PORTUGAL AFTER THE COUP*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000600050009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 8, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence
DATE: 8 May 1974
TO : DDI
SUBJECT: Portugal
Attached is an estimative memorandum
on the new regime in Portugal and its African
problem, done by a group from CIA, INR and
DIA. The many uncertainties prevailing in
this situation dictate a fairly short-term
look ahead, but this assessment does seek
to define the forces at work and foreseeable
crunch points.
We are giving this very limited distri-
bution.
eith Clark
National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe
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INTERAGENCY MEMORANDUM . 8 May 1974
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL AFTER THE COUP*
This Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the TNationai
Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. Experts from CIA, DIA
and INR participated in its preparation.
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PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
A. General Spinola and the junta have set in train a process
with ends which are clearer than the means by which they hope to
achieve them. The announced objectives are:
A speedy liberalization of Portuguese political life;
--- An urgent effort to improve economic and social conditions,
-- and an accommodation in Africa.
In the first euphoric days, the program has been enthusiastically
received by the bulk of the Portuguese at home and a honeymoon phase
is still on. Those in African territories are torn between hope
and apprehension. The difficulty will come in defining these goals
in practical terms and in evolving methods of government which will
work without getting out of control. A kind of instant liberaliza-
tion has been started in which inexperienced political forces will
compete for power under untested procedures and the consequent strains
and uncertainties make for a very chancey outlook. Political libera-
lization must be considered a very tender plant in Portugal, and
moderate forces have not yet organized effectively.
B. A counter-coup or other drastic reaction from the right is
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-- Institutional pillars of the old regime have been so
caught off guard, purged and fragmented that they are probably
incapable of organized action, for a considerable time to come at
least.
- Most elements that made up the former establishment are
highly.apprehensive, but can do little at the moment. Some, including
elements of the forty families, will probably go along with the junta..
Others will look for opportunities to reverse the course of events --
particularly as the new regime encounters frustrations in Africa and
challenges at home from the left.
C. On the long suppressed left, the new freedom is still heady
stuff, but rivalries are beginning to appear and will probably become
more apparent when the junta begins actually to allocate positions
of power in the prospective provisional government.
-- For some time at least, both Socialist and Communist
leaders, mindful of their own organizations' weaknesses and inexperience,
will probably try to maintain a moderate enough line to avoid provoking
the junta into a crackdown on the left (something for which the conser-
vatives will hope and work).
-- However, with inexperienced factions contesting for power,
the chances of provocative acts will remain high, and the junta may
resort to repression.
D. The most critical determinant of success or failure will be
the armed forces' unity and support for the junta and the provisional
government. Unified military support will be essential both to the
regime's ability to liberalize at home without loosing uncontrollable
forces and to make.difficult decisions in Africa without losing control
either to black insurgents or dissident white settlers. Armed forces
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unity will, in turn, depend heavily on progress toward military
disengagement on the African front -- an uncertain prospect. Yet
If this regime cannot keep military support for its program, the
alternatives are probably a reversion to suppression or another
military coup.
E. A tolerable accommodation in the provinces will be dependent
not just on the Lisbon government but also on the African insurgents,
other African governments, Portuguese settlers, and the territorial
governments. The left at home is making African independence its
political battle cry. Given the conflicting interests, the process
could easily be derailed.
F. As for the new regime's specific policies, we do not yet know
enough about the junta to make confident assessments of its orientation,
and it has hardly had time to turn attention to details of substantive
policy. With Portugal facing problems as intractable as France in
.1958, Spinola may prove to be a Portuguese de Gaulle, or he may turn
out to be a Naguib. Subject to these qualifications, however, the
provisional government now appears likely to pursue the following lines:
-- At home, an effort to open up political life and move
speedily toward representative government -- subject to certain
minimal controls by the junta against excesses by the far left or
a resurgence on the right.
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- In the African territories, a policy of disavowing
military solutions and working through new governors to institute
certain high impact concessions to blacks, while trying to promote
a Portuguese national consensus on the eventual solution. Since
concessions to the blacks will generate apprehension among the white
settlers -- at least in Angola and Mozambique -- chances that the
regime can walk this tight rope are not good. The insurgencies are
thus likely to continue.
-- Relations with Spain will be marked by intense Spanish
wariness over the forces set loose in Portugal, but the chances are
the two governments will achieve a precarious modus vivendi unless
Spinola and the moderates lose control.
Portugal will seek to improve political and economic
relations with West European governments and enhance its role in
NATO and ties with the EC. It will find these governments sympathetic
to any movement toward accommodation in Africa and to giving Portuguese
moderates and socialistspower in a liberalized government.
Good relations with the US will be particularly important
to Spinola and the moderates. Whether this will translate into better
terms for US-use of the Azores base is uncertain. The regime may
de-couple arms for Africa from the negotiations, or it may press
for arms as protection for the territories while they move toward
self-determination. It will in any case probably seek postponement
of the Azores negotiations.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
WHO STAGED THE COUP AND WHY? ............................... 1
THE SECURITY. FORCES ........................................ 3
THE NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ............................. 7
Structure .............................................. 7
Support and Opposition 8
The Left's Initiative ............................... 8
Center and Conservatives ............................ 9
The Far Right and the Forty Families
Other Groups .......................
Representation in the New Government
................ 10
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
................ 11
L IKELY POLICIES-OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT .. .............. 12
Domestic Priorities ................................... 13
Foreign Relations ..................................... 13
Portugal and Europe .................................. 14
Portugal and the US: The Azores Negotiations....... 16
THE AFRICAN NETTLE ......................... 17.
The Outlook in Africa ................................. 18
Reaction to Date .................................... 18
Lisbon's Policies in Africa ..... ............. .... 20
The White Redoubt .......... 22
THE CHINESE AND SOVIET RESPONSES ............................ 23
ET
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May 1974
INTERAGENCY MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Portugal After the Coup
WHO STAGED THE COUP AND WHY?
1. The Armed Forces Movement which overthrew the Portuguese
government on April 25 is composed principally of middle rank
officers -- most, if not all, career officers -- who largely remain
an=-unknown-quantity - Thy officers were moved to act by:
-- anger over the firing of Generals Costa Gomes and
Spinola after the publication last February of General Spinola's
book advocating political rights for Portuguese and a federation to
solve the African problem.
-- conviction that Prime Minister Caetano, by his response
to Spinola's challenge, was a captive of the far rightists and there-
fore incapable of making any moves toward liberalization at home or
in the African provinces.
-- beyond these specifics lay a more general discontent
with low military pay, lack of modern weapons, repeated assignments
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in Portuguese Africa, and a feeling that the army might be made
a scapegoat if and when the civilians decided to pull. out of Africa.
2. Following the swift takeover of the government the Armed
Forces Movement called on Spinola to lead a junta of National Salvation
and to run the government until a new administration could be formed.
Costa Gomes and five other officers from the three services comprise
the junta.
3. Because they were ostensibly "invited" to join after the
revolt was launched it is not clear how significant a role Spinola
and the other junta members played in the planning of the coup.
Sptnola ::and'Costa_Gomes may have known about the coup
for some time but preferred to remain in the background to be available
for another try in the event that it failed.
or the young officers, acting on their own but recog-
nizing the need to reassure moderates and gain broad popular support,
may have decided late in the process to invite Spinola's support.
4. Whatever the circumstances, Spinola and Costa Gomes have a
power and prestige of their own that argues against their playing
merely figurehead roles. They and the new junta appear to have a wide
latitude in making decisions; and the Armed Forces Movement is so
far remaining in the background. General Spinola gives the impression
that he is in charge..
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FBI
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THE SECURITY FORCES
5. The junta, and after it the provisional government, can
probably count on the military and what remains of the security
forces to keep order in Portugal.* This, at least, is the conclusion
to be drawn from public statements and behavior so far, other evidence
concerning military loyalties to Spinola and the junta, and the fact
that purges have been carried out or are in process against those
in the military or security services whose loyalty to the old regime
would make them suspect to the new.
* With the abolition in the Metropole of the principal security service,
the Directorate General of Security (DGS), and the ultra-rightist
paramilitary organization, the Portuguese Legion, the remaining security
services are the Portuguese Security Police (PSP), the National
Republican. Guard (GNR), the Judiciary Police and the Customs Guard
or Fiscal Guard. Other small, specialized police forces exist,
but they would not make a significant contribution to the overall
Portuguese security situation. Of the security services currently
in existence, only the GNR gave any resistance to the coup on 25 April.
But its resistance was minimal and on 26 April the junta announced that
the GNR had submitted to the junta and was to be obeyed by the populace.
The junta announced on 26 April and reiterated on 2 May that a
reorganization and cleansing of the armed and military forces is
presently underway and included the PSP, GNR, and Customs Guard among
the organizations which would be affected.
In the overseas provinces, the DGS has been reorganized under the
military with a reduced role. In Portugal, some wprking-level elements
of the DGS may also be reorganized under control of the military with
restricted duties.
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6. But this estimate must be qualified. Not only have the
Spinola regime's-liberalization measures opened up a wide spectrum
of suppressed political forces in new and untested relations with
each other and the government, but they have also eliminated the
most important institutional organs which supported order under the
former government.
-- The political left is calling for further purges among
the remaining security organizations -- the Security Police and the
National Guard. Inevitably, the regime faces the problem of main-
taining order against possible unfamiliar challenges and with security
forces whose efficiency and reliability is not clearly proven.
-- It is probable that the wide public enthusiasm for the
regime manifested so far, together with the loyalty of the army, will
enable the junta to deter or cope with any serious challenge. But it
is by no means certain, and splits within the military could easily
alter this outlook.
7. In the next few-months, the leaders who have set out to
revolutionize the country will have to determine what institutional
role the military is going to fulfill in the new political system.
-- Spinola's intention to move toward free elections in a
year or so would seem to require a temporary, custodial role by the
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military while preparations are made to turn the government over
to elected civilian politicians.
-- The military leaders, however, would probably feel
compelled to take some restraining measure and perhaps tighten
their control instead of loosening it if they perceive a serious
threat of political upheaval, particularly involving leftists and
communists. (The interim President will have the same strong power
as ex-President Thomaz to use to crack down if the situation gets
out of hand.)
At a minimum, the military will retain a watchdog stand
over the developing situation and will not concede the strong in-
fluenceit has traditionally held in Portuguese political affairs.
Furthermore, if no significant progress is made toward military
disengagement on the African front, military dissidence may again
well up against the government in power.
8. The military have also assumed political control in the
African provinces of Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique. They have ousted
the provincial governors.and, in Mozambique,disbanded the legislature.
-- Thus far, the military leaders in the provinces have
supported and followed instructions from the junta'in Lisbon, but how
long they will continue to accept faithfully such direction is open
to question.
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-- In each province, the armed forces now contain a large
percentage of local personnel whites and blacks. Although they are
Portuguese in culture and training, their futures are tied more to
their provinces than to the Metropole.
9. In addition, military service in the provinces has provided
opportunities for a number of senior Portuguese military commanders,
as with General Spinola, to obtain a taste for political power. Indeed,
General Kaulza de Arriaga, former Military Commander in Mozambique,
had been considered as a competitor with Spino.la for the presidency.
-- Kaulza, or_others,like him, might conceivably try_to_
seize authority in the potentially rich provinces of Angola and
Mozambique. Supported by the provincial military forces and Portuguese
colonists, they could attempt to dictate the degree of "federation"
they would be willing to retain with the Metropole.
-- South Africa and Rhodesia might be willing to back such
locally-controlled regimes in Angola and Mozambique in an effort to
develop a stronger position in the future economic development and
exploitation of these areas, and, more importantly, help to insure that
these regimes would continue to prosecute the counter-insurgency
campaign.
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THE NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Structure
10. The junta's plan is to serve for about three weeks to allow
time for appointment of a provisional government. Until a government
is chosen, a delegate of the junta will be in charge of each ministry.
The provisional government, Spinola says, would serve for one year
during which preparations would be made for the election by secret
ballot and universal suffrage of a constituent assembly and a new
president.
11. The junta will choose the president of the provisional
government who is expected to have the same power granted that office
by the present constitution. Spinola is likely to be selected and
he could be expected to be a candidate when and if the permanent
government is set up. There probably will be a prime minister although
this is not yet confirmed. With Spinola as president, the prime
minister would likely be subordinate to him, and thus the interim
government may bear strong resemblance to the regime de Gaulle
established in France in 1958. Spinola has already let it be known
that military officers will occupy only the service ministries.
Reportedly the junta will become a Council of State to advise the
president. Junta members have already been appointed to head the
joint armed forces staff and to be chiefs of the three services.
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Support and Opposition
12. The lifting of the restrictions on political activity has
get in motion the rebirth and realignment of political and social
forces a kind of instant liberalization in which inexperienced
political forces will compete for power under untested conditions
and ground rules. The outcome is necessarily very uncertain.
The Left's Initiative
13. So far, the leftist forces have been clearly in the lead.
The Socialists, Communists, and some liberals quickly formed a
coalition, the Portuguese Democratic Movement, as a vehicle for
consolidating the forces of the left. Left wing activists from
the movement have been involved in widely publicized actions such as
encouraging workers to take over labor organizations, some newspapers,
and a wide range of other institutions. But to date they have been
careful to proclaim-that they are acting to ensure adherence to the
principles of the junta.
14. But rivalries are already beginning to appear as factions
of the left maneuver for power, and it is possible that the initial
"popular front" efforts may be superseded by separate campaigns for
power. Socialist leader Mario Soares and Communist chief Alvaro Cunhal
in fact began to compete for leadership of the left as soon as they
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returned to Portugal from exile. Soares is reported to fear the
competition of the better-organized Communists and is working to
build up his own party's organization.
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15. The Communists can also count on funds from abroad. They
maintained a better party machinery during the repression under the
former regime. They claim to have made converts within the Armed
Forces Movement which would give them some influence with the junta,
but there is no independent evidence of this. The real test will be
which party develops the best appeal to the voters in the period prior
to the free elections the junta has promised to hold.*
Center and Conservatives
16.. The Portuguese people are generally conservative but politi-
cal life under the old regime left a vacuum of organized political
parties of a conservative or moderate type which is still apparent.
The moderate forces in the center are expected to announce formation
* Portu,:~ese cor, :unist party menmbers~ip prior to the coup was
variously estimated from 1,000 - 5,000.
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of a new political party soon. The Catholic groups that became
moribund under the previous regime can also be expected to become
active again. With the abolition of Caetano's official political
organization, National Social Action, its conservative members may
eventually organize a party, but it would have little influence now.
The Far Right and the Forty Families
17. The far rightists -- some senior military officers under
the old regime and political types who were prominent in Salazar's
administration -- have been effectively neutralized by the sweeping
away of the old government. But there is a special case as regards
the group of 40 families who control most of the country's wealth
and thereby played a decisive role in the exercise.of political power
under the old regime. Although many of them could be expected to
disapprove of the liberalization measures, there is evidence that some
of them were impressed by Spinola's thesis that the overseas policy
of the old government was unrealistic. At least some members of this
group probably were knowledgeable of the coup and may even be cooperating
with the new regime.
Other Groups
18. The dismissal of the university rectors and the reopening
of student organizations shut down by the former regime will win at
least initial support from students and intellectuals for the new
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regime.
19. The workers are enjoying their new-found freedom and are
busy ousting officials of the labor organizations whom they
long felt were more responsive to the government and management than
to labor. The management of several newspapers, the national airline
TAP, and the Ministry of Labor have been forced out by employees
who subsequently obtained acquiescense of the junta in the changes.
20. The enthusiasm of the workers and impatience to reorganize
could easily get out of bounds. If widespread disorder were to erupt,
the new regime would be forced to institute controls that would
alienate labor and drive workers into the radical leftist parties.
The fact that May Day passed without serious incident will give the
new government a breathing space to begin installing the new social
system it has promised.
Representation in the New Government
21. A key question now'is what political participation the
junta will allow in the provisional government.
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The The junta probably has
'some misgivings about including the Communists, but apparently believes
that it would be better to let them share responsibility in the new
government than to leave them on the outside to criticize and plot
against it.
22. The junta could, of course, choose a provisional government
of non-political technocrats, but this would not encourage the kind
of broad participation in the new society that it wants. The only
groups likely to'be excluded are the violent revolutionaries to the
left of the Communists and right wing figures like monarchists or
active supporters of the Caetano regime. The precise composition
of the provisional government will offer one indicator of how'free a
campaign will be permitted in the elections which the junta has promised
within a year.
LIKELY POLICIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
23. Spinola's policies and priorities will be determined by
-- the necessity of creating a new state to replace the
structure erected by Salazar and Caetano.
-- the demands of the African problem.
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WOO
Spinola has stated that the domestic situation will receive first
priority. Leftist demands for immediate action to end the African
wars and pressures from left and right for a voice in determining
policy could upset this timetable.
Domestic Priorities
24. Creation of a new provisional government is the first order
of business. The provisional government will promulgate measures to
guarantee the new freedoms announced by the junta. Included are:
-- measures to guarantee freedom of association and expression.
-- laws to assure independence of the judiciary.
-- free labor union activity in accord with special-laws.
-- new economic policies, emphasizing measures to help lower
income groups and to fight inflation and the high cost of living.
These intentions have at least for the time being bought the new
government support from the left and time to get organized and formulate
specific programs.
Foreign Relations
25. General Spinola, having to devote himself to the dismantling
of much of the Caetano regime, liberalization at home, and the colonial
problem has given little indication of the new government's foreign
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policy other than to state publicly that Portugal's international
agreements and treaties will be honored. He
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desires closer ties with the
US, wants to end Portugal's isolation from the rest of the world,' and
believes that the policies he will pursue will make it much easier
for Portugal's friends to support her (an apparent reference to
African policy). While the foreign policy directions to be taken
by the new regime will become clearer when a government has been
named, Spinola's preliminary statements seem to point to no abrupt
changes in foreign policy and:
-- continuing membership in NATO.
-- more active relations with Western Europe -- especially
economic.
-- emphasis on bilateral relations with the US.
-- a broadening of the focus of Portugal's foreign policy
to encompass more "normal" interaction with Third World governments
and perhaps relations with Communist countries.
Portugal and Europe
26. Western European governments outside Iberia undoubtedly
approve of the junta's actions and program so far. Movement toward
accommodation in Portugal's African territories would remove the basic
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cause of tension between Lisbon and the NATO capitals -- and western
European governments generally -- and eliminate a perceptible strain
on the Alliance. And liberalization at home would bring Portugal into
the western European mainstream. The other capitals, however, will
be waiting to see whether the regime will be able to implement libera-
lization measures both at home and in the provinces. Meanwhile, certain
European governments and parties will be hoping to influence the
course of events by aid and support to Portuguese political factions --
particularly the socialists. West European governments will be hope-
ful and tolerant of Portugal's problems for a considerable time, but
full acceptance will depend on how well the new regime looks like-
following lowing its =promises .
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Portugal and the US: The Azores Negotiations
28. Spinola wants close Portuguese-US ties, but he has not
yet focussed on the Azores base negotiations and probably wants to
.postpone them. It is not yet clear whether his policy of self-
determination for the territories will de-couple arms-for-Africa demands
from the negotiations or if, on the other hand, such arms will continue
to be part of the quid and justified as protection for the territories'
inhabitants as they are prepared for self-determination.
29. Whenever serious talks do begin, however, the Portuguese
price for renewal of US base rights will probably be high,
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Furthermore, they may expect additional rewar
support in return for the commitment to grant self-determination
to their African territories. If domestic problems monopolize the
government's attention it may press for postponing the Azores Base
negotiations indefinitely.
THE AFRICAN NETTLE
-- the solution to the overseas war is political and not
The Outlook in Lisbon
30. General Spinola's announced guidelines are:.
-- the future of the overseas territories will be "whatever
the nation desires."
military.
-- to establish a dialogue with African liberation movements
provided they accept a ceasefire.
His personal preference would be to offer a federation of Portugal
and its overseas territories with considerable autonomy and equality
to the individual components. Over time he would be willing to allow
the territories "self-determination" in, deciding to remain in the
federation.
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31. Spinola's policy on Portuguese Africa is the crux of
both the junta's relationship with the emerging left at home and
with the international community. Forces on the political left
in Portugal, the insurgent movements in the territories, the
neighboring African countries and even apparently some of the coup
members have adopted positions ranging from immediate grant of
independence to intermediate measures leading to that end, such
as immediate ceasefires followed by negotiations with the insurgents
leading rapidly to independence.
32. The initiative on this matter is still with the junta.
If Spinola's momentum on this issue were to stall -- by a continuation
of the wars and an unacceptable postponement of self-determination
the resultant loss of initiative could seriously undermine the future
of the new regime,-both at home with the left and abroad with
sympathetic and hostile countries alike.
The Outlook in Africa
Reaction to Date
33. The Spinola regime has won initial support from the establish-
ment in the African territories. The military there has especially
welcomed the coup as a signal of the beginning of the end of Portugal's
three stalemated and debilitating wars in Africa.' Civilian sentiment
is more mixed. Portuguese white settlers will be fearful of abandonment
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by Lisbon. Most politically conscious blacks are probably cautiously
optimistic but wary of creating a white backlash. The Portuguese
army in the territories has many local whites and blacks. Differing
racial sentiments have not so far interfered with the army's
reliability or support for the junta in the territories and probably
will not so long as Lisbon appears to be moving toward some accommoda-
tion. Failing this, splits along racial lines could eventually
develop in the army.
34. The African liberation movements and the black African
governments that have supported them have welcomed the downfall of
the Caetano government but they are under no illusion that the Spinola
regime is prepared to meet their demands for independence. They will
not give up their insurgencies, though they may prove willing to talk
at the same time. Lisbon may decide on some phased withdrawal of
troops from the Metropole, with more locals filling in, but the
poltical process is likely to be drawn out and a Portuguese military
presence continued indefinitely -- certainly in Angola and Mozambique.
35. A number of black African governments have expressed interest
in facilitating negotiations between the new regime and Portuguese
African liberation movements. The African leaders who have supported
the insurgents are showing an interest in playing an intermediary. role
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in any negotiations. The African nations probably will seek to
align their policies toward the new regime during the meeting of
the African Liberation Committee scheduled for mid-May. The
approach is likely to be along the lines of the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto
which was endorsed by the OAU and subsequently by the UN General
Assembly. Among other things, the African governments declared in
the Manifesto that they would urge the resistance movements to use
peaceful means of struggle if conditions changed to make possible
"peaceful progress to emancipation." The Africans, however, will
not be satisfied with rhetorical gestures and in exchange for any
assistance they give in brokering between the parties will want
evidence that Lisbon is moving toward eventual independence for
the territories.
Lisbon's Policies in Africa
36. Lisbon is likely to initiate what it hopes will be highly
visible reforms in the territories. But there will be sharp distinctions
in how they are carried out in each of the territories because: of
differing levels of insurgency, varying strength and attitudes of white
settlers, and relative importance of the territories to Lisbon. In
all three, it probably will appoint more local residents, both black
and white, to high-ranking territorial administrative positions previously
filled from Lisbon. It also will encourage the development of local
black and multiracial political groups. In some cases it may even seek
to enter into dialogues with leaders of the insurgency movements.
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37. In Portuguese Guinea, where Lisbon has faced its strongest
guerrilla opposition, the new government will probably try to de-
escalate the conflict quite rapidly. Lisbon's stake in the territory
is marginal.
General Spinola maintained
discreet contacts with rebel leaders during his tour of duty there,
and might attempt to initiate new talks. In the long run, Lisbon
might not be averse to cutting loose Portuguese Guinea if it can do
so without seeming to be establishing a precedent which Africans can
apply to Angola and Mozambique.
38. In Mozambique, where insurgents are now fighting in five
of the territory's ten, districts, the Poriiuguese_will-face great
difficulties if and as they attempt to disengage. The Mozambique
guerrillas are well-organized, ethnically cohesive, and have received
considerable external support from both Africanand Communist sources.
Their gains have left Mozambican whites and the governments of South
Africa and Rhodesia extremely nervous. Thus almost any proffered
concessions would risk eroding the confidence of Mozambique's white
community. Lisbon has already given some support to a small, recently
established pro-Portuguese, predominantly black political party.
The junta might continue to encourage this party in hopes of pulling
support away from the insurgents, but such a tactic appears of limited
promise.
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39. In Angola, Portugal's richest and increasingly prosperous
territory, Portugal is not likely, because of the near-moribund state
of the insurgency, to negotiate directly with the insurgents, but
it will attempt to undercut them by increasing the Africans' stake
in the territory. The leaders of Angola's 300,000 whites have
frequently called for greater economic and political self-determination,
but they are likely to resist reforms that promote substantially
greater African participation in the public and private sectors.
A strong federation with Lisbon would dampen this resistance however.
A Rhodesian-style unilateral declaration of independence seems unlikely.
Those whites who might opt for such a course of action are probably
in the minority and would be deterred by their Tow chance for success.
40. The governments of Rhodesia and South Africa are intensely
concerned over developments in the Portuguese territories. Rhodesia's
position is the most immediately exposed. With its fractional (255,000)
white population and long border with Mozambique, it regards the
territory as a buffer against increased insurgency in Rhodesia.
41. The South African government is likely to press the junta
to keep military forces in Angola and Mozambique. Pretoria will
probably give serious consideration to economic and financial inducements
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that might persuade the new Lisbon government not to offer hasty
self-determination or independence to Angola and Mozambique.
42. If the new Portuguese government confirms that it will
maintain its military position in its African possessions for the time
being, present anxiety will ease in Salisbury and Pretoria. If an
abrupt military withdrawal seemed imminent, the two would at least
consider seizing certain strategic sections of Mozambique.
THE CHINESE AND SOVIET RESPONSES
43. Despite the substantial military and political assistance
they have-,.given _to the liberation movements in Africa, Chinese and
Soviet influence over the movements is quite limited. In some respects,
their assistance has been an extension of their own rivalry in seeking
to win support from "third world" countries. It also has been subject
to restrictions established by the black African governments through
which military aid has been channeled over. the years.
44. The Soviets have welcomed Spinola's flexible attitude toward
the Communist party and may hope the new regime will establish diplo-
matic ties with Moscow. They may also hope that, over the longer run,
political developments in Portugal could cause Lisbon to weaken its
military ties with the US. Fundamentally, they probably think that
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the continued drag of the African insurgencies will be the most
effective force pushing for leftward political change in Portugal
itself. This argument would counsel continued support for the insurgents,
and the Soviets will probably continue at least the levels they have
been giving. The only qualification might arise if they came to
believe that more was to be gained with the new Lisbon government
than would be lost in Africa by soft-pedaling aid to the insurgents.
This might be particularly true if black African leaders came to
accept that Lisbon was moving toward independence for the provinces
and were therefore less willing to serve as transshipment points for
arms to the insurgents. However, this contingency is not very likely
nor would it bring the Soviets to cut off aid entirely. It is even
less likely that the Chinese would do so.
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