term
priorities and goals (rip. 30-32)
9. .:-.equate arrangements for the organization and coordination of
foreign economic policy -- which involve a large numher of powerful
departments -- have yet to be established. Policy formulation afid
coordination have fallen partly to the Council. on International Eco-
nomic Policy (CIFP) and partly to the National Security Council --
a system that satisfies virtually no one. At the present time most
economic intelligence reporting and analysis are done by the Central
Intelligence Agency, whose work in this area is highly regarded throucrh-
out the government. In view of the lack of any consensus about the
appropriate U.S. government organizational structure and procedural
arrangements for dealing with foreign economic policy, it would be more
sensible to build upon the present arranrrem,euts for economic into1_l:i ence
,than to make any major organizational changes. One procedural arrange-
ment that might be appropriate, however, would be to make sure that
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and for the latter body (as well as departments outside the Intel--
li-;ence community) to have the iuthori~v to task the intelli^ence
community. (pp. 47-51).
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Introduction
The develop;,aent of the Cold War and the:,withdrawal of the European
colonial powers from Asia in the late 1940s made it clear to American
leaders that the United States would be drawn into a deeper and more last-
ing involvement in world affairs than had ever been the case in peacetime.
During World War II the hastily expanded U.S. intelligence organizations
had given top priority to Germany, Italy, and Japan. Thus, little was
known about America's principal adversary, the Soviet Union, or about the
vast array of new nations stretching from North Africa through the 'fiddle
East and the Indian subcontinent to the South China Sea.
The confusion and uncertainty about the appropriate foreign policies
to adopt regarding the bewildering series of problems facing the United
were
Stages /? intensified by the lack of institutions and procedures wir-^in
the U.S. government necessary to formulate and execute an effective policy.
President Roosevelt's highly personalized and informal style of leadership
had obvious deficiencies and was, in any case, not congenial to his suc-
cessors. Institutions and procedures had to be established which would
enable the President to bring together the key U.S. officials who dealt
with the various aspects of foreign policy'to consider the relevant facts,
appraise American interests and weigh alternative courses of actions,
make the necessary policy decisions and see that they were carried out.
These needs led to the creation of the National Securitv Council. and
the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. United States political leaders
recognized the need for government departments with policy resnonsihilities
to retain a capacity for intelligence research and analysis, but tl:he'r
decided that the task of providing much of the reporting and analysis needed
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 should rest with an -ganization with no direct poi' - responsibilities
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and thus no departmental positions to defend. Thus the former Researc'b
and Analysis branch of OSS, which had moved into the State Department after
World War II, was transferred to the CIA. A growing effort was launched
to collect information of all kinds in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union,
the Far East, and the former colonial territories. Information that would
be needed if war broke out received priority. However, the paucity of
knowledge on the world abroad -_ant that almost any information seemed
valuable, and thus avast: collection process was set up to gather data on
and
everything from factory locations, road and rail networks,/trade relations.
to the strength and attitudes of various political: forces in far-flung
countries. Arrangements for basic research, current reporting, and long-
range estimating were established, and extensive efforts were devoted to
thinking through and working out appropriate arrangements for the utiliza-
tion of intelligence in the policy-making process. Intelligence has had
its successes and its failures over the years, but even its critics acknowl-
an
edge that it has and will continue to play/iMnortant role in American foreign
policy.
It is simple to state the formal responsibilities and to describe
the work, varied and voluminous though it is, of the U.S. intelligence
community in the area of intelligence production. It is to give the -policy
makers judgments as to what the situation actually is in the world at any
given time, what it will be in the future, and (to a degree) what the impli_
cations of such judgments are. To carry out its responsibilities the U.S.
intelligence community has become one of the largest consumers and producers
..of information in the world -- and thus in history. It gathers masses of
facts, rumors and opinions by reading everything from foreign newspapers
and the translations of foreign radio broadcasts to the cables of U.S.
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 mission t c iFg 2 set ~~5~ 1/~2~3 , 9,4,-e DP80B 5495R 90006 00ph8otogr nhs
taken by satellites to the information in intercepted radio messages.
Selected pieces of this information go d.ircctly to policy makers in their
original form, but much of this data goes no farther than the intelligence
analysts themselves. The intelligence organizations, after evaluating and
analyzing it, regularly produce a variety of reports (National Intelligence
Estimates, daily and weekly intelligence journals, special memoranda and
various studies in depth) and send them forth to compete for the attention
of the overburdened and harassed policy makers. These reports deal with
affairs ih countries as far apart as Albania and Zambia and with subjects
ranging from the prospects of an insurgency movement in Iraq to the impli-
cations of Soviet research and development efforts for Soviet veaponry a
decade or more hence.
The responsibility for political analysis has grown as new nations
have been born, and the need for such analysis seems unlikely to diminish.
The amount of effort devoted to scientific intelligence has increased many-
fold in the last fifteen years. In view of the seemingly inexorable march
of science in the industrialized nations and the growth of the scientific
capabilities of some of the new nations, the tasks in this area are likely
grow in importance, complexity, and volume.
knowledge of the military forces of the major powers has always been sub-
stantial, and despite a somewhat reduced U.S. involvement in the affairs
of other continents it remains important to know the military capabilities
of dozens of countries. Even today the U.S. intelligence community's efforts
are focused heavily upon military considerations and toward discovering and
evaluating potential military threats.
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 ChAp1! t,oMedcfrahR sel [0@ kb2 lcGl]~-~Ia~AP Q 14 R OQ QQQ,~r~ reducing
old responsibilities significantly -- a trend that presents growing problems
in a time of fiscal stringency . These new tasks are most str F_l_ing in the
area of economic intelligence, for the international trade and monetary
upheaval of 1971 and the oil crisis of late 1973 highlight a major shift
In the focus of American foreign policy in recent years. This is the grow-
ing importance of international economic policy relative to the traditional
security concerns that dominated U.S. foreign policy for nearly three decades
after 1941. The decline of American economic predominance by the late 1960s
as a result of more rapid Western European and Japanese economic growth was
one factor in this change, and the growing dependence on imported raw mate-
rials (especially petroleum) added another element. These trends have not
only undermined the structure and procedures of the international. monetary
and trading systems that made possible the great postwar economic
but have also-,raised serious questions about the likelihood of a Worldwide
depression and about the economic viability of the resource-poor underdeveloped
nations. Thus the intelligence community must grapple with the analytical
problem of likely Erends in U.S. dependence on imported oil, the uses likely
to be made by the oil producers of their new wealth, and the ability of the
international monetary system to deal with new pressures. Intelligence
appraisals of the strengths and likely courses of action of such men as the
Shah of Iran and King Faisal. of Sandi Arabia are of critical importance,
as are judgments about how they would react to various U.S. courses of action.
Finally, intelligence organizations have the task of weaving judgments
on political, economic, sociological, military, and scientific matters into
an integrated and complete view of an area or an issue. This is as difficult.
and complex as integrating the modes of thought and expression of the polit-
ical scientists, historians, economists, military strategists, and scientists
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who comprise the intelligence community or the foreign policy apparatus
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of the rpr vernment. ius intelligence permeates the entire foreign policy
process. Intelligence-activities cost several billion dollars annually,
and intelligence judgments influence decisions involving the spending of
even larger sums and, on occasion, concerning irar or peace.
Two developments have increased the difficulties facing intelligence
analysts in recent years. The first is the growing complexity of American
foreign policy. Intelligence organisations opera Le most easily when the
international system is stable and their ~;overn:ment is pursuing a clearly
defined and well-articulated foreign policy. These conditions were charac-
teristic of the period when the Cold War was at its height, but they have
been less true for several years. The strength of America's principal
adversaries and allies (except the United Kingdom) have increased relative
tc that of Lite United States, and so ha; their freedom of action in certain
areas. The U.S. remains in an essentially competitive relationship with
the Soviet Union, but the policy of. "detente." injects elements of cooperation
into the relationship -- elements which will grow if the policy is successful.
This not only creates new intelligence requirements such as monitoring
arms control agreements, but also complicates the task of appraising Soviet
policy. The same is true regarding China, with whom U.S. relations have
shifted even more dramatically, and whose policies have fluctuated sharply
in the past. And the rise of terrorism and drug use have resulted in new
demands on the intelligence community for analysis as well as collection of
information.
The second develon?ment is the 'proration and knowledge explosion.
The growing interdependence of nations means that a particular event may-
have very serious secondary and tertiary consequences which are difficult
to trace out in advance. New techniques and equipment for processing and
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are. F o ver, ey o ten prova e a oo~ o . n ormat .nn w>. cn s more
than any individual can digest. Jobs are then broken up and greater
specialization ensues, but this incre.,r;es the dangers of parochialism
in outlook and creates new problems in coordinating the work of specialists.
Moreover, neither "intelligence" nor "policy making" exist in dis-
embodied form. They represent the work of men and women, who are both
supported and constrained by the institutions which employ them. Loyalties,
ambitions, emotions, values, dedication, and vested interests are involved
in ways difficult for the various individuals themselves to disentangle.
Thus it is hardly surprising that the relationship between intelligence and
policy making -- and between intelligence officers and policy makers of
various types and in many different situations -- is a difficult and complex
one. Major-General Kenneth Strong, long a senior official in the British
intelligence structure, has commented:
The relationship between Intelligence officers and
policy-makers is of course difficult and complex.
The generally accepted view that it is the duty of
the Intelligence officer to 'give just the facts,
please' has little relevance in a modern governmental
structure. In the first place, the facts are often
such that the policy-makers are unable to interpret
them without expert advice. Secondly, and. obviously,
the choice of facts is critical, and the Intelligence
officer's decision. as to which facts are relevant and
which should be presented to the policy-makers is often
the major initial. step in the decision process. This
choice between the trivial and sensational., between
the unpleasant and nl.easine, is by no mean..- as eas,, as
it may appear. Intelligence officers are human, too,
and the temptations to prepare a lo^ical. story or to
serve personal prejudices cannot be overlooked, espe-
cially In areas where the facts themselves are often
in some doubt and the interpretation of them is as
much a matter of opinion as of logic.
On the other hand, there is a frequent temptation for
policy-makers to use Intelligence data selectively to
suit their own preconceived judgments'or political
requirements.
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as central as a feature of the American system as is that between Executive
and Legislature, nor is it as complex as themilitarv -civilian relationship.
Nonetheless, it does raise important issues, but these have received rela-
tively limited study. This is partly due to the fact that the relationship
in its present form is only a few decades old, but also stems from.the
secrecy surrounding intelligence activities.
However, before examining the relationship itself and some of the
problems it poses, it is useful to discuss the sources and types of data
that intelligence is based upon as well as the organizations within the
U.S. government responsible for intelligence production.
w as_eiial of Intelligence Pro union
"'he Ra M
Intelligence is a term which has different meanings for different
people. ItAbas come to mean not only information on foreign countries
which has been collected and evaluated, but also sometimes refers to
counterespionage and covert operations as Drell as espionage. At times
intelligence is used to describe a process, and at other times to describe
a product. Perhaps the most useful definition for the purposes of this
paper is a modification of the one found i'n the Dictionary of the United
States Nilita.rv Terms for Joint Usage: Intelligence is the product
resulting from the collection, evaluati.on, and analysis of all avnAla!)1e
information which concerns foreign nations or activities, and which is
immediately or potentially significant to planning and decision-making.
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 TbApprOvacllE ,L sez 2OO5t 123:tQlArRPJ 8 9 49,q PP996Qq4g-8knowIeige
concerning present conditions, trends, capabilities, and intentions of
foreign countries and groups within them. There are, of course, degrees
of knowledge -- or rather degrees of certainty about knowledge. Some
matters are known. Others may be unknown but (at least theoretically)
knowable with a high degree of certainty, such as the size and character-
istics of the Soviet strategic forces. It is the task of the intelligence
community to gather and interpret such facts. It is also possible, through
studying the Soviet research and development effort, its industrial produc-
tion capabilities and performance, and its general. foreign policy, to pro-
vide fairly reliable estimates -- i.e. those within reasonable ranges --
of probable trends in Soviet military posture for the next several years.
Other matters are not only unknown but unknowable. For example, it is not
possible to give more than a rough estimate of the likelihood of a. war
between Greece and Turkey at a particular period in the future because this
depends upon the interaction of many contingent events as well . s on the
intentions of leaders who probably have not made up their minds over what
course they will follow. Thus one of the important but difficult tasks
facing the intelligence officer is to indicate the degree of certainty (or.
uncertainty) he.attaches to his conclusions'.
Intelli.Bence can also be categorized as either strategic or tactical.
(Count erint IIisence, or actions designed to counter the operations of foreign
intelligence services, is basically a police function. ?either counter-
intelligence nor covert operations will be considered in this paper.) Strate-
gic intelligence involves knowledge of the capabilities and intentions o'f
foreign powers which is required by United States leaders for making plans and
decisions regarding national security and foreign policy. This includes
intelligence on current developments as well as long-range forecasts.on polit-
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 ical, r .litar.y econ# mac., and scientific trends in fc i.scn countries.
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i 'Tactical (or denartriental~intelligence is so designated because it involves,
in the first ins tanc.e,_infornaLion needed by a military co:;rander or a diplo-
mat in order to conduct his own operations. Yet it quickly becomes clear
that there is no dividing line between tactical and strategic intelligence
when we see how a single fact -- the placing of Soviet army units in East
Germany on the alert -- would be to ctical ihtelli_gence to the U.S. army
commander in Germany and strategic intelligence to U.S. leaders in Washington.
With this limitation in mind, this paper concentrates on Strategic or national
intelligence.
The information that is collected for processing and analyzing by the
intelligence community comes from a variety of sources ranging from the
mundane to the esoteric. Since the importance of different sources vans
with i he country boring studied and the issue under cc~i~s.iuetacion, it is
difficult to provide a meaningful statement of the importance of each type
of data in the over-all intelligence process. The comments made on this
matter should thus be regarded as no more than very rough orders of magnitude.
A basic source of information for intelligence production is material
which is open and in the public domain. This includes newspaper and magazine
articles, scholarly journals, books, open radio broadcasts, and the published
documents of foreign governments and international organizations. These
are important sources, of information on Communist as well as non-Communist
countries in many fields -- although seldom concerning; Communist military
affairs. Open sources tend to be of more importance in developed or semi-
developed countries than in those parts of the world which have only rudi-
mentary media facilities and statistics-producing systems. Perhap~]0-25
per cent of the information used by the intelligence community come from
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civilian officials of U.S. government agencies (excludint CTA) stationed
abroad. The most important of these are the reports of the Foreign
Service Officers in embassies and consulates, but also included are the
reports from U.S. aid missions, attaches from the Treasury, Lab>or, and
Agricultural Departments, and USIS personnel. The cables and dispatches
of Foreign Service Officers, containing as they do the results of con-
versations with high local government officials (as well as background
studies) probably are the most important source :of political-information
available. 'Llla.ny extremely useful economic studies also come from American
officials, who integrate open source material with information picked up
in their discussions with local officials or provided by local governments.
Official reporting probably also provi des 20-25 per cent of the total
material that goes into the intelligence process.
U. S. military officials stationed abroad (either as military attaches
or as 141%AG personnel to oversee the distribution and use of U.S. military
equipment) and routine military operations of U.S. forces abroad also pro-
vide information through their official reports. Naturally, these reports
deal largely with military matters. U.S. military officials provide much
more information on non-Communist than Communist forces. The operations
of U.S. forces abroad may provide information on the capabilities of allied
forces, as when joint maneuvers are held., They may also stimulate actions
on the part of Communist forces which provide useful information through
technical collection methods, a matter that will be discussed shortly.
Considerable tactical intelligence is obtained from these sources, but
probably only about 10 per cent of strategic intelligence originates with
them --- although this figure increases sharply in wartime.
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The final source of information collected by human as against tech-
nical means is that obtained clandestine collection.* This has been.
declining, for many decades for a variety of factors. Weapons have become
complex that few spies could evaluate a modern aircraft even if they
examined it. Even a scientist watching a nuclear explosion can tell less
than an acoustic--listening device thousands of miles *ay. Moreover, many
societies have become so c.o:nulex that they must publish increased amounts of
information if they are to be managed. This process has gone very far in
the open democratic countries, which automatically reduces the potential
role of the spy. The police organizations of the Communist countries, espe-
ci.ally the Soviet Union and China, make these societies extremely difficult
to penetrate. However, the death of Stalin and the Sino-Soviet split have
forced Soviet -Leaders to co:,?^,a`e for the e?.leai.ance of forei n Comu-unist
parties ;,y providing information on Soviet thinking and policies. Thus
some success has been obtained against Communist countries by recruitment
of agents from the Communist parties of non-COImm.unist countries. However,
there is always the danger that a seemingly good source will turn out to
be a double agent, who has provided some good information to establish his
credibility in order to mislead at a crucial point.
Nonetheless, agents can sometimes provide the missing pieces of information
that make it possible to answer key questions. They can be an important
source of information on the Intentions as distinct from the capabilities of
a foreign power. However, as governments become larger, more complex, and
more bureaucratic, the amount of information that any single agent can provide
is limited by his contacts. This is why such importance is attached to secu-
ring an agent close to the center of power, who can provide a broader and
more inclusive picture of the plans and policies of his government. The
Some cxplrcveaio l:&sash /~ / 't l -` ~8 1t4~5~b0~b ~r$on, as when
an agent maces a h ca enetration to imp ant a technical device.
 diffic~lo~fdte?[e~'2Q~i~r~~n?uE~?96%8of open
and official contacts with the non-Communist industrial powers have made
agents most useful in the Third World co .n.tries, which are usually
not the primary concern of American foreign policy. Probably no more
Community
than5 per cent of the total information used by the intelligence/comes
from classical espionage operations.
Since World War II technological collection methods have increga-d
and together these probably account for qua r xd._..of the total information,
rapidly in scope and diversity,/ The scientific and technological revolution
of recent decades has not only made it possible to improve collection tech-
nology dramatically, but the increased power and range of modern weapons
have made them more vulnerable to technological collection methods. The
power of nuclear explosions can 1?,c detected around the globe, ICB',f. sites
can be observed by aerial photography, and a missile being tested emits
signals over the course of its several-thousand--mile flight that c.^~ ;,,,
picked up hundreds or even thousands of miles away.
Before discussing those types of technical collection which have
arisen and grown in recent decades, it should be noted that there has been
some decline in the importance of the oldest form of intelligence collected
by technological metho .__ This is communications intelligence (CO1INT),
which became a major source of intelligence after the advent of radio
communications. The success achieved by the United States in breaking the
Japanese codes before World War II was a major factor behind American success
in the Pacific War -- just as U.S. failure to utilize such intelligence made
possible Japanese success at Pearl Harbor.
The reason for the decline in importance of this source is that the
senders have come out ahead of the interceptors in the never-ending struggle
to encrypt messages so that they cannot be deciphered. Secure systems have
come to characterize not only the advanced nations -- non-Communist as well
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as Communist -- but some of the developing countries as well. At the same
 Approved For Rdiesse 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01495RQD900060002-8
time, the volume of messages is so great that unbreakable systems are not
practical for all communications, ev:..n in the military area. Human and
mechanical errors are sometimes made which make not only individual messages
readable but, in at least some instance5) can lead to the breaking of a sys-
tem. And communications security inevitably declines considerably (luring
the disarray of *ar.. Y:` nelly, it is not necessary to be able to read
messages to obtain, valuable information from them by means of traffic
analysis. Communications between two points indicate there is a connection
between them; if what is taking place at one is known this may provide
a clue to the activities of the other. A rapid increase in communications
between headquarters and z.~ fleet at sea could mean an operation was about
to take place. While most intercept activity can be carried out at a
distance from the target country, it is sometimes necessary to bargain in
order to secure listening posts within friendly countries adjacent to the
target area. The host country quite naturally tries to extract a high
price for its cooperation.
There has been a rapid rise in the importance of electronic intelligence
(ELINT) in the past fear decades. This involves the interception of radio
waves of a non-communications type -- from radars and from new and sophisti-
cated weapons being tested. Radars must continually be in operation if they
are to be useful, and there are few countermeasures that can he taken to
maintain security. Locating the radars and determining their characteristics
often involves sending planes or ships close to a country's borders -- sometimes
approaching them as if one intended to penetrate national boundaries, which
can increase tensions and occasionally lead to international incidents.
When certain types of new weapons are tested they are equipped with instruments
which measure their performance and transmit the data to test sites by radio
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 Approved For Re?e"ase 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1495RQQ0900060002-8
telemetry. Interception of those signals -- which can sometimes be done
at great distances -- can provide important information on the character-
i.stic`, of the we pon. -"Another type clf r,7.,I`TT i'r the use of radars to
1 '
monitor the actual flight of a missile,\(RADINT)i which also provides
valuable information on the pattern of test firings.
The advent of nuclear weapons with their tremendous power brought
into being, ;peci