INQUIRY INTO THE ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE WATERGATE AND ELLSBERG MATTERS - REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-THIRD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000500030007-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 23, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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[H.A. SZ' No. 93-25]
INQUIRY INTO THE ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IN THE WATERGATE
AND ELLSBERG MATTERS
OF THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
OCTOBER 23, 1973
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
NINETY-THUD CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
F. EDWARD HFIBERT,
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois
O. C. FISHER, Texas
CHARLES E. BENNETT, Florida
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New Yorl:
OTIS G. PIKE, New York
RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, Michigan
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri
CHARLES H. WILSON, California
ROBERT L. LEGGETT. California
FLOYD V. HICKS, Washington
RICHARD C. WHITE, Texas
BILL NICHOLS, Alabama
JACK BRINKLEY, Georgia
ROBERT H. (BOB) MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
DAN DANIEL, Virginia
G. V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi
HAROLD RUNNELS, New Mexico
LES ASPIN, Wisconsin
RONALD V. DELLUMS, California
MENDEL J. DAVIS, South Carolina
JAMES R. JONES, Oklahoma
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado
WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana
LFlSLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
BOB WILSON, California
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California
CARLETON J. KING, New York
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, Alabama
JOHN E. HUNT, New Jersey
U. WILLIAM WHITEHURS'T, Virginia
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
FLOYI) D. SPENCE, South Carelina
WALTER E. POWELL, Ohio
ROBERT PRICE, Texas
DAVID C. TREEN, Louisiana
WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado
GEORGE M. O'BRIEN, Illinois
ROBIN L. BEARD, Tennessee
DONALD J. MITCHELL, New York
MARJORIE S. HOLT, Maryland
ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR., Virginia
FRANK M. SLATINSHEK, Chief Counsel
WILLIAM H. Coog, Counsel
JoHU J. FORD, Professional Staff Member
RALPH MARSHALL, Professional Staff Member
GEOIILE NORRIS, Counsel
JAMES F. SHUMATE, Jr., Counsel
WILLIAM H. HOGAN, Jr., Counsel
H. HOLLISTER C,LNTUS, Professional Staff Member
ONETA L. STOCKSTILL, Executive Secretary
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, Michigan, Chairman.
F. EDW. HABERT, Louisiana WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois ,LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
O. C. FISHER, Texas BOB WILSON, California
FRANK M. SLATINSHag, Chief Counsel
WILLIAM H. HOGAN, JR., Counsel
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
October 16, 1973.
The Honorable F. Edw. Hebert
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : I have the honor to transmit herewith the
report of the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence on its Inquiry into
the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the
Watergate and Ellsberg Matters.
The report has been unanimously approved by the subcommittee
members and I would appreciate your early approval in order that
it may be printed.
With kind regards, I remain
Sincerely,
LUCIEN N. NEDZI,
Chairman,
Special Subcommittee on Intelligence.
Approved for printing :
F. Edw. Hebert
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CONTENTS
Page
Background ---------------------------------------------------------
1
Preliminary statement----------------------------------------------
1
Legislative purpose-------------------------------------------------
1
Procedures --------------------------------------------------------
2
Principal witnesses-----------------------------------------------
2
Ceveat ------------------------------------------------------------
3
Basic observations----------------------------------------------------
3
Discussion ----------------------------------------------------------
5
White House concerns______________________________________________
5
The CIA contact----------------------------------------------------
5
How this happened in the CIA_______________________________________
7
The Ellsberg psychiatric profile______________________________________
8
The Ellsberg psychiatrist caper ---- --------------------------------
10
The Dita Beard interview___________________________________________
11
The Watergate_____________________________________________________
11
"Pressure to blame Watergate on CIA"-McCord ---------------------
12
The White House attempt to involve CIA in Watergate------------------
15
The laundered-money allegation_____________________________________
15
The White House meeting on June 23, 1972-Haldeman's version -------
15
The Helms version ---------------- R--------------------------------
16
The Ehrlichman version____________________________________________
16
As General Walters saw it-------------------------------------------
16
The Walters-Gray meeting on June 23, 1972-General Walters' version__
17
Mr. Gray's version of the Walters' meeting____________________________
17
The effort to entrap the CIA_________________________________________
18
The FBI concern---------------------------------------------------
19
The Gray call to the President---------------------------------------
20
1970 Interagency Committee on Intelligence____________________________
22
Final statement------------------------------------------------------
22
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REPORT BY SPECIAL MJBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLI-
GENCE ON ITS INQUIRY INTO THE ALLEGED IN-
VOLVEMENT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IN THE WATERGATE AND ELLSBERG
MATTERS
BaCICGROUNI)
In early May 1973, the Chairman, House Armed Services Committee,
and the Committee membership became deeply concerned over reports
that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was implicated in the
Daniel Ellsberg Pentagon Papers ease and in the abortive break-in
of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the Water-
gate complex on June 17, 1972 and its subsequent coverup. Those con-
cerns resulted in the Chairman, the Honorable F. Edward Hebert,
assigning to the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence the task of
inquiring into those matters in connection with the Committee's CIA
oversight responsibility. That subcommittee was reappointed on Feb-
ruary 27, 1973 at the organization. meeting of the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee pursuant to the authority contained in H. Res. 185,
93d Congress, under the chairmanship of the Honorable Lucien
N. Nedzi.
Preliminary Statement
As noted, the events that triggered the investigation were the release
of information regarding the illegal break into the office of Dr. Lewis
J. Fielding, the Ellsberg psychiatrist, on September 3, 1971, and the
Watergate entry into the Democratic National Committee Headquar-
ters on June 17, 1972 with the speculation that CIA was involved in
both operations. The probe was commenced with an inquiry into the
relationship between the White House consultant, E. Howard Hunt,
the CIA and the alleged improper use of CIA technical materials
(disguises and alias material). That inquiry led the subcommittee into
the so-called Daniel Ellsberg profiles which the White House allegedly
commissioned the CIA to produce. Then came information regarding
the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office which purportedly housed the
Ellsberg psychiatric file. In between all this, the subcommittee learned
that the CIA disguise and alias materials were reportedly used in
domestic interviews in 1971 involving a Mr. Clifton DeMott who was
allegedly peddling Kennedy family information and with Mrs. Dita
Beard in connection with the ITT affair. During the entire inquiry
there was the requirement to look carefully into Watergate since it
was established that the CIA technical materials provided to Mr. E.
Howard Hunt and Mr. G. Gordon Liddy were confiscated during
the ensuing arrests.
With the Watergate inquiry carne the attendant requirement that
the subcommittee looked into post Watergate White House activities
that reportedly sought to use the CIA to impede the FBI investigation
and to assist the Watergate defendants with CIA funds. In that same
general context the panel heard testimony on Mr. James McCord's
allegations of a massive effort to lay the blame for Watergate on the
CIA. Each of these areas is addressed in this report in more detailed
chronological coverage. Also examined is the CIA legislative charter
and the need for its amendment.
Legislative Purpose
The basic reason for the probe was to determine whether there was
any CIA activity in the reported incidents which was contrary to the
(1)
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letter and spirit of CIA authority and, if so, to determine what, if
any, legislative recommendations should be'made to remedy the situa-
tion. The CIA charter as contained in the National Security Act of
1947, as amended, provides in part: That the Agency shall have no
police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security func-
tions and That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible
for protecting intelligence eources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure.
Thus, in the context of this 'investigation, the question must be
whether the activities under inquiry involved the CIA in purely do-
mestic intelligence matters and thus were outside its charter, or pos-
sibly any stretch of credulity, whether CIA involvement was some-
how proper under some "sources and methods" authority. The sub-
committee concluded that the involvement in issue had no support in
reason or law.
Procedures
Subcommittee hearings were commenced on May 11, 1973 with the
unanimous adoption of a rule that meetings would be conducted in
executive session to protect the sensitivity of information with regard
to the CIA. In detail, some seventeen meetings were held with some
twenty-four principal witnesses appearing, among whom were, the
following :
Dr. James A. Schlesinger Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Former Director of Central Intelligence Former White House Staff Member
Mr. William E. Colby Mr. John D. Ehrlichinan
Deputy Director for Operations, CIA Former White House Staff Member
Dr. John R. Tietjen Mr. James McCord
Director of Medical Services, C][A Former Committee for the Reelection (if the
Mr. Lawrence R. Houston President (CREEP)
General Counsel, CIA air. ii. Howard Hunt
Mr. George L. Cary, Jr. Former White House consultant
Acting Legislative Counsel, CIA 3Ir. William Rittman
tier. John M. Maury Counsel for Mr. Hunt
Legislative Counsel, CIA Mr. Charles W. Colson
General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC Former White House Counselor to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps President
Former Director of CIA ,Mr. Tom Charles Huston
Lt. General Vernon A. Walters Former White House Staff Member
Deputy Director of I len'tral Intelligence 3Ir Gerald Alch
The Honorable Richard Helms Former Attorney for Mr. James
Ambassador to Iran McCord
(Former Deputy Director of Central In- tIr Egil Krogh
tHowce) Former White House Staff Member
Mr. Howard J. Osborne
Director of Security Affairs, CIA Mr. David Young
Former White House Staff Member
Mr. Paid F. Gaynor Air. John W. Dean, III
chief of Security Research Staff, CIA 3I Former White House Counsel
All'. William V. Broe Mr. George Gordon Liddy
Inspector General, CIA Former Counsel
Mrs.'Nancy C. Lewis Committee for the Reelection of the
Secretary to Deputy Director, CIA President
Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III -Mr. Peter A. Maroulis
Former Acting Director of the FBI Attorney for Mr. Liddy
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In the process, subcommittee subpoenas were issued to Messrs.
IIaldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean, and due to their confinement status,
Messrs. Hunt and Liddy were before the subcommittee pursuant to
Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum duly signed by the Chief
Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Messrs.
Krogh, Young and Dean claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege
throughout their appearance, aside basic identification. During his
appearance on July 20, 1973 Mr. George Gordon Liddy refused to
be sworn to testify, claiming that right under the Fifth Amendment.
As a result, the subcommittee, and in turn the House Armed Services
Committee, resolved that Mr. Liddy be referred to the U.S. Attorney
for the District of Columbia for contempt of Congress under the
processes of applicable law. By a vote of 334 to 11 the House of
Representatives adopted the resolution on September 10, 1973 and
reported the committee action in House Report No. 93-453 dated
September 10, 1973. That matter now remains pending in the Depart-
Inent of Justice.
Caveat
This report is based solely upon evidence submitted to the sub-
committee and the subcommittee has attempted to be meticulous about
eliminating from its consideration the plethora of information that
has come from the media reporting other congressional actions, leaks
and endless "sources." Also, the subcommittee limited its inquiry to
CIA related matters.
BASIC OBSERVATIONS
(1) Alias identification gear, disguises and other technical materials
were provided improperly to Mr. E. Howard Hunt of the White House
staff by the CIA for use by non-CIA personnel due to a failure to
determine whether the purposes were in keeping with the statutory
mission of the CIA.
(2) Those improper purposes included :
a. A disguised interview with an informant who allegedly
was to provide information of a purely domestic-political
nature in connection with the Kennedy family;
b. A surveillance under disguise in August of 1971 in con-
nection with the unlawful break into Dr. Fielding's office in
California in what proved to be an unsuccessful search for
Mr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatric records ;
c. A disguised visit to Mrs. Dita Beard in a Denver, Colo-
rado hospital during March of 1972 in connection with the
ITT afair ; and
d. The abortive break-in at the Democratic National
Committee Headquarters in the Watergate complex on
June 17,1972.
(3) Utilized at one time or another in the above-noted actions was
the following CIA provided material: 2 wigs, speech-altering devices,
alias materials commonly called "pocket litter," a tape recorder, a
clandesthie camera, one-way tinted spectacles and film developing
facilities. Among the items requested but not provided were credit
cards, a telephone service and a secretary.
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Aft
(4) There were continued CIA dealings with Mr. Hunt after Gen-
eral Cushman first questioned Hunt's judgment in requesting addi-
tional CIA. assistarce. These "dealings" included a contact in October
1971. with reference. to a 1954 French case involving the leakage of
documents, contacts concerning Agency retirees regarding whom data
was furnished to Mr. Hunt and the Ellsbe.rg profile. This resulted
from such compartmentation within the CIA organization as delayed
the, internal dissenrinati.on of information of Hunt's activities and
thus requires comment in this report.
(5) had the equipment been demanded by CIA and returned by
Mr. Hunt when further assistance was terminated, its use in subse-
quent activities would have been prevented.
((;) Demanding the workup of domestic-psychiatric profiles on
Daniel Ellsberg during the period July-November 1971 by CIA
technical personnel was an abuse of CIA facilities.
(7) Efforts were made by Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman and
Dean of the White House staff to deflect the FBI investigation of the
Watergate break-in by invoking nonexisting conflicts with CIA
operations.
(S) Substantial efforts were made by Mr. John Dean, then White
House Counsel, to involve CIA in the Watergate break-in without
any foundation i n fact. Particularly, Dlr. Dean attempted to use the
CIA to provide assistance to the Watergate defendants in a clear
violation of the statutory charter of the CIA.
(9) When these requests for CIA assistance were made there was
a clear picture of White House aides avoiding former Director Helms
and looking to career military officers, Cushman and later Walters, for
unquestioned compliance.
(10) Substantial evidence of record leads to the inescapable con-
clusion that Mr. H. R. Haldeman, former White House Chief of Staff,
and Mr. John E'hrlichman, former Chief of Domestic Programs in the
White IIouse, were the sources of enormous executive authority and
were considered by the Acting Director of the FBI and CIA officials
to be speaking for the President.
(11) There exist material inconsistencies between the statement
and certain testimony offered by General Vernon A. Walters, Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, in his appearance as a witness on
May 16, 1973 and the statements and certain testimony presented dur-
ing his return appearance on May 21, 1973, both as to omissions and
changes in language.
(12) Mt-. James McCord sent six memoranda by mail to the CIA
during the period August 1972-January 1973 regarding alleged at-
tempts to involve CIA in the Watergate. This correspondence was
filed and not turned over to the FBI and the Department of Justice
until a, request from the Department of Justice was received in May
1973.
(13) As late as February 1973, Mr. Dean called Dr. .James A.
Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence, to see if CIA could get
back from the FBI the file material CIA had provided Justice rela-
tive to llie Agency's contact with Hunt.. This was not done.
(14) Legislative recommendations are necessary in the following
three areas with regard to Sec. 102(d) of the National Security Act:
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a. To expressly prohibit the Director of Central Intelli-
gence from performing any acts not included in Section 102,
without the express authorization of the President.
b. Tighten the phraseology of the section with regard to
protection of intelligence sources and methods by the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence; and
c. bit transactions between former CIA employ ee
and t re. Agency above an e -on purely routine a. mullstr
tive mat el s.
White House Concerns
During the summer of 1971 leading members of the White Mouse
staff were reportedly concerned over serious security leaks mainly
centered around the Pentagon Papers affair and a decision was made to
add to the staff a consultant who would be the central person responsi-
ble for. research on such matters. The person eventually recommended
by Mr. Charles Colson, White House Counselor, and retained by Mr.
John Ehrlichman, was Mr. E. Howard Hunt, retired career Central
Intelligence Agency officer, former news magazine writer, novelist
and at that time, a ranking member of a public relations firm in Wash-
ington, D.C.
The CIA Contact
Early on in his employment as a consultant, Mr. Hunt requested
through Mr. Colson that arrangements be made for certain alias and
disguise gear in connection with an interview. Apparently there, was
some internal discussion with Mr. Colson as to who should supply this
material but a reasonable interpretation of the testimony establishes
that in the final analysis Mr. John Ehrlichman, Senior White House
Aide in charge of domestic programs, made an introductory call to the
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence, General Robert Cushman,
on or about July 8, 1971 introducing Mr. Hunt as a newly retained
White House Consultant who was in need of CIA assistance. That
call was announced at, a subsequent CIA staff meeting. An appointment
was made and on July 22, 1971 Mr. Hunt and General Cushman had
a meeting at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. At that meeting
arrangements were made for Mr. Hunt to receive "technical assistance"
from the CIA in the form of flash alias documentation and physical
disguise material for an undisclosed mission of some alleged sensi-
tivity. Mr. Hunt expressed it in this way to General Cushman :
"I've been charged with quite a highly sensitive mission by the White House
to visit and elicit information from an individual whose ideology we aren't
entirely sure of and for that purpose they asked me to come over here and see
if you could get me two things : flash, alias documentation * * * and some degree
o?f physical disguise, fora one time op[eration]-in and out."
General Cushman approved the request. Mr. Hunt's documented alias
was Edward J. Warren. From the advantage of hindsight, it is un-
fortunate that Mr. Hunt was not pressed for the details of his mission
prior to any agreement to meet his request, as normally should be the
case.
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While the total evidence is in some conflict as to just what Hunt's
sensitive mission was to be, it is crystal clear from Mr. Hunt's testi-
mony that the project was a purely domestic caper to gain information
on the Kennedy family which had been offered by a Mr. Clifton I)e-
Mott, then apparently located in Rhode Island. Parenthetically, it is
obvious that the projected DeMott interview was hardly the sensitive
task represented to General Cushman during the meeting on July 22,
1971 at the CIA Headquarters. The DeMott interview was conducted
'at a motel at the Providence, Rhode Island airport where Hunt ap-
peared in the CIA disguise, including the "ill-fitting wig" and pocket
litter. The interview proved to be flat and unproductive according to
Mr. Ilunt.
Meanwhile, Hunt was making added demands on the Agency for
technical assistance including disguise and alias material for
Mr. George Gordon Liddy. Mr. Liddy's documented alias was George
F. Leonard. On August 2`T, 1971 after receiving internal complaints
from CIA staff members concerning the Hunt request, General Cush-
man called Mr. John Ehrlichman and advised him that assistance to
AIr. Ilunt would have to end since Hunt obviously was overreaching
the original agreement.
As future events graphically illustrated, the deed had then been done
and Mr. Helms, General Cushman and the CIA had become the un-
witting dupes for purely domestic White House staff endeavors that
were beyond the realm of CIA authority. Not only did the "technical
assistance" material appear in the DeAlott interview as previously
noted, but as we shall see, certain materials appeared in the illicit
search for Ellsberg's psychiatric records, was also in evidence at the
Dita I)eard interview in Denver, Colorado and finally at the infamous
Watergate complex entry.
It should be mentioned here that early in his employment in the
White House during July 1971, Mr. Hunt was apparently assigned
the task of developing certain information on U.S. relations with.
South Vietnam with specific reference to the circumstances which led
to the coup, and assassination of former Premier Diem. In that con-
nection Air. Charles Colson suggested that Hunt seek out 'a Lieutenant
Colonel Lucien 'Conein who was reputed to be knowledgeable in Far
Eastern affairs through his OSS associations and later CIA work in
South Vietnam. At the time Colonel Conein was said to be retired from
the CIA and living in McLean, Virginia as a private person. Report-
edly, Mr. Colson thought it necessary for CIA to approve such an in-
terview, 'and Colson considered this an additional motive for Hunt to
be cleared through Mr. John Ehrlichman for contact with the CIA. In
fact, Colson testified that the requirement for this clearance was "im-
mediate" in view of the need to interview Colonel Conein.
Hunt stated he knew Conein through earlier association in the OSS,
and after locating him directly through the telephone book, a meeting
was arranged in Hunt's office at the White House. There ensued a dis-
cussion of the Diem era in South Vietnam and the circumstances of
the revolt that led to Diem's assassination. Hunt reported that he also
discussed with Colonel Conain the narcotics control situation in South-
east Asia. Hunt concluded that the interview was of interest in con-
nection with Hunt's review of the Department of State chronological
cable files on the Diem regime. It was this review that among other
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matters led to the reported controversial and fraudulent alteration of
State Department cables by Hunt "which would clearly point to Wash-
ington, the Kennedy Administration, as having in effect, hoped for
or brought about the assassination of the former Vietnamese Premier."
Thus, the subcommittee determined, to its satisfaction, that the
Aunt-Conein interview did not involve the CIA.
How This Happened in the CIA
Former CIA Director Richard Helms testified that often the Execu-
tive Office of the President made requests of the CIA for assistance
and advice. The principal limit on such CIA assistance is the statutory
barrier to its operation in the domestic-intelligence field, as noted
earlier in this report. On the other hand, witnesses associated with the
CIA were unanimous in their views that requests from top level White
House aides in the present Administration were, almost without excep-
tion, taken as orders from people wlto were speaking for the President,
which could and did put a strain on those statutory barriers. In that
setting, then, we have the request from the White House staff for the
cooperation of the CIA with Howard Hunt.
General Cushman, a four-star general officer in the Marine Corps,
and the former Deputy Director testified that he received that request
from 11Ir. John Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman, with rather obvious vigor,
testified that he had no recollection of making any such call to the
CIA. The evidence of record supports General Cushman.
Mr. Ehrlichman in his testimony before the subcommittee assumed a
rather cavalier, hands-off attitude about the CIA technical assistance
to Hunt in an obvious attempt to lay the responsibility at the doorsteps
of others-first for getting Hunt into the White House organization
"carte hired him") and then by wondering aloud why the CIA gave
carte blanche for nearly a month without asking [Hunt] what he was
doing." The overall subcommittee record is enlightening on Mr.
Ehrlichman's approach to the matter at hand. Mr. Ehrlichman's
impression of his force and effect in conducting White House business
appears to be unduly modest. The clear impression from the record is
that Mr. Hunt was given CIA assistance solely because Mr. Ehrlich-
man intervened. In this instance, the CIA had not one scintilla of
information concerning the actual purpose of that assistance, and the
lack of such information was not questioned. Indeed, assistance was
given in almost a complete "absence 'of the procedural steps and
approvals normally required by Agency regulations," according to
former Director of Central Intelligence, Dr. James A. Schlesinger.
There is little doubt from the testimony that General Cushman was
impressed with the source of the telephone call introducing- Mr. Aunt
as a White House Consultant. General Cushman concluded that Hunt
was hired to work on the security leaks problem, and "the CIA was
being ordered to assist him." [Emphasis Added.] Further, stated
General Cushman, he never envisioned such a request to be for an
improper purpose. Thus, when a meeting between General Cushman
and Hunt resulted on July 22, 1971, there was a clear-cut spirit of
cooperation on the part of the Deputy Director despite the fact that
hunt beclouded the reason for the "technical assistance" except to
describe the need for a sensitive one-time interview. Hunt was not
pressed for further explanation and the arrangements for assistance
were agreed upon. Ironically, although Hunt suggested privacy, that
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meeting was bugged and it is clear on the verbatum record that
Mr. El irlichrnans name was dropped by Mr. Hunt in the correct places
to convey the message to General Cirshinan. Thus commenced a string
of requests from Hunt for the agreed upon technical assistance, as
well as other materials as previously reported. The extent and depth
of the technical assistance provided to Mr. Hunt can be better under-
stood when it is noted that on no less than three occasions CIA tech-
nical personnel met with Mr. Hunt and/or Mr. Liddy in a so-called
"safe house" location in Washington to fit disguise materials, as well
as deliver other disguise and alias items. A safe house is generally
described as a detection-secure location maintained by the Agency for
clandestine meetings.
'I'bis all came to an end on August 27, 1971 when the CIA staff and
General Cushman became concerned over the propriety of Hunt's
increasing demands in relation to the CIA and the assistance stopped.
Unhappily, neither at that date nor at any time thereafter did the
CIA make a request for the return of the materials and, except for
the camera, none of the material was in fact returned.
The Director of CIA was advised of the Hunt-Cushman agreement
and I Punt's CIA contacts after the fact but considered it "fait accom-
pli," particularly since "there was absolutely no indication of wrong-
doing." In "hindsight" said Ambassador Helms maybe we should
have asked [hunt:] a lot more questions." The subcommittee can only
add its unanimous and solemn concurrence to that observation. Mr.
Helms said that "when the top man in the White House asks for
support and assistance, it is given to him." Interestingly, Mr. Hunt's
view as a retired CIA agent and former White House Consultant was
expressed thusly : "* * * the CIA was regarded as a service organiza-
tion 1'or the intelligence community and certainly to the Chief Execu-
ti e." [Emphasis Added.] The, better view, although charitable, was
probably expressed by I)r. James R. Schlesinger, the succeeding
Director of Central Intelligence at the time of this inquiry and now
Secretary of Defense : "The Agency was insufficiently cautious in the
initiation of assistance to hunt."
The Ellsherq Psychiatric Profile
Incredible as it may seem, at the very time that Mr. Hunt was
conducting his business with the CIA for "technical assistance" an-
other White House staff project was being engineered which was to
involve the CIA in one more undertaking which was outside of its
mission. 'This, aside from the separate Ellsberg's psychiatrist's
break-in, which apparently was undergoing concurrent planning, also
had CIA implications -and which will be addressed under the next
subheading.
The profile operation originated in the White House Investigations
1 i nit, better known at the, time as the Room 16 Group, and now popu-
larly called "The Plumbers." The, group was reportedly concerned
with security matters involving leaks of classified. information. Ap-
parently, the un it was under the. overall aegis of Mr. John Ehrlichman,
with Mr. Egil Krogh in immediate charge, as assisted by Mr. David
Youna and Mr. George Gordon Liddy. According to his testimony,
1Ir. E. ]Toward Hunt joined this group about the middle of July
1971-while continuing to work on his original assignment. At that
time the group was apparently in the process of organizing.
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The mission at hand seemed to be to get a complete backdrop on
Ellsberg and his entire psychiatric makeup, for the purpose of gain-
ing -a better understanding of the total Pentagon Papers problem and
to apparently assist in Ellsberg's Prosecution. From those considera-
tions developed a suggestion by F. Howard Hunt that CIA had the
technical capability of putting together a personal profile as had been
done in the case of certain foreign leaders and secondly, an interest
in certain psychiatric records that were reportedly in the files of a
Los Angeles psychiatrist. Hunt recommended, therefore, that CIA be
requested to construct a profile on Ellsberg. Apparently, Mr. David
Young was the contact man with CIA on this project. At some point
in time, Mr. Ehrlichman talked with Mr. Young about the project and
it had his approval. This could have been after work on the profile was
underway.
In late July 1971, the first contact was made with CIA requesting
an Ellsberg profile. This resulted in some conversations between Mr.
Young and Mr. Helms, in which CIA's reservation were expressed but,
stated Mr. Helms, Young assured him "it had the highest White House
level support * * *", and an agreement was reached. Young supplied
the materials to be used. The CIA psychiatric personnel involved, in-
cluding medical doctors, expressed varying degrees of concern over the
propriety of the project in view of the limited information on Ellsberg
at hand, and the question of whether it was CIA-mission oriented since
the subject was a U.S. national. Also there was concern that the prod-
uct could be misinterpreted as coming from a doctor-patient relation-
ship, which, of course, would not be the case. The evidence indicates
that the project was finally approved with some reluctance by "senior
Agency officials because of the peculiar problems posed by the case."
The initial effort was produced from articles from media sources, as
well as FBI documents. This first effort did not satisfy the White
House staff and an August 12, 1971 meeting was called in the Execu-
tive Office Building on the matter with a CIA medical representative
present. A witness who attended that meeting attributed the following
to Mr. Young : "That the Ellsberg study had the highest priority and
had been requested by Mr. Ehrlichman and Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Young
also stated that the President had been informed of this study. He
stated that it was a multi;-faceted approach and the psychiatric report
would be only one facet. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy were
also present with that group, and further discussion ensued on the
points they hoped to develop in such a profile.
New material was forthcoming from the White House which was
biographical in nature and appeared to have Justice Department
origin. At no time, it was testified, was sufficient material received upon
which a valid report could be assembled. 'There were several other
meetings with White House personnel and there was a CIA attempt to
fend off White House staff insistence on the second paper on the
grounds that the material added very little to the production. But the
Room If) Group insisted on a final profile. With much expressed re-
luctance by the CIA professional stafr involved, the final product "was
delivered * * * to the 117-hite House and to Mr. Liddy, Mr. Young
and Mr. Hunt" on November 12, 1971 after being reviewed by Director
Helms. Interestingly, General Cushman was not aware of the Ellsberg
profiles project.
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The Ehlsbea g Psychiatrist Caper
Also incredible as it may appear, while E. Howard Bunt was rnak-
ing demands upon the CIA for additional technical material, he was
doing it not for purposes of the "sensitive" interview, but rather for
use in connection with the Room 16 Group's plan for the surreptitious
entry into the office of a Beverly Hills doctor, Dr. Henry Fielding, who
was identified as Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. It should be noted that
shortly prior to the break-in CIA had indicated that the psychiatric
information for the profile lacked some sufficiency for the task at hand.
While the timing would indicate some known connection between CIA
and the. uge sth mic that CIA the had testimony ~o knowledge of then rather
than any su. any prior entry into 1)r. Fielding's office.
According to Hunt, and. as was noted earlier, sometime during
July 1971, after the Room 16 (Plumbers) Group was formed, it was
determined by the Group that information on Ellsberg s life and life-
style, mental competency, tendencies, propensities and the like, would
be valuable in a better understanding of the entire Pentagon Papers
matter. Thus, the plan to burgle the psychiatrist's office.
Per the Group's plans, Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy were scheduled to
make a preliminary reconnaissance trip to Beverly Hills in connection
with the Fielding break-in and Hunt asked CIA for a camera conceal-
ment device for indoor photography. This was the camera concealed
in the infamous tobacco pouch that was later used during the recon-
naissance for photographing the inside of the building in which Dr.
Fielding held office space.
Indeed, in addition to having the camera, the surveillance was con-
ducted with both Hunt and Liddy using the disguise material and
"litter," including the "ill-fitting wigs" provided earlier by the CIA
to Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy in a safe house. Among other services,
CIA provided Mr. Liddy with technical instructions for the use of
camera and developing services when the job was completed. But in
all fairness, it must be repeated that the CIA was not aware of the
true purpose for which the camera and equipment was to be used.
Mr. John Ehrlachrnan disclaimed prior knowledge of the basic
plan-"I certainly cannot recall seeing such a memo, Mr. Chairman"-
but did testify that, "there was a written proposal. that Hunt and
Liddy be sent to the coast to do investigation work. * * * The sub-
stance of it was they would go and investigate these questions o I alluded
to before, Ellsberg s relationships, how he gt the sort of a person he is, is he a part of a conspiracy, all the lingering,
remaining' questions about Ellsberg as an individual that we were not
getting answers to. * * '~ I approved that proposal." Ehrlichman
added that he would not have approved any proposal that included
a plan to burglarize the psychiatrist's office.
Following the West Coast trip Mr. Hunt saw a need for credit cards
and a, sterile telephone for back up in case an alias address was checked.
The credit card problem came up on the surveillance trip when credit
cards were asked for to pay bills and none were available.. This request
to CIA was not granted. Also, upon returning, Mr. Hunt made an
effort. to show the Fielding pictures to Mr. Charles Colson, but Colson
rebuffed Hunt out of hand before Hunt could explain what he had to
offer.
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During the actual burglary of the Fielding office on September 3,
1971, Mr. Hunt stated that lie did not personally make an entry upon
orders that nobody with a White House connection was to be "any-
where near the target area." On the evening of the Fielding break-in,
Hunt stated he was miles away covering the Fielding house, for said
Hunt, "I had to be there. I was the planner."
Mr. Liddy was close by in a car to provide mobile surveillance, and
both Hunt and Liddy were in touch with the entry team by walkie-
talkie. As it developed, nothing of worth was received as a result of
the operation.
The Dita Beard Interview
It will be recalled that in 1972 at the time of the Richard Klein-
dienst confirmation hearings as Attorney General, there was consider-
able discussion and publicity regarding the authenticity of an ITT
memo allegedly written by Dita Beard, as Washington ITT representa-
tive, which allegedly linked the ITT antitrust settlement with a re-
ported contribution for the benefit of the Republican National Con-
vention then -planned for San Diego.
Mr. Charles Colson stated that in early March 1972 he received
information from Mr. Hunt that the Beard memo could be a forgery
and Colson concluded that there may be a way of gaining information
on the matter through an interview with Mrs. Beard in a Denver
hospital where she was undergoing treatment.
The arrangements were made and Hunt (in disguise-the "ill-fitting
wig" and Edward Warren "litter") visited Mrs. Beard in the. Denver
hospital to seek her version of the infamous memo. The results were in-
conclusive. Hunt's story is that the disguise was used to shield his
White House identity. Mr. Colson stated that he did not order the dis-
guise, it was Hunt's idea. In any event, we had another clear-cut use of
CIA equipment to assist in carrying; out a purely domestic-intelligence-
gathering mission, without the knowledge of the very people who sup-
plied the material.
The Watergate
As probably very few people are unaware, on the evening of
June 17, 1972, a group allegedly sponsored by the Committee for the
Reelection of the President made an abortive entry into the Watergate
Headquarters of the Democratic National Committee reportedly to
photograph files, "* * * install a room bug * * * which would per-
mit the transmission of conversations * * *", and also to put in place
a telephone listening device. There had been a prior successful entry
into the Headquarters on Memorial Day Weekend 1972. That entry
was classified as successful because nobody was caught, but the
bugging of a telephone failed for mechanical and technical reasons,
and there was a new demand for photographic 'copies of additional
documents from the files-thus the plan for a second try.
Although there seemingly was repeated reference to "the
principals"-"* * the Attorney General, Mr. Dean and Mr.
Magruder * *' said Hunt-George Gordon Liddy reportedly was
the leader and planner for the entry with Mr. Hunt as one of his top
assistants, along with Mr. James W. McCord who was a "hitch-hiker"
on the operation as the electronics man. McCord was a former FBI
agent who later joined the CIA from where he retired in 1970. Later
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in September 1971 McCord was employed by CREEP as a. security
man and was operating his own business in the security and investiga-
tive field.
11iwt was the recruiter for the Cuban-American branch of the entry
team whose, principal task was photography. ("The team had demon-
strated its ability in Los Angeles. 'That was certainly a clean opera-
tion," said Hunt.) Among those "team" individuals were Mr. Baker
and Mr. Martinez. Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy were not part of the
entry team. Interestingly, some 50 35INUNI cameras were bought for
the mission.
On the critical evening, Hunt and Liddy were in a room in the
Watergate Hotel where the team assembled prior to entry. Hunt had
carried the CIA-supplied disguise gear to the room to make distribu-
tion as might be desired. McCord stated that Hunt handed McCord
some credentials including, he thought, a driver's license. When
McCord was apprehended later, the CIA cover name of Edward L.
Warren was on the documents which were confiscated by the police.
Hunt, in his testimony, stated that he thought Barker used his "set"
of disguises and pocket litter and Liddy's was used by another mem-
ber of the entry team. This evidently included the wigs. A portion of
Hunt's direct testimony on the subject is succinct:
["Let me put it this way, s i r : : took all of that [CIA] disguise equipment down
to the operations room of the Watergate, Room 214, that evening. The men who
made up the entry team helped Caemselves to whatever they wanted. And the last
time I recall seeing any of that material was in Room 214 in the Watergate
Hotel."]
Hunt normally stored the alias and disguise gear in a safe in the
Executive Office Building, but on June '17 all of it was confiscated by
police at the Watergate. The only item left was a tape recorder which,
during his testimony, Hunt promised to return to the CIA.
Again, as the world knows, the "lights went out" as Mr. Hunt put it,
and the team was caught. It is ironic, too, that certain doors had been
taped at the lock and McCord reported over walkie-talkie that he had
to retape them. Hunt was startled by that report and wanted to stop
the operation but Liddy refused. McCord, too, wanted to press for-
ward. A short while later the group was arrested on the scene.
None of those involved in the break-in were employees of the CIA;
however, Martinez was at the time an active Florida informant for the
CIA and was being paid for his information at the rate of $100 per
month. He is no longer on the payroll of CIA, and there is no evidence
that CIA had any advance knowledge of his prospective participation
in the break-in. Interestingly, Hunt stated that following Watergate
he, Mrs. Hunt and Attorney Bittman received some $156,000 for
lawyers fees from mysterious sources by what can be best described as
cloak and dagger deliveries. Also, payments of $27,000 in additional
moneys for personal use and for the Cuban-Americans were reported.
McCord stated that he received $46,000 for lawyers fees and subsist-
ence from "committee" sources.
"Pre.,svi?e To Rl,anze Watergate op., CIA"-,1f(,,0ord
Mr. Jaynes McCord, convicted participant in the Watergate break-in,
former FIJI agent and retired CIA employee, was persistent in his
claims before. the subcommittee that immediately after Watergate
aborted, there was a massive attempt to pin the break-in on the. CIA
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in an effort to cover up the White, House and the Committee for the
Reelection of the President. In_ addition, McCord stated that "the.
White House" had dismissed Helms to lay a foundation for blaming
Watergate on the CIA, and that "Helms had been fired for it." McCord
alleged a conspiracy involving people in high place in the Executive
Department, in the Committee for the Reelection of the President and,
indeed, he alleged the involvement of E. Howard Hunt, Hunt's lawyer,
Mr. William Bittman, and Mr. Gerald Alch, his own attorney, among
others.
In the latter regard, McCord testified that Hunt placed great pres-
sure on the Cuban-American defendants to use the "CIA was involved"
ploy as a defense at trial. Hunt just as vehemently denied that. allega-
tion under oath. With equal vigor did Hunt deny that he participated
in any plot to .blame the entire venture on the CIA, but there was
an admission from Hunt's attorney, as well as McCord's counsel, that
there was some discussion early on in preparation for the defense of
the accused as to whether there might be a CIA-type defense since
some of the participants had been associated with the Agency previ-
ously. However, that tack was dropped after discussion with the clients,
said the attorneys for Hunt and McCord, as being without foundation
in fact.
McCord had occasion to contact Hunt's wife during this early period
after Watergate and McCord attributed to Mrs. Aunt a statement that
the Watergate was a CIA operation and that Hunt had information
sufficient to impeach the President. This Hunt denied. It was also
stated by McCord that Mrs. Hunt attributed to her husband a letter
threatening to "blow the White House out of the water." This, too,
was denied by Hunt.
Also attributed to Mrs. Hunt was a statement that Mr. Paul O'Brien,
of the Committee for the Reelection of the President, had advised Hunt
that Watergate was a CIA operation. McCord stated that his only
sources at the time regarding this allegation were Mrs. Hunt. and the
press stories to which he was exposed.
Because of this alleged cover up, McCord sent an unsigned letter to
Mr. Richard Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, under date
of July 29, 1972, enclosing correspondence purportedly addressed to
his attorney expressing concern over a "ploy" to lay Watergate, at the
doorstep of CIA. The attorney, Mr. Alch, denies ever receiving the
letter. That correspondence was not acted upon in CIA in any fashion
beyond recognition of its source as probably McCord, and it was not
turned over to the FBI,or the Department of Justice by the CIA until
requested by the U.S. Attorney in May 1973.
Interestingly, at that very time, McCord expressed his loyalty for
the Administration for "they seemed to be doing what they could to
help the defendants and there was contact there * * * ." Then in
October 1972, he saw a "1 S0? turn" and "they were going to try to keep
the defendants silent" by offering executive clemency and care for
dependents. At that point in his testimony, McCord didn't invoke the
CIA allegation.
Although McCord believed the plot to use the CIA emanated
from on high, he pointed the principal finger of guilt at Hunt,
Mr. William Bittman, attorney for Hunt, and his own lawyer,
Mr. Alch. McCord saw Bittmanas the leader of a. plot to blame CIA
for Watergate and use it as a defense at trial in January of 1973. In
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the now famous meeting with Mr. Alch in Washington, D.C. on
December 21, 1972 at the Monocle Restaurant, McCord attributes to
Alch the statement that they would use a CIA defense; that they would
doctor McCord's CIA records to show a recall to duty; that the new
Director, Dr. Schlesinger, "would go along with it," and that they
could show the history of CIA sponsoring such operations. This pur-
portedly shocked McCord. McCord attributed the same approach to
Mr. Alch in a subsequent meeting at Mr. Alch's office in Boston on
December 26, 7 2.
Mr. Alch disputed McCord's version of these meetings in the strong-
est of terms. Alch stated that, in fact, Bittman had suggested in De-
cember 1972, when defenses were being discussed, that they should
check with their clients on the possibility of CIA involvement as a
defense, particularly since Hunt and McCord were CIA veterans. This
was done with McCord during the luncheon at the Monocle on Decem-
ber 21, 1972 and McCord stated that he would think about it, according
to Alch's version. In the December 26th meeting in Boston, McCord
was definite about no CIA involvement and to Alch, that ended the
matter, for he stated he had a feeling all along that CIA was "not
behind it." Further, said Mr. Alch, he talked to his associate, F. Lee
Bailey, about the CIA matter and Bailey discouraged any such defense
unless they were on solid ground. Mr. Alch's Washington correspond-
ing attorney, Mr. Bernard Shankman, was present at the Monocle and,
in an affidavit made available to this subcommittee, has supported Mr.
Alch's version of the meeting.
Theso latest meetings prompted McCord to address a series of letters
to Mr. Paul Gaynor, of CIA, with whom McCord was formerly asso-
ciated in his active duty CIA days. That correspondence commenced
on December 22, 1972, and in it McCord referred to the "tremendous
pressure" to put the operation on the CIA. The follow-on correspond-
ence consisted of an undated note and others dated December 29, 1972,
January 3 and 5, 1973 regarding alleged wiretaps on his home, Mc-
Cord's decision to release his lawyer, and more litany on attempts to
involve, the CIA in the Watergate. None of this mail was signed. The
record indicates that CIA retained this correspondence on file, recog-
nizing that it came from McCord, but nothing was done to bring it to
light until after the subcommittee commenced its hearings on May 11,
1973. Why this material was not given to the FBI or the Department
of Justice earlier was not responded to satisfactorily by CIA witnesses.
Mr.Alch, in fact, represented McCord in matters relating to the
trial and at the trial itself during January of 1973. In his earlier
letter to the presiding judge asking that Mr. Alch be excused as his
attorney, McCord did not mention the CIA matter. After a judicial
conference, McCord's concerns were evidently satisfied, the letter was
withdrawn and, as indicated, Aich stayed on to represent McCord at
trial and in bail proceedings thereafter. CIA was not raised in any
fashion at trial, as a defense or in matters of extenuation.
This subcommittee cannot -unravel the direct conflict of evidence in
the testimony of Mr. McCord and Mr. Alch-both under oath. The
story of this alleged attempt to involve the CIA has been told briefly
here because of its relevancy to the subcommittee's mission. There are
indications that McCord was not completely open and frank with
Attorney Alch and that he, McCord, may have been taking advice.
and counsel from another source contrary to Mr. Alch's efforts for
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his client. The conflict in testimony between Mr. Alch and Mr. McCord
is so great as to cause the subcommittee to speculate that both are
telling what they believe to be the truth, but McCord's perspective was
distorted because of his personal predicament.
On a related matter Mr. Robert C. Mardian, who was associated with
the Committee for the Reelection of the President, was contacted by
the subcommittee regarding his knowledge of any possible CIA in-
volvement in Watergate. Mr. Mardian identified Mr. Paul O'Brien as
the individual who stated that he. "thought the CIA was involved in
the Watergate break-in," and that "he would stake his life on it, or
words to that effect." Subsequently, Mr. O'Brien, a former CIA em-
ployee, was interviewed and as the result of that interview the sub-
committee concluded that ,while Mr. 'O'Brien may have made such a
statement he was unable to furnish any information that in fact con-
nected the CIA with Watergate.
THE WTTrrE HousL ATTEMPT To INVOLVE CIA IN WATERGATE
The Laundered-Money Allegation
Out of the early Watergate investigation came information that
there was evidence possibly tying presidential campaign funds to the
break-in. through a so-called money-laundering operation that was
running from the bank of then Watergate suspect Barker in Miami,
Florida, to a bank in Mexico City, with checks drawn on that Mexico
City bank in the name of one Manuel Ogarrio. Also caught up in the
same inquiry was an individual from Minneapolis named Mr. Kenneth
H. Dahlberg. The FBI wanted to interview both men, but it was
mainly the Ogarrio matter that became known as the Mexican Connec-
tion in this inquiry. It was this branch of the FBI investigation that
was apparently the central theme in certain White House staff requests
that the FBI "hold off" or discontinue interviewing Ogarrio and Dahl-
berg and making inquiry into the Mexican matter for fear of uncover-
ing some "sensitive resources or assets of the CIA."
There, are varying-and sometimes hopelessly conflicting-versions
of what developed thereafter, but we shall try to piece together what
the central plan seemed to be.
The White House Meeting on June 23, 1972-Ilaldeman's Version
The most common thread that can be found for a starting point is
an alleged concern over national security matters and CIA sources in
the FBI-Watergate investigation. Mr. ITaldeman's version had L.
Patrick Gray conveying to Mr. John Dean Gray's concern over CIA
involvement in the matter and a Gray request for guidance on or about
June 22, 1972. This argument was made despite the personal assurance
of CIA Director Helms to Gray that there was no such involvement.
Purportedly, Gray's request triggered a Haldeman talk with. the
President on the matter in which, in substance, the President ordered
Haldeman to meet with Helms, Walters, and Ehrlichman to find out
(1) whether CIA was involved in Watergate, (2) whether, because of
the participants, the Bay of Pigs was a concern, (3) to express concern
over possible exposure of past CIA or other national security activities
of the ex-CIA people involved and,. finally, to get CIA and FBI
together for an understanding of the situation: Haldeman does not
recall bringing up the Mexican laundering of funds at all, but con-
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16
cedes it could have been mentioned. Thereafter, having received
assurances from Director Helms that, CL! was not involved in Water-
gate and that there were no concerns over exposing the Bay of Pigs
or other covert operations, Walters (not Hehns, CIA Director) pur-
suant to the President's direction to Haldeman was "asked" to see
L. Patrick Gravy. Mr. Haldeman disclaimed any notion of a purpose
to impede the, FBI investigation. Mr. Gray was conspicuous by his
absence at the meeting, having been uninvited, although it would
appear that Mr. (Tray could have added much to the meeting and may
have helped clear the confusion. Walters then met at FI3I Head-
quarters with Grav.
The helms Version
Mr. Richard Helms sees the meeting in a somewhat different light.
Put succinctly, he heard Mr. Haldeman tell. General Walters to go and
see Acting Director Gray of the FBI and talk to him about halting
the FBI investigation in Mexico because it might run into CIA opera-
tions. This occurred after Helms had stated there were no such prob-
lems..Further, stated Mr. Helms, he thought Mr. Haldeman's remarks
about the Bay of Pigs were "incoherent," and assured Mr. Haldeman
there was no worry about the Bay of Pigs. Indeed, on that subject
_Mr. Haldeman told the subcommittee, "* * * I can maybe agree with
Director Helrns' char rcterization of My question as incoherent, because
I didn't understand what the connection was or what the concern
might be, but I raised the question because I was told to." Mr. Helms
saw Haldeman's "request" of Walters to see Gray as an order to stop
the investigation and thought it. went too far. He told Walters prior
to visiting Gray to go only so far as reminding the acting Director
of the understanding between the agencies to avoid running into each
others' operations, and to advise the CIA should lie do so in Mexico.
The F_h.rlich,man Version
Mr. Ehrlichmalr had his own -version of the Time, 23, 20-minute,
meeting. He recalls Mr. Haldeman going through the litany of several
items including whether there was any CIA-Watergate involvements,
as well as any concern over the Bay of Pigs-with Mr. I lelms rejecting
both possibilities out of hand. Ehrlichman agreed that the Mexican
matter was mentioned and gathered that there was some hesitation on
the part. of Walters to give a flat denial of possible problems. This
hesitation, Ehrlichman suggested showed a concern on the part of
Walters and Helms over a possible conflict and, therefore, the request
Irv Haldeman that Walters visit with Gray to clear up the matter of
a. possible conflict with CIA operations in Mexico.
Is General Waiters Saw It
General Walters iu his testimony of May lfi, 1973 and in a memo-
randum for the record dated June 24, 1972 regarding the June 23rd
meeting, described Mr. Haldeman as being rather direct and certain
about calling oft the FBI investigation. General. Walters' reported
version had Haldeman expressing concern over the, Democrats maxi-
inizing Watergate, that the FBI investigation was leading to a lot
of important people and matters could get worse. After being assured
by Director Helms that the CIA was not involved, Mr. Haldeman
stated that the whole thing was getting embarrassing and since the
live suspects had been arrested that was sufficient and there would be
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no advantage to pushing the inquiry-especially in Mexico. Haldeman
then asked General Walters to call upon Gray and suggest that the,
investigation not be pushed further. Mr. Ehrlichman implied it should
be done soon.
The Walters-Gray Meeting on June 23, 1972-General Walters'
Version
General Walters made arrangements to visit Mr. Gray that after-
noon. He told Mr. Gray that lie had been "directed" by top White
House officials (no names mentioned) to tell Mr. Gray that any on-
going investigation of the Mexican aspects of Watergate could jeop-
ardize the agencies covert actions in the area. Walters added that in
view of the five Watergate arrests it would be better to taper the mat-
ter off there.
Actually, the record seems clear that General Walters was truly
conveying the message and giving (Gray the "hard sell" by marking the
gratuitous statement about the at-rest of the Watergate people and
that it was best to taper the, matter off there.
Walters checked later that day at CIA and found there was no
danger to the Mexican sources, but no effort was made to convey this
message to Acting FBI Director Gray, who had ordered any inter-
view of Manuel Ogarrio withheld, "because of the. information re-
ceived on June 23rd in connection with the telephone calls I had to
and from Mr. Dean and the visit from General Walters."
ltr. Gray's Version of the Walters Meeting
Mr. Gray stated he was not told by General Walters that there had
been a meeting with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. Gray
denied that Walters mentioned "senior people at the White House"
as the source of the admonition that "pursuit of the investigation of
Mexican financing would uncover some of the Agency's clandestine
activities." Mr. Gray was vehement in his statement that Walters did
not mention "senior people at the White House." 'The important aspect
of that testimony is that Mr. Gray said he thought Walters was
speaking for the CL1. ("He told m(,, flat out this was the CIA
position * * *.") However, this, leaves unexplained the effect of the
tremendous pressure exerted by Mr. Dean on Mr. Gray to frustrate
the FBI investigation of the matter and Gray's failure to recognize
the White House connection. In his testimony before the subcommittee,
Mr. Gray stated that. he originally discovered there was ~a, White House
meeting as a result of publicity of a congressional hearing which was
reported in the press on May 16, 1973. In his testimony Mr. Gray
raised two basic points that continue to trouble the subcommittee :
"With both helms and Walters present they acquiesce in this move to send
Walters over to give me a message they both know to be false. At least Helms
does, because I talked to him on 6-212-72 and he said no CIA involvement.
"Why, upon his return to CIA and learning that investigation of Mexican
financial affairs (and what affair was it) would not compromise any CIA
clandestine assets did he not inform me? He had just told me that it would
and he did not tell me 'that senior White House people told him to tell me. Now
he finds out that investigation will not compromise (on his return to the Agency
that very afternoon) and he does not tell nme???"
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The Effort To Entrap the CIA
Meanwhile it appears that Mr. Dean was taking an active part in
the parameters of the FBI investigation. After some preliminary
contact with Mr. Gray concerning the conduct of the investigation,
on June 22, 1972, Mr. Dean called Mr. Gray with regard to a possible
CIA money chain involvement, and later to advise Mr. Gray of Gen-
eral Walters' visit on the same day. As will be evident later, Mr. Gray
told the subcommittee that during this period Mr. Dean raised with
him on a regular basis the hatter of whether there were -CIA aspects
in the case and whether in pressing the investigation there may be a
conflict with CIA sources. On Monday, June26, 1972, Mr. Dean called
General Walters to the White House and kept pressing the possibility
of CIA involvement in Watergate-despite Walters protestations to
the contrary. Dean suggested the Agency could be involved without
General Walters knowing it. The following day Dean kept the pres-
sure on Walters by again calling him to his office where Dean made
the astonishing request that CIA provide bail money and salary for
the CIA suspects using covert funds. He also wanted to know whether
there was some other way -CIA could help. Walters told Dean that to
provide bail and pay salaries was "out of the question." but as to other
CLk help. Walters stated lie "could not think of any but would discuss
the matter with the Director and be in touch with [Dean].",Of course,
that request was denied by Mr. Helms and yet the next day, June 28,
Dean had Walters in his office another time making further inquiry
about any CIA involvement in Watergate. In what appears to be an
offer of help, Walters suggested the possibility of Anti Castro Cubans
being involved. The following is from General Walters' Memorandum
for Record dated June 29, 1972:
* * * * * *
"lie (J)ean] then asked if I had any ideas and I said that this affair already
had a strong Cuban flavor and everyone knew the Cubans were conspiratorial
and anxious to know what the policies of both parties would be towards Castro.
They, therefore, had a plausible motive for attempting this amateurish job which
any skilled technician would deplore. This might be costly but it would be
plausible.
"Dean said he aereed that this was the best tack to take but it might cost half
a million dollars. ,He also agreed, (for the second time) that the risks of agency
involvement were unacceptable.
This memo is in share contrast to General Walters' earlier affidavit
and testimony before this subcommittee on May 16, 1973 wherein he
said:
"Tle [Deanl then asked if I had any ideas and I said that I had none which
could be helpful. Perhaps the Cubans who were anti-Castro might have had a
hand in it but the CIA did not."
When asked why that statement was made, General Walters replied :
"lie said to me, "Who could have done this?,How could this have been done?
who would have had an interest in this?' I noticed there was a. large number of
Cubans involved in this situation. I presume the Cubans wanted to know what
the policy of both parties would be, this is why I made it. I don't think there is
any deep significance. He was almost pleadingly asking me for some theory, for
somethin that would help him oat in this."
Dean. also reportedly stated that the problem was how to stop the
FBI i'in'cstigation beyond the fiive suspects.
With this exposure to Dean, General Walters testified it became
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evident that Mr. Dean was "exploring the option" of placing the
blame for Watergate on CIA, and of "covering something up." Said
Walters, "This man [Dean] called me in and tried to get me to accept
blame for my organization, and I refused."
The Acting Director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray, was contacted
by the White House for the first time following Watergate on Time 21,
1972 at 9 :35 a.m. The caller was John Ehrlichman, with the sug-
gestion Gray call John Dean that morning because he, Dean, "was
going to handle [Watergate]." While it is true that the FBI, in its
original. examination of the Watergate break-in considered the possi-
bility of CIA involvement or overtones, that was only one of the
avenues of exploration. Director Richard Helms personally assured
Mr. Gray on June 22, 1972 that CIA was not involved and that the
FBI was not "poking into" a CIA matter. [However, during a conver-
sation on June, 28, 1972, Mr. Helms requested that the FBI "not inter-
view CIA active agents Carl Wagner and John Coswell." Former
Director Helms stated that this was done since they were active CIA
agents and any reports from those sources would be made available
to the FBI through channels.] That evening, June 22, Dean visited
Mr. Gray's office to arrange for White House FBI interviews. Mr.
Gray has no recollection of discussing the CIA at that time, but
concedes it is a possibility. Now began a period of continuous contacts
by Dean with Gray-some twenty-five in this time frame-in which
much was made by Dean of a possible CIA involvement 'and continued
requests by Dean to hold off interviewing 0garrio and Dahlberg re-
garding the money laundering in Mexico. At the same time Mr. Gray
reportedly told Dean how important it was for the FBI to forge on
with an aggressive investigation.
It was during this very period that Dean was also pressing General
Walters in trying to generate a CTA involvement in Watergate when
in fact none existed. As one member of the subcommittee put it during
the hearings, "Mexican assets were not in the cards from the begin-
ning." It is not clear according to our record whether other top White
House aides were aware of Dean's activities, but it is clear that they
were talking to each other during this period, and as Mr. Ehrlichmau
put it "at the, time Mr. Dean certainly spoke for the White
House * * *. He had the apparent authority, so to speak, to under-
take head-to-head contacts of this kind." This was clearly understood
by Messrs. Helms, Walters and Gray.
The FRI Concern
Meanwhile Mr. Gray was concerned over getting on with the. Mexi-
can aspects of the investigation. He called Helms for assurances on
Ogarrio and Helms told Gray that CIA had no interest. But at the
same time Dean continued to press for holding off the Mexican aspect
of the inquiry. Indeed Gray had turned on this aspect of the investiga-
tion on ,Tune 28, 197 2, and shut it off again on June 29 "possibly" on a.
call from Dean. So a veil continued over the entire Mexican connection.
Tt remains a good question why General Walters failed to assure
Mr. Gray of the lack of CIA conflict in the Mexico matter immediately
after it, was so determined on June 23, 1972. General Walters' ex-
planation was that he told Dean in the subsequent three meetings
commencing on June, 26, 1972 that there was absolutely no CIA prob-
lem, and he would think that Dean would pass the word to the FBI.
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To be charitable, the best that can be said for that explanation is that
it, is rather strange. General 1TTalters, by his own admission, was con-
cerned that Dean was attempting to blame CIA for Watergate, and
in that frame of reference. one could hardly expect Dean to be the
vehicle for informing Mr. Gray that there was no CIA-Mexican
connection.
Interestingly, Mr. Helms and Mr. Gray were to have a meeting on
June --~S, 1972 with regard to the Og'arrio-Dahlberg matter and
Elirlicliman in a cryptic phone. call to Mr. Gray ordered the meeting
cancelled without explanations except "there is no reason at all to hold
the meeting.''
Going into early July 1972, the persistent Dean theme to Gray was
to hold off on the interviews with Ogarrio and Dahlberg and the calls
were made in such a way as to constitute harassment, said Gray. Gray
now insisted of CIA that they give him a writing regarding the exist-
ence of a conflict, or he would forge ahead with the investigation of
the entire Mexican connection. As a result, General Walters met with
Mr. Gray on .Tuly 6, 1972 and. a memorandum was delivered to the
FBI stating there was no CIA interest in Ogarrio or Dahlberg. Gen-
eral Walters. with some emotion. told Mr. Grav that he, would not go
along with any writing that. indurated a conflict- and "would resign
before. doing it." In what appeared to be a reference to Dean and other
White House top aides, General Walters said lie "wasn't going to let
those kids kick him around any more." He also suggested that Gray
might. care to call the Pr sident on the entire matter. When Walters
left the order went out to interview Ogarrio and Dahlberg and sub-
sequently the "uncovering of the dollars" took place.
The G'i'ay Call to the President
Following the Walters visit on July 6, 1972, Mr. Cray decided to
call the. Western White House and advise the President of his con-
cerns. He called Mr. Clark MacGregor, and in a return call, informed
Mr. MacGregor of his concern over "confusion which has developed
regarding CIA interests in. or not, in people that the. FBI wishes to
interview." Grav also believes he mentioned to MacGregor that it
"could be wounding" to the President. Gray stated that about thirty
minutes later the President called. The transcript records this event
as follows:
* * * * * *
"Theo at 11:28 a.m., the President called me. I was surprised because I wasn't
expecting any call from the President. But the President first congratulated me
on the successful conclusion of the hijacking the day before in San Francisco,
and asked that I pass his congratulations to the agents in San Francisco, and I
assured him that I would do so, that they would he very, very pleased to know
that the President had called to congratulate them, and I thanked him. Then I
said, 'Mr. President, there is something that I want to speak to you about. Dick
Walters and T'-and I just blur-`ed it right out-I said, `Dick Walters and I feel
that people on your staff are trying to mortally wound you by using the FBI and
the CTA and by confusing the question of CIA interest in or not in people that the
FBI wishes to interview.' I said to him I had just talked to Clark MacGregor,
and had asked him to speak to you about this. There was a slight pause and the
President said. `Pat. you continue to conduct your thorough and aggressive
inv estiga.ti on.' "
fit his testimony before this subcommittee, General Walters reported
that-.Mr. (gray related a stat,rment to the President that "the case could
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not be covered up and lie [Gray] felt the President should get rid of
the people involved." Walters would have the President replying, "I
should get rid of whoever is involved, no matter how high." Mr. Gray
is adament that no such statement was made by himself or in answer
by the President.
So that the record may be complete, it should be stated that Mr. Ehr-
lichman, having been at San Clemente at the time, has some notion of
the conversation as reported to turn by the President. In that regard,
Mr. Ehrlichman testified in part as follows :
* * * * * * *
"During the first week of July, 1972, the President told me Pat Gray told him
on the telephone that General Walters had told Gray there was no CIA objection
to a full FBI investigation of the Mexican aspects of the Watergate case. The
President said he then instructed Gray to conduct a full investigation.
"The President told me then that he still personally believed and feared that
the FBI investigation might harm the Agency.
"Ile said he believed the CIA would be making a mistake if it pretended an
investigation would not disclose some of its current operations. Ile said he hoped
the General and other CIA management were not covering up for their
subordinates."
* * * * * * *
Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony, indicates that the President called
Mr. Gray at the "strong urging" of Mr. MacGregor becantse of Mr.
Gray's concern over the FBI role in the Watergate investigation, and
after the call. the President had a "lingering doubt" that there was
some CIA "exposure" despite assurances to the contrary. Yet, in his
May 22, 1973, public Watergate statement; the President said :
"On July 6, 1972, I telephoned the Acting Director of the FBI, I,. Patrick Gray,
to congratulate him on the successful handling of the hijacking of a Pacific
Southwest Airlines plane the previous day. During the conversation Mr. Gray
discussed with me the progress of the Watergate Investigation * * *."
[Emphasis Added.]
Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony in that regard is pertinent :
* * * * * * *
Mr. NEpzr. But the call was prompted by MacGregor's report?
Mr. EHRLICII.MAN. By MacGregor's conveying a request from Graff to the
President.
Mr. NEnzi. Ora call?
Mr. EBaLICBM,kN. Yes, sir.
Mr. NEpzr. Are you acquainted with the President's statement which was
made on May 22nd?
Mr. EIILICxMAN. I have read it, yes.
Mr. NEpzr. Does his account square completely with your account of that
conversation?
Mr. EBRI.ICHMAN. I don't believe it does.
fir. NEpzr. I didn't think it did. I was just wondering whether you recognized
that fact.
!Air. EHELICUMAN. I do. I think the drafter of that statement did not have the
advantage I had of my verbatim notes of the conversations-I say verbatim-I
take substantially verbatim notes of my conversations with the President.
Mr. NEpzr. The President is rendering the statement?
Mr. ExsLICUMAN. At least nominally so. Although I know the research that
went into it stumbled in a few places.
Mr. NI EDZi. Where else did it stumble?
Mr. EHRLICBMAN. It stumbled at the place where the statement says "Within
a week after the Pentagon Papers leak the special unit was formed at the White
House." That is not accurate. That is a discrepancy as far as I am concerned.
I called it to the attention of Dir. Buzhardt at the White House as soon as I saw
it. He acknowledged it was a discrepancy.
Mr. NEpzr. Has that been publicly acknowledged?
Mr. EHRUICHM AN. I don't believe so. iEmphasis Added.]
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O"W
Aside additional meetings with Walters on July 12 and 28, this
completed, for all intents and purposes, the saga of the CIA-FBI-
Mexican connection with regard to Watergate.
1970 INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE Ov INrELLIGENcE
In addition to the testimony taken in connection with the basic
Watergate-Ellsberg'-CIA matter, the subcommittee in exercising its
oversight responsibilities heard detailed testimony from former White
House Aide Tom Charles Huston in executive session with regard
to the 1970 Ad Hoc White House Interagency Committee Report on
Domestic Intelligence. At the time, the President was reportedly con-
cerned over having a current assessment of the internal security threat
and wanted a recommendation on options to fill the alleged gaps in
intelligence gathering methods to cope with the threat. Apparently,
because the Ad Hoc Committee could not agree, the plan was never
finally implemented. The subcommittee records discloses that the CIA
role in this venture can fairly be described as passive; nevertheless,
that testimony has been taken into consideration in arriving at the
above legislative recommendations.
The investigation has illustrated clearly that during the period
covered by the inquiry there existed in the White House staff a pro
pensity for using the CIA for purposes not intended by the Congress
in enacting the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. While
testimony indicated that in the White House staff organization matters
regarding the CIA were normally handled by Dr. Henry Kissinger,
the White House involvement with the CIA, as dramatically illustrated
by this investigation, was basically through direct CIA contact by
Mr. H. R. Haldeman, Mr. John Ehrliehman, Mr. David Young (of
the Plumbers Group) and Mr. John Dean. While it is understood Dean
was handling the Watergate case, nonetheless, he was exerting c.on-
tinuing personal pressure on the CIA to involve itself in a matter that
was clearly illegal. The "requests" for assistance to Hunt and for the
Ellsberg profiles were no less blatant. It is not only that the deeds
were in fact done, but also the propensity of certain White House
aides to dip directly into the CIA for improper purposes, leaving
in doubt the serious question of whether this was done with
authorization. However, we are convinced that the CIA did not know
of the improper purposes for which the technical materials provided
were to be used and resisted later efforts to involve the Agency.
It is clear, then, that the National Security Act must be strengthened
to assure that the CIA not engage in any activity not included in
Section 100, of the Act, except as is personally approved by the
President.
Mr. Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence,
informed the subcommittee chat there were problems with respect to
tite statutory charge on the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods. Said .Helms :
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MW 23
"* * * I would like, Mr. Chairman, to put a parentheses in here now to say
that as a citizen who is no longer involved in the Agency, I think it would be well
to look at that provision of law as a charge against the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, because he has no investigative power, he has no facilities for looking
into who might have leaked what, and when classified papers disappear, or the
stories appear in the New York Times, or whatever the case may be, all he can
do is wring his hands and check around with other Agencies of the Government
and ask who might have talked to that reporter, and so forth, but he has no way
to really follow up. So he has a charge against him which he has an awful time
trying to fulfill. * * *."
Thus, the language of the sources and methods section of the statute
must be reexamined with a view to making it more workable in fact, if
the language is to remain in the law.
This inquiry revealed some association between former employees
of the CIA and the active organization which went beyond purely
social contact. Both Hunt and McCord testified to using Agency lists
to recruit personnel in addition to contacts heretofore described. The
subcommittee also noted, in an earlier inquiry, publicity about former
Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John A. McCone making contacts
with the CIA on official matters, which is another example of activity
by former CIA members that should be avoided.'This justifiably raises
suspicion and should be eliminated. Statutory language should be
included in the CIA charter to outlaw such contacts except for purely
administrative matters.
The subcommittee is currently committed to conduct hearings on
these legislative proposals and other suggested changes in the overall
foreign role and operations of the CIA at the earliest possible date with
a view to bringing legislation to the floor of the House in the 93rd
Congress.
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