COPING WITH THE INFORMATION HANDLING PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000600100020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 13, 1974
• Content Type: MF

j }is-?
Approved For Re.*ease 2005/07/22: CIA-RDP80BO1495600600100020-6
25X1
4FEB 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby
SUBJECT Coping with the Information Handling Problem
1. Attached for your consideration is a memorandum, subject
as above, which proposes an approach to handling that I consider to
be a truly major problem which we must shortly face up to.
2. The DDS&T, DDI, DDO and DDM&S have equities in this,
and their views on the attached draft are being sought.
3. I am not proposing any formal action on your part with
respect to the attached memorandum at this time, but I would appreciate
any views you have which would be useful in our further development
.of the proposal.
25X1
Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC
Attachment
As stated -
cc: /DDI
DDO
DDS&T
DDM&S
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000600100020-6
 Approved For l eltase 2005/07/22: CIA-RDP80B01495PFA006 0100020-6 25X1
8 February 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Coping with the Intelligence Information
Handling Problem
1. There currently exists within the Intelligence Community a
melange of concepts, proposals and uncoordinated actions concerning
various aspects of the problem of intelligence information handling --
the dissemination and display of collected and processed data -- which
converge into a very major, general issue calling for immediate action.
2. Currently involved in this situation are:
At least ten programs are developing separate
electronic CRT display systems, involving different
sensor systems and reporting at varying security
levels. No overall coordination plan exists.
Efforts to improve or replace COINS.
Efforts to improve warning and crisis intelligence
support systems.
Efforts to improve the national-tactical intelligence
interface, which will have to interrelate with the
worldwide information handling systems of the mili-
tary command and control system.
ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80BO11495R000600100020-6
 Approved For FR&eease 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B01495f3ii00600
100020-6
Study activities to define the impact on users of
upcoming major collection system sensor inputs, and
to identify user needs and operating procedures as
they affect the layout of communication nets and
terminal equipment for users.
Problems of dissemination to deployed commands of
information becoming available through decompart-
mentation of certain TK materials.
3. In one way or another, all of these efforts deal with
the central nervous system of the US intelligence effort -- and there
is serious danger in attempting to deal with them on a piecemeal basis.
Unless they are integrated and pull together, the Community will be
confronted with technical confusion delays, unnecessary costs of
sizeable magnitude and systems that serve only segments of the con-
sumer world.
4. The problem is particularly acute in the developmental
electronic information systems. If the many efforts now underway are
brought to fruition, the Intelligence Community will be operating numerous
separate, secure "real-time" video exchange systems in a few years.
Modern, computer and electronic display technology, if not applied on
a coordinated Community-wide basis, could result in an extensive waste
of resources and actually deter efficient and effective operations.
25X1
5. The systems have several features in common, but they also Sfr c
have many features which distinguish one from the other. Each system
is being designed primarily to display a particular intelligence input 5
Ai kE
or group of related inputs. Each system will have its own file structure,
retrieval language and data base management system. Access will be
made more difficult by reason of the large variety of classifications and f ' .
categories. The intelligence analyst will be surrounded by scopes.
He will have to be a walking library of retrieval languages. Inefficiency
will border on ineffectiveness.
6. The COINS program already is under examination, with ASD (I)
assigned Executive Agent responsibilities under IRAC auspices. The
primary missing element in the current COINS situation is the lack
of a demand by analysts for the kind of assistance which a community
on-line intelligence system should provide. In part, this is because
the analytical methodologies which might cause the demand are in
scarcely more than rudimentary use in the Intelligence Community, and
Approved For Release 2005/07/2k: CIA-RDP80B01495R000600100020-6
 Approved For l efease 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B01495}ldb06
acceptance is slow. An additional limitation is that COINS files are not
always kept current and are difficult to get at through existing operating
procedures. Question is being raised in some quarters as to whether
the Intelligence Community should cut its losses in COINS (as such) and
should get underway with a new study which would yield specifications
of capability, costs, schedules, contractor candidates, and the like, and
provide basis for determination as to whether and to what degree the
Intelligence Community wants to proceed with an up-to-date community
on-line intelligence system which would include CIA and State as well
as DOD agencies.
7. There is a strong requirement to back off and scope this
problem before individual elements of the Community become so heavily
committed on a single course of action, or data handling system, that
they cannot be persuaded or will be unable to move toward compatibility
of systems.
8. A number of approaches are available -- alternatively or
in combination -- to bring the situation under control and develop a
coordinated Community-wide approach to the information handling problem.
a. Assign the job to the USIB Intelligence Information
Handling Committee. The IHC is not now staffed to cope
with a problem of the magnitude already apparent, but it
has a strong membership of upper middle-level representa-
tives from the agencies and services, most of whom are in
direct charge of information handling or communications in
their parent organizations. The IHC is well thought of in
the Community and the JCS Joint Staff, but the climate to
date has been such as to limit it primarily to service as a
forum for the exchange of information.
b.. Establish a special task force, employ a full-
time chairman of established reputation, and either authorize
him direct access to the DCI or make him immediately re-
sponsive to someone who has direct access to the DCI, such
as the _DDS&T or the D/DCI/IC .
c. Establish an Information Handling Group as part
of the IC Staff, contract for the services of a Group Chief
with first-rate expertise in this field, and give him a high-
powered staff. This would reflect direct DCI support and
give emphasis to the Community aspects which demand
attention.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600100020-6
 Approved For Rwl?ease 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B01496Mb06
d. Enter into a contract, cost of which would be
sizeable, with an established firm competent in computer-
based research. Some considerable period of "education"
of the contract staff would be involved and the contractor
would be apart from the intra-Community management circle.
e. Assign the task to an element of the Intelligence
Community which has experience in the development and
administration of major programs, and make provision for
necessary contract assistance. The CIA/DDS&T, the Director,
NSA, and the NRO all have experience in managing in-house/
contractor-supported programs as do the military services.
Each of these has institutional imperatives, and objections
might well be raised by some elements of the Community if
the overall task is assigned to any single agency or depart-
ment.
9. In my view, the essential elements of whatever approach
you decide upon should meet the following criteria:
a. The project office should be part of the DCI
management structure at a high enough level so that
the head of the activity can deal directly with_ program
managers.
b. The activity should be clearly Community-
related and not focused primarily on the information
handling needs of any particular agency.
c. Staffing of the activity should be drawn from
all Community members. If the effort is to be successful,
each organization must be made to feel it has a full
opportunity to assist in shaping the results. To over-
come bureaucratic objections, achievement of a "DCI
and the Community" spirit will be of great importance.
d. The undertaking should be broad enough --
and clearly evident as broad enough -- to assure all
concerned parties that it is not "intelligence in isolation"
from operational, telecommunications, policy and planning
realities -- including the needs of military field commands.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000600100020-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B0149.' Rb06 0100020-6 25X1
e. The project leader should have this responsi-
bility as his full-time assignment, and his staff, including
Community representation, also should be devoted full-
.time to the project.
10. On balance, I recommend that you:
a. Appoint an Intelligence Information Project Officer,
responsible directly to you. This project officer should be
selected in consultation with the program managers and could
come either from within the Intelligence Community, from
another government agency, or from private industry.
The important factor should be the individual competence
and recognized stature of whoever is selected. The
appointment should be a full-time one for at least one
year, with a possibility of extension.
b. Provide for support of the project officer by
a Steering Group including senior representation from CIA,
NSA, DIA, the IC Staff, the JCS and the Defense Communi-.
cations Agency. The critical factor here is to introduce
the expertise and ability to cope effectively with all the
ramifications of a complex situation much as DDS&T has done
in its major projects.
c. Direct the ? IHC to provide staff support to the
project officer and his Steering Group. Since this will
require augmentation of the IHC Staff, arrange with pro-
gram managers to provide personnel augmentation to the
IHC Staff to cope with the workload which will be involved-
d. Authorize the project officer to employ contract
research assistance, as appropriate, subject to guidance
from the Steering Group, and your approval.
e. Direct the project officer to develop:
(1) A Community-wide information flow
analysis, indicating the current situation and what
the Community would like it to be, with appropriate.
recommendations to bring this latter about.
ILLEGIB
ILLl L IB
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600100020-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80B01495W0060b100020-6 I 25X1
(2) A study documenting the current status
of efforts underway with respect to electronic
information display systems and their costs, and
recommending specifically how to funnel the present
diverse activities into a coherent system for the
benefit of the Intelligence Community and its con-
sumers as a whole -- both in and out. of Washington.
(3) An adequate coordination/ management
arrangement which, upon approval of the recommenda-
tions called for in (2) above, will assure implementation
of a single coherent intelligence system which inter-
faces as appropriate with consumer systems (such as
the military command and control arrangements).
(4) An overall plan for coping with information
handling problems which recognizes that even though
the "real-time" video exchange problem is of major
significance, it is still only part of a needed overall
Community plan for dealing effectively with the
inter-agency/inter-departmental flow and handling of
information.
11. I further recommend that:
a. Coincident with your decision to proceed with
this project, you advise the USIB and IRAC of your
personal commitment to the success of this effort, and
request that all intelligence organizations desist temporarily
from further contracting or procurement in the intelligence
information handling field without prior clearance from you.
This will pose problems because some time-sensitive procure-
ment actions must be dealt with expeditiously, and getting
your project effort underway will require a bit of time,
but it is important that the situation not be further compli-
cated by additional moves on the part of agencies currently
involved in developing new systems.
b. You discuss the project personally with Dr. Hall
because of its impact on ASD (I) actions with respect to
ILLEGIB
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000600100020-6
 Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC
7
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 CIA-RDP80B01495R000600100020-6
Approved For Release 2005/07/2t. :.-CIA=RpP80B01495!~
COINS, and invite his support to the effort you are getting
underway on a unified approach to present activities and
proposed initiatives.
25X1
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000600100020-6
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/07/22 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000600100020-6