POST-MORTEM ON CIA REPORTING ON THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AFTER THE BOMBING HALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000600160027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/11/04: CIA-RDP80B01495R000600160027-3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : Post-Mortem on CIA Reporting on the
Situation in Cambodia After the
Bombing Halt
1. Attached is the post-mortem you requested on our
reporting on the likely course of events in Cambodia after the
bombing halt of 15 August 1973. The post-mortem was prepared
by OCI and coordinated with DDO, SAVA, ONE, and OER. I
think the post-mortem is a very fair evaluation, although I would
have preferred, of course, that our batting average was some-
what better when it came to our forward-looking estimating.
2. I think two observations are in order. In the estimating
field, this post-mortem points out the difficulty of making estimates
when so much of the analysts' judgment e ends upon his knowledge
of future t S, co. rses .ofaction. By this I mean that if the com-
munity had been aware of the massive scale of bombing which the
US was going to undertake, I am sure the estimate would then
have turned to the really critical question-- What will be the effects
of this bombing on Khmer Communist capabilities ? This sort of
inquiry would have led to a judgment that the Khmerw.Comrr tai t
cam-abili.ti.e would.,he_ _.eeyexely degraded by the time the bombing
had stopped that we would not have been so pessimistic about the
capabilities of the FANK forces and the Cambodian government
to continue.
5,10 P. IIL_ [
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3. My second observation is that we performed better
in our current intelligence reporting for the period following
the estimate. I think the citations and the post-mortem point
out quite clearly that we were warning our readers that the
capabilities of the Communists to pull off any large-scale
offensive were being weakened and, more to the point, could
not be rebuilt for some time after the bombing halt.
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
SC 07236-73/a
HAND:;
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Approved For Release 2006/11/04: CIA-RDP80B01495R000600160027-3