A REVIEW OF CIA JUDGMENTS ON THE PROBABLE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AFTER THE US BOMBING HALT ON 15 AUGUST 1973

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000600160028-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: September 14, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: A Review of CIA Judgments on the Probable
Situation in Cambodia after the US Bomb-
ing Halt on 15 August 1973
Summary
The CIA box-score between mid-May and mid-August
shows some errors and so &e_H"E . In May, befor e the
US bombing halt was a certainty, we were too pessi-
mistic concerning the ability of the Cambodian Army
and government to withstand the loss of US combat
air support. On the other hand, subsequent judg-
ments during June and July that questioned the Khmer
Communists' capabilities for sustaining major mili-
tary campaigns indefinitely stood up reasonably well.
It was our failure -- in a sense our inability -- to
pointedly assess in May the insurgents' military cam-
paign potential that led us initially to take a mis-
takenly pessimistic line on the government's post-
bombing chances. Our judgments that the Communists
would not be able to launch an all-out offensive in
the Phnom Penh area after 15 August proved accurate.
Although yet to be fully tested, our assessments of
the prospects (poor) for any significant short-term
improvement in the performance of both the army and
the government still appear valid.
Cy No. 1
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Discussion
A review of the analytical material prepared on
the issue of the post-bombing situation in Cambodia
reveals that all of the significant CIA judgments were
in one Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE),
several WSAG briefings prepared for the Director by
the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), and in a
number of OCI Current Intelligence Bulletins (CIBs).
These judgments were focused on the most critical
aspects of the Cambodian problem: the abi1_Qf
the Cambodian. _:A,rmyto wi th. an -..Khmer..--.Communist
.pressure w .tk1Qut US combat air support; the willing-
ness of Sihanouk and the Communnegotiate; the
politica v3- iali y of the Lon Nol government; and
the insurgents'ability to susta na high level of
military activity, and their capacity to win a mili-
tary victory over the FANK.
SNIE 57-73, "The Short-Term Prospect for Cam-
bodia" (24 May), was the first -- and only -- effort
to make a comprehensive projection of what was likely
to happen in Cambodia after a US bombing halt. The
intelligence community, as well as most CIA analysts
who participated in preparing the SNIE, generally
agreed with the estimate on the post-bombing situa-
tion and it was not changed materially from the
original draft.
The major judgments in the SNIE on this subject
are contained in Section III, "Prospects if US Bomb
ink is Ended in the Near s Term. " This section begins
with the observation that "the shock (of a bombing
halt) would be profound." It goes on to state that
"FANK's demoralization would be accelerated, and the
army would cease to pose any significant impediment
to Communist military action, except perhaps around
Phnom Penh itself. The import of both military and
civilian supplies would be severely curtailed as
the Communists moved to cut the major supply routes..."
The impact of a bombing halt on government leaders is
addressed in paragraph 12, which concludes that "Des-
pair would be the overwhelming reaction, accompanied
by the belief that it was only a matter of time before
the Communists in one way or another gained predomi-
nant, if not total, control of the country."
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The SNIE's next three paragraphs estimate probable
Communist intentions in light of the foregoing circum-
stances. Paragraph 13 leads off by stating that "Hanoi
and the Khmer insurgents might be sorely tempted to
press for a complete military takeover. Their chances
of accomplishing this would be good, and they might be
able to pull it off without a significant commitment
of North Vietnamese forces to the effort. Even so, in
the belief that time was on their side in any event,
they would probably want to test other means to achieve
their ends before launching any all-out military effort.
Paragraph 14 opens with the view that "instead of
a strictly military approach to the Cambodian situation
in the wake of an end to US bombing, the Communists
would be moreikely`#o _ r a political solution,
accompanied by coiiside,rap1e_,.mil te..ry._pressure. tt '--
ends by stating that "with the removal of the US aerial
umbrella, the non-Communist position could on get
4mzse. Pressures in Phnom Penh for some kind of a deal,
however disadvantageous, to bring the fighting to an
end would mount."
It is clear in retrospect that some of the judg-
tents in the SNIE were i errs. For example, the
militaryapability of the FANK was underestimated;
and its.bility to bring in supplies was overly down-
graded. Perhaps the basic mistake contributing to
these misjudgments was the failure of any of the
analysts, or of other elements of the intelligence
community, toome specifically to grips then with
the issue of insurgent military strength and sustain-
ing power. We now k . that it was not as good as
the unstudied wisdom held it to be and that the i.ns -
cEent strength was badly sapped b losses _sus,tained in ,
the last! _qratly_steped-up phase of the US bombing
campaign.
It is not clear in retrospect whether a pointed
_gjad
thisyweaknessrcent capabilities woul have reve_
time the SNIE w prepared. We
doubt it. The fact that a'great step-up in bombing
was to take,plAce~was not revealel>.~
involved, nor could they have judged with confidence
that the insurgents would mount extensive operations
in the last weeks of the bombing that would make them
particularly vulnerable. As the insur ent weaknesses
became evident after the SNIE they egan_to lac deported
in CIA publications.
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Moreover, if the SNIE was unduly gloomy about
Phnom Penh's prospects, it should be noted that it
was written at a time when FANK's military fortunes
were at a particularly low ebb. And if the SNIE
seemed unduly optimistic about the prospects for a
political solution, it should be noted that there
still appeared to be some good arguments in late May
that the other side might be willing to talk on
acceptable terms. Whatever the case, the basic
issue -- the survivability of the Lon Nol Government
-- is still open to question.
In the weeks that elapsed between the approval
of the SNIE and the mid-August bombing halt, CIA
judgments and predictions on the evolving situation
in Cambodia were confined almost exclusively to a
number of OCI articles (primarily in the CIB) and
briefings prepared for the Director (primarily for
WSAG meetings). Most of these focused on Khmer Com-
munist military capabilities, and on the declining
prospects for any negotiations. A chronology of
the most pertinent CIBs and briefings -- with key
observations and judgments -- follows:
4 June CIB: "The significant drop-off in the
level of the fighting in the past
few days appears in part due to
the deterioration of Khmer Com-
munist combat capabilities. Ac-
18 June DCI
briefing: "It remains to be seen if the Khmer
Communists can maintain a high-
level of combat throughout the rainy
season. Many of their units have
been on the offensive for over three
months and have been hit hard by US
air strikes."
6 July CIB: Sihanouk's tough line on negotia-
tions "indicates that he and the
Communists have been emboldened
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by the announcement of the 15 August
US combat ban and plan to stand on
their present demands in the belief
that the US must eventually accede
to them as the price for a truce."
10 July WSAG
briefing: "It seems likely that the Vietnamese
and Khmer Communists will pursue a
very hard line on negotiations and
defer any major military action at
least until the end of the rainy
season...the Communists will, how-
ever, keep up the present level of
pressure against the Phnom Penh gov-
ernment... (but) the Communists may
not be able to sustain a high level
of combat indefinitely."
24 July WSAG
briefing:
"The government appears unable to
do much to counter Communist (mili-
tary) pressure and the situation
is unlikely to improve with the
end
of US air support... the present
mili-
tary
situation could drag on in
the
Phnom
Penh region for some time
with
only
slow deterioration--since
the
insurgents evidently do not wish to
attack the capital frontally."
3 August CIB: The article notes that some insur-
gent officials in the Phnom Penh
area conceded in mid-July that the
US air strikes had inflicted heavy
casualties, disrupted supply lines,
and impeded their plans to force
a collapse of the Lon Nol regime.
7 August WSAG
briefing: "The military situation in Cambodia
is bleak. The Khmer Communists are
seriously threatening Phnom Penh on
at least two fronts."
9 August WSAG
briefing: "The military situation around Phnom
Penh has improved somewhat... some in-
surgent units are beginning to pull
back.
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w
indicate the insurgents have suf-
fered heavy losses from US air
attacks, and have at least localized
supply shortages...we simply do not
know how quickly they will be able
to mount new attacks."
13 August CIB: The article reports that military
activity in the Phnom Penh area is
at its lowest level since April and 25X1
again calls attention to Communist
manpower and supply problems.
14 August CIB:
__1 2J
udges that "a major offen- X1
sive against Phnom Penh on such short
notice is probably beyond their
present capabilities."
15 August CIB: The article states that FANK should
be able to withstand any attacks
that the insurgents are likely to
mount in the next few days.
16 August CIB: It reports that the planned insur-
gent offensive in the Phnom Penh
area has been rescheduled for 21
August but observes "that it is
possible that there could be further
delays in the enemy's timetable."
20 August CIB: The article reports that there has
been little significant military
activity in the Phnom Penh area
since 15 August, and notes that "in-
surgent plans for their new offen-
sive have made no mention of a sudden,
concerted thrust against Phnom Penh
itself."
24 August CIB: This final entry reports that the
insurgent offensive has been delayed
until 25 August, and states that "a
major coordinated effort may be be-
yond Communist capabilities at this
time," and that "the insurgents may
not be able to meet the deadline of
25 August."
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Some of these CIBs and most of the DCI briefings
also included judgments about the government's politi-
cal viability and FANK's chances for showing significant
improvement. CIA's assessments on these two vital sub-
jects have consistently been on the apprehensive and
pessimistic side. Following are representative key
judgments in these areas:
15 June Weekly
Review:
The article notes that "since the
new cabinet headed by Prime Minister
In Tam was installed... neither the
cabinet nor the ruling High Politi-
cal Council has made any significant
effort to meet the country's priority
military and economic problems. It
concludes with the judgment that
"although In Tam is willing to stay
in office ...the chances that he and
the council will be able to provide
a semblance of effective government
remain poor."
18 June DCI
briefing: "The Cambodian Army is also having
its problems...it is largely a
demoralized and defensive-minded
force."
18 July CIB: In reviewing the military situation
over the past two months, the article
states that "Prospects for any dra-
matic improvement in the Cambodian
Army's performance are bleak." Also,
"Corruption, poor tactical planning,
and mismanagement of resources at
command levels continue to compound
lackluster field leadership, and
morale--already precarious in a num-
ber of outfits--shows signs of fall-
ing even further as the bombing dead-
line approaches."
7 August WSAG
briefing: "This (political) bickering illus-
trates what may prove to be the most
serious aspect of the situation--
namely, increasing stress and fric-
tion at the top levels in Phnom Penh.
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As tensions mount, the risk of
a rupture within the leadership
increases proportionately, and
the government could fly apart
with little or no warning."
15 August CIB: The article reports that "Govern-
ment and military leaders...are
expressing confidence that govern-
ment forces can hold their own.
But if a defeatist mood develops,
even moderate Communist pressure
could cause FANK resistance to
crumble quickly."
Despite the misgivings expressed in the above ex-
cerpts, the Lon Nol government lurches on and the FANK
is still in t'field. Recent events have indicated,
however, that Phnom Penh's ability to survive thus far
without US combat air support is due in large part to
flagging insurgent military capabilities. Although it
now appears quite clear that the overextension of Khmer
Communist military resources and the in ensive omb 'ng
campaign has given the governmenta much needed respite
and some equal? ess rt'~i l co fid nce, it probably as
yet to be put to an acid m1litary test by the insurgents.
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